I don’t believe that she’s married to someone else, I believe that she’s married to a postman. — Michael

That's an oversimplification of what you believe. An accounting malpractice. It is the malpractice that is the problem here.

You do not believe just that she's married to a postman. Rather, you believe - in strict accordance to the argument you've offered - that the postman she is married to is you. Moreover, you believe that the reason she's married to a postman is because she is married to you and you are a postman.

I believe that you will punch me because I believe that you know that I slept with your wife. — Michael

The above is a good account. The below is inadequate.

My belief that you will punch me... — Michael

That's an oversimplification of what you believe. An accounting malpractice. It is the malpractice that is the problem here.

You do not believe just that she's married to a postman. Rather, you believe - in strict accordance to the argument you've offered - that the postman she is married to is you. Moreover, you believe that the reason she's married to a postman is because she is married to you and you are a postman. — creativesoul

I believe that you will punch me because I believe that you know that I slept with your wife.
— Michael

The above is a good account. The below is inadequate.

My belief that you will punch me...
— Michael — creativesoul

Beliefs aren't just some single monolithic thing that contain all the various avenues of reasoning such that if any one part is false then everything we believe is false. It's a network of different beliefs, with possibly some true and possibly some false. If I believe that murder is wrong because I believe in divine command theory and that God has prohibited murder than my belief that murder is wrong is true even if it turns out that God doesn't exist. If I believe that my friend is moving to London because I believe that she has found a job at law firm there then my belief that my friend is moving to London is true even if it turns out that her new job is at a marketing firm.

Beliefs aren't just some single monolithic thing... — Michael

Exactly! Propositions are. Some belief cannot be adequately accounted for and/or represented by a single proposition. That is precisely the point I'm making. Gettier examples are nothing more than cases of accounting malpractice. A basic conflation of proposition and belief.

If I believe that my friend is moving to London because I believe that she has found a job at law firm there then my belief that my friend is moving to London is true even if it turns out that her new job is at a marketing firm. — Michael

If you believe that your friend is moving to London because she has a job at a law firm, then the proposition "my friend is moving to London" does not take proper account of your belief.

A basic conflation of proposition and belief. — creativesoul

Beliefs have propositional content. I believe that [some proposition] (is true).

See the SEP article on belief:

Philosophers generally say that the belief that P has the (propositional) content P

I'm aware of the convention Michael.

If you believe that your friend is moving to London because she has a job at a law firm, then the proposition "my friend is moving to London" does not take proper account of your belief. — creativesoul

Yes it does. It just doesn’t account for all my beliefs. I might have lots of beliefs related to the issue. She’s moving to London because she has a new job at a law firm after passing an interview she went to on Thursday, and her motive for doing so is to earn more money and distance herself from an abusive ex-boyfriend.

It’s just wrong to say that this is a single belief which is false if any one part of it is false and that I can’t just say that I believe she’s moving to London - and be right, even if I’m wrong about some other details.

If you believe that your friend is moving to London because she has a job at a law firm, then the proposition "my friend is moving to London" does not take proper account of your belief.
— creativesoul

Yes it does. — Michael

No, it does not.

"My friend is moving to London because she got a new job at a law firm." is not equivalent to "My friend is moving to London."

I might have lots of beliefs related to the issue. She’s moving to London because she has a new job at a law firm after passing an interview she went to on Thursday, and her motive from doing so is to earn more money and distance herself from an abusive ex-boyfriend.

It’s just wrong to say that this is a single belief — Michael

I did not say such a thing about all that.

"My friend is moving to London because she got a new job at a law firm." is not equivalent to "My friend is moving to London." — creativesoul

I didn't say they mean the same thing. I'm saying that if you believe that X because Y then you (also) believe X (and believe Y).

Look into epistemic closure.

"My friend is moving to London because she got a new job at a law firm." is not equivalent to "My friend is moving to London."
— creativesoul

I didn't say they mean the same thing. — Michael

Then the latter cannot be substituted for the former. We're assessing the former, not the latter.

I'm saying that if you believe that X because Y then you (also) believe X (and believe Y). — Michael

I'm saying that there are some beliefs which are more complex than a single proposition can represent, with this being one example thereof. All Gettier examples are as well. Such complex belief are understood and thus represented in their entirety... and only in their entirety.

If you believe your friend is moving to London because she got a new job at a law firm, then that is the belief. Nothing less is adequate.

Smith does not believe that his wife is married to someone else.

We're looking at Smith's belief.

Smith believes that he is the only one married to his wife. — creativesoul

This, and the OP itself, is exactly the point I made in another thread a couple weeks ago:

Applying this idea of familiarity to a famous Gettier example which is supposed to be an issue for JBT: say I see what i believe is a sheep in a field and form a consequent extended belief "there is a sheep in that field". But the sheep turns out to be a cardboard cutout, so my belief is mistaken; there is no sheep in that field. According to JBT then my belief does not count as knowledge because it is not a true belief.

But then say there is another hidden sheep in the field; does my belief that there is a sheep in that field then count as knowledge? It is justified by seeing the cardboard cutout, and it is true because there is a sheep in the field, so perhaps I do know there is a sheep in that field.

No, I do not know there is a sheep in that field. I think the answer to such puzzles is pretty simple and obvious; I am only justified in believing that the cutout is a sheep on account of perceiving what I understandably (if it is a very convincing cutout) take to be a sheep. Regardless of whether this is mistaken, seeing the cutout cannot serve as a justification for believing there are any other unseen sheep in the field, it can only serve as justification for mistakenly believing that the cutout is a sheep.

This is all becoming more and more ridiculous if you ask me.

Who on earth could sit and say - with a straight face - that Smith believed Brown was in Barcelona or anyone other than he was going to get the job?

We must dispense with any 'logic' that leads to concluding otherwise.

Yes, I agree that the Gettier "problems" are "ridiculous" because they deal with beliefs in a confusingly abstract "de-natured" kind of way. I find it incredible that so many apparently intelligent philosophers have been hoodwinked or even troubled by such supposed objections to JTB for so long.

Smith believes that the man with ten coins in his pocket will get the job because Smith believes that he has ten coins in his pocket and Smith is referring to himself. Smith picks himself out to the exclusion of all others.

Some would have us believe that Smith was referring to the other guy?

No.

Hell no!

When reporting upon Smith's belief we ought at least keep that in mind. It is supposed to be Smith's belief. It is Smith doing the thinking. Gettier is reporting upon it. With that in mind...

If Smith carried ten coins and thought "the guy with ten coins in his pocket is going to get the job" he was thinking about himself.

Our account of Smith's belief(any and all such accounts), if it is to be called a good practice, it ought use "the guy" only in reference to Smith, because that's how Smith used it, that's what Smith's belief means, and we're supposed to be reporting upon Smith's belief.

There's an oddity on another level.

Speaking of belief having propositional content...

On the one hand(Case II), Gettier wants us to join two propositions that - quite simply - do not belong together in the category of Smith's belief, and yet on the other(Case I), he separates two propositions that are inseparable(meaningfully irreducible) without losing crucial semantic content of Smith's thought/belief. That would be to report upon something other than Smith's belief.

Ridiculous indeed!

You're attempting to dismiss, discard, and/or discount truth. That will not go unchallenged.
— creativesoul
Nope, I am not.
— Coben

This coming from one who said "Truth is for the Pope"...

Yes, you are. — creativesoul

So you opted to ignore the bulk of my post. Comforting and facile; I suppose, for you.

So you opted to ignore the bulk of my post. — Coben

Stop writing shit that you don't really mean...

I am looking at the specific model or definition of knowledge, JTB, and given the way it is used being critical of using the two adjectives justified and true. It is in that specfiic context, the way justification is used in contexts with JTB, that I think using true is problematic. There are other contexts where I have no problem with true and truth. — Coben

What's wrong with discussing justified true belief?

What's wrong with discussing justified true belief? — creativesoul

There's nothing wrong with discussing jtb. I am discussing jtb. My problem with jtb I explained
in an earlier post.
If we look at a statement/conclusion/belief we can check to see if it is justified. This would include things like does it fit obervations/experience, is there counterevidence, how has the evidence been gathered (like, say, is there a good sample, was it controlled conditions, if the justications is scientific), are the conclusions arrived at logically, are there other beliefs that better fit the evidence.....

You don't then go and check the truth. Whatever one would do in checking the truth of a statement is already there in the justification. That's how we decide if things are true. In science, for example, we do not decide something is justified and then check to see if it is true. There should not be two adjectives. If it was false, then it would not be well justified.

In the context of discussions of knowledge based on justification, it is silly to add in as a criterion true, especially for empiricists.

True is a perfectly good adjective, but in jtb it is redundant. I use true and truth in other contexts, but to add it to JB is like being the Pope. Beyond all that nice justification I also know directly that it is true. But the reason one would know is in the justification. It's like a weird claim that one can separately judge truth and justification.

True is a perfectly good adjective, but in jtb it is redundant. I use true and truth in other contexts... — Coben

Such as?

Such as? — creativesoul

I think the statement I exist is true. Even if I could not convince others it is the case. To me knowledge formulations like jtb are about communal beliefs, which ones we all have good reasons to believe in. One example of where I might use true includes things wehre I realize others, lackign my experiences, lack the same justificaiton I have. Despite that; I believe certain things are true. That I saw a mountain lion in the US where there are not supposed to be any - and a number of other explanations were put forward for what I 'really' saw. I have sympathy for what they want to consider knowledge. But I still hold it to be true that at least one mountain lion was where I saw it. If it had flashed past in the shadows, ok, perhaps I made an image more than saw that animal. But I had time. I know my own ability to doubt my perceptions, how and when I can jump to conclusions, my own lack of interest or need to have seen the animal and so on. I know - not to absolute certainty - but I know it is true. I saw one, despite what the relevent biologists would say about one being there. Despite my own use of true in this case, I do understand why they don't just take my word for it. Of course in other situations I consider some things true where it is also considered knowledge. In fact knowledge for me is a set of things we consider true. However if I am describing knowledge I will only describe it as the best justified belief. Because now we are getting into the process of deciding. We are into nuts and bolts. And the nuts and bolts we have access to are justification. We do not have some separate other access to truth....

1.1 The Truth Condition
Most epistemologists have found it overwhelmingly plausible that what is false cannot be known. For example, Hillary Clinton did not win the 2016 US Presidential election. Consequently, nobody knows that Hillary Clinton won the election. One can only know things that are true.

Sometimes when people are very confident of something that turns out to be wrong, we use the word “knows” to describe their situation. Many people expected Clinton to win the election. Speaking loosely, one might even say that many people “knew” that Clinton would win the election—until she lost. Hazlett (2010) argues on the basis of data like this that “knows” is not a factive verb.[2] Hazlett’s diagnosis is deeply controversial; most epistemologists will treat sentences like “I knew that Clinton was going to win” as a kind of exaggeration—as not literally true.

Something’s truth does not require that anyone can know or prove that it is true. Not all truths are established truths. If you flip a coin and never check how it landed, it may be true that it landed heads, even if nobody has any way to tell. Truth is a metaphysical, as opposed to epistemological, notion: truth is a matter of how things are, not how they can be shown to be. So when we say that only true things can be known, we’re not (yet) saying anything about how anyone can access the truth. As we’ll see, the other conditions have important roles to play here. Knowledge is a kind of relationship with the truth—to know something is to have a certain kind of access to a fact.[3] — Stanford Philosophy Encyc

Note the part I bolded above.

There should not be two adjectives. If it was false, then it would not be well justified. — Coben

I don't think this is right; there may be justified false beliefs, as in the example of the cardboard cutout sheep in a paddock I referred to a couple of posts ago. From where it is viewed it is indistinguishable from a real sheep, so I have no reason to believe it is not a real sheep, at least on immediate viewing. Say I am going by at high speed and only catch a glimpse of the cutout for a couple of moments, then I will not have time to notice that it is not moving; something which, if noticed, would be good reason to doubt it is a real sheep.

Another example: the ancient's belief that the Earth is flat could be counted as a justified false belief. There would be countless examples of justified false belief.

seems quite confused...

If we were to clean up JTB by virtue of dropping one of the three... it would have to be the justification aspect, as traditionally held. One need not argue for a belief in order for it to be true. Traditional JTB cannot admit of prelinguistic thought/belief, let alone pre-linguistic true belief, or pre-linguistic well-grounded true belief(knowledge). And yet, it is quite clear that many creatures can learn that fire hurts when touched, despite not being able to tell anyone about the causal connections they've drawn between the behaviour and the pain.

We do not have some separate other access to truth.... — Coben

I don't understand this at all. What in the world does "access to truth" mean?

We can look to see if a cup is on the table. That's access enough, right?

True is a perfectly good adjective, but in jtb it is redundant. — Coben

And yet there are justified false beliefs. Paradigm shift happens by virtue of peeling them away from conventional certainty. Copernican revolution. Einstein's On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies and General Relativity are exactly such cases which show that what were justified beliefs held to be true were not true, but were justified nonetheless.

That's right! When new facts emerge or new observations are made what was a justified false belief may no longer be justified, and if held onto, will become simply a false belief. :yikes: :fear: :cry:

Paradigm shift happens — creativesoul

This could easily be misread as "paradigm shit happens"... :lol:

If the critique I've put forth here holds good, then Gettier poses no problem for JTB, even as it is currently understood with belief having propositional content and justification requiring being able to give one's ground for arriving at the belief. Rather, he showed that there is an accounting malpractice of reporting upon Smith's belief at hand.

You're being unusually conducive here. Something wrong?

:joke:

One need not argue for a belief in order for it to be true. — creativesoul

Yes, the "justified" would seem to be relevant only to the context in which justification can be given, which would obviously not be the context of pre-linguistic believing. In that latter context not only can a justification for what is believed not be given, the believing cannot even be stated as a definite belief.

Obviously I agree since I presented pretty much the same critique in the other thread (copied and pasted here in my first comment in this thread).

You're being unusually conducive here. Something wrong? — creativesoul

It may not always or even often happen that we agree, but does it follow that when we do there must be something wrong? :joke: