If we claim that we are made of physical entities, then we ought to explain how these give rise to experiences, and if we can't then there is something missing in the idea that we are made of physical entities, as it isn't an idea that fits the very fact that we experience. — leo
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htmColours, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, times, and so forth, are connected with one another in manifold ways; and with them are associated dispositions of mind, feelings, and volitions. Out of this fabric, that which is relatively more fixed and permanent stands prominently forth, engraves itself on the memory, and expresses itself in language. Relatively greater permanency is exhibited, first, by certain complexes of colours, sounds, pressures, and so forth, functionally connected in time and space, which therefore receive special names, and are called bodies. Absolutely permanent such complexes are not.
...
The apparent permanency of the ego consists chiefly in the single fact of its continuity, in the slowness of its changes. The many thoughts and plans of yesterday that are continued today, and of which our environment in waking hours incessantly reminds us (whence in dreams the ego can be very indistinct, doubled, or entirely wanting), and the little habits that are unconsciously and involuntarily kept up for long periods of time, constitute the groundwork of the ego. There can hardly be greater differences in the egos of different people, than occur in the course of years in one person. When I recall today my early youth, I should take the boy that I then was, with the exception of a few individual features, for a different person, were it not for the existence of the chain of memories. Many an article that I myself penned twenty years ago impresses me now as something quite foreign to myself.
...
Colours, sounds, and the odours of bodies are evanescent. But their tangibility, as a sort of constant nucleus, not readily susceptible of annihilation, remains behind; appearing as the vehicle of the more fugitive properties attached to it. Habit, thus, keeps our thought firmly attached to this central nucleus, even when we have begun to recognise that seeing hearing, smelling, and touching are intimately akin in character. A further consideration is, that owing to the singularly extensive development of mechanical physics a kind of higher reality is ascribed to the spatial and to the temporal than to colours, sounds, and odours; agreeably to which, the temporal and spatial links of colours, sounds, and odours appear to be more real than the colours, sounds and odours themselves.
...
That in this complex of elements, which fundamentally is only one, the boundaries of bodies and of the ego do not admit of being established in a manner definite and sufficient for all cases, has already been remarked. To bring together elements that are most intimately connected with pleasure and pain into one ideal mental-economical unity, the ego; this is a task of the highest importance for the intellect working in the service of the pain-avoiding, pleasure-seeking will. The delimitation of the ego, therefore, is instinctively effected, is rendered familiar, and possibly becomes fixed through heredity. Owing to their high practical importance, not only for the individual, but for the entire species, the composites " ego " and " body " instinctively make good their claims, and assert themselves with elementary force. In special cases, however, in which practical ends are not concerned, but where knowledge is an end in itself, the delimitation in question may prove to be insufficient, obstructive, and untenable.
Similarly, class-consciousness, class-prejudice, the feeling of nationality, and even the narrowest-minded local patriotism may have a high importance, for certain purposes. But such attitudes will not be shared by the broad-minded investigator, at least not in moments of research. All such egoistic views are adequate only for practical purposes. Of course, even the investigator may succumb to habit. Trifling pedantries and nonsensical discussions; the cunning appropriation of others' thoughts, with perfidious silence as to the sources; when the word of recognition must be given, the difficulty of swallowing one's defeat, and the too common eagerness at the same time to set the opponent's achievement in a false light: all this abundantly shows that the scientist and scholar have also the battle of existence to fight, that the ways even of science still lead to the mouth, and that the pure impulse towards knowledge is still an ideal in our present social conditions. — Mach
The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). What was said on p. 21 as to the term " sensation " must be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. The ego is not a definite, unalterable, sharply bounded unity. None of these attributes are important; for all vary even within the sphere of individual life; in fact their alteration is even sought after by the individual. Continuity alone is important. ...But continuity is only a means of preparing and conserving what is contained in the ego. This content, and not the ego, is the principal thing. This content, however, is not confined to the individual. With the exception of some insignificant and valueless personal memories, it remains presented in others even after the death of the individual. — Mach
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htmThe plain man is familiar with blindness and deafness, and knows from his everyday experience that the look of things is influenced by his senses; but it never occurs to him to regard the whole world as the creation of his senses. He would find an idealistic system, or such a monstrosity as solipsism, intolerable in practice.
It may easily become a disturbing element in unprejudiced scientific theorising when a conception which is adapted to a particular and strictly limited purpose is promoted in advance to be the foundation of all investigation. This happens, for example, when all experiences are regarded as " effects " of an external world extending into consciousness. This conception gives us a tangle of metaphysical difficulties which it seems impossible to unravel. But the spectre vanishes at once when we look at the matter as it were in a mathematical light, and make it clear to ourselves that all that is valuable to us is the discovery of functional relations, and that what we want to know is merely the dependence of experiences or one another. It then becomes obvious that the reference to unknown fundamental variables which are not given (things-in-themselves) is purely fictitious and superfluous. But even when we allow this fiction, uneconomical though it be, to stand at first, we can still easily distinguish different classes of the mutual dependence of the elements of " the facts of consciousness "; and this alone is important for us.
...
The biological task of science is to provide the fully developed human individual with as perfect a means of orientating himself as possible. No other scientific ideal can be realised, and any other must be meaningless.
The philosophical point of view of the average man - if that term may be applied to his naive realism - has a claim to the highest consideration. It has arisen in the process of immeasurable time without the intentional assistance of man. It is a product of nature, and is preserved by nature. Everything that philosophy has accomplished - though we may admit the biological justification of every advance, nay, of every error - is, as compared with it, but an insignificant and ephemeral product of art. The fact is, every thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon his one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity, immediately returns to the general point of view of mankind. Professor X., who theoretically believes himself to be a solipsist, is certainly not one in practice when he has to thank a Minister of State for a decoration conferred upon him, or when he lectures to an audience. The Pyrrhonist who is cudgelled in Moliere's Le Mariage force, does not go on saying " Il me semble que vous me battez," but takes his beating as really received.
Nor is it the purpose of these " introductory remarks " to discredit the standpoint of the plain man. The task which we have set ourselves is simply to show why and for what purpose we hold that standpoint during most of our lives, and why and for what purpose we are provisionally obliged to abandon it. No point of view has absolute, permanent validity. Each has importance only for some given end. ... — Mach
The primary fact is not the ego, but the elements (sensations). What was said on p. 21 as to the term " sensation " must be borne in mind. The elements constitute the I. s have the sensation green, signifies that the element green occurs in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories). When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then the elements no longer occur in the ordinary, familiar association. That is all. Only an ideal mental-economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist. ,,]all that is valuable to us is the discovery of functional relations, and that what we want to know is merely the dependence of experiences or one another. — Mach
The philosophical point of view of the average man - if that term may be applied to his naive realism - has a claim to the highest consideration. It has arisen in the process of immeasurable time without the intentional assistance of man. ...The fact is, every thinker, every philosopher, the moment he is forced to abandon his one-sided intellectual occupation by practical necessity, immediately returns to the general point of view of mankind. — Mach
Still another important event the work [Thought and Reality] of African Spir. ...This work clarified my ideas on the meaning of life remarkably, and in some ways strengthened them. The essence of Spir's doctrine is that things do not exist, but only our impressions which appear to us in our conception as objects. Conception (Vorstellung) has the quality of believing in the existence of objects. This comes from the fact that the quality of thinking consists in attributing an objectivity to impressions, a substance, and a projecting of them into space. — Tolstoy
I largely agree. If we take 'mind-independent' in a sharp, metaphysical sense. But I think the opposite position fails for the same reason. What is the 'mind' but experience of the 'world' or 'non-mind'? — g0d
If 'mind-independent reality' is a contradiction, then that only matters if it's a contradiction for us. What is it that is 'for us' and 'not just me' that grounds intelligible conversation? You and I have to share a language and a sense of logic to even discuss the issue. So being in language together is (I argue) being in a 'world' together. — g0d
In the quote above, you open with There are. What is in this 'are'? 'Reality is socially constructed' seems to want to tell me about reality, about 'real' reality. — g0d
But the mind-independent framework has a lot of intractable and unsettling problems. In that framework we cannot explain how we can experience anything. We never see things as they are. Free will is very limited or inexistent. Why do these things bother us so much? Maybe because they are not an accurate representation of existence. These problems go away if we stop assuming a mind-independent reality. — leo
The problems as I see them are largely about awkward language. I don't think we can solve them. — g0d
We never see things as they are. Free will is very limited or inexistent. — leo
And I talk of "we" because we have a common ground, our realities partially intersect. — leo
In my view, in the temporary intersection of our realities we find regularities, which we summarize in what we call scientific laws, and we make predictions from them, from which we create technology, which is a way to shape our shared reality. In that view scientific laws would not have a universal everlasting validity, they would apply to a temporarily shared reality, and they would be wrong or meaningless to someone who doesn't share that reality. — leo
People mostly use language in a context where they presuppose an external reality, so the words they use refer to things that are part of an external reality, but I am not referring to an external reality myself. — leo
Notice the reference to 'ideal mental-economical unity' (whatever that means) — Wayfarer
Mach was a rank materialist, — Wayfarer
According to traditional philosophy, ideas and sensations belong to completely different ontological levels, namely that of form and matter, respectively. Logic consists, not of the relationship of experiences, but of ideas (including number and arithmetical proofs etc.) These are not 'experiences' and nobody 'experiences' them. — Wayfarer
Nonsense on stilts, empiricism run amuck. — Wayfarer
you will appreciate the delightfully-named Afrikan Spir. — Wayfarer
In his Journal (2 May 1896) Tolstoy wrote: "Still another important event the work [Thought and Reality] of African Spir. I just read through what I wrote in the beginning of this notebook. At bottom, it is nothing else than a short summary of all of Spir's philosophy which I not only had not read at that time, but about which I had not the slightest idea. This work clarified my ideas on the meaning of life remarkably, and in some ways strengthened them. The essence of his doctrine is that things do not exist, but only our impressions which appear to us in our conception as objects. Conception (Vorstellung) has the quality of believing in the existence of objects. This comes from the fact that the quality of thinking consists in attributing an objectivity to impressions, a substance, and a projecting of them into space". — wiki
We are both (partially) 'here' ---wherever or whatever 'here' is. — g0d
But even philosophers appeal to 'world' as I intend it. 'World' is what our philosophical theses describe. 'There is no single reality' is aimed at some kind of a single reality, since otherwise it would have no use. We who speak only have reason to talk and listen inasmuch as we are in a single reality/world which we can inform one another about. — g0d
Mach was a rank materialist,
— Wayfarer
I can't make sense of this claim — g0d
agree, but this idea/sensation distinction is one of those useful abstractions. We live in a world of apples and tornadoes. It's hard to for us to dry out out concepts. When we do we are left with math or symbolic logic. I think Kant was basically right on math. It's based on a shared intuition of space. — g0d
If there are only minds, then there is no mind-independent 'here' or 'world' that our minds are in. — leo
What use is it to talk of a single reality if we can say nothing at all about it? Just like it is seen as meaningless to talk about what's outside the universe, in the view here it is meaningless to talk about a single reality. — leo
The ability to grasp and form concepts is basic to language and reason. — Wayfarer
So what I'm questioning is the idea that everything amounts to a form of 'experience' - logic and reason don't arise from experience, but are an innate capacity. But, 'innate capacities' are generally verboten to empiricists with their dogma of the 'blank slate' onto which everything is 'inscribed by experience'. — Wayfarer
my view is that at the point humans are able to use language and reason, they transcend the biological and our capacities are no longer explicable in purely biological terms. — Wayfarer
In this investigation we must not allow ourselves to be impeded by such abridgments and delimitations as body, ego, matter, spirit, etc., which have been formed for special, practical purposes and with wholly provisional and limited ends in view. On the contrary, the fittest forms of thought must be created in and by that research itself, just as is done in every special science. In place of the traditional, instinctive ways of thought, a freer, fresher view, conforming to developed experience, and reaching out beyond the requirements of practical life, must be substituted throughout. — Mach
I think it's our recent habit of using science as the one and only tool for examining the world. ... Other perspectives than the scientific one can also have merit. — Pattern-chaser
Hi. I agree that other perspectives have merit. I'm not so sure that humans have ever used it as their one and only tool or that they ever could. — g0d
I personally think we can't just ignore biology though — g0d
Scientific thought arises out of popular thought, and so completes the continuous series of biological development that begins with the first simple manifestations of life.…. Indeed, the formation of scientific hypotheses is merely a further degree of development of instinctive and primitive thought, and all the transitions between them can be demonstrated.
Dennett does not believe in reason. He will be outraged to hear this, since he regards himself as a giant of rationalism. But the reason he imputes to the human creatures depicted in his book is merely a creaturely reason. Dennett's natural history does not deny reason, it animalizes reason. It portrays reason in service to natural selection, and as a product of natural selection. But if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection? The power of reason is owed to the independence of reason, and to nothing else. (In this respect, rationalism is closer to mysticism than it is to materialism.) Evolutionary biology cannot invoke the power of reason even as it destroys it.
You may have already looked at this, but in case not:
https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/mach.htm — g0d
And this dude resisted the theory of the atom. That's how skeptical he was. Was his passion for understanding not spiritual somehow? — g0d
But what can it mean for you to say what you said above? About what is it true? — g0d
Is it meaningless for us to talk about a single reality? Or just for you? For me there's a performative contradiction in arguing against a single reality. Or rather the good arguments against a single reality are well aimed at bad conceptualizations of the single reality. — g0d
The single reality I have in mind is manifest in the very structure of our communication, the same communication we use to give artificial names to it like the 'physical.' — g0d
It seems to me that as soon as there is subjectivity in our experiences, we can't reconcile that perfectly with a single objective reality. — leo
Today many people agree on the idea of a single physical reality, but they can't explain how is it that they can experience anything at all in such a reality. At that point there is only faith holding that single reality together. Minds believing in it. — leo
Now you can see that modern science in a sense is striving for that ‘common world’ also, which is the world of primary objects and forces that can be shown to be ‘the same for all observers’. This notion is elaborated in great detail on Thomas Nagel’s important book, The View from Nowhere (review here.) Again, the particular contribution of modern scientific method was to bracket out the individual, the subjective, by discerning what could be quantified and validated by all observers. Or that was the theory. But as Nagel says, ‘Among philosophers of mind, the prevalent form of objective blindness is a cult of the method of the physical sciences, which leads in extreme cases to the outright denial of subjectivity. — Wayfarer
This is strongly connected to the original post. The faith you speak of, is the faith that reality is physical and objective, or in any case, is amenable to discovery by the sciences. — Wayfarer
I think the solution lies in the direction of ‘transcending subjectivity’ i.e. transcending the sense of self-hood, but not on the basis of according sole reality to the so-called ‘objective domain’. That’s the sense in which it is basically a spiritual quest. — Wayfarer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.