And here we may imagine, for example, that he does copy the figures by himself, but not in the right order [...]
Or again, he makes ‘mistakes’ in the order. [...]
Or he makes a systematic mistake; — PI 143
After all, I’d like you to say: “Yes, it’s true, one could imagine that too, that might happen too!” — But was I trying to draw someone’s attention to the fact that he is able to imagine that? — PI 144
But was I trying to draw someone’s attention to the fact that he is able to imagine that?
But was I trying to draw the pupil's attention to the fact that the pupil is able to imagine that the pupil's ability to learn may come to an end here?
This is not intended to be some sort of theory of developmental learning. — Luke
The second line of the above quote relates to the first, as he then asks whether it was his objective to draw our attention to the fact that we could imagine that. — Luke
Isn't that a very odd (or oddly phrased) question? Why would Wittgenstein ask it? — Luke
Furthermore, what alternative picture does Wittgenstein put before the student (other than the "picture" of the series of numbers which are written down and placed before him)? What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him? — Luke
Sorry, to have to reiterate, but he doesn't say "we", he says "he", referring to the theoretical student — Metaphysician Undercover
69. How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we’d describe games to him
31. ...We may say: it only makes sense for someone to ask what something is called if he already knows how to make use of the name.
32. ...Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a foreign country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if he already had a language, only not this one.
What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him? — Luke
143. ... he copies the series 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,... like this: 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4
Skip the first number, 0, and write down the next number 1 followed by the skipped number 0, then skip the next number 2 and write down the next number 3 followed by the skipped number 2, then skip the next number 4 and write down the next number 5 followed by the skipped number 4. The series continues 7, 6, 9,8 (unless I made a mistake). — Fooloso4
Yes, I think it is easier to see if looked at that way. — Fooloso4
I think I might disagree with you though. There isn't always a unique justification for someone using language in any given way, there can be plurality of understandings consistent with it. — fdrake
What a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory, but of a fertile new point of view. (CV 18)
[emphasis added]122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. a Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links.
The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?)
308. How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? —– The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states, and leave their nature undecided. Sometime perhaps we’ll know more about them - we think. But that’s just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a certain conception of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that seemed to us quite innocent.) a And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we don’t want to deny them. [emphasis added]
309. What is your aim in philosophy? To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.
What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him? — Luke
Rather I was trying to consider how the student might have looked at the series of numbers he wrote on the assumption that if we can understand how he looked at it we might be able to provide another way for him to look at it — Fooloso4
You're reading too much into "he". — Luke
Furthermore, what alternative picture does Wittgenstein put before the student (other than the "picture" of the series of numbers which are written down and placed before him)? What "way of looking at things" is required in order for the student to copy the numbers on the page in front of him? — Luke
it's a matter of determining the proper referent of "he" — Metaphysician Undercover
After all, I’d like you to say: “Yes, it’s true, one could imagine that too, that might happen too!” — But was I trying to draw someone’s attention to the fact that he is able to imagine that?
How does he come to understand this system?
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