Once the model implicit in the question is on the table, one would be swimming uphill starting to respond. Once, say the subject object split is assumed, for example. The subject here, controlling the existence of things out there.

I'm not an anti-realist or solipsist, so it's not my position, but it seems like answering that question is problematic for those who are, but because it presumes realism.

I don't know what a more neutral formulation would be,since that would depend on their philosophy, its ontology. And there's certainly nothing wrong with formulating the question from your perspective. But it's also a Trojan Horse. — Coben

Well, since I think that idealism is pretty stupid--I'm not joking when I say that I think it amounts to adults being stuck in a preoperational (a la Piaget) development phase, I'm not going to assume idealism in answering a question. It would need to be supported somehow as to why it should be treated as a default.

Why would the existence of something like a rock hinge on anything about us? — Terrapin Station

Why wouldn't it? That we perceive something that we call a rock does not imply that this rock has an outside existence that doesn't depend on us. Which may be hard to see if you remain stuck in a physicalist mindset, seeing minds as parts of a universe rather than the universe as a part of minds. Outside of a physicalist mindset, physical death does not necessarily imply death of the mind. I think you finding idealism to be stupid has more to do with you being a fervent physicalist than with idealism being objectively stupid.

ultimately it is environmental feedback, experience and reason that determines an individual's concept of truth — sime

Do you then agree with the idea that truth is individual-dependent and not something that has independent existence?

The sentence "The sky is orange" is objective. It is objective because it is truth-evaluable. It happens to be false, but so be it. — Kornelius

That's the thing, is it true that "The sky is orange" is false? What if I'm watching a sunset and I see the sky orange? What if someone perceives differently and see the sky orange when others see it blue? What if someone doesn't perceive a sky (in which case the sentence wouldn't be truth-evaluable for that person)? How could we say that "The sky is orange" is false for everyone? How could we find anything that is necessarily false (or true) for everyone?

My point is we can't find anything that is true for everyone. And that even the sentence "we can't find anything that is true for everyone" wouldn't be true for everyone. And so on in an infinite regress.

Why wouldn't it? — leo

Because we're no longer infants. Our brains have developed past a stage where we believe that we're the entirety of the world, so that if we cover ourselves in a blanket, we've effectively disappeared, where we believe that the world is centered on us, and where we are not capable of understanding difference from ourselves.

Why would the existence of something like a rock hinge on anything about us? — Terrapin Station

It wouldn't; the perception of the rock, though, does - as you note elsewhere. As to perception, though, that's mental, yes? And if mental, then you have to allow for some access to the objectivity of the rock, by some criteria, in order to even have the idea that it's a rock, so far yes? That is, some aspect of the rock that is in your mind/brain produced perception, must in some way or sense - not sayin' how - be from the rock itself, somehow. If not, then no objectivity - it's all in and of your mind - by your own definition. Do you find anything to disagree with here?

It wouldn't; the perception of the rock, though, does - as you note elsewhere. As to perception, though, that's mental, yes? And if mental, then you have to allow for some access to the objectivity of the rock, by some criteria, in order to even have the idea that it's a rock, so far yes? That is, some aspect of the rock that is in your mind/brain produced perception, must in some way or sense - not sayin' how - be from the rock itself, somehow. If not, then no objectivity - it's all in and of your mind - by your own definition. Do you find anything to disagree with here? — tim wood

Why are you avoiding answering the question I asked in the other thread?

(And apparently why are you avoiding answering why you're avoiding answering the question I asked in the other thread?)

Why are you avoiding answering the question I asked in the other thread? — Terrapin Station

I thought I did. The account of taking. And I wouldn't push the notion of avoidance too far. It's you who won't engage on the simple question of how you see a tree. But I'll go back and look.

I explained that your answer needs to be in this form:

""The way that you can take a cookie, despite taking being a function of your arm/hand is ___________"

Where you're filling in the blank.

After my last post to you in that thread, which was this:

"The way you take something, such as a cookie, is with your arm/hand. But how do you actually do this if taking is something your arm and hand do? Doesn't that imply that really all you can take is your arm/hand? "

You didn't respond at all.

I cant get any purchase on it. It's nonsense. "The way"? The via?

Here's my response then:

"The way that you can take a cookie, despite taking being a function of your arm/hand is
— Terrapin Station
"The way." I shall take that to mean how. Pace, neurobiologists: my brain, processing a lot of perceptions and internal states, orders my muscles to move in certain ways the result of which language easily describes as taking, yes? — tim wood

What are you looking for beyond that? Or what's your point?

Practical matter: you decide which thread. Imo two is one too many.

An Objective statement is one that correctly describes some aspect of Objective Reality, i.e. that which actually is. A statement correctly identified as Objective cannot be challenged or doubted because there is no possibility of it being wrong. And that is the "more" you asked for. :smile:

The silliness comes in when we remember that Objective statements cannot be correctly made by humans, except to say that Objective Reality exists. — Pattern-chaser

But we can even challenge or doubt that "Objective Reality exists", so "objective truth exists" is not an objective truth, it is a personal truth.

If we can't find any statement that cannot be challenged or doubted then what use do we have for the concept of objective truth? It seems to me that the concept is used by people who want to impose their personal truth on others, as if they had a transcendent access to a supposed objective reality beyond perception. The statement "I have access to objective reality" could be challenged itself.

And if we say "There is no objective truth is an objective truth" then we're contradicting ourselves, so again it seems to me the concept of objective truth is incoherent, or at least very problematic, we'd be better off simply talking about personal truth, and not pretend that our personal truths somehow apply to everyone and everything.

Because we're no longer infants. Our brains have developed past a stage where we believe that we're the entirety of the world, so that if we cover ourselves in a blanket, we've effectively disappeared, where we believe that the world is centered on us, and where we are not capable of understanding different from ourselves. — Terrapin Station

Or maybe as we develop even more we realize that we are not passive observers of a world that doesn't depend on us, that we are actively involved in constructing our idea of the world from our perceptions and thoughts, that what we call imagination or dreams or spiritual experiences can be interpreted as perceptions of a world rather than as internal visions of a brain in a material world, that what we call the material world could be interpreted as a shared imagination, and then why would imagination depend on us but not shared imagination?

we realize that we are not passive observers of a world that doesn't depend on us, — leo

From where are you getting the notion of someone positing "passive observers of a world that doesn't (in any way) depend on us"? I just want to check whose views you're referring to, in order to make sure that you're not suggesting a straw man that you're reverting to an infant/todder/juvenile stage of development in response to.

Well, since I think that idealism is pretty stupid--I'm not joking when I say that I think it amounts to adults being stuck in a preoperational (a la Piaget) development phase, — Terrapin Station

You do realize your position, your division of subjectivity/objectivity, and your denial of objectivity puts you into the idealist camp, yes?

your denial of objectivity — tim wood

You do realize that this puts you in the camp of people who can't read, right?

You do realize that this puts you in the camp of people who can't read, right? — Terrapin Station

Perhaps I misread. But you tell me. You have not in other threads denied objectivity?

ou have not in other threads denied objectivity? — tim wood

I've denied that certain things are objective. I've not denied objectivity wholesale. Not at all. If that's what you were thinking, you're grossly misreading me for some reason.

What determines whether something is objective or subjective on my view is ultimately, simply where the "thing" in question is located. What it's a property or process of.

From where are you getting the notion of someone positing "passive observers of a world that doesn't (in any way) depend on us"? — Terrapin Station

It doesn't matter. What we call the material world can also be interpreted as a shared imagination, under this interpretation the existence of a rock depends on us. That shared imagination doesn't stop if you die, but it would stop if we all die. Why would your imagination depend on you and our shared imagination not depend on us? Why would your personal experiences depend on you, and our shared experiences not depend on us?

What we call the material world can also be interpreted as a shared imagination — leo

And the reason that you'd pick that option is?

And the reason that you'd pick that option is? — Terrapin Station

Our concept of a material world stems from experiences we have in common. If you are willing to believe that your subjective experiences depend on you (in the sense they stop when you die), what prevents you from believing that your shared experiences depend on you and those you share them with?

Our concept of a material world stems from experiences we have in common. If you are willing to believe that your subjective experiences depend on you (in the sense they stop when you die), what prevents you from believing that your shared experiences depend on you and those you share them with? — leo

Wait, is that telling me why you'd pick one option over other options? Or are you ignoring that question and asking me other questions instead?

That's the thing, is it true that "The sky is orange" is false? What if I'm watching a sunset and I see the sky orange? What if someone perceives differently and see the sky orange when others see it blue? What if someone doesn't perceive a sky (in which case the sentence wouldn't be truth-evaluable for that person)? How could we say that "The sky is orange" is false for everyone? How could we find anything that is necessarily false (or true) for everyone?

My point is we can't find anything that is true for everyone. And that even the sentence "we can't find anything that is true for everyone" wouldn't be true for everyone. And so on in an infinite regress — leo

Hi Leo,

Thanks for the reply, but I have to admit that as it stands this does not seem to be a defensible position. I used that sentence as an example for what is fairly obvious. We could make our sentences as precise as we need to in order to avoid any issues with reasonable disagreement. There will always be disagreement, but it would likely be unreasonable.

I can enumerate for you an infinite number of objectively true propositions. I will start with one:

$(P \wedge (P\rightarrow Q)) \rightarrow Q$

This is objectively true. It is objective because I can easily create a truth-table to show its relevant truth-conditions for any truth-value assignments for $P$ and $Q$. It is true because this sentence is true on any possible truth-value assignments. That is, it is a logical truth.

Now let $M_1, M_2, M_3,\dots$ be an enumeration of infinitely many propositions with different contents. It is easy to see that:

$((P \wedge (P\rightarrow Q)) \rightarrow Q) \vee M_1$

Is a logical truth and, so, both objective and true. Further,

$(((P \wedge (P\rightarrow Q)) \rightarrow Q) \vee M_1)\vee M_2$

is also objective and true for the same reasons. By $\vee$ introduction, it is easy to see that I can generate infinitely many of these. In fact, I didn't even a list of infinitely many proposition to do that. I could have started with a logical truth, and simply generated infinitely many propositions by applying $\vee$ introduction infinitely many times with the proposition $P$.

I can equally generate many empirical sentences that are both objective and true. For example, "More than two lions exist in Africa at this moment", where we can qualify "this moment" with the precise time of my writing. There are so many propositions of this sort.

Radical skepticism is fine, but I am not bothered if this is the only way you find to deny that propositions can be objective and true.

I also think that radical skepticism tends to work only with conditions we need not accept (on what constitutes knowledge), but I am out of time so I will leave this point to another reply.

Wait, is that telling me why you'd pick one option over other options? — Terrapin Station

It's supposed to. I find that option no less plausible than believing the experiences we have in common stem from a world that exists independently of us. I am sure that I have experiences, I am confident that others have some experiences in common with me, I am less certain that these experiences stem from a world independent of us (as in a world that doesn't depend on minds).

I have evidence of mind (my own), I don't have evidence of something that doesn't depend on mind.

I find that option no less plausible than believing the experiences we have in common stem from a world that exists independently of us. I am sure that I have experiences, I am confident that others have some experiences in common with me, I am less certain that these experiences stem from a world independent of us (as in a world that doesn't depend on minds). — leo

Wait--you'd say that you're more certain that the experiences stem from a world that doesn't exist aside from our minds?

So in what sense can "rocks" be said to exist, if none of the things that make a thing a "rock" exist? — Echarmion

Please. Allow me?

None at all. The things that make a thing a “rock”, that is, a general representation of a real kind of material object in the world, are the myriad of conceptions developed from experience by a rational being. Absent the rational being, the object of his thought in conformity to the conceptions belonging to it, ceases to exist, but of the object itself, no sense of existence can be forthcoming. If there is no thinker, there is nothing to be thought.

I am asking in what way distinct objects with their specific properties exist outside of human cognition. — Echarmion

Same thing: They don’t, as such. Objects are only distinct because of their properties, that which makes a thing that thing and no other. Properties are nothing but named conceptions, themselves mere representations of appearances, developed from experience by rational beings. It follows necessarily that without the cognizant rational being the distinction of objects by means of their representative conceptions, disappears. But again, that says nothing whatsoever about the real existence of objects as they happen to be in themselves, or even if there are any such objects irrespective of human cognition.

If it is presented to us, it is as we understand it; if we are not present, questions about anything are irrational. And foolish. Which is what I think you were trying to show.

If not, then in the words of the immortal Gilda Radner .........never mind.

My (pragmatic) answer to the question 'do we need objective truth ?' is ' yes', because the concept is useful in particular human contexts. But when an attempt is made to play with the individual words in that proposition (...play =philosophize...) ...words like 'we' or 'truth', or 'objective' ...the question becomes meaningless.

Does it matter if it is objective or otherwise, provided it is true?

No.

Yes.. 'it matters'...because playing with the word 'truth' can involve contexts such as religion where 'revealed truth' is contrasted with 'objective truth'.

Do you then agree with the idea that truth is individual-dependent and not something that has independent existence? — leo

Yes, as far as truth is concerned, perspectivism is unavoidable. But that isn't to say that I necessarily believe in the possibility of first-person centered epistemology. A far as epistemology is concerned, the 'third-person' subject seems unavoidable, in so far as knowledge is communicable representation.

I can enumerate for you an infinite number of objectively true propositions. I will start with one:

$(P∧(P→Q))→Q$

This is objectively true. It is objective because I can easily create a truth-table to show its relevant truth-conditions for any truth-value assignments for $P$ and $Q$. It is true because this sentence is true on any possible truth-value assignments. That is, it is a logical truth.

Now let $M1,M2,M3,…$ be an enumeration of infinitely many propositions with different contents. It is easy to see that:

$((P∧(P→Q))→Q)∨M1$

Is a logical truth and, so, both objective and true. Further,

$(((P∧(P→Q))→Q)∨M1)∨M2$

is also objective and true for the same reasons. — Kornelius

The issue I see with calling these objective truth is, I am sure this is true to you, and I am sure you think this is true in general, but what if I don't know what these symbols mean? What if these arrows, chevrons and parentheses do not evoke anything in me beyond shapes drawn on a screen? Then these statements wouldn't be true to me, they would be drawings, and while I could say it is true to me that I see these drawings, I couldn't say these drawings refer to some independent truth.

Now you may say that I would simply have to learn about propositional logic and what these symbols mean in it, and that once I do I too would see the truth of these propositions, but propositional logic was created by other people, and I too could create my own system in which I assign truth to such or such proposition, but that doesn't mean that the truth of these propositions would extend beyond the system they were formulated in.

Because the way I see it, such a system was created out of perceptions and thoughts, and it doesn't apply to people who have perceptions/thoughts incompatible with it, or who haven't created that system in their mind (I see learning as an act of creation in one's mind).

It seems inevitable to me that truth is personal, that we can't find a truth that applies to everyone, unless we force everyone to agree with our personal truth or silence in some way those who disagree, but then we wouldn't create objective truth, we would create the illusion of it. (by objective truth I refer to a truth that would apply to everyone)

I can equally generate many empirical sentences that are both objective and true. For example, "More than two lions exist in Africa at this moment", where we can qualify "this moment" with the precise time of my writing. There are so many propositions of this sort. — Kornelius

What if some great catastrophe occurred in Africa very recently and I am not yet aware of it and it turns out all lions are dead? Or what if I consider that it is meaningless to talk about what goes on in a place "at this moment" if I am not in that place? Or what if I have never seen a lion and I consider that what I haven't seen doesn't exist? People could very well disagree with that proposition in a reasonable way according to them, and with other propositions of this sort.

Yes, as far as truth is concerned, perspectivism is unavoidable. But that isn't to say that I necessarily believe in the possibility of first-person centered epistemology. A far as epistemology is concerned, the 'third-person' subject seems unavoidable, in so far as knowledge is communicable representation. — sime

I think the third-person perspective gives rise to a lot of confusion though, because it gives the impression that what we say applies to everyone and everything, instead of simply to the people who share a given truth. And then people fight each other to prove that their truth is right and others are wrong, to make their truth prevail. If we stopped having that third-person perspective, I think there are a lot of things we could solve, a lot of problems that would disappear. We would listen more, and impose less.

I think the third-person perspective gives rise to a lot of confusion though, because it gives the impression that what we say applies to everyone and everything, instead of simply to the people who share a given truth. And then people fight each other to prove that their truth is right and others are wrong, to make their truth prevail. If we stopped having that third-person perspective, I think there are a lot of things we could solve, a lot of problems that would disappear. We would listen more, and impose less. — leo

This problem, of course, is due to the conflation of truth and meaning. The 'official' semantics of our shared language is too coarse and inflexible to accommodate the idiosyncrasies of every person's bespoke use and interpretation of their national language. One can imagine a futuristic society in which each person's private dialect of their national language is publicly translatable into every other person's private dialect. If in addition the causes of every person's utterances were also understood, then every utterance in the language could be publicly interpreted as being necessarily correct.

Don't forget to answer: "You'd say that you're more certain that the experiences stem from a world that doesn't exist aside from our minds?"