Each is to serve as that of the conception granted by means of the effort expended on behalf of another, from which he remains exempt.

"Jabberwocky"; circa 1871; Lewis Carroll

Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;

"Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe.

“Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun
The frumious Bandersnatch!”

He took his vorpal sword in hand:
Long time the manxome foe he sought—
So rested he by the Tumtum tree,
And stood awhile in thought.

And as in uffish thought he stood,
The Jabberwock, with eyes of flame,
Came whiffling through the tulgey wood,
And burbled as it came!

One, two! One, two! And through and through
The vorpal blade went snicker-snack!
He left it dead, and with its head
He went galumphing back.

“And hast thou slain the Jabberwock?
Come to my arms, my beamish boy!
O frabjous day! Callooh! Callay!”
He chortled in his joy.

’Twas brillig, and the slithy toves
Did gyre and gimble in the wabe;
All mimsy were the borogoves,
And the mome raths outgrabe." -Through The Looking Glass; Lewis Carroll; circa 1871

You are still saying much more than you need to.

For you stands' only what is contrary, in both tone and substance; as I see you have never once sought to offer, here, that which is enough. Little else I can say, with equal clarity, and conviction.

Quoting unrelated fiction...that's what Banno does when he can't keep up and has nothing relevant to add, which is more often than not.

I have yet to encounter reason to suspect otherwise.

If you cannot understand that even the 'physicality of atoms' depends on the utility of that concept for humans, we will fail to communicate. — fresco

The words/language that we use to describe objects - and (however it works) the thoughts underlying them - do indeed depend on the utility of the concepts.

But our thoughts cannot change the underlying physicality of objects or atoms. The moon existed before humanity (and there were no observers), it existed when the early Greeks thought of the moon as the goddess Artemis, it exists today now that people have walked around on it, and it will exist in the future even if humanity self destructs and there are no observers (as we seem to be doing). But none of this changed or will change any of the atoms comprising the moon. The utility of our concepts - or the absence of any concepts - of the moon have had no impact on the physicality of the atoms that comprise the moon.

If this is naive realism, then I'm content with that label. I'll let you have the last word - which I will read. In the meanwhile I think I'll have a cup of water heated to a temperature of 180 degrees Fahrenheit suffused with coffee molecules.

BTW - just on a personal note, I don't know if it was deliberate, but I appreciate that in our exchanges you expressed yourself in plain language.

Surely 'physicality' depends on the physiology of the observer. And 'time' is considered to be a 'psychological concept. So without humans and their psychological needs, what could 'the moon' mean prior to humans ?
Yes, of course we can imagine a pre-human moon in our current mind's eye, in order to explain current human observations....but do you not see the essential role of humanity in all that ?

'Existence' is a human concept, and like all concepts requires context in which it is meaningful. The issue was perhaps highlighted my Niels Bohr's argument with Einstein about the existence of 'electrons'.
Bohr argued that there were no 'things in their own right' we call 'electrons', only consistent human 'interactions' with an aspect of the world it was convenient to explain by the word 'electron'. Einstein, perhaps in line with his role in establishing 'the reality of atoms', disagreed.
A current book by Rovelli (the Order of Time) underscores Bohr's view with the phrase 'things are just repetitive events.
This proposed 'relativity of existence' seems to me to render most philosophical discussion of 'ontology' to be what Wittgenstein called Geschwätz (idle chatter).
Any thoughts ? — fresco

The concept of number is a human concept, but human judgments of number have an objective character in matters of fact. The concept of existence is a human concept, but human judgments of existence -- for instance about what is said to exist and what is said not to exist -- have an objective character in matters of fact.

I'll agree, it seems far too much philosophical "ontology" amounts at best to idle chatter. I often repeat Rorty's slogan: There is no privileged ontology. We can and do construct various ontologies, or recognize various entities and sorts of entities, to suit various discursive purposes. I suppose we may say accordingly that particular judgments of existence vary along with ontological context and discursive purpose. I see no reason not to allow that this variability is a sort of "relativity" of judgments of existence. But this ontological relativity is a matter of conceptual flexibility, and does not support claims against the objective character of judgments of existence.

In the investigation of nature, we refine our terms against the grindstone of experience, and let the world speak for itself with our language.

Note that the word 'fact' comes from the Latin facere-to construct
For me 'facts',are human constructions with a high degree of consensus.
Note that, in the literature, there is at least one paper discussing 'the half life of facts'.

But this ontological relativity is a matter of conceptual flexibility, and does not support claims against the objective character of judgments of existence.

In the investigation of nature, we refine our terms against the grindstone of experience, and let the world speak for itself with our language. — Cabbage Farmer

Well said. I agree.

For me 'facts',are human constructions with a high degree of consensus. — fresco

You can go that way, but it leads to some counterintuitive conclusions. If most of us disagree with you, I suppose you haven't stated a fact.

And maybe it was once a fact that the world was flat or that God created the world in 7 days.

It seems easier to say that people tended to believe X, etc.

I do get it, though. I have played the pragmatist ontological-epistemological edgelord. I still think that I was right in spirit. But there are sore spots in the position. Because you are trying to give us the facts.

The constructivist view of 'facts' is basically an anti 'naive realist' stance, which recognizes that 'facticity' can be negotiated and shifts over time. Facticity is basically about the human preoccupation with prediction and control which are aspects of another psychological construct we call 'time'.
You are correct in saying that this pov makes little difference to everyday transactions, except where 'facticity' is being disputed as in the recent topic of 'fake news'. I don't think logical contradiction' is a valid analysis involved in 'fact about fact'. Like with Wittgenstein's view of Russell's Paradox as 'aberrant language use', I think binary logic with its axioms fixed set membership, has its limits as a semantic tool.

The constructivist view of 'facts' is basically an anti 'naive realist' stance, which recognizes that 'facticity' can be negotiated and shifts over time. — fresco

I hear you. But isn't this view itself presented as a fact? (Or is it only edifying? A cheerleading for open-mindedness?) I've been reading A Thing of This World, which is great. It starts with Kant and moves to Derrida and weaves a narrative that largely focuses on those 'shifts over time.' Nevertheless, it's a theory about the 'filter' that still depends on some sense of reality beneath it all. With Kant we have a static impersonal conceptual scheme. After Kant we get dynamic schemes. Folks try to go beyond dynamic schemes (beyond the scheme/content model), but I'm not so sure that this can be done well.

I suggest that we just look at the structure of communication. The notion of world or 'what is the case' is elusive and yet seemingly always with us. Representational thinking dies hard.

Facticity is basically about the human preoccupation with prediction and control which are aspects of another psychological construct we call 'time'. — fresco

I'm with you on the centrality of prediction, control, and time. I'm mostly relate to what you write. I'm really only arguing with you about a finer point. Our differences seem to be mostly cosmetic.
There's just one issue perhaps at the root of my quibbles.

I'd like to hear what you think of the phenomenon of 'world. '

3. "World" can be understood in another ontical sense—not, however, as those entities which Dasein essentially is not and which can be encountered within-the-world, but rather as the wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'. — link

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heideggerian_terminology

It's this 'wherein' that serves as the 'real' or 'living' thing-in-itself, I suggest. All the confused mind-matter babble is maybe dancing around this 'wherein' that grounds communication in a way that we find hard to specify.

I like naive realism. It gets the human experience right for the most part.

The naïve realist theory may be characterized as the acceptance of the following five beliefs:

There exists a world of material objects
Some statements about these objects can be known to be true through sense-experience
These objects exist not only when they are being perceived but also when they are not perceived. The objects of perception are largely perception-independent.
These objects are also able to retain properties of the types we perceive them as having, even when they are not being perceived. Their properties are perception-independent.
By means of our senses, we perceive the world directly, and pretty much as it is. In the main, our claims to have knowledge of it are justified." — Wiki

It's almost a description of common sense. Other 'isms' add a useful complexity to the model. Heidegger's 'ready-to-hand' versus 'present-at-hand' is brilliant. And we can think of the schemes that divide the world into just this or that system of objects 'preconsciously.' And we can think of those schemes or paradigms as evolving, dying, being born via new dominant metaphors/frames.

But all along we talk about reality, what is the case. We inform and disclose the situation, a situation that is implicitly shared --else who are we talking to about what? What could we have to say to one another and about what if we aren't strangely located in the same place? The world isn't a ball of mud. It isn't even a system of objects. It's 'here' and we are 'in' it together, talking about it. Any system of objects is 'in' this world with us. And, as Heidegger stressed, this 'in' is not a spatial relationship. We are just using a spatial metaphor as we try to express the elusive ground of expression.

Sorry..no time to reply in detail. Read my comment above above about Russell's Paradox for a reply to your 'fact about facts'.
Back later.

↪Janus Let him speak for himself. That is what he said. — Banno

On the one hand stated that all thought is unspoken, while on the other called thinking in musical terms "non-linguistic" thought...

He's said enough.

The World As It Is Of Itself; A Priori
1: All manner of conception which stands contingent upon the whole of the world, and each aspect arising therein needn't cast reflection unto that of the object for which one harbors the privilege to strive to adjoin one's sight unto the former, as it be absent and thus separate from an act of observance. One could speak of the form with which a particular object, if not series thereof is to manifest; yet one would be unwise to eschew abidance by that of the requisite through which there is yielded true apprehension of what is spoken of, as if each were to be greater in substance, than that which serves merely to represent the object held in sight; in contrast to that which is of the truest form, independent of its appearance in our eyes. One ought not to seek dismissal of either, as each bears much pertinence.

The Relation Amongst Thought And Experience
2: Thought is itself the catalyst for conception. We must have an image, in our minds; an intangible yet clear form if we are to conceive of any object. We are reliant upon associations drawn in the past; the sum of all that is experientially grounded, and sought in life, to confer depth unto thought itself. Often the depth of one's thought is in proportion to the depth of one's experience. The act of speech serves as a medium for expression of such thought; what One has known, and what shall be known in potentiality, is expressed by means of that same medium, though can be granted in written form as well. The associations which one has drawn amongst what is known, and what has been inferred, are each the determinants for what One can conceive, and by consequence of that, what One can express.

The Necessary Association Of Subject And Expression
3: All conceptions stand tantamount to that with which one has hitherto associated, there is thus a correlation between each, wherein the form of one reflects unto the other; the converse holds true, also. This is to be regarded as evident. Language as akin to the sum of all linguistic conceptions in a certain domain, has the greatest entrenchment in experience; how it appears, how it is spoken, is determined solely by what the subject has known prior to its inception in usage, and what the subject believes' proper in form and conduct in the course of all modalities, pertaining to expression of itself, as preceded by the action of the subject.

The Functionality Of Terms In Usage And Their Influence Upon The Structure Of Expression In Full
4: The functionality of all terms, as contained within a particular language, manifest by means of speech, as well as the written form; though are nonetheless determined by their relations to other terms, sequentially. The order in which each appears, often coincides with much influence, exerted unto both the clarity and meaning, expressed through the former. The cumulative whole of any sequence of terms whether spoken, or otherwise, is nonetheless bound by other considerations, in the meaning which it expresses, and is thus inconstant. In the sense that there needn't entail loss in clarity, nor in meaning if either transition to a state distinct from the previous, whilst that of the rest lie in destitution; that is, neither attribute is supervenient with respect to the other; a change in the degree of clarity may not in truth entail a change in the form of meaning, as conveyed through some manner of sentiment.

The Indirectness Of The Nature Of Our Apprehension And Its Consequence
5: None can garner apprehension of the form with which an object is to manifest, beyond the farthest reach in the breadth of sight, nor can one make discernment of that of which it alone is constituted. The means through which one can apprehend what rests within the principal domain of one's faculties of perception, never once shall be permitted to exceed that toward which it remains able to venture forth. Whilst one bears the liberty to conceive of such notions, insofar as each be bound by the aforementioned condition, there must prevail the subject; one whose course may facilitate its advent. Yet it need be a matter of truth that in the absence of either, no sense of understanding is to be conferred, as no manner of judgement can be granted passage. In concurrence with the prior attribution, the world and every aspect therein must persist, destitute of all that which seeks to ensure apprehension of itself, for the sake of the subject only through whom can the latter of which be yielded.

For the sake of brevity;
"What is spoken of, to describe an object of the world, is contingent upon, yet independent of that which it serves to represent; the object as it truly is of itself."
"The faculties which permit our own apprehension, and all aspects contained therein constitute matters of the world themselves, and thus their every form, remains determined by the conditions of the world, and all it comprises."
"The World As it appears in our eye's needn't bear semblance to itself, as it is in truth independent of observance; a course from which it can never deviate, merely affirm."
"As consequence of the prior condition, of which I have spoken since, the world as it is neither must conform to our prejudice as a matter of truth, nor be reflected without fault by the forms of apprehension, and sight, through which it is expressed."
"All of that which we apprehend, as objects of the world, can never lie beyond the boundaries of representation for itself, as granted through the mind of the subject and thus, stands only partial; offering sight of the object, yet all the while lessening the clarity of its image."

Sorry..no time to reply in detail. Read my comment above above about Russell's Paradox for a reply to your 'fact about facts'.
Back later. — fresco

Well I do look forward to talking with you. Your posts are fascinating and I even enjoy your arrogance (says one god to another.)

Re: your common sense view, I suggest you consider replacing 'objects existing whether perceived or not' by ' expectation of functional persistence evoked by the abstact persistence of a naming word'.
That 'functionality' can only be related to human needs, including the need to predict, say, animal behavior. Thus Maturana makes the point that ' a predatator stalking its prey' is meaningful for human purposes, but in the animal,world in which 'self awareness' is debateable, there may be no separation of roles, merely the automatic conjoint behavior we might call 'a chasing'. IMO, it is only by thinking about non human (language) species that we can understand the significance of talking about the relativity of 'existence'.

If most of us disagree with you, I suppose you haven't stated a fact. — g0d

Exactly. The construction with a high degree of consensus is actually that "fact" refers to "state of affairs."

No. I am claiming that objection to 'facts about facticity' is a futile issue akin to Russell's Paradox. The level of 'rationality' required to discuss these matters is transcendent of classical logic with its 'law if the excluded middle'. Such rationaliy is well known in QM, which would take us right back to the Bohr reference.
And as Von Glasersfeld implied in his analysis of Maturana, it is 'gut instinct' which tends to point the way towards a contoversial, yet potentially transcendent vantage point. After all, we are attempting to language about languaging !
http://www.oikos.org/vonobserv.htm

Exactly. The construction with a high degree of consensus is actually that "fact" refers to "state of affairs." — Terrapin Station

Yeah, I think we agree here. Our difference might be (correct me if I am wrong) that I don't equate what is this the case with the 'physical.' (I see that the physical is strongly related, but I don't think a satisfying reduction of world to any other concept is possible.)

Re: your common sense view, I suggest you consider replacing 'objects existing whether perceived or not' by ' expectation of functional persistence evoked by the abstact persistence of a naming word'. — fresco

I see why someone might want to do that, but now we just have a new kind of object, a new noun, an 'expectation.' So...objects are expectations. This is idealism, no? I'm not anti-idealism, but I am trying to cut through the confusion.

Note that I also object to some simple reduction of objects to the physical. Like objects are 'really' atoms, etc. We can experience the same object in different modes and thru different theoretical lenses. We can view the object as an expectation, but we already have a pre-theoretical sense of the object that makes that metaphor possible.

Thus Maturana makes the point that ' a predatator stalking its prey' is meaningful for human purposes, but in the animal,world in which 'self awareness' is debateable, there may be no separation of roles, merely the automatic conjoint behavior we might call 'a chasing'. — fresco

I understand this, but in order to make the point you are holding some kind of content fixed and viewing it through different schemes. I agree that 'what is the case' or reality is experienced through the 'lens' of this or that impersonal conceptual scheme. For one conscious entity, reality may be a system of 4 objects. For another conscious entity, a richer system of 4000 objects, not including the original 4.

But we humans seem have some sense of 'what is the case' or 'state of affairs' or 'reality' that makes assertion possible.

The level of 'rationality' required to discuss these matters is transcendent of classical logic with its 'law if the excluded middle'. Such rationaliy is well known in QM, which would take us right back to the Bohr reference. — fresco

I don't think this does away with the difficulty. I admit it doesn't matter much practically. But since I enjoy the challenge of trying to get clear on the issue, I must object to this as handwaving and not proof.

All of that which we apprehend, as objects of the world, can never lie beyond the boundaries of representation for itself, as granted through the mind of the subject and thus, stands only partial; offering sight of the object, yet all the while lessening the clarity of its image." — Vessuvius

Yo, there's got to be a clearer way to say this.

Let me try to translate. We have to fit reality 'into' or 'through' our conceptual scheme. Reality (for us) can only be as 'big' or complex (for us) as this scheme. So maybe reality is more than we know of it. So maybe we only see part of it. And maybe what we do see we don't see in high resolution.

Is that close?

While that's plausible, there are famous problems with 'reality in itself' understood as part of an exact model.

Let's get mundane.

I 'm pretty sure I still have $55 in my wallet, a 50 and a 5 dollar bill. But then I look and there's just a 20.
Most representation is not aimed at some impossible beyond.

It's not the case that 'expectancy' is 'just another noun' because the expectancy associated with using a word like 'tree' can vary according to context across a vast range. Calling a tree 'an object' is merely to acknowledge that we can agree to contextually focus, or narrow down on the range of expectancies. In short, 'expectancy' is the common function associated with all nouns (Russell again...the class of all classes...etc)

'Getting clear about what's being said' may not be feasible from a transcendent pov which attempts to look at 'languaging' as behaviour rather than 'thought'. Such a pov is a bit like swimming without the buoyancy aids of fixed axioms.

Your own iteration of what I had sought to convey at the time of such inception, lies in subsistence, destitute of all manner of fault.

Let's get mundane; you are correct in your assessment, for which I wish to commend you.
Not to grant the implication that the notion of correctness(nor commendation) each are mundane in form. Though in my mind the latter of which ought not to be striven toward for its own sake, much unlike the former.