It needs and deserves more than a quick read. — Banno

I promise to read it closely and carefully, and then reread it even more closely and carefully.

Note how the 'thinghood' of 'knife' is being negotiated according to its contextual utility.
It is my assertion that all 'things' are contextually defined and potentially subject to negotiation. You discard naive realism when you realize that. — fresco

I did not see any negotiation going on.

The punk's mental attitude changed when he realized he had picked the wrong people to rob. Sue's attitude changed in that she realized that Dundee could handle himself in the big city.

But the underlying "thinghood" of the knife did not change. It was exactly the same object both when it was hidden and after it was revealed, it did not somehow morph from a small knife to a big knife.

Of course the usage/meaning of words changes with context. Well know example is "John shot some bucks". What exactly went on? Did John go hunting or did John lose some money at Las Vegas? We need context to determine the meaning. But the underlying "reality" (AKA "objective truth", AKA "state of affairs", etc, etc) of what occurred to John did not change.

You miss the point. Thinghood always implies functionality. I'm currently sitting in a room in a friends house and have noticed a small hole in the wall opposite. (Note a hole contains no wall atoms). I immediately begin to speculate on its functionality/thinghood. Would I even notice a similar 'hole' in a lawn ? Indeed, would it 'exist' ?
If you cannot understand that even the 'physicality of atoms' depends on the utility of that concept for humans, we will fail to communicate.

Definitely not speech or writing. Hmmmm...I just can't seem to find a good example that illustrates thought that doesn't involve language. — Merkwurdichliebe

One simple example I gave earlier was a visual artist thinking in terms of shapes, relationships of shapes, etc.

All conceptions stand predicated by means of that to which each shall lie in pertainment; yet therein has dwelt a certain form by which what One is to speak of, remains bound. That which serves as the centrality for what is to designate a particular sentiment, its most necessary tenant, needn't harbor entrenchment in the determinate, beyond that which is ascribed unto itself, by virtue of the tone for which it is to stand without dispensation, to express that of which it remains representative as imbued by certain externalities. What had been regarded as contentious throughout the course unto which we affix our sight coincided with the advent of much force, by which he was found to have drawn toward each, though in time the intensity with which all thereof had come to manifest, grew absent and thus no longer exerted bearing, as consequence.

The lesser breadth in form which your assertion shall entail, insofar as it be deemed as having mere veracity, ought not to be held in sight, in a manner such that it be seen in the eye's of the many as a basis for true representation of the whole which it had been to describe, with much effectuality as was the intent. One can conceive of an instance in which what is to be designated, through usage of a term, as it be given, precede no ascertainment of that to which it refers, in either respect, inasmuch as there be absence of a conceptual scheme which must yield the former, if its utility is to be granted vindication. The modality which accords with the function of all thereof, can be discerned most readily, only through that of the state of which it is reflective, in contrast to that unto which it imparts much fulfillment, and be spoken of as such, prior to the inception of its central form.

All manner of linguistic expression, in its myriad forms, and constituents, which lend themselves to the formation of a cohesive whole, an unity, ought to be understood through their distinct role in particular instances, and the variegated considerations amongst each rather than as sole terms which remain isolated from that to which all are to pertain. The function in which each term serves as it be contingent upon the rest is the most effectual basis for identifying what all are to designate, and convey. Yet the whole is no less pertinent than the sum of its every aspect, nor of lesser meaning as alone all therein must stand destitute of that attribute, though in full there can be no grander form of expression; seldom is it true that much else be comparable. It is nonetheless vital, that those through whom there be made passage of judgement, bear in mind the requisite for mere differentiation, and strive to preserve the inconstancy, within the series of actions which have no semblance to that of the rest, beyond itself, and are thus dissimilar in regard to the same, by means of recognition of such distinctness, hitherto drawn.

One simple example I gave earlier was a visual artist thinking in terms of shapes, relationships of shapes, etc. — Terrapin Station

That's a good point. A musician too, thinking in terms of sounds and rhythms.

Merkwurdichliebe It needs and deserves more than a quick read.


https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/4520/philosophical-investigations-reading-it-together — Banno

Thanks for the link. But I have the book. Can you tell me which §'s you were referring to?

All conceptions stand predicated by means of that to which each shall lie in pertainment; — Vessuvius

You start like that, yet want me to read the rest of it?

Yes, for what sake would my preference be otherwise, if it be the case at all?

Not going to happen.

Alright then, I wish to concede.

It seems to me that our own preferences in regard to manner of speech are nothing short of dissimilar from one another; owing to that in the hope of inciting a fruitful discussion, I shall eschew that toward which I have striven thusly, with respect to the same action for your sake, and mine.

Thought is itself the catalyst for conception. We must have an image, in our minds; something of an intangible yet clear form if we are to conceive of any object. We are reliant upon associations drawn in the past; the sum of all that is experientially grounded, and sought in life, to confer depth unto thought itself. Often the depth of one's thought is in proportion to the depth of one's experience. The act of speech serves as a medium for expression of such thought; what One has known, and what shall be known soon, in potentiality, is expressed by means of that same medium, though can be granted in written form as well. The associations which one has drawn amongst what is known, and what has been inferred, are each the determinants for what One can conceive, and by consequence of that, what One can express.

All conceptions stand tantamount to that with which one has associated, in the past; there is thus a correlation between each, wherein the form of one reflects unto the other; the converse holds true, also. This is to be regarded as evident. Language as akin to all conceptions, has the greatest entrenchment in experience; how it appears, how it is spoken, is determined solely by what the subject has known prior to its inception in usage, and what the subject believes' to be proper in form and conduct in the act through which it is expressed.

The functions of certain terms, as contained within a particular language, manifest through speech, as well as the written form; though are nonetheless determined by their relations to other terms, in a spoken sequence. The order in which each appears, often coincides with much influence, exerted through itself unto both the clarity and meaning, as granted expression by means of such a sequence. The cumulative whole of any spoken sequence of terms is nonetheless bound by other considerations, in the meaning which it expresses, and is thus inconstant, variable even. in the sense that there needn't entail loss in clarity, nor in meaning if either transition to a state distinct from the previous, whilst the other stands destitute; that is, neither attribute is supervenient with respect to the other; a change in the degree of clarity may not in truth entail a change in the form of meaning, as conveyed through some manner of sentiment.

I would hope this to suffice, here.

I would hope this to suffice, here. — Vessuvius

Nope.

Fucking hell, man. This shit sucks, for me. Here.

Much better.

SO what are you wanting to say?

I'd be interested to hear your account of what "much more" you think @Merkwurdichliebe is claiming.

All thoughts are unspoken. — Merkwurdichliebe

What do you think he means by that? In the ordinary sense of course many thoughts are spoken, so surely you can't be taking @Merkwurdichliebe to be making some ridiculous claim denying that?

Let him speak for himself. That is what he said.

Language is formed primarily through associations in the meaning of particular terms, and forms of consideration which have bearing on the sentiment expressed. Yet to inquire as to whether the singular constituents, the terms themselves convey meaning, alone, would preclude much of what is most relevant to the matter itself. Meaning is best discerned, linguistically, through recognition of a particular statement's role, in an instance; a "language-game" as has been termed, since. The reason for which, I believe to owe itself to the ever greater expansion in complexity of the many forms of mere sentiment, that coincide with ever greater depth, in what is expressed, and their relations.

For instance, suppose that one wishes to speak of a fondness for some model of automobile, and convey this sentiment to another in such a manner that it be understood without fault. The other neither can identify the form of such an automobile by association of its assigned name with a specific model, nor deduce it from observance. How can the subject find resolve to the dilemma, if it be bound by each condition? One must describe it, in depth. Therein arises the question of how one ought to describe it. Well, one could say, "it is quite large and bears a distinct insignia atop its front." Yet each modality is pervasive, and indistinct from much else as a great many models' of automobile can rightfully be spoken of as 'large' in proportion as can an equally numerous array be described as distinct in the insignia each is to bear.

What thoughts' have you come to, in relation to this?

Nuh. Seems to me you have much the same issue as Merk. ANd it's too difficult to make sense of your writing. So. Nuh.

What manner of 'issue' is it you believe we harbor? Beyond of course what you had spoken of, thereafter.

(Though I imagine the latter of which would serve to preclude a sense of mutuality, with regard to the same.)

@Janus Let him speak for himself. That is what he said — Banno

I'm sorry, did I miss something?

I'm still waiting for Banno to tell me which passages he is referring me to in 'Philosophical Investigations'. Its really a simple request. I don't know why he's having such a hard time with it. I'm beginning to think he has no idea what he is talking about. Or maybe its just a reflection of his hollowness as a philosopher. :grin:

Of course the usage/meaning of words changes with context. Well know example is "John shot some bucks". What exactly went on? Did John go hunting or did John lose some money at Las Vegas? We need context to determine the meaning. But the underlying "reality" (AKA "objective truth", AKA "state of affairs", etc, etc) of what occurred to John did not change. — EricH

I tend to agree with you. I understand opposing views and would once have argued for them, but now they seem more clever than serious. Anyone who disagrees with you would seem to be telling you that you are getting some state of affairs wrong. A slier opponent might just suggest that his approach is better...for no reason. Or if a reason is given, it's hard to imagine some state of affairs not being invoked. That thinghood == functionality or that it's turtles interpretation all the way down. Typically the superstitious concept (reality, the thing considered apart from its purpose) in employed in the theory that denies it.

To be clear I'm not saying that the atoms of the knife or its measurable qualities are the thing itself. The notion of 'what is the case' is intrinsically murky, 'beneath' our ability to decisively analyze it while making that attempt possible.

I'm still waiting for Banno to tell me which passages he is referring me to in 'Philosophical Investigations'. — Merkwurdichliebe

All of them.

Or maybe its just a reflection of his hollowness as a philosopher. — Merkwurdichliebe

Doubtless.

Yes! — Banno

So you agree? That's refreshing. It seems so simple, and yet the alternative is so tempting. Or it was once long ago. And still is for others. Though perhaps I'm just trying to play the same game in the next Mario world.

I remember those are pearls that were his eyes that the present king of France is bald.

Pretty much the theory critiqued in the first few pages of the Philosophical Investigations. — Banno

I'm still waiting for Banno to tell me which passages he is referring me to in 'Philosophical Investigations'.
— Merkwurdichliebe

All of them. — Banno

Garbage.

T'was brillig.

Really? That's all you can come up with? What a plop.

And the slithy toves

Talking stick. :blush: