The notion of truth can arise irrespective of whether the subject and all faculties contained therewith are in absence...... — Vessuvius

I understand this as an attempt to report that the conditions for an analytic proposition, tautological expressions in general the contradictions of which are impossible, are antecedent to the conceptions contained in the subject and predicate of such proposition, expressions. While it may be given that the conditions pre-exist the conceptions, no synthesis of the condition with the conception, such that the notion of truth should arise from it, is at all possible absent a rational entity in possession of a natural ability to so synthesize.

...........as a matter of truth within its own intrinsic form — Vessuvius

Wherein lays a differentiation between our arguments: truth as humans understand it, does not have its own intrinsic form, but rather, rationality constructs a form a priori within which the possible notion of truth resides necessarily, re: a logical syllogism, or merely a subject/predicate statement.

with regard to all forms of tautology for which the truth of each, as conferred implicitly unto itself by means of its own content as intrinsic in nature, determine that the former must be transcendental amongst the object of which it stands reflective in appearance. — Vessuvius

OK, but this suggests a kind of truth different than the kind of truth understood as such by humans, which are to be considered herein the “object(s) of which it stands reflective”. At any rate, “implicit unto itself” would seem more transcendent than transcendental. Not to say such is impossible, but I submit such at least makes little sense, hence is of precious little use, and at most is utterly beyond the scope of human knowledge.
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By what means, in your belief, could there be amended the prior, in full, and permit it to be reconciled with, in the account, without as consequence deferring to the former to ensure preservation of constancy in form and deter the encroachment of fault in that upon which it need be reflective? — Vessuvius

In the interest of dialectical consistency, please clarify to what “prior” is in reference, as opposed to what “former” is in reference. You’re asking for a means by which A can be amended such that it reconciles A with B without consequential deference to......A(?). Thanks aforehand.

I understand this as an attempt to report that the conditions for an analytic proposition, tautological expressions in general, the contradictions of which are impossible, are antecedent to the conceptions contained in the subject and predicate of such propositions. While it may be given that the conditions pre-exist the conceptions, no synthesis of the condition with the conception, such that the notion of truth should arise from it, is at all possible absent a rational entity in possession of a natural ability to so synthesize. — Mww

While it need be the case that all manner of truth, beyond that contained within its own predicate; are bound by reliance upon a subject through whom each can be apprehended and given credence, there stands no such requisite for those of the 'analytic' in form. The notion of truth shall arise insofar as there be present a certain supposition which serves to permit sight and thus privilege in usage of reason; that which has entrenchment in the rational and is catalyst for all inferences, arising therefrom. Yet in regard to mere tautology, on the basis for its own determination, as an instance bearing truth and contingent upon its predicate to yield the former attribute ((truth)), each is to subsist in independence and lie thusly transcendent(al?) amongst that of the object upon which it would reflect and to which it must pertain.

If particular criteria be fulfilled, by means of the predicate of any conception hitherto remaining latent, and if it be a matter of principle that if the former were granted fulfillment, the latter must be true, there can be vindicated no disputation of its veracity irrespective of whether it had been conceived beforehand, if at all, as having arisen in thought.

Wherein lays a differentiation between our arguments: truth as humans understand it, does not have its own intrinsic form, but rather, rationality constructs a form a priori within which the possible notion of truth resides necessarily, re: a logical syllogism, or merely a subject/predicate statement. — Mww

The basis for distinction, and variance amongst ourselves, known since, rests upon how we regard the prospect of truth as preserved through an object of thought in the absence of its own inception therewith; if either attribute be intrinsic and thus transcendent(al?) amongst that in which it would otherwise originate, it need come to bear, despite.

OK, but this suggests a kind of truth different than the kind of truth understood as such by humans, which are to be considered herein the “object(s) of which it stands reflective”. At any rate, “implicit unto itself” would seem more transcendent than transcendental. Not to say such is impossible, but I submit such at least makes little sense, hence is of precious little use, and at most is utterly beyond the scope of human knowledge. — Mww

I have grown to suspect to an ever greater extent in clarity, that your claim in which there be present, an unassailable boundary in the depth of understanding which can be attained, and as to the reason for which either would preclude its truth, as you have sought to convey thus far, all the while acting to delineate each aspect of its modality, and in what respect the latter's truth as conferred ought to be held as transcendent(al?) in form. If all manner of thought in which a sentiment of that nature no longer is to be evident it remains the case nonetheless, that its truth while separate from that which can be apprehended, hadn't come to endure a change therein as consequence.

For any collective A whose every member B has a certain property P, all members of A must have that same property P as assigned, and remain true T even if it be absent amongst the whole of thought by virtue of the content with which it manifests as in encapsulation of its own predicate.

That of which I have made expression, stands destitute of merit if there be conducted even the faintest transition, in that unto which we affix our sight, as object's of inquiry. Merely that with entrenchment and firmness in grounding within the experiential, cannot serve as either, therefrom much else to the inclusion of certain notions of which we ourselves have hitherto spoken, are exempt from its truth.
(The domain of noumena, wherein it may lie, if it be; all manner of tautology; that which is the case, independent of its appearance in thought; the abstract, and so forth are all that bears applicability as constituents of its relation in contrast to the world as it appears solely amongst experience.)

All of the aforementioned I imagine would seem, as I can say with certitude, rather contrived on the outset as seen through the eye's of another. I had taken intrigue in it, and thus its course toward which I came to abide had garnered ever more precedence in my mind at the time, and thereafter, toward the present. I remain in doubt as to if either imparted betterment in any sense therewith.

an unassailable boundary in the depth of understanding which can be attained — Vessuvius

Yes, I hold with an unassailable boundary for understanding, a limit, the overstepping of which leads to illusion in the form of cognitions with the inherent possibility of self-contradiction.

I don’t think your thesis is contrived, however much I find it, at some fundamental level, in opposition to my understanding. Given the difficulty I have with your half of the dialogue, I accept responsibility for failure to properly interpret your arguments.

How is discernment to be made of wherein that boundary truly lies amongst the breadth of all understanding, hitherto known? Must there be particular criteria which vindicate that course, only insofar as each be that unto which there is cast fulfillment? What must have bearing in one's consideration of sight of the former ((the boundary itself as it is regarded))and that which may entail therefrom, if either is to be apprehended?

What is that through which one can deem its nature as unassailable in the truthful sense; need a certain condition if not series thereof be evident, if such a boundary as drawn is to be granted credence? If that be the case, then, by means of what manner of criteria, particularly? Furthermore, how ought one to differentiate that which lessens the vastness of all forms of understanding which can each be attained, from that inherent in its expression?
(That which stands reflective upon a natural limit((if it be so)) in thought as inhering within itself, and any aspect which resides therein as distinguished from mere synthetic restrictions to which the former would pertain.)

I don’t think your thesis is contrived, however much I find it, at some fundamental level, in opposition to my understanding. Given the difficulty I have with your half of the dialogue, I accept responsibility for failure to properly interpret your arguments. — Mww

That may bear semblance unto and thus serve as denotation for my own commitment of fault, in contrast with that for which you have spoken of yourself, as the subject unto which that sentiment ((deficiency)) be ascribed((I imagine that to reflect upon me, and embody a deficit of some form held on my behalf, rather than the same, for yourself)). The degree of clearness with which one can derive understanding, is contingent upon the clarity with which its matter, and content, are expressed. I wish to offer recognition of its veracity as principle, exemplified by the state in which I have since taken occupancy((my role, here)), in the course from which we ourselves have yet to deviate.

The burdens' conferred by our desire in having striven to ensure that attribute((sufficient clarity)), pervade every instance through which we partake in an act of expression, for its own sake on our behalves, are commensurate with one another((wholly equivalent with respect to the same)).

We ourselves each traverse the path halfway, if alone, and as such are reliant upon one another to permit its completion, for which only the sum of our every effort is of consequence.

How is discernment to be made of wherein that boundary truly lies amongst the breadth of all understanding, hitherto known? — Vessuvius

Judgement. The faculty whereby a conception is cognized as belonging to its object. The limit of understanding is, therefore, where judgement does not cognize a conception as belonging to its object. For instance, if we see a bicycle with square tires, we understand immediately the bicycle will not move, for the concept of square does not belong to the concept of tire. Because experience promises bicycles with round tires always move, we will never understand how it is possible a bicycle with square tires will also move. Of course, we could force a bicycle with square tires to move, but then we’d have to judge some force as conjoined to the conception of moving bicycle which does not naturally belong to it. We would thus understand how it is possible to move a bicycle with square tires, but then we’d have trouble understanding how one would employ the bicycle in its primary function, whereby understanding devolves from a faculty of rational thought, to a merely non-intuitive speculation.
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What is that through which one can deem its nature as unassailable in the truthful sense; need a certain condition if not series thereof be evident, if such a boundary as drawn is to be granted credence? — Vessuvius

The principle of non-contradiction, predicated on experience or empirical possibility in general. On the other hand, we can think anything we want, but to arrive at valid cognitions when doing so we must still abide the principle. Any principle deemed intrinsic to human rationality presupposes a very unique capacity, which must escape definitive investigation, for in such case reason must be used to investigate itself.
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We ourselves each traverse the path halfway, if alone, and as such are reliant upon one another to permit its completion, for which only the sum of our every effort is of consequence. — Vessuvius

Herein a prime example of the diversity of human understanding, despite is fundamental structural congruency. I analyze the statement as: if we each transverse a path halfway no completion is permitted, and, if we rely upon another to complete the path, we are not alone. At the same time, I also understand completely the intention in the construction of the statement irrespective of my analysis of it.

Judgement. The faculty whereby a conception is cognized as belonging to its object. The limit of understanding is, therefore, where judgement does not cognize a conception as belonging to its object. For instance, if we see a bicycle with square tires, we understand immediately the bicycle will not move, for the concept of square does not belong to the concept of tire. Because experience promises bicycles with round tires always move, we will never understand how it is possible a bicycle with square tires will also move. Of course, we could force a bicycle with square tires to move, but then we’d have to judge some force as conjoined to the conception of moving bicycle which does not naturally belong to it. We would thus understand how it is possible to move a bicycle with square tires, but then we’d have trouble understanding how one would employ the bicycle in its primary function, whereby understanding devolves from a faculty of rational thought, to a merely non-intuitive speculation. — Mww

It need be the case that all manner of judgement insofar as it make passage, and thus manifest, lies in predication of the experiential, yet all forms of conception bear the privilege to subsist, though not be apprehended, in spite of absence of the former and that by means of which it can be yielded; the subject. The consequence which would find entailment therefrom, stands' in its implication to express that of the truth which must exemplify the same, and as to how all aspects residing therein constitute the whole, while are transcendent(al?) amongst that of the object(s) through which each is to be spoken of, as contingent upon experience. It seems evident in my eye's if hope for facilitation in passage of judgment isn't itself to lie in vain, there must be conferred fulfillment as cast unto a certain requisite for conveyance of mere thought. There need be held in sight prior to its inception, a subject through whom thought in its every form can manifest. The latter prospect is to be of greater substance than that as to which either would appear, were it otherwise. That which is drawn in association as arising among that of a series of object's amongst the same((thought)), remains bound by the prior, and determined in form solely through repudiation of dissimilarity therewith, as granted by the subject.

If association amongst a particular object, and that of which the latter is constituted is to be made, there need be granted before, a subject through whom its recognition is certain, and of clarity. On account of the condition in which each are in absence, there would be precluded such a supposition owing to which. Truth as it be ascribed, and in the tone with which I have hitherto spoken of the same in my every conveyance, whereof the matter had arisen, is of a transcendental form and by no means contingent upon nor subject in its determination through either inasmuch as it preserve establishment of mere necessity in its predicate, therewith((truth)) by virtue of that unto which it is reflective in content.

"For any bachelor there is one who is unmarried."
The central modality of the former presupposes in its appearance, and thus assumes for itself, the latter, by means of implication and as consequence is a matter of truth, necessarily.

"Either it is raining, or it is not raining."
An instance in which the notion of 'Law Of Excluded Middle' is clear as it had been termed thusly;
For the sake of offering that of a sense of greater generality;
"Either A is A, or A isn't A."

The principle of non-contradiction, predicated on experience or empirical possibility in general. On the other hand, we can think anything we want, but to arrive at valid cognitions when doing so we must still abide the principle. Any principle deemed intrinsic to human rationality presupposes a very unique capacity, which must escape definitive investigation, for in such case reason must be used to investigate itself. — Mww

All of the aforementioned each to their own bear semblance to truth, a priori, independent of whether either be conceived by the subject. If it be the case that each as it appears, had grown absent, its truth if not otherwise ((falsity)), insofar as either be rightfully bore by the object, neither is given tarnishment in subsequence as each must persist as it were, despite. All manner of expression which has come to precede, since, remain object's of thought, and are those unto which we strive to affix our sight throughout the course in which we inquire as to the integrity in expression of all thereof. The nature of its catalyst, the means whereby credence can be imparted, and attainment of understanding made, ought not to be exempt from such inquiry. The act through which one speaks of the latter, as a maxim for which abidance need be yielded, reflects only upon that for which there is sought, aversion.

To describe the variegated forms of limitation wherein the depth toward which one can venture through the faculty of reason, is bound, is to commit in course, reflection upon the same. If one were to speak of the latter, whilst in concurrence subsisting in that which preceded, is to ensure, implicitly, through that same means, entailment of contradiction, arising therefrom. If one were to speak of the unassailable boundary of understanding, and reason, as you have done, whilst regarding a certain sentiment as truthful, in which it be expressed that all manner of faculty therewith, cannot be exercised to inquire as to the truths to which its own modalities would pertain, and by which each be determined, is to make commitment of that which one had hoped to prevent; contradiction.

((None can appeal to the veracity of the principle of non-contradiction, and speak(investigate) of the boundaries which restrict the breadth of reason whilst regarding it as truthful, concurrently, that all reason need be exempt from such inquiry. As to accord with that, there can entail no grander contradiction.))

...even more word salad !
There is a lot of rubbish here about 'the law of the excluded middle'. Since this is inapplicable in parts of quantum physics it is clear that classical logic is merely one form of limited rationality we apply to what we call 'ontology and epistemology'. There are other 'logics' and aspects of mathematical modelling like 'symmetry' which need to be considered. As Rorty indicated, philosophy has no authoritative claims in those areas.

There is a lot of rubbish here about 'the law of the excluded middle'. Since this is inapplicable to all parts of quantum physics, and much else, it is clear that classical logic is merely one form of limited rationality we apply to what we call 'ontology and epistemology'. — fresco

I had neither spoken of it in such a tone that its usage be implicated wherein it ought not to be, nor sought to assimilate it in the greater whole of my prior deliberation, as it came to serve merely as an instrument, through which certain series of propositions could be expressed with much clarity, whilst ensuring that neither be misappropriated through the same course.

"Either it is raining, or it is not raining." By means of appeal to that principle, inference of the prior's truth as a whole can be drawn; as was my intention.

Whilst it rests upon a particular domain which is itself quite discrete((predicate; propositional-logic)), and is applicable to each, I nonetheless had felt it to suffice in its illustration((to demonstrate that which is tautological in nature)) of that which I hoped to convey at the time. If the case were otherwise, I couldn't vindicate its usage, and thus wouldn't have acted upon it. One needn't offer consolidation of all forms of rationality in judgement to illustrate a singular aspect thereof.

None have hitherto conceived of a form of thought which accounts in full for every modality through which the aforementioned can manifest, whilst preserving coherence and dispelling all manner of prospects' in which contradiction can arise. To endeavor toward the former would as I imagine, be no less than inviable to an extent such that it lie beyond comparison.

even more word salad ! — fresco

I had made commitment of fault in only a few instances, though all have since been granted resolve. I find it nothing short of burdensome a task, to address each firstly, nor have I come to harbor fondness for what must precede therein if it is to be regarded as effectual in any sense(proof-reading). Owing to which I seldom strive to fulfill that need, despite the depth of clarity which would entail therefrom were it to be given. The modestness of my device in its proportionality lends no aid in that respect, either(Nokia Lumia Model-521).

For further discussion, see the following; https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_of_excluded_middle

It need be the case that all manner of judgement insofar as it make passage, and thus manifest, lies in predication of the experiential.......... — Vessuvius

A notion is a conceptualized idea, re: quantity, possibility, existence, etc., and for which no representation is given. Any judgement grounded on an idea, and from which a possible cognition follows, is entirely a priori, therefore not of necessary experiential derivation. If any mathematical judgement, as is any simple arithmetic expression from which applied mathematics arises, should manifest as cognition, a purely a priori conception must be antecedent to it, for it is quite impossible to express combinations of numbers in whatever form without the explicit incorporation of the pure conception of “quantity”. Simply put: if we don’t understand the idea of “one” and cognize it as a singular and therefore the simplest possible notion of quantity, we will never judge a multiplicity of “ones” in unity with themselves as having any meaning whatsoever.

If, on the other hand, by “manifest” is meant verified with objective validity, then experiential predication would be required. Nonetheless, the manifestation of judgement is primarily cognition, the possible proof of which lies in experience.
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........yet all forms of conception bear the privilege to subsist, though not be apprehended, in spite of absence of the former and that by means of which it can be yielded; the subject. — Vessuvius

I suppose forms of conception can subsist, meaning continue or prevail, without being in attention to conscious thought. Depends on what one considers a form of conception to be. If by form is meant a kind of pattern, the question becomes whether there subsists a pattern to which conceptions adhere, or some criteria to which conceptions conform, which in turn begs the question: how do we know the form of conceptions without first having conceptions for them? I don’t know, but am inclined to let conceptions be merely the spontaneity of the understanding.
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There need be held in sight prior to its inception, a subject through whom thought in its every form can manifest. — Vessuvius

The ego? If it be granted the human cognitive system is representational, and if ego as that which is presupposed by the act of thinking, such that all such thinking has that to which it necessarily belongs, it follows ego must have its representation. Reducing the systemic predicate far enough, we will end up with the ego determining its own representation, which defeats the lawfulness of the entire logical system. While I grant there must be a subject that exists thinking, in order to circumvent the inconsistencies intrinsic to “cogito, ergo sum”, which is at its final rest quite backward, it is sufficient to merely grant the subject without having to prove its fundamental constituency.

There exists the argument that the ego is represented by the “I”, which necessarily precedes all thought in general such that “I think” is given objective validity. It follows then, that a subject through whom thought can manifest, could be the “I”, without too serious a complication. Still, much closer examination will lead to self-contradictions, or at least the possibility of having no logical explanation, because we can always ask why such should be the case.
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If one were to speak of the unassailable boundary of understanding, and reason, as you have done, whilst regarding a certain sentiment as truthful, in which it be expressed that all manner of faculty therewith, cannot be exercised to inquire as to the truths to which its own modalities would pertain, and by which each be determined, is to make commitment of that which one had hoped to prevent; contradiction. — Vessuvius

This particular theoretical speculation is logically consistent, hence there is no contradiction. That is not to say another theory, grounded in other hypotheticals or conditionals would not falsify it. But as it stands, and given the premises that support it, in which it is given that there is a proverbial bottom line to such speculation from which no further truth be forthcoming, self-contradiction is averted. In other words, the truth is in and of the speculation itself, and no attempt is made by it to subsidize truth as a stand-alone entity.

Am I to understand it is your position that understanding has no boundaries? If by chance my position is contradictory, what means would you suggest to mitigate the conditions which suggest it?

I suppose I could attenuate its form in a manner such that what had been spoken of, and expressed on my part, be of greater frugality in that respect. — Vessuvius

Do you mean "I could've said it more concisely"? :roll:

A notion is a conceptualized idea, re: quantity, possibility, existence, etc., and for which no representation is given. Any judgement grounded on an idea, and from which a possible cognition follows, is entirely a priori, therefore not of necessary experiential derivation. If any mathematical judgement, as is any simple arithmetic expression from which applied mathematics arises, should manifest as cognition, a purely a priori conception must be antecedent to it, for it is quite impossible to express combinations of numbers in whatever form without the explicit incorporation of the pure conception of “quantity”. Simply put: if we don’t understand the idea of “one” and cognize it as a singular and therefore the simplest possible notion of quantity, we will never judge a multiplicity of “ones” in unity with themselves as having any meaning whatsoever.

If, on the other hand, by “manifest” is meant verified with objective validity, then experiential predication would be required. Nonetheless, the manifestation of judgement is primarily cognition, the possible proof of which lies in experience. — Mww

With regard to the former, we seem to be in alignment and thus are reflective of one another in that for which we had made conveyance at the time. The manner of sentiment in which there be ascribed truth unto that whereof certain conceptions((truth, falsity, quantity, existence, possibility and so forth)) pervade throughout thought and are those upon which the latter itself stands contingent, in all forms, with which it may manifest in potentiality independent of its appearance in the eye's of the subject((a priori)), we hold as destitute of all confliction in its every aspect amongst ourselves((a matter of consensus in that which it illustrates, as we ourselves regard it)). In the same course I sought to offer recognition merely of each, though had succumbed to failure in ensuring that it be of an extent of clarity, sufficient to facilitate greater apprehension of those with whom I spoke, than that for which either would be, were it otherwise.

The latter, insofar as it come to bear in consideration, I felt to be evident in such sense, on account of which I remained bound by no disinclination toward the prospect wherein it be expressed, as principle.

I suppose forms of conception can subsist, meaning continue or prevail, without being in attention to conscious thought. Depends on what one considers a form of conception to be. If by form is meant a kind of pattern, the question becomes whether there subsists a pattern to which conceptions adhere, or some criteria to which conceptions conform, which in turn begs the question: how do we know the form of conceptions without first having conceptions for them? I don’t know, but am inclined to let conceptions be merely the spontaneity of the understanding. — Mww

I had spoken of the matter in the sense of that which came to precede, since, and granted entailment for its own expression by means of the same. The criteria to which all must adhere serve merely to exemplify that which is the case, independent of the form with which it manifests and by virtue of the prior, its appearance as held in sight by the subject. I imagine the designation which it bore, as conferred through that toward which we had striven to act, to have semblance beyond that basis((with respect to that which I described in the past as 'conception'; beyond how it came to be termed on our own behalves as that alone would seem to be the catalyst for all dissimilarity having arisen therewith)). Attainment of resolve for which, can be granted without much further consideration.

The ego? If it be granted the human cognitive system is representational, and if ego as that which is presupposed by the act of thinking, such that all such thinking has that to which it necessarily belongs, it follows ego must have its representation. Reducing the systemic predicate far enough, we will end up with the ego determining its own representation, which defeats the lawfulness of the entire logical system. While I grant there must be a subject that exists thinking, in order to circumvent the inconsistencies intrinsic to “cogito, ergo sum”, which is at its final rest quite backward, it is sufficient to merely grant the subject without having to prove its fundamental constituency.

There exists the argument that the ego is represented by the “I”, which necessarily precedes all thought in general such that “I think” is given objective validity. It follows then, that a subject through whom thought can manifest, could be the “I”, without too serious a complication. Still, much closer examination will lead to self-contradictions, or at least the possibility of having no logical explanation, because we can always ask why such should be the case. — Mww

The sum of our every faculty constituted thereof can yield only series' of representations which are to be vindicated through the acuity with which the appearance of each stands to reflect upon that to which it would pertain. Yet, herein rests an intrinsic fault if one is to have hope to speak of the world as it is, truly, which is itself to lie in vain, inasmuch as one be bound by the requisite for such faculties of mind to discern either. Therefrom would follow the sentiment in which none can garner apprehension of what bears truth as separate from that which is beheld as an object of inquiry, and perceived thusly. One can draw inference, then, if such is predicated by the experiential, as seen through the same lens, that none can offer with even the faintest sense of veracity, and rightful belief, attestation of the world as it proceeds forth despite, in indifference of the subject should the latter be accounted for in either manner of judgement.

I suppose there may arise therewith an instance of necessity if each be truthful; that one must predicate all forms of consideration, and every aspect residing therein, as conferred solely by means of the subject, as exempt itself from furtherance of such a course in inquiry; an axiomatic condition((the subject)).

For further discussion on the matter of the final, see the following; if you haven't done the same, before, of which I remain doubtful((as it is evident to me that you are far more perceptive than most of those whom I have hitherto encountered)). https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regress_argument

This particular theoretical speculation is logically consistent, hence there is no contradiction. That is not to say another theory, grounded in other hypotheticals or conditionals would not falsify it. But as it stands, and given the premises that support it, in which it is given that there is a proverbial bottom line to such speculation from which no further truth be forthcoming, self-contradiction is averted. In other words, the truth is in and of the speculation itself, and no attempt is made by it to subsidize truth as a stand-alone entity.

Am I to understand it is your position that understanding has no boundaries? If by chance my position is contradictory, what means would you suggest to mitigate the conditions which suggest it? — Mww

If resolve is to be attained for that sake, in its contradiction, one need only concede to that of the principle, the condition, which permits all forms of reason to be exercised such that it have entrenchment in inquiry of itself as a matter of thought; to discern its own nature rather, than espouse, and abide by prohibition of each as you had done, it seemed to me. Though, if it be the case, that what I have sought to profess, as it lies in pertainment to that of your own, had in truth been misconstrued on my part, I shall offer concession in argument, instead.

Am I to understand it is your position that understanding has no boundaries? If by chance my position is contradictory, what means would you suggest to mitigate the conditions((see the prior segment of my exposition))which suggest it? — Mww

My position at present is one for consideration of the boundaries which serve to constrain yet inhere within the breadth of all understanding((to inclusion of the world not merely in its appearance)), and as to how either can be differentiated((if there be such distinctions in any truthful sense)) from those which are synthetic in nature. As attributive to thought yielded by the subject, rather than of the fundamental conceptions((quantity, possibility, change, time, space, truth, falsity, etcetera)) which subsist, despite absence of the aforementioned((subject)) and which are transcendental with regard to the myriad object's whereof each may arise((all that constitutes the world)).

For the sake of brevity; all manner of understanding is bound((as I speak of it)), in contrast with that of an array of certain conceptions((the same as before)) on which it is predicated in full, which needn't themselves be grounded in the experiential as each must be held distinctly, a priori, independent of whether either be conceived, beforehand((and are thus in a discrete sense, boundless;transcendent(al?).

I believe that which came to precede, as offering illustration of such principle, and its necessity, with the utmost clearness((what you felt it prudent to demonstrate earlier on, and an intent upon which you had acted in the end, with respect to the notion of 'quantity')).

Do you mean "I could've said it more concisely"? — Pattern-chaser

Yes. Though on account of its implication, each form of expression would be indistinct from one another. Despite which, I have since come to offer recognition of the truth wherein, were I to persist in such a course, and further abide by that as a matter of preference, I may be subject to derision, if not dismissal in prospect. Neither of which, I imagine would manifest to a comparable extent, were it otherwise(if I were to cease in action, indulgence in verbosity for the sake of itself; I sought to make it clear however, prior, that to accord with its cessation would stand contrary to that for which I harbor much preference.)

Yet, that had been what I meant at the time.

(I reside in classification, amongst the same continuum to which you pertain through your own condition, as well it seems, as has been made evident; Asperger's-Autism Spectrum Disorder (High-Functioning; in accordance with the criteria set forth in the DSM-V).

one need only concede to that of the principle, the condition, which permits all forms of reason to be exercised such that it have entrenchment in inquiry of itself as a matter of thought; to discern its own nature rather, than espouse, and abide by prohibition of each as you had done — Vessuvius

I understand reason already inquires as to itself, attempts to discern its own nature. But in doing so, reason may exercise its intrinsic capacity to exceed its own ability to tell us the truth about what we really want to know, overstep its boundaries as it were. If we are not interested in knowledge for its own sake, we permit reason to wander wherever it wishes to take us. Or, more accurately, we do not critique that which reason presents to us. Hence the prohibition imposed, for the sake of knowledge.

Odd though, to talk of reason as if it were an actual thing, rather than merely a specific kind of procedure adopted by the human animal, intended solely to accomplish a specific task.

Odd though, to talk of reason as if it were an actual thing, rather than merely a specific kind of procedure adopted by the human animal, intended solely to accomplish a specific task.

Well said !

Thanks.

Odd though, to talk of reason as if it were an actual thing, rather than merely a specific kind of procedure adopted by the human animal, intended solely to accomplish a specific task. — Mww

The modalities with which reason be conveyed, are neither more nor less tangible in form, and procedure, than the domain of mathematical thought((though I acknowledge the former to bear a much greater disposition for elusion within its state, and is thus seldom found untarnished)); as in truth one could assert without incurring loss in veracity of that which one wishes to express, that all such forms are antecedent to the faculty of reason in its fullest constitution. I had sought merely to speak of it in the sense of a conceptual relation of the abstract, which stands destitute in its representation for that which is singular, and determinate, as consequence of the broadness arising therewith, such that it reflect upon those of the rest. All manner of inquiry, remains bound by that through which it finds' appearance, from which discernment can be drawn, whereof it serves as that upon which the former is predicated, and conceived thusly prior to its own inception((a priori)).

(There is requisite for presupposition of the same faculty, which need be granted fulfillment in its course, if that which is to entail therefrom is to be regarded as deserving of consideration in passage of judgement as yielded by the subject'.)

understand reason already inquires as to itself, attempts to discern its own nature. But in doing so, reason may exercise its intrinsic capacity to exceed its own ability to tell us the truth about what we really want to know, overstep its boundaries as it were. If we are not interested in knowledge for its own sake, we permit reason to wander wherever it wishes to take us. Or, more accurately, we have critiqued that which reason presents to us((and shall persist in that course)). Hence the prohibition imposed, for the sake of knowledge((is of tenuous ground as it imposes synthetic restrictions on reason, rather than permitting it to remain in its natural state, and inquiry, as to that same form by means of itself)). — Mww

That which lies in potentiality, needn't exert itself unto the same as constraint, nor ought one to offer abidance by either as to accord with that there can be made only contrived restriction in the breadth of forms with which reason is permitted to manifest. Yet vastness alone wouldn't preclude sufficient acuity in its manifestation; on account of which, none shall have bore the inclination to tarnish its state by means of either and need be impelled to preserve the same, to ensure that it remain as such whilst bearing in mind in concurrence with which, the prospect whereby credence had been ascribed unto fallacy, and strive to avert each resultant thereof.

(Preservation of constancy in understanding, and reason by consequence, can be attained, without conceding to that of the intention upon which you have hitherto come to act; establishment of series of restrictions which are mere externalities and thus not intrinsic to any form therewith, though which are regarded as vital((falsely, in my belief)) nonetheless if the course toward which it must venture, and conform through the subject, is to never once deviate from that which rests amongst the centrality of its own domain, as the latter be assigned.)

@Vessuvius
I like polished classical prose as much as the next guy, but it seems like the prose style you favor is cramping you here. As others have mentioned, your prose sparkles most when you break out of the high style. & In terms of the high style : I mean this nicely, but there are a lot of missteps. It isn't quite right, semantically. Stylistically, it's strained. Why force your ideas into an alien medium? It comes out so much better when you say what you're saying as it is.

I have yet to determine as to how, with regard to that form, that of which I have conceived, since, can be expressed without incurring loss of either; the clarity of its expression, and the extent to which it exemplifies most acutely, such prose. My hope is that each attribute, insofar as the whole thereof manifest, be commensurate with one another, and coalesce, thereby assuming for itself a form far grander in its appearance than either would be, alone, were it otherwise.

The sum of my aspirations are many in number, and variegated in substance; as I have a keen fondness for much of the fields which constitute that of Linguistics, in full, as well as philosophical thought. To instill greater specificity than would be granted were I to abstain; Morphology, Discourse Analysis, The Study Of Syntactical Structures((Syntax)), Logical Positivism, German Idealism etcetera.

As you have hitherto seen, and to which we ourselves can attest readily; I ascribe neither greater nor lesser a degree of precedence unto each, than I have for those of the rest. Nor are there discrepancies amongst any in the value of all those residing therewith, as I speak of it; in the sense of the aesthetical in particular.

ah man, but that's...

ah man, but that's... — csalisbury

All the best shit, and nothing besides, man.

:cool: theres the real ontological requisite

Caveat: don't get tricked into thinking occasional vulgarity safeguards the real shit. Don't oscillate - integrate!

I stand now before you, humbled by your audacity, and that for the sake of which you had made conveyance of such manner of sentiment((and some other fucking shit, none of which I would care to explicate at this time)).

ha, closer! But for real just imagine you're talking to your friends, or even yourself, and no one cares (no one does, alas) and just say what you want to say. That's enough! and its even better. Imagine high style as a final flowering. It arises organically out of the movement upward. You can't jump to the top.

The flower has already begun to blossom, and yield its fruit.

tldr: youre clearly smart, but everyone seems smarter when theyre themselves. thats what draws people in.

The flower is a good one but is imitating other, older flowers, and it distracts. makes some ppl think its a false flower when its not.

The discernment of mere inauthenticity, as granted expression by means of that toward which I feel drawn, lies predicated upon fallacy, and is thus of tenuous standing. To ensure that one seem dissimilar((to what end?)) from those whom have hitherto preceded the advent of one's own life, is itself no requisite for that which is contrary to the baseless supposition of fraudulence, in which one be implicated.

Seldom have many shown aptitude for differentiating truth, from the manifestations of prejudice, and blind conviction.

recap of last post:

---The recognition of simply being fake [ adverbial clause that doesn't work grammatically (or any other way, though I know you're talking about 'final flowering' from our convo)] is based on a falsehood, and so has uncertain worth. To make sure that one seems different from people who came before one [ungrammatical transition] isn't a necessary condition for what's different from an unfounded assumption of falsehood (further grammatical confusion - this doesn't flow. Leaving the rest of this sentence out. It's so fatally compromised that countenancing - countenancing :wink: - the rest of it would fling the reader irrecoverably into linguistic chaos)

It's not often that people seem good at separating truth from expressions of prejudice and blind conviction [lose 'manifestation'] ---

Summary over.

My reaction :

I actually don't know what you're saying, because the post just plum doesn't make sense.

(And this is coming from someone who *enjoys Proust* !) (I enjoy Proust!) (Proust is grammatically complex!) (He's French!) ( The Cookie Thing !)

So a challenge, because I think you can handle it: how would you have phrased that post if you were just saying what you were trying to say? Just off the cuff, straight. Flourishes welcome, but only if they don't distract, and serve to strengthen the force of the message. (analogy : Picasso would have sucked if he painted Raphaels. Raphael himself would have sucked, if, living in the twentieth century, he painted Raphaels. Picasso worked because he painted what he was feeling (tho, we must remember, he was a troubled man). Anyway, just go for it. Say what you're saying. You wouldn't be able to write such eccentric old-style posts, if you didn't have some simmering capacity for invention that you'd redirected into a constrained rhetorical space. Lift the blinds! Channel it here and now!

"What one speaks of as an instance of mere inauthenticity, in which another is implicated, may reflect only upon one's own belief of the matter of fraudulence, and hollow imitation, rather than that which is the case in truth((the claim itself would then, be unfounded)). The belief held may have no rational grounding, and be prejudicial. To be regarded as dissimilar in a particular respect to any arbitrary degree, in the eye's of many others, is not necessary to preclude claims of fraudulence, in which one stands implicated. One can maintain semblance in choice of prose to those of the past, without descending toward either vice, as consequence."

"It is not often that people are good at distinguishing their own prejudice, and blind conviction, from the truth of any particular matter, or instance."