Yes, the "justified" would seem to be relevant only to the context in which justification can be given, which would obviously not be the context of pre-linguistic believing. In that latter context not only can a justification for what is believed not be given, the believing cannot even be stated as a definite belief.
↪creativesoul Obviously I agree since I presented pretty much the same critique in the other thread (copied and pasted here in my first comment in this thread). — Janus
It may not always or even often happen that we agree, but does it follow that when we do there must be something wrong? :joke: — Janus
Obviously I agree since I presented pretty much the same critique in the other thread (copied and pasted here in my first comment in this thread). — Janus
the believing cannot even be stated as a definite belief. — Janus
1.Are we agreeing that the thinking/believing creature cannot state it's own thought/belief?
2.Are we agreeing that the thought/belief of a pre-linguistic creature cannot be in propositional form?
3.Are we agreeing that the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief cannot have propositional content(it cannot consist of propositions)? — creativesoul
Could you re-phrase this? What is the referent of "the believing"? The process of thought/belief formation? The 'act' of thought/belief formation?
We can definitely state what the content of pre-linguistic thought/belief is.
Do we still agree? — creativesoul
...I am not comfortable with speaking about "content" of "pre-linguistic thought/ belief". I would instead speak about 'the process of pre-linguistic believing' or something along those lines. — Janus
...we've been over this before, perhaps a few times now, I think. — Janus
In other words I don't see any advantage, and perhaps no inevitable disadvantage, but I do see possible disadvantages, to be had in referring to the act of believing as an act of "belief formation" when speaking about a pre-linguistic context. — Janus
What else could differentiate pre-linguistic believing from post-linguistic believing if not the content? — creativesoul
Pre-linguistic believing can only be had by a creature capable of drawing a correlations between different things. — creativesoul
What else could differentiate pre-linguistic believing from post-linguistic believing if not the content?
— creativesoul
The fact that the latter has determinate content, insofar as it can be expressed verbally. — Janus
The association of different things in the animal mind or brain may be nothing more than a neural one for all we know. — Janus
I don't think this is right; there may be justified false beliefs, — Janus
Of course. And any of our current beliefs may turn out to be false. That's why in the JTB formulation, I think it is irrational to use the word true. Not in other contexts, but because the addition of the word true implies that we know, somehow, beyond our justification.Another example: the ancient's belief that the Earth is flat could be counted as a justified false belief. There would be countless examples of justified false belief. — Janus
And yet there are justified false beliefs. — creativesoul
I don't understand this at all. What in the world does "access to truth" mean?
We can look to see if a cup is on the table. That's access enough, right? — creativesoul
And let's look at this again. When I read this question it is as if I am saying y ou cannot consider the cup being on the table to be the truth. Like I am a radical skeptic.That's access enough, right?
And yet there are justified false beliefs. Paradigm shift happens by virtue of peeling them away from conventional certainty. Copernican revolution. Einstein's On the Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies and General Relativity are exactly such cases which show that what were justified beliefs held to be true were not true, but were justified nonetheless. — creativesoul
That's the false belief. But there’s also the true belief that Mary is married to a postman. — Michael
I have a false belief (that you know that I slept with your wife) that justifies a true belief (that you will punch me). And in the same way I have a false belief (that Mary is married to me) that justifies a true belief (that Mary is married to a postman). — Michael
Nevertheless, the content of all thought/belief can be expressed verbally, just not always by the thinking/believing creature. We are more than capable of taking proper account of that much. We can know what pre-linguistic thought/belief consists of by virtue of knowing what linguistic thought/belief consists of and taking it from there. — creativesoul
Of course. And that will always be the case. That's how we work in science. This is what the evidence suggests. Nothing seems to contradict it. It fits with our models. Other scientists receive the same results. So we add X to our body of scientific knowledge. But there is the chance that later it will turn ou to be false. I am not saying we should not use the word true. But if adding the word true means that it can never ever turn out to be false, who are we to say that? — Coben
TBH I'd rather dispense with belief/ believing and stick to thought/ thinking, particularly when trying to address pre-linguistic scenarios.
The problem with the term 'belief' and 'believe', even in the linguistic context, is that they seem to carry a kind of extra baggage that 'thought' and 'think' do not. I can't see any logical difference between 'I think X is the case' and 'I believe X is the case'.
But there could be a difference between thinking X and believing X, so the former seems to somehow carry extra weight, and although I don't think that impression of extra weight is really based on anything substantive; there just seems to be a quality of extra commitment associated with the term 'believe'... — Janus
I agree that our dialogue has been steadily improving; which is a good thing. And I have begun to enjoy our conversations, and to learn and sharpen my thinking from participating in them.
I also agree with pretty much everything you say above, and it is the very fact that, as you point out, thinking and believing would not seem to be distinguishable in the case of animals that leads me to want to talk for the sake of parsimony, in that context, only about thinking. — Janus
As you say, and as I have also suggested, it is in the light of the logical difference that obtains between merely thinking and actively believing some proposition that the distinction between thinking and believing, between thought and belief, becomes necessary.
Wow, I actually agree with what you are saying here. Or rather what you are saying is a reiteration in different words of what creativesoul and I have been saying. But, in any case, it's a marvel: agreement nonetheless!
I'd be interested to know if there are any academic papers presenting the same devastating critique of Gettier that the three of us here apparently agree upon, and if not, why not? — Janus
However, the involuntary salivation shows us that aforementioned something more that we typically associate with belief but not always with thinking...
Expectation.
The dog believed that he was going to be fed after hearing the bell. — creativesoul
However, the involuntary salivation shows us that aforementioned something more that we typically associate with belief but not always with thinking...
Expectation.
The dog believed that he was going to be fed after hearing the bell.
— creativesoul
Interesting! — Janus
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