YOu seem to want an ethical theory that will give you political power. That's not what ethics does. — Banno
I don't see her offering a moral outlook or ethical theory. — frank
You said that if a person doesn't conform to our moral standards, it says something about them. Among other things it may tell us that a certain person is from a different culture. True? — frank
For Rawls setting up a just society involved setting the rules up before one knows what role one will play in that society. — Banno
The capabilities approach seeks to leave this behind and instead to promote the potential of each individual. — Banno
When referring to "representation" in my previous comment, I was thinking there is a continual criticism of the "original" deal because that articulation concealed those who were being spoken for without their participation. — Valentinus
On the other hand, it is interesting how dependent those forces are upon our simple compliance with particular requirements. — Valentinus
Having children is not only replicating the conditions that will cause them to suffer. It is not all just about receiving or not receiving an inheritance. If you want your kids to be smarter than you are, that can be arranged. If you want them to be stupid, that can be done.
Generations of choice. — Valentinus
You seem to be saying that all attempts to limit authority as a means to predetermine conditions for subsequent generations is a loser's game. — Valentinus
But no generation is interested in giving the one before them the last word.
Let's say, for the sake of argument, you are correct. The next generation could not care less about that judgement.
That is why the problem is like Job's. — Valentinus
Does it not fall into the same/equivalent problem of deciding criteria of individuality? On the face of it, it would lead to a hard line against abortion... — unenlightened
This emphasis leads the CA (Capabilities Approach) to take issue with Kantian ideas in two ways. First, whereas Kant conceives of our human dignity as residing entirely in rationality, the CA understands the basis of human dignity far more inclusively: human dignity inheres in sentience, emotion, affection, physical health, and appetite as well as in rationality. Thus it can see human beings with severe cognitive disabilities as full equals in human dignity, and damages to any of these elements as assaults on human dignity. It also recognizes that dignity is not the private possession of the human species alone: each animal species possesses a type of dignity. (As in the human case, this dignity inheres in the entire organized set of its characteristic capacities, whatever they are in each case, and not in any putative set of “higher powers”.) Second, whereas Kant imagines dignity as like a diamond, impervious to the blows and shocks of natural accident, the CA imagines it as vulnerable, capable of suffering assaults from the world of nature. When such assaults occur, dignity is not removed, but it is profoundly harmed (just as we would say that a rape does not remove a woman’s dignity, but does profoundly harm or violate it). From the perspective of the CA, then, deprivations of health opportunities or opportunities for emotional well-being are just as pertinent to the concept of human dignity as deprivations of liberty of choice.
From the perspective of the CA, then, deprivations of health opportunities or opportunities for emotional well-being are just as pertinent to the concept of human dignity as deprivations of liberty of choice. — Banno
Well, at the very least, do you accept that "people" are not accepting the role you describe because it sickens them?
If there is nothing in the package but what you describe, I would kill myself. — Valentinus
Does it not fall into the same/equivalent problem of deciding criteria of individuality? On the face of it, it would lead to a hard line against abortion... — unenlightened
If opportunities are not guarantees, then where does that leave the CA? There is no clear path to any endeavor labeled "well-being", if that can even be so defined arbitrarily. — schopenhauer1
The idea is that a minimally just society is one that secures to all citizens a threshold level of a list of key entitlements, on the grounds that such entitlements are requisite of a life worthy of human dignity. (There is also an account of the entitlements of other animal species, and here reference is made to the dignity appropriate to the species in question.) The notion of dignity is an intuitive notion that is by no means utterly clear. If it is used in isolation, as if it is utterly self-evident, it can be used capriciously and inconsistently.
A life with human dignity requires protection of all the Central Capabilities up to a minimum threshold level: but all are conceived as opportunities for choice, and thus none has been secured unless the person has the opportunity to exercise choice in matters of actual functioning.
Should it read "Opportunities are not guaranteed"? If so, then we ought do what we can. — Banno
There's something amiss with ethical theories that set out an algorithm for evaluating actions - as the greatest happiness, or to do one's duty. Pretending that the complexity of human life can be so reduced... It's more complex than that. — Banno
And, continuing the line I introduced earlier, given that you think the sum of the value of human life is negative, you are not going to agree with this approach anyway. — Banno
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