And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes
before our mind in an instant, fit a use"?
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word?—
Isn't it something like a picture? Can't it be a picture?
What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to
(reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one
we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to
call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture
forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only
the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution
as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call
a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and-such a picture,
such-and-such an analogy, and so on.
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our
minds when we hear the word and the application still be different.
Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not. — 140
Don't be silly, there's no such distinction. Meaning is use. Using a word is speaking. Understanding the meaning of a word is understanding speaking. Either we choose our words when we speak, we do not, or sometimes we do and sometimes we don't. — Metaphysician Undercover
139...
Suppose I were choosing between the words "imposing", "dignified", "proud", "venerable"; isn't it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? ...because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words; and so on.
...
140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should like to express by saying: I should have thought the picture forced a particular use on me? How could I think that? What did I think? Is there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces a particular application on us; so that my mistake lay in confusing one picture with another?
Meaning is use, and we use words by speaking and writing, and this implies choosing which words will be used. Wittgenstein, is talking about choosing words here. How could you possibly read through 139 and 140 without noticing this? . — Metaphysician Undercover
...he doesn't properly differentiate between "understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking. These two are distinct mental processes, and though he speaks of these activities, he seems to conflate them into one sense of "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover
In your latest post, you demonstrate that Wittgenstein discusses choosing between pictures at §139. That may be, but he does not discuss understanding choosing, which is something that only you have attempted to interject into the discussion. — Luke
If meaning is use, and use is described as choosing words, then understanding meaning requires understanding choosing. That's very simple isn't it? — Metaphysician Undercover
But if you think that understanding the meaning of a spoken word upon hearing it, is something different from the understanding required to choose words to speak, then you'll recognize the distinction which I said Wittgenstein is blurring. — Metaphysician Undercover
What about the fact that you can understand spoken words in a flash, but it takes time to choose the words required to properly express what you want to say? — Metaphysician Undercover
No, it's convoluted. Where is use described as choosing words? I know it's your presumption, but it's not part of the text. — Luke
WIttgenstein doesn't talk in mentalistic terms of choosing words. He says only that use is extended in time. — Luke
Well, he introduces the topic of what it is to "understand a word" at 138, and proceeds to discuss the meaning of words, the use of words, and the choosing of words. Where's the problem? Why do you insist on excluding the bulk of 139 and 140 where he discusses the choosing of words, claiming it's only my presumption? — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose I were choosing between the words “stately”, “dignified”, “proud”, “imposing”; isn’t it as though I were choosing between drawings in a portfolio? — No; the fact that one speaks of the apt word does not show the existence of a Something that... ["a Something that we have in our mind and which is, as it were, the exact picture we want to use here"]
One is inclined, rather, to speak of this picture-like Something because one can find a word apt; because one often chooses between words as between similar but not identical pictures; because pictures are often used instead of words, or to illustrate words, and so on. — PI 139 - Boxed section (a)
Or do you think that he is putting the choosing of words into some category other than meaning and use? How could you think this when he explicitly talks about the picture-like thing in the mind, "forcing" upon us a particular use, when we might actually choose the word to mean something else? — Metaphysician Undercover
We have the three elements right here, clear as day in 140, choice, which leads to use, and therefore meaning — Metaphysician Undercover
His rejection of a mental picture "forcing" a particular meaning/use has nothing to do with choosing words. — Luke
140. Then what sort of mistake did I make; was it what we should
like to express by saying: I should have thought the picture forced a
particular use on me? How could I think that? What did I think? Is
there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture, that forces
a particular application on us; so that my mistake lay in confusing one
picture with another?—For we might also be inclined to express
ourselves like this: we are at most under a psychological, not a logical,
compulsion. And now it looks quite as if we knew of two kinds of
case.
What was the effect of my argument? It called our attention to
(reminded us of) the fact that there are other processes, besides the one
we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to
call "applying the picture of a cube". So our 'belief that the picture
forced a particular application upon us' consisted in the fact that only
the one case and no other occurred to us. "There is another solution
as well" means: there is something else that I am also prepared to call
a "solution"; to which I am prepared to apply such-and-such a picture,
such-and-such an analogy, and so on.
What is essential is to see that the same thing can come before our
minds when we hear the word and the application still be different.
Has it the same meaning both times? I think we shall say not.
The illusion that a picture forces an application on us merely reflects the fact that by habit and training only one application is naturally suggested to us. If, however, the same mental image occurs to us in relation to different applications, we will not claim that the word has the same meaning despite its different applications. Consequently, the meaning of a word is not a picture in the mind, nor any other entity, and grasping the meaning of a word at a stroke does not consist in having such a picture come before one’s mind.
We may say: a blueprint serves as a picture of the object which the workman is to make from it.
And here we might call the way in which the workman turns such a drawing into an artefact "the method of projection". We might now express ourselves thus: the method of projection mediates between the drawing and the object, it reaches from the drawing to the artefact. Here we are comparing the method of projection with projection lines which go from one figure to another. — But if the method of projection is a bridge, it is a bridge which isn't built until the application is made. — This comparison conceals the fact that the picture plus the projection lines leaves open various methods of application...
...what we may call 'picture' is the blueprint plus the method of its application. — Philosophical Grammar (p.213)
I think you could be conflating the use (or speaking) of words with choosing words. — Luke
The use of words that Wittgenstein is talking about in these (and possibly all) sections of the book is a physical expression, not some mental decision making process. — Luke
If I'm mistaken, then you are still welcome to explain where Wittgenstein is talking about choosing words (or understanding choosing) at 140. — Luke
What's at stake is not 'one picture as opposed to a different picture', but different ways to understand the application of a picture. This lines up better with: "there are other processes, besides the one we originally thought of, which we should sometimes be prepared to call “applying the picture of a cube”." In this light, to be held 'captive by a picture' is a shorthand for being captive by one way of applying a picture, and to not recognize the multiplicity of applications of a picture. — StreetlightX
...by Wittgenstein' description, speaking words, and choosing words are one and the same thing... — Metaphysician Undercover
Thanks for clearing that up. Could you now explain your earlier distinction between ""understanding" in the sense of understanding a spoken word, and "understanding" in the sense required to choose a word in speaking"? If speaking and choosing words are one and the same according to Wittgenstein, then why should there be two different types of understanding here? — Luke
This reads nicely with Witty's setting up of the 'two-stages' of meaning in §139, only to then subsequently undo it. Note that he speaks, in §139, of multiple (two) ways of determining meaning: "On the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict?" (my emphasis). In this light, §139 is an attempt to show that there is no two-stage process, but only the one. To conjure up a 'picture of a cube' is to already have an application of it in mind. It may not be the only application there is ("it was also possible for me to use it differently"), but this doesn't imply that there are two stages from meaning to application. Rather, the application is always-already inherent to the meaning. — StreetlightX
Suppose you hear a spoken word, and understanding that word consists of associating it with a picture like thing (I will call it an "idea", perhaps). Now, speaking is using words, what Wittgenstein calls "application". If we simply reverse the process above, and say that choosing the appropriate word for use is simply a matter of applying that idea, to determine the appropriate word, we have the problem brought up at 139. — Metaphysician Undercover
As much as the idea associated with "cube" tends to force a certain use on me, I can still use the word to refer to a prism if I want. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, as Wittgenstein concludes at 140, there must be another process, or other processes involved in choosing which words to use, distinct from the process of associating the word with ideas, which we often assume accounts for the "understanding" of the spoken word. That is why I referred to this other process whereby we choose words to be spoken as a distinct form of "understanding". — Metaphysician Undercover
However, it should not be inferred from this that you can use a word to mean whatever you want. — Luke
Again, understanding a spoken word does not necessarily consist of "associating it with a picture like thing" either, so I dispute your distinction between two types of understanding. — Luke
"The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was possible for me to use it differently."
If it is always possible to use the word differently from what is suggested, then what could restrict the number of different uses which a word could have, and why could you not use a word however you wanted, thereby forcing the pertinent meaning on the word by virtue of that use? — Metaphysician Undercover
This is the weakness of his argument. He starts with a proposition about understanding a word, either hearing or speaking it. This is the proposition of associating the word with a picture-like thing. He criticizes that proposition through reference to the process of speaking words, application. But he provides no evidence that such a criticism would be relevant to understanding in the sense of hearing a word. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is essential now is to see that the same thing may be in our minds when we hear the word and yet the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times? I think we would deny that. — PI 140
It is possible for the meaning/use of the word to be different from what is suggested by the mental picture which is evoked when you hear or say the word. Thus, meaning is not a mental picture. This does not mean that anything goes; there are other constraints. Otherwise, elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance. Understand? — Luke
What we understand is the meaning of the word(s), right? — Luke
If meaning is not a mental picture, then this applies equally to words spoken and words heard. Do you agree that Wittgenstein demonstrates that meaning is not a mental picture? — Luke
What we understand is the meaning of the word(s), right?
— Luke
I would prefer to say that what we understand is the use of the words. Do you agree with this? — Metaphysician Undercover
To understand the meaning of a heard word is to understand its use, i.e. how it was used by the speaker. What Wittgenstein demonstrates is that there are no such constraints on the user of the word (speaker). — Metaphysician Undercover
Meaning is use, and use is not a mental picture, it is an activity. So the fact that meaning is not a mental picture is self-evident from the premise that meaning is use. However, Wittgenstein has provided nothing as of yet, to demonstrate that understanding the meaning of a spoken word (understanding its use), is not a matter of associating the word with a mental picture. He proceeds to demonstrate at 141, how the application of words (use) may be carried out simply as a process, without any mental picture associated with the words, but I think it's questionable whether such use would be intelligible. It may be something like this: "elephant of cheese red line upon whiskey very distance". — Metaphysician Undercover
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