You didn't think that dreams were experienced, only remembered. Well, I've had lucid dreams a few times. They are conscious experiences as much as perception is. — Marchesk

It's not fair for me to judge the experience you've had without a better understanding. But that never stops me, does it? I guess I don't see how a lucid dream is any different from any other kind. In the most common kind of dream I have, I experience frustration and anxiety. In your lucid dream, you experience consciousness. Consciousness, frustration, and anxiety are all mental experiences.

I know, I don't find that response particularly satisfying either. It's the best I've got right now.

Consciousness, frustration, and anxiety are all mental experiences. — T Clark

I'm wondering why all your mental experiences aren't just being conscious? Feelings included. Are we using different terms? By consciousness, do you mean awareness of what you're experiencing, and that inner dialog is what makes us aware?

Which is not one I would make. Why wouldn't they be conscious?

Part of the problem here is that experience can mean behavior as well as consciousness, and I would rather restrict experience to consciousness, otherwise it's easy to slip between the two, resulting in arguing past one another in these debates. — Marchesk

Maybe we're at the heart of our disagreement. Maybe "difference of understanding" is better than "disagreement." As usual, it comes down to a matter of definition. You define "consciousness" differently than I do. If I were to say that my definition is more in keeping with the common meaning of the word, that would just start us off on another spiral of disagreement.

I'm wondering why all your mental experiences aren't just being conscious? Feelings included. Are we using different terms? By consciousness, do you mean awareness of what you're experiencing, and that inner dialog is what makes us aware? — Marchesk

Geez, I'm falling behind here. See my response immediately previous to this one.

I am having a good time with this discussion. We're both being thoughtful and friendly and we're homing in on our differences of understanding. Even if those aren't resolved, it's still useful and interesting.

So the point of all this disagreement is the hard(er) problem. If we learn about our consciousness the same way we do other people, then it might not be a problem.

But I think our own case is special, because we experience our conscious states, and can only infer them about other people.

So the point of all this disagreement is the hard(er) problem. If we learn about our consciousness the same way we do other people, then it might not be a problem. — Marchesk

I've never gotten all this talk about the hard problem. Now that I've heard about the harder problem, I don't get it either. Nothing here seems particularly difficult to me.

But I think our own case is special, because we experience our conscious states, and can only infer them about other people. — Marchesk

And that's the heart of the matter. The point I've been making is that I don't believe it is true, at least I don't think I do. I'll leave myself some room for additional thought. I understand why people think that way. As I said earlier, consciousness is very personal. Just about everyone who considers themselves consciousness has a strong opinion.

I've never gotten all this talk about the hard problem. Now that I've heard about the harder problem, I don't get it either. Nothing here seems particularly difficult to me. — T Clark

So Data wouldn't present a problem to you, because he could tell you he was conscious, and back that up with convincing behavior?

I don't know that I can agree with that. How would they functionally be different for such a simple case? You're saying that there can never be an exact duplicate function across different physical subtrates. — Marchesk

So, what would make one a nominalist, at least in the more common sense of the term, is that one doesn't believe that any numerically distinct things can be identical.

Because different substrates are numerically distinct things, then as you surmise, under nominalism, no properties, including functions, can be literally identical. And it's even the case that with the "same" substrate, two numerically distinct instances can not be literally identical.

That doesn't mean that they can't be similar enough that we (loosely) call them "the same." It's just that literally, they're not actually the same. It's different things that are similar.

So all that functionalism would amount to, to a nominalist, is similar behavior in some respect(s). It's not identical behavior, as in "one and the same."

So, what would make one a nominalist, at least in the more common sense of the term, is that one doesn't believe that any numerically distinct things can be identical. — Terrapin Station

So all it would take to disprove nominalism is to find a numerically distinct thing that was identical for some property or function?

Wouldn't any two computers count then, or do they have to be of different chip design?

So Data wouldn't present a problem to you, because he could tell you he was conscious, and back that up with convincing behavior? — Marchesk

That's not something I'd worry about. It doesn't make much of a difference in a case like that if we figure he's conscious or not.

So all it would take to disprove nominalism is to find a numerically distinct thing that was identical for some property or function? — Marchesk

Sure. Although how anyone could do that is a mystery. A nominalist isn't going to take any numerically distinct things as identical to each other, a fortiori because we believe that the idea of this is incoherent . . . and that's the case even for nominalists who buy that there are real abstracts, but most nominalists do not buy that notion.

We haven't solved the easy problem yet.

Keep in mind that nominalists are NOT saying that two separate things can't be "similar in all (non-relational) respects."

They're saying that two separate things can't literally be the same, single thing. For one, it contradicts the idea that they're two separate things.

This extends to saying that a property instantiated in two separate things can literally be the same, single thing.

A nominalist isn't going to take any numerically distinct things as identical to each other, a fortiori because we believe that the idea of this is incoherent . — Terrapin Station

But that's begging the question. How do we know two numerically distinct things can't be identical in some manner that would contradict nominalism? Note here that I'm exluding numerical identity and spatiotemporal location.

We have tomatoe 1 and tomato 2. If they both have exactly the same color, then isn't that an identical property that nominalism says can't exist?

So all it would take to disprove nominalism is to find a numerically distinct thing that was identical for some property or function? — Marchesk

It would have to be identical in all ways to be “identical”. Thats an important distinction here isnt it? Things can have identical properties, such as color, under nominalism, just not the same instances of that color?

So Data wouldn't present a problem to you, because he could tell you he was conscious, and back that up with convincing behavior? — Marchesk

I would consider Data conscious, if he actually existed, because he acts like a conscious being when compared with the other conscious beings I know - primarily humans. Maybe that comes down to the Turing Test.

I'm reading "The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind." Written in the 1970s. The author, Julian Jaynes, claims that humans did not become conscious until about 3,000 years ago. Before that, the role that consciousness plays now was played by voices in our heads which directed our actions and which were interpreted as the voices of gods speaking to us directly...Yes...I know...

Actually, Jaynes work was taken seriously and even now is not considered pseudo-science by most. I have not been impressed with the quality of the argument. I'm three chapters in. It reads like a Malcolm Gladwell essay. I don't consider that a good thing.

Things can have identical properties, such as color, under nominalism, just not the same instances of that color? — DingoJones

I don't see how that works. How can nominalism have the same instances of color if everything is particular?

Properties and functions present the same problem for nominalism as does object identity. You can even dispense with objects in favor of mereological nihilism, and properties/functions would still pose a problem.

But that's begging the question. — Marchesk

You're using "begging the question" in that weird, non-formal way. It's not begging the question re the logical fallacy.

How do we know two numerically distinct things can't be identical in some manner that would contradict nominalism? — Marchesk

As I said, because for one, "numerically distinct" contradicts "not numerically distinct."

We have tomatoe 1 and tomato 2. If they both have exactly the same color, then isn't that an identical property that nominalism says can't exist? — Marchesk

Are they numerically distinct instances of redness?

Are they numerically distinct instances of redness? — Terrapin Station

Not if they reflect exactly the same wavelength of light.

Things can have identical properties, such as color, under nominalism, — DingoJones

Typically nominalism does not allow identical properties in numerically distinct things.

To be an identical property, we're saying that it's just one property--there's no numerical distinctness--that's somehow instantiated in two different things.

Not if they reflect exactly the same wavelength of light. — Marchesk

So the same light reflects off of two numerically distinct tomatoes?

So the same light reflects off of two numerically distinct tomatoes? — Terrapin Station

The tomatoes are numerically distinct, the property is not.

I'm asking you about the light. You used that as a determiner.

I don't see how that works. How can nominalism have the same instances of color if everything is particular? — Marchesk

I just finished saying it wouldnt have the same instance of color. Instance of color and color are not the same thing. The former has a temporal quality, the latter does not. Im sure Terra will have the formal terms for us.

I'm asking you about the light. You used that as a determiner. — Terrapin Station

You're asking me whether the same photons bounce off different surfaces? Not under normal circumstances, but there might be a way to do this experimentally.

You're asking me whether the same photons bounce off different surfaces? — Marchesk

The photon wouldn't be numerically distinct (including numerically distinct temporal instances) but we'd somehow be able to point the the photon bouncing off of numerically distinct tomatoes?

The photon wouldn't be numerically distinct (including numerically distinct temporal instances) but we'd somehow be able to point the the photon bouncing off of numerically distinct tomatoes? — Terrapin Station

There might be a way to emit and capture the same photons in a very controlled setting, while bouncing them off two surfaces made to reflect the same wavelength.

There might be a way to emit and capture the same photons in a very controlled setting, while bouncing them off two surfaces made to have the reflect the same wavelength. — Marchesk

So at the same exact time, the same photons would bounce off of numerically distinct surfaces--so that the surfaces would have to be spatially separated, but we're not talking about photons that are spatially separated . . . somehow.

That seems really incoherent.

That seems really incoherent. — Terrapin Station

Why does it have to be the exact same time to be the same photons? Do the photons turn into other photons over time?

But anyway, are you really so sure this couldn't be done with a double-slit kind of setup?

Typically nominalism does not allow identical properties in numerically distinct things. — Terrapin Station

So two things that are red are not actually red but rather two different colors that we just refer to as red as an approximation?
Does a distinction between a property and something like a category or some other trait matter at all, or is that just another approximation we use for ease of language/reference?