I'm convinced that any sufficiently in depth discussion of realism or consciousness will turn into one on QM.

It does make me wonder what Platonists do with the wavefunction and the possibility that properties don't have set values until they're observed. @Wayfarer?

Not sure this helps the nominalist either.

Why does it have to be the exact same time to be the same photons? Do the photons turn into other photons over time? — Marchesk

As I said above "The photon wouldn't be numerically distinct (including numerically distinct temporal instances)"

Not at the same time is numerical distinction, so it's not identical in that sense.

Why does it have to be the exact same time to be the same photons? Do the photons turn into other photons over time? — Marchesk

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences.

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences. — DingoJones

So a specific shade of red cannot be the same shade over time? What about the mass of an electron? Is that property different over time, even though its numerically measured to be the same?

So two things that are red are not actually red but rather two different colors that we just refer to as red as an approximation? — DingoJones

They're similar. It's not that "they're not actually red." It's that "actual red" isn't just a single thing. You're basically assuming platonism a la there being singular forms that are nevertheless somehow multiply instantiated in different things. On the standard nominalistic view, that idea is incoherent, and we don't buy any real abstractions (such as platonic forms).

Does a distinction between a property and something like a category or some other trait matter at all, or is that just another approximation we use for ease of language/reference? — DingoJones

I'm not sure what you're asking there.

Not at the same time is numerical distinction, so it's not identical in that sense. — Terrapin Station

Which means you're not allowed to conceive of an object over time, since it's always different.

Which means you're not allowed to conceive of an object over time, since it's always different. — Marchesk

It's not that "you're not allowed to conceive of it." Your abstraction isn't literally the case objectively, and your abstraction/conception itself isn't identical through time.

t's not that "you're not allowed to conceive of it." Your abstraction isn't literally the case objectively, and your abstraction/conception itself isn't identical through time. — Terrapin Station

So is it philosophically the case that composite objects don't exist, or only exist for one instance in time?

Actually for that matter, is it the case that fundamental particles don't persist in time, since they're always numerically different?

So is it philosophically the case that composite objects don't exist? — Marchesk

There's no connection between nominalism and whether objects can be composites. Under nominalism, it's just that the parts and the object are particulars (that aren't identical through time on a nominalistic rejection of genidentity as well).

There's no connection between nominalism and whether objects can be composites. Under nominalism, it's just that the parts and the object are particulars (that aren't identical through time on a nominalistic rejection of genidentity as well). — Terrapin Station

I kind of think there is. Because if we say a chair can be a composite object, then we're saying a lot of different kinds of material arrangements can be a chair. If every chair is particular, then what is the meaning of "chair"? Why are these different objects chairs?

Concepts like "chair" are abstractions we perform where we mentally generalize some features and ignore others. If something matches the conception then we apply the name to that thing--basically we say that that particular fits the concept we've formulated. (And "essential" properties are the necessary requirements, per how we've formulated our concepts, to for us to don something by a concept name.)

Yes, it would have to be at the same time in order to be identical. If the time was different, that would not be identical. To be identical there can be no differences. — DingoJones

So when we say that 2 is identical to 2, it doesn't matter if one two was written on a blackboard in 1972 and another on a whiteboard in 2019.

Is that because 2 is not an object? Substitute the word red or #FF0000 for 2 if you like, or F=MA.

So when we say that 2 is identical to 2, it doesn't matter if one two was written on a blackboard in 1972 and another on a whiteboard in 2019.

Is that because 2 is not an object? — Marchesk

It would be because you're not a nominalist, and you maybe buy real abstracts/abstract objects, you'd probably be a platonist re ontology of mathematics, and so on.

They're similar. It's not that "they're not actually red." It's that "actual red" isn't just a single thing. You're basically assuming platonism a la there being singular forms that are nevertheless somehow multiply instantiated in different things. On the standard nominalistic view, that idea is incoherent, and we don't buy any real — Terrapin Station

I don’t think so, I just do not know the proper/formal terminology. I was hoping you would be able to understand what I meant. “Not actually red” in the sense that there is some difference between the two instances of red that in certain contexts (such as a discussion like this one) makes it important to recognise the distinctions that nominalism makes.
Anyway, I understand.

I don’t think so, I just do not know the proper/formal terminology. I was hoping you would be able to understand what I meant. “Not actually red” in the sense that there is some difference between the two instances of red that in certain contexts (such as a discussion like this one) makes it important to recognise the distinctions that nominalism makes.
Anyway, I understand. — DingoJones

The distinction is one I pointed out in an earlier post:

"Keep in mind that nominalists are NOT saying that two separate things can't be 'similar in all (non-relational [to other thing]) respects.'

"They're saying that two separate things can't literally be the same, single thing. For one, it contradicts the idea that they're two separate things.

"This extends to saying that a property instantiated in two separate things can literally be the same, single thing."

It would be because you're not a nominalist, and you maybe buy real abstracts/abstract objects, you'd probably be a platonist re ontology of mathematics, and so on. — Terrapin Station

I'm not sure. I can see your argument against composite objects, but what about physics itself? There are universal laws and properties in physics. How can equations apply to all instances?

The context of the current dispute is whether functionality can be identical across multiple things, which is something that's kind of taken for granted in computer science.

So when we say that 2 is identical to 2, it doesn't matter if one two was written on a blackboard in 1972 and another on a whiteboard in 2019.

Is that because 2 is not an object? — Marchesk

Im not sure what 2 identical to 2 would mean. In the strict, technical way we are talking about here nothing can truly identical to anything else.

Im not sure what 2 identical to 2 would mean. In the strict, technical way we are talking about here nothing can truly identical to anything else. — DingoJones

So the concept identical is incoherent? This is a reductio ad absurdum.

In a certain sense I would say so ya. Obviously, when making references informally “identical” is perfectly coherent though.
Ah, you added to it. Ok, maybe incoherent isnt the right word. I got caught up in the terms of others there.

In a certain sense I would say so ya. Obviously, when making references informally “identical” is perfectly coherent though. — DingoJones

Doesn't identity underpin logic? That's a pretty extreme position to take. Nominalism isn't worth jettisoning logic.

Im not sure in what way identity underpins logic, but I cannot see where I said anything extreme. What implications do you imagine are extreme, from what Ive said here?

The third law of logic is the principle of identity. If identity is incoherent at the level of rigor logic requires, then we can't say that X=X is true, which likely has pretty bad ramifications.

All I'm saying is that if strict nominalism leads to abandoning a pillar of logic, then perhaps the nominalist restriction on identity should be loosened up a bit so as to not undermine logic?

I wasnt talking about “identity” as strictly the use in formal logic. It has more meanings than that.
Also, you do not have to abandon a pillar of logic to maintain nominalism as far as I can tell. Im not really here arguing for nominalism, just clarifying part of the discussion so it can continue.

I wouldn't have gone that far, but you did say that 2 in 1972 on a blackboard would not be equal to 2 in 2019 on a whiteboard, because they are numerically different in space and time. Same goes for X.

If that's the position nominalism ends up taking, then it does undermine identity. When I write X = X, well there are two Xs in different locations, written at slightly different times!

Wording is important here, I didnt say “equal”.

Wording is important here, I didnt say “equal”. — DingoJones

Equal means identical in logic and math ...?

Sure, in logic and math (maybe). Did I stumble into a discussion where it had been agreed to use only that context? My mistake, I must have missed that caveat.

There are universal laws and properties in physics. How can equations apply to all instances? — Marchesk

I'm not a realist on laws existing as something independent of the "behavior" of particulars. And I'm basically a constructivist on mathematics and logic. I see them how we think about relations, and then we extrapolate from that thinking in a game-like manner, with it being something with strong social mediation, aided by the fact that aside from rudimentary usage, initial transmission is largely via organized social settings--mostly in classrooms.

Searle just says we know in the case of humans we know that we're conscious, so it must be tied to our biology, since we don't have any other explanation. — Marchesk

But then how about my criticism?

What I thought was a funny conclusion from much of these philosophies, is that neurons themselves seem to have a sort of magical quality.. If one does not bite the bullet on PANpscyhism, one bites the bullet on NEUROpsychism. In other words, the "Cartesian theater", the "hidden dualism", and the "ghost in the machine" (or whatever nifty term you want to use) gets put into the equation at SOME point. It just depends on exactly what point you want to put it in the equation. — schopenhauer1

Yes, I saw that and agree. I'm not satisfied with anyone's solution to the hard or harder problems. You end up biting one or more bullets no matter which way you go.