If a being does not exist then it cannot be necessary, because since its being depends on nothing outside itself it must exist or fail the criteria. — Janus


This confuses the necessary being with the necessity of the being. Two different animals. Which? (Or both?) — tim wood

My understanding is that the idea of necessary being as variously understood by Aristotle, the Scholastics and Spinoza is that a necessary being necessarily exists. This is basically a form of ontological argument. The idea is also inherent in different ways in Aquinas' "five ways" as well.

In any case my original input was simply to point out that:
IF God is a necessary being, and
IF to be a necessary being is to necessarily be, and
IF being a necessary being means that everything about that being is necessary and
IF God is a triune being and
IF Jesus is the Son of God meaning that he is one arm of that trinity,
THEN all this is necessary because God is a necessary being and everything about his being is necessarily as it is.

It is really simply tautologous, but as I have laid it out it is not purporting to be an argument that shows that God actually exists or is a triune being and so on. The point simply is that IF these are true THEN they arenecessarily true, under that conception of necessary being.

For Spinoza (whose thought I am most familiar with) at least the logic of necessity is contrasted with the logic of contingency and can be worked out from scratch rationally by means of "intellectual intuition". It has little or nothing to do with "identification" as erroneously asserts (but as usual does not explain).

Spinoza probably would have rejected the idea that God could be a triune being or that a human could be God, in any case, but although the idea does seem incoherent I don't think the logic of necessary being as Spinoza presents it necessarily rules that out, because for Spinoza God is also nature, and because he understood God through the lens of an absolute determinism, nature and the fact of existence of every being that ever existed is also in that deterministic sense necessary while also being contingent (in the conceptually different sense that the existence of finite beings is dependent on other finite beings and ultimately on infinite being (God). In other words for Spinoza if anything is true then it is necessarily true, even if contingent.

This confuses the necessary being with the necessity of the being. Two different animals. Which? (Or both?)
— tim wood

My understanding is that the idea of necessary being as variously understood by Aristotle, the Scholastics and Spinoza is that a necessary being necessarily exists. — Janus

I have no question with your logic. But I invite you to consider the terms themselves.And I am completely aware that the whole matter may hang on details and arguments not front and center here.

If the necessary being exists, then he must exist somewhere, somehow, in some way or capacity. To say that a being exists but not in any way, calls out at the least for a definition of existence such that a being could exist but not in any way. And were such a definition possible, then how could it connect to our ordinary existence? Existence, then, would appear to be about ways.

Or, if the necessary being exists, but not in ways accessible to this existence, then the existence of that being is - necessarily - conjectural and entirely vague.

Perhaps the necessary being exists. Which is prior, existence or being? Can't be existence, because then the necessary being wouldn't be necessary. Is the being prior? But how can a being be, prior to being? Or neither prior. But if neither is prior, then the being is not prior, which is to say, then, unnecessary.

Or maybe the connection of necessary being and existence is incorrect. Maybe the being just is, whatever that might mean, of itself, prior to existence. That is then a non-existing being.

Or much more prosaically: I am married. I take that to be a contingent fact of existence, after all, I might not be married. Being married, however, invokes a necessary being, and the necessity of that being, my wife. But that necessity is grounded in a prior contingency. Can you think of any necessity not so grounded?

If the necessary being exists, then he must exist somewhere, somehow, in some way or capacity. To say that a being exists but not in any way, calls out at the least for a definition of existence such that a being could exist but not in any way. And were such a definition possible, then how could it connect to our ordinary existence? Existence, then, would appear to be about ways. — tim wood

I think I see where the confusion lies. The idea of necessary being, the fact that there is an idea of necessary being, and the logic that idea entails in no way guarantees that a necessary being actually exists. There may be no necessary being other than being itself (if it is indeed necessary that there be something rather than nothing).

It's probably my fault and I should have put an extra clause right at the beginning:

IF there is a necessary being. The whole point is that IF there is a necessary being then the attributes of that being must also be necessary.

I agree we don't have to worry about the logic. I'm thinking the idea of a necessary being, attractive as it may be, is incoherent on its face, rescuable if at all by the magic of a highly qualified definition.
Your last makes sense to me. For being to be, & etc., without the requirement that there be being.

The OP itself, then, reduces, as most of these discussions do, to defining terms and seeing if the terms so defined make any sense.

As to the fact of the matter of the OP, that would be a nonsense question, because it refers back to what people take as a matter of faith, not as fact.

Have you read Meillassoux' After Finitude. He argues there that the only thing which is necessary is contingency; quite a reversal! I don't find the argument convincing, but an interesting corollary would seem to be that if contingency is necessary then there must be something contingent; which means that there must be something, which means that being is necessary.

Hi. That is, you start with maybe? That does make sense. Well, then, the maybe must be necessary. Maybe! And at some point, I experience fatigue at all the trips cutting through language and getting nowhere or nothing. (Although, if something is necessary, then it certainly may be necessary!)

From a very interesting book, The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie.

"In this way, Ockham's assertion of ontological individualism undermines not only ontological realism but also syllogistic logic and science, for in the absence of real universals, names become mere signs or signs of signs. Language thus does not reveal being but in practice often conceals the truth about being by fostering a belief in the reality of universals" p. 23.

Take your position: a numerical expression actually refers to a constituent of thought. This is problematic, since it cannot mean the constituent of my thought or your thought. — Kornelius

That's not an objection; if it weren't true, we could neither communicate nor collaborate. People play blindfold chess!

The definition of 'object' is:

object
noun
/ˈɒbdʒɛkt,ˈɒbdʒɪkt/
1. a material thing that can be seen and touched.
"he was dragging a large object"
synonyms: thing, article, item, piece, device, gadget, entity, body; More
2. a person or thing to which a specified action or feeling is directed.
"disease became the object of investigation"
synonyms: target, butt, focus, recipient, victim
"he became the object of fierce criticism"

So the use of the word 'object' for number is arguably like the second of these cases - but again, I'm suggesting, is itself a metaphorical deployment of the primary term 'object'.

I think you are trying to redefine objectivity to suit a particular position, i.e., it must "pertain to objects" and you are refusing to admit that mathematical propositions involve objects. Even if they don't involve objects, there is no way mathematical propositions are not objective. They are paramount objectively true propositions. — Kornelius

I'm pointing out that here the word 'object' is used in a metaphorical way, and saying that this has overlooked implications.

The word 'objectivity' only entered the discourse in the early modern period - the online thesaurus says first written in 1610. Nowadays, the description of the arbitration of what is true as being 'objective' is so much part of normal discourse, that it seems absurd to challenge it - as you are saying! I'm saying that logical and arithmetical truths are not reliant on objective validation, that they're true a priori - something which still has a connection to the thread, even if tenuous!

From a very interesting book, The Theological Origins of Modernity, Michael Allen Gillespie. — tim wood

:up: Great book. And that quotation you provide is directly on point.

It has little or nothing to do with "identification" as ↪Terrapin Station erroneously asserts (but as usual does not explain). — Janus

What has to do with identification is "Jesus is God."

There's something we're calling "Jesus" and something we're calling "God." If they turn out to be the same thing, so that the identity statement "Jesus is God" is correct, was it the case that necessarily they turned out to be the same thing--that is, would they have to be the same thing in all possible worlds?

It's the same question as whether "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is a necessary identity.

And the issue I brought up is that if we believe that Hesperus is metaphysically necessary, does that have any implication for whether it's necessary that Hesperus is Phosphorus? I say that it does not.

Of course, I don't believe there are any necessary identity statements period. And a fortiori, I don't really buy the notion of rigid designation beyond it being a way of saying that particular individuals can stipulate rigidity for a way that they're going to use a term, no matter what. I'd agree that we tend to use proper names in a rigid way--once we christen a baby "Richard Milhous Nixon" we tend to continue thinking of and calling that person "Richard Milhous Nixon" whether he becomes president or a janitor, but we wouldn't have to.

That someone else--Spinoza, Kripke, etc. might disagree with me is irrelevant, unless someone has specified that they only want to know what Spinoza or Kripke would say.

Christ signifies the point of mediation between humanity and the divine. Within a Judeo-Christian framework, Jesus would be a maniestation of the divine, but, not equivalent to the sum total of what comprises divinity. It is often stressed that Jesus was a man. According to the theology, God made himself man to mediate with humanity. Jesus was mortal, and, therefore human. He ascends to the empyrean after death. The metaphor, I think, shows how a mortal man is capable of mediating the situations of historical events. Christ becomes resurrected by that everyone learns to be capable of such things. You might find for it to a bit strange to engage someone in a conversation about this who takes their influence from Zizek and Endnotes, but, I have been thinking about this lately.

I'm saying that logical and arithmetical truths are not reliant on objective validation, that they're true a priori - something which still has a connection to the thread, even if tenuous! — Wayfarer

But this is my point: you are misusing "objective validation". Arithmetical propositions are necessarily true and deductively certain. They are objectively validated since they are true in every possible world. That is, one cannot reject the proposition and still claim to be thinking rationally.

Or we could put it this way: mathematical propositions are deductively proven, therefore objectively validated.

The definition of 'object' is: — Wayfarer

That is not a suitable definition for 'object' in philosophy at all. An object is whatever can be the semantic reference of a term. This includes abstract objects like sets, for example. Indeed, anything that could occur flanked to an identity sign in mathematics is an object, since only an object can be assigned to a term that flanks an identity sign.

IF there is a necessary being. The whole point is that IF there is a necessary being then the attributes of that being must also be necessary. — Janus

This pretty much sums up the appropriate response to the OP as well. The entire claim is a conditional claim of this sort, which is why it is not controversial.

If God exists, then he necessarily exists. If Jesus is God, then Jesus is necessarily God. If Jesus is not God, then Jesus is necessarily not God.

That's it really.

Jesus Christ, in my opinion is the personality of God. I believe God felt the need to have a personality so he subdivided his multi dimensional attributes into himself and human form that actually had a personality.

Or we could put it this way: mathematical propositions are deductively proven, therefore objectively validated. — Kornelius

In which case, I would agree with you. As I've said, we refer to mathematical judgement to determine what is an objective claim.

That is not a suitable definition for 'object' in philosophy at all. An object is whatever can be the semantic reference of a term. — Kornelius

And I'm saying that this usage amounts to a dead metaphor, that it's a consequence of the absorption of an empiricist or naturalistic point of view which then has un-acknowledged semantic and even metaphysical consequences.

And I'm saying that this usage amounts to a dead metaphor, that it's a consequence of the absorption of an empiricist or naturalistic point of view which then has un-acknowledged semantic and even metaphysical consequences. — Wayfarer

Why empiricist or naturalist? They would at least want to deny that there are abstract objects. One route to do this is to say that mathematical language that uses referential terms is a mere convenience or misleading, that the genuine semantics for such a language doesn't involve reference to numbers at all. They would, of course, have to construct such a language, or argue that terms can refer without taking seriously the objects to which they are referring.

I tend to see the view that objects are the reference of terms as a straightforward Platonist one (at least when it comes to abstract objects and properties/universals).

I have responded further in this thread

You must be aware of the Holy Trinity paradox. The claim is that

1. Jesus is God

and also

2. Jesus is NOT god

If you accept 1 then ''Jesus is god'' is necessarily true


BUT


If you accept 2 then ''Jesus is god'' is necessarily false.

God is a 10 dimensional entity. The holy spirit moves up and down all 10 dimensions. Jesus Christ is in the 3rd and 4th dimension and God the father is in the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th dimensions. :)

google or bing "10 dimensions explained" on youtube

God is a 10 dimensional entity. — christian2017

:smile:

Here's another thought. The idea of God being three persons seems to defy our rules of logic and/or is a logical fallacy. If that is true, then question whether there are any existing analogies in the world of physics or otherwise that defy logic. Our consciousness is one of them.

I would argue the reason consciousness defies logic is because it precludes the law of excluded middle. The reason is, we humans can do two things at one time. One example is driving a car while totally thinking about something else. Or reciting something and thinking about something else that is completely different.

I believe Atheist Daniel Dennett wrote a book on Consciousness but unfortunately could not logically explain this phenomena about the mind (as well as other things).