To summarize, the harder problem is that human phenomenal concepts do not reveal whether our material makeup or the functional role our neurobiology plays is responsible for consciousness. As such, we have no philosophical justification for saying whether a functional isomorph made up of different material such as the android Data from Star Trek is conscious. Even more confusing, we have no way of telling whether a "mere" functional isomorph is conscious, where "mere" means functional in terms of human folk psychology only, and not in the actual neural functions. — Marchesk
This applies to other possible physical systems, such as Block's Chinese brain, were a billion Chinese with radios and flags implement the functional role for conscious brain states. And if one bites the functional bullet on this and says that such a system would be conscious, then in all likelihood, countries like India are already performing enough of those roles to be conscious. — Marchesk
I should also note that Data would likely not pass the Turing Test as he has certain idiosyncrasies that would probably tip humans off that he's a machine, if the test were sufficiently thorough. — Marchesk
Searle's biological position — Marchesk
Can you reiterate this for me? What makes neurons special as a carrier of chemical messengers, sodium/potassium gates, and so on? — schopenhauer1
Simulating consciousness is consciousness. Consciousness is a behavioral feature, not a physiological or neurological one. — T Clark
Data could certainly pass the Turing test if he wanted to. — T Clark
What Putnam et al are arguing is false. The state of adding 2 would be identical to the electronic state for the electronic device as it adds 2, and it would be identical to the brain state as the brain (as someone mentally) adds 2. — Terrapin Station
IMO, the difficulty is due to the vagueness of the term "consciousness". Broadly speaking, we can consider Data, my cat, and myself to each possess a sort of functional capability that are analogous to one another - and we could label this functional capability as "consciousness." Or we could adopt a narrow view of consciousness that could only possibly apply to humans (and possibly not even all HUMANS!).To summarize, the harder problem is that human phenomenal concepts do not reveal whether our material makeup or the functional role our neurobiology plays is responsible for consciousness. As such, we have no philosophical justification for saying whether a functional isomorph made up of different material such as the android Data from Star Trek is conscious. Even more confusing, we have no way of telling whether a "mere" functional isomorph is conscious, where "mere" means functional in terms of human folk psychology only, and not in the actual neural functions. — Marchesk
it's not behavior. I can pretend to be in pain or feel sad. i can also hide my pain (within reason) or sadness. When you dream at night, usually your body is paralyzed so you don't move around in response to your dreams. You can sit perfectly still and meditate. — Marchesk
I don't think we're doing exactly the same thing as a calculator/computer when we add two, — Marchesk
However, I think the argument is that functionalism is a kind of dualism, because it's something additional to the physical substrate. — Marchesk
Now, back to our internal experience of consciousness. For me, and, as I understand it, others, the essence of the experience is internal speech. Talking to ourselves. Another essential aspect is that it allows us to stand back and observe ourselves objectively, as if from the outside, just the way we observe others. We judge ourselves conscious just as we judge others - based on our behavior. — T Clark
That would work maybe if the functionalist is positing multiple instances of something identical, so that they'd have to be realists on universals/types. But we could have a nominalist sort of functionalism, where we're calling x and y "F," even though it's not literally two identical instances of F. — Terrapin Station
I agree with this, but would like to clarify that inner dialog is one aspect of HUMAN consciousness. Non-human animals (and non-verbal humans) probably don't have an inner dialog, but they arguably experience qualia.Inner dialog is just one more form of conscious experience. And it's not necessary to experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. — Marchesk
That might work, but would you extend that to different computers performing addition? — Marchesk
I agree with this, but would like to clarify that inner dialog is one aspect of HUMAN consciousness. Non-human animals (and non-verbal humans) probably don't have an inner dialog, but they arguably experience qualia. — Relativist
I argue that we should use a comprehensive definition of consciousness that admits a wide set of mental behavior. If we get too specific, we become overly human-chauvinistic. — Relativist
Yes. Again, I said this in the earlier post. The full quote was: "'Adding 2' is not identical in both instances, obviously. And it's not identical in two instances of a calculator (or two calculators) adding two, either. " — Terrapin Station
On the show, Data is always puzzled by some feature of common human behavior. Maybe he could convince someone he's autistic, except the can perform calculation and recitation of facts at a superhuman level if asked, and he usually does so unless told not to. — Marchesk
Here is where we fundamentally disagree. Inner dialog is just one more form of conscious experience. And it's not necessary to experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. — Marchesk
I judge myself to be conscious because I am conscious, not because I behave as if I am. I judge other people on behavior AND biology, because I don't experience what they do, but I have no reason for supposing they would be lacking. — Marchesk
What does Grandin say about awareness vs. consciousness. — T Clark
It is necessary to consciously experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. It's obviously possible to experience these without being consciously aware. — T Clark
It is not necessary to consciously experience color, sound, pain in perception, memory, imagination, etc. — T Clark
When you dream at night, usually your body is paralyzed so you don't move around in response to your dreams. You can sit perfectly still and meditate. — Marchesk
You've never had a lucid dream? — Marchesk
I would say we aren't experiencing anything when we're not conscious. We're p-zombies in that regard. Experience is consciousness. — Marchesk
Really? When a baby cries for food, it's not because it is experiencing hunger? When a dog is injured, it doesn't experience pain and fear? Dogs and babies don't experience anything? That seems like a pretty radical claim to me. — T Clark
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