Anti-realism is just the wrong term to use. The world is always, already, interpreted. Hence, there is a world. Calling this view anti=realism is obfuscation — Banno

I wasn't talking about world-anti-realism. Instead, ontological anti-realism. At least it's a good place to start so you don't end up just trying to find a theory that fits the conclusion you've already reached.

OK. So when we talk about the stuff around us, are we talking about the stuff, or the perceptions-of-stuff?

Realism is the view that we are talking about the stuff. Anti-realism is the view that we are talking about the interpreted stuff. Davidson is saying that these are the very same. That's why he never agreed to be called an anti-realist.

Banno agrees with Davidson, via Wittgenstein. The interpretation is not a conceptual schema, but a bunch of language games.

So Kuhn's work should be re-written with the language games of Newton and Einstein replacing incomensurable paradigms. Clearly we can and do use both F=ma and the relativistic equations, and which we choose depends on what we are doing.

It's probably worth pointing out that a language game is not just words. It also involves slabs and apples, and other stuff.

This is what is misunderstood by those who use "it's just a language game" as a dismissal.

But I don't think these views incompatible. Language games are not conceptual schemes.

The "Slab!" game and the counting apples game could be played by the very same person. But in what sense could we translate one into the other? — Banno

It's clear in that case, but above we were reducing the information-transfer aspect of language by focusing on the game-like nature of actual fact-exchanges and how learning a fact it only knowing-how when embedded in a larger game. Isn't a Kuhn suggesting something like competing conceptual games?

Edit: I see you addressed that just above.

OK. So when we talk about the stuff around us, are we talking about the stuff, or the perceptions-of-stuff? — Banno

Terrapin claims to be a physicalist. It's not clear what that means. It's an unnecessary straight-jacket for the mind. Ontological anti-realism just says that in varying degrees of force.

In other ways, Terrapin nails it, though. He sees that syntax and meaning are bound together. I mean, it's not really syntax if it has no meaning, is it? And how could there be meaning without some vehicle for expression? Two sides of the same coin.

but above we were reducing the information-transfer aspect of language by focusing on the game-like nature of actual fact-exchanges and how learning a fact it only knowing-how when embedded in a larger game. — csalisbury

(A) "Can you tell me the capital of Mongolia?" asked Bob sincerely. "London", answered Sally.

:rofl:

Yep. If only he could see that meaning is not in heads, but out there in the world.

Wouldn't not having to find where meaning is located in our neurones make his physicalism simpler?

What it was meant to highlight was that "I do" there is not just communicative, it registers consent. Functionally, it marries rather than transmits. Of course, it also communicates, but it does more. — fdrake

Register, as in indicate, display or show, as in some form of output. Advertise, let know, inform... We are talking about the same thing - the movement of information with different causes.

What do your senses do? What kind of work do your senses do?

Or make that Beijing, continued Sally coquettishly. I'm being earnest! Bob said earnestly.

Ok, so let's say conceptual or language games take place within a shared terrain. You can divide it up however you like, but all games still succeed or founder insofar as they're in some way adequate to the terrain. Mere internal coherence is not enough. There's still the question of whether there is the possibility of a unified theory or whether what we always have is a patchwork of loosely connected conceptual games that we shift between depending on what we're doing. If there's a metaphysical question lurking here,it's whether the world itself is any less patchwork than our games. (but importantly, if it isn't, that isn't full relativism. games still work or don't.)

Or make that Beijing, continued Sally coquettishly. I'm being earnest! Bob said earnestly.

Ok, so let's say conceptual or language games take place within a shared terrain. You can divide it up however you like, but all games still succeed or founder insofar as they're in some way adequate to the terrain. Mere internal coherence is not enough. There's still the question of whether there is the possibility of a unified theory or whether what we always have is a patchwork of loosely connected conceptual games that we shift between depending on what we're doing. If there's a metaphysical question lurking here,it's whether the world itself is any less patchwork than our games. (but importantly, if it isn't, that isn't full relativism. games still work or don't.) — csalisbury

@Banno

You are all playing a language game by equivocating explanation and use.

Meaning is something that individual people do. — Terrapin Station

What people do is activities. There is meaning in activities, but actions are not meaning.

I don't think it makes a lot of sense to try to quantify thing/process A versus thing/process B as "more meaningful"--at least not in general. It can make sense a la the report of an individual, where they're telling us something about the extent to which they think about A versus B in terms of meaning. — Terrapin Station

I don't believe that you believe this. I'm sure you must see some activities as more meaningful than others.

In any event, this is avoiding the point I was making and what I was asking. I explained how it makes sense to talk about DNA "matching" something. That's referring to a physical process, inherent in the properties of the substances involved, that results in something with similar structure, etc. being fashioned out of particular substances. In what similar way would we be talking about matching when we're talking about propositions and states of affairs? — Terrapin Station

You didn't make a point. I was talking to Creative about "meaning", not propositions. And Creative seemed to be denying meaning from DNA replication on the mistaken account that nothing is making a correlation in DNA replication and the incorrect assumption that there is no agent involved in DNA replication. So to simply attempt to change the subject, and introduce "propositions and states of affairs", does not make a point at all. To make a point, you would need to say how the correlation between two sets of DNA is related to the correlation between propositions and states of affairs. Until then, you're asking me to compare apples and oranges. That's why I answered you by saying that I believe one is more meaningful than the other. What else are you looking for?

You are all playing a language game by equivocating explanation and use. — schopenhauer1

Nuh. Explanation is one use.

Nuh. Explanation is one use. — Banno

Well, what is the difference of the two in your conception? How are we not making everything just "use", and conflating words into each other, thus misconstruing them?

There's still the question of whether there is the possibility of a unified theory or whether what we always have is a patchwork of loosely connected conceptual games that we shift between depending on what we're doing. If there's a metaphysical question lurking here, it's whether the world itself is any less patchwork than our games. (but importantly, if it isn't, that isn't full relativism. games still work or don't.) — csalisbury

Not a loose patchwork. A family resemblance?

As with Gödel, set up such a unified theory and then the game becomes finding a counter-instance.

In the relevant sense, the world is our games.

Well, what is the difference of the two in your conception? How are we need making everything just "use", and conflating words into each other, this misconstruing them? — schopenhauer1

That's not what is being claimed here.

That's not what is being claimed here. — Banno

Ok good. Sometimes I think these debates go down to "language as use" thing, which then leaves no room for "language as explanation". We use language to explain things about the world. Its use in explaining things is different than its use in "getting something done". One is trying to provide metaphysical claims. One is about something's utility. My guess, is you would reject making metaphysical claims about what is the case. Others might argue that the metaphysical claim is its own thing apart from how it is useful to getting something done.

Sometimes I think these debates go down to "language as use" thing, which then leaves no room for "language as explanation". — schopenhauer1

I don't see why that should be. Giving an explanation is one thing we can do with language...

We use language to explain things about the world. Its use in explaining things is different than its use in "getting something done". — schopenhauer1

Explaining is something we do.

One is trying to provide metaphysical claims. One is about something's utility. — schopenhauer1

Some language games have very little utility... and yet are still played on forums around the world. Sue is not just utility. Language as use is not utilitarianism.

My guess, is you would reject making metaphysical claims about what is the case. — schopenhauer1

I'm not sure what they would be... We do make claims as to what is the case, just sans metaphysics.

Others might argue that the metaphysical claim is its own thing apart from how it is useful to getting something done. — schopenhauer1

If the meaning of a game is given in what one does in that game, metaphysics may be little more than a parlour game.

A computer running voice recognition software for a bank's customer interface makes excellent use of the information it gathers.

Is anything else required for the computer to be said to have understanding of the speech it acts on?

Explaining is something we do. — Banno

Yes, but how is that not a truism? Who doesn't agree with that? But is being done, is something different than "getting something done". We are playing with semantics here. Getting something done would be more like a command, or trying to have an outcome come about. There is no outcome in an explanation other than the explanation itself. If you are saying, "We are trying to get done understanding what is the case about the world", ok.. but this is a superficial argument that wouldn't really be controversial.

Some language games have very little utility... and yet are still played on forums around the world. Sue is not just utility. Language as use is not utilitarianism. — Banno

No, but some might call it a kind pragmatism, which is about uses for people.

I'm not sure what they would be... We do make claims as to what is the case, just sans metaphysics. — Banno

Why sans metaphysics? State of affairs X is Y. This is not a metaphysical statement? Perhaps not a true one, but it is trying to get there, I guess. How we know it is, is something different.

If the meaning of a game is given in what one does in that game, metaphysics may be little more than a parlour game. — Banno

I don't know. Can't there be degrees of metaphysical truths? Surely Newton's is pretty close to something? Surely Einsteins might be closer?

↪Banno A computer running voice recognition software for a bank's customer interface makes excellent use of the information it gathers. — frank

Depends on the bank, maybe?

Is anything else required for the computer to be said to have understanding of the speech it acts on? — frank

Doesn't the computer understand - and if not, how does it make those transfers for you?

I don't see a problem.

I don't see a problem. — Banno

I wasn't presenting you with a problem. I was asking how far you go in reducing human cognition. You said: 'all the way.'

In the relevant sense, the world is our games. — Banno

But also the obscure source that can disrupt the game, even when we're playing in way that has always before been right.

I'm coming around to the idea that cognition does not take place only in heads, either.

You mean we can't do whatever we like in the game? Yep.

I'm coming around to the idea that cognition does not take place only in heads, either. — Banno

I agree.

You mean we can't do whatever we like in the game? Yep. — Banno

that's a soberer way to put it, but yes.What's important tho is that the world is our games and something else as well.

What I'm arguing would be closer to saying that moving information is not moving meaning or knowledge. That much more is involved. — Banno

My concern with the OP, as others have already expressed, is that moving information from one head to another can be one use of language, even though it may not be its only use. If the OP was instead that language is not only moving information from one head to another, then I would be more inclined to agree. Also, I take 'moving information from one head to another' to mean informing someone of something (e.g. teaching, alerting), but I'm not sure whether that's what you mean by it?

Creative seemed to be denying meaning from DNA replication on the mistaken account that nothing is making a correlation in DNA replication and the incorrect assumption that there is no agent involved in DNA replication. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not an assumption. It's a conclusion.

My concern with the OP, as others have already expressed, is that moving information from one head to another can be one use of language, even though it may not be its only use. — Luke

I've seen it claimed. I've seen agreement. What I have not seen is a coherent explanation of exactly how information - which is already meaningful, lest there could be no translation/decoding - can be moved. Meaning is not a monolithic single thing that is able to change locations like some things can, cups, cupboards, chairs, and tables. Rather, it consists of simple/basic elemental constituents, such as language use(a speaker), slabs, intonation, other behaviours and additional context. In order to move information, meaning has to be moved along with it.

So...

Since all of those things are required for meaning to be attributed, and not all of them move through a conduit, or phone line, or fibre optic, or airwaves, or... whatever, what since does it make to say that information(meaning) can be moved?

What I have not seen is a coherent explanation of exactly how information - which is already meaningful, lest there could be no translation/decoding - can be moved. — creativesoul

If you had read my entire post, you would have seen what I took 'moving information from one head to another' to mean.