So if there is a God present, it is the God of semiosis. Although I agree you would be quite justified to ignore it as existing. — Punshhh

Sorry. Gods that exist in ways that don't make a difference don't exist according to my definition of existence. So all you are doing is trotting out the modern theistic formula which seeks to avoid the cold hard facts of science by pretending cold hard facts can be both true and yet not really matter.

Which is why the only consistent position I could hold is that if God does in fact exist in ways that don't make a difference, then my metaphysics is holed below the waterline. No lame excuses.

If I don't accept lame excuses from theists, I can hardly accept them from myself.

↪apokrisis But surely if something must be stopped, it must have begun before. Unless it is just a brute fact that something is the case, which sounds suspiciously like a — darthbarracuda

Hence the third category of vagueness - the land of no brute fact which can give rise to the yin and yang of mutually co-arising brute facts such as stasis and change.

In actual fact, speculation about a purported first cause is still alive and well in the form of arguments about the fine-tuned universe.h — Wayfarer

Yep. The cosmology that captures the public's attention is exactly that which taps straight into the mechanical thinking that has become endemic via technology in modern society.

So of course multiverses, string landscapes, eternal recurrence, and so forth are what everyone talks about. It seems like the sort of thing science ought to be saying. Existence is utterly contingent. Structure can only be a cosmic accident.

So all you are pointing out is how far my organicism is from the populist mainstream that would find it easier to believe we all exist inside a Matrix simulation.

Hence the third category of vagueness - the land of no brute fact which can give rise to the yin and yang of mutually co-arising brute facts such as stasis and change. — apokrisis

Is it a brute fact that the third category of vagueness is the land of no brute fact?

No, I don't think that is it. I think the 'argument from transcendence' is more that the first cause is what enables differences to exist in the first place. And that manifests as the fact that the Universe emerges from the singularity in just such a way that it is not simply chaotic. I take that as the import of such books as 'Just Six Numbers': the rather mind-boggling conception that a very small number of constants simply are in such a way that stars>matter>life emerges.

The reason I don't think that amounts to an argument as such is that it can only ever be suggestive, not conclusive. It is quite feasible to say that these constraints exist as a simple matter of brute fact or chance, and I guess it is even feasible to argue that there are indeed an infinite array of 'other universes', and so on. This question is related to Kant's antinomies of reason - it is impossible, by exercise of reason, to arrive at a definite conclusion about such questions.

Now natural theologians will argue that on this basis that it is reasonable to believe that there is an intelligence that set the wheels in motion. And I think it is! But it can never be conclusive as it's not an empirical argument, by definition. But from the viewpoint of natural philosophy, it's a matter about which judgement ought to be suspended, one way or the other (i.e. either against it, or for it). So, again, it's a good argument for agnosticism, but of a very deep kind, not simply a casual shrug. ( Similar points arise in John Horgan's interview with cosmologist George Ellis.)

Is it a brute fact that the third category of vagueness is the land of no brute fact? — darthbarracuda

Don't be silly. It is a deduced fact. Just like the complementary notion of there being instead a first cause. Both derive from the axiom of sufficient reason. One just puts reasons in the past, the other puts them in the future.

So the mechanical view says there is some thing that exists. Therefore it must have a further thing sufficient to cause its existence.

My organicism instead acts from the observation that existence is always dichotomised. Therefore there must be a prior state in which such dichotomisation is dissolved. Symmetry breaking implies the symmetry that got broke. And so, following that logic through, we arrive at the ontic definition of a vagueness or Apeiron.

Had symmetry always existed before it broke?

But you are ignoring the known distinction between dimensionless and dimensionfull physical constants.

So at the singularity, we are talking about the Planck triad of constants. And these are pure ratios that thus encode a naked reciprocal or dichotomous relation.

The singularity is thus not singular. It is not a dimensionless point. The very first moment of existence is already divided, even if that division is yet to be expresed. The symmetry is broken, even if it hasn't yet moved off from its own absolute symmetry.

So the basic dichotomy the Planck triad captures is that between spacetime extent and quantum action - the size of the container versus the density or temperature of its contents. At the Big Bang, these two aspects of physical being were "symmetric" - both at their material limit in terms of compactness. And the difference was pure, not something that could be measured in terms of some numbers that would speak of transcendent reference frames.

The stuff Rees was talking about was mostly the after the fact constants that emerged against the fundamental Plankian backdrop. And modern physics hope is to account for these also as pure mathematical constants that reflect further structurally inevitable symmetry breakings.

As I understand it, physics can rewind the tape to an infinitesmal fraction of a second after 'the singularity', but not right to it. Is that right?

You see this:

Scientists think they can pick the story up at about 10 to the minus 36 seconds — one trillionth of a trillionth of a trillionth of a second — after the Big Bang.

At that point, they believe, the universe underwent an extremely brief and dramatic period of inflation, expanding faster than the speed of light. It doubled in size perhaps 100 times or more, all within the span of a few tiny fractions of a second.

http://www.space.com/13347-big-bang-origins-universe-birth.html

Seems very much like 'creation ex nihilo' to many people.

Has the symmetry always existed? — darthbarracuda

Silly question. You already know that my position isn't tied to a mechanical notion of time.

I would appreciate it if you didn't treat me like a child. What exactly is the mechanical notion of time, and how does your pansemiotic view somehow escape eternal existence?

Is there any comparison between Deleuze's take on eternal return and Kierkegaard's repetition? — Mongrel

Yeah for sure - Deleuze cites Kierkegaard as a principle inspiration for his thoughts on repetition, although he ultimately criticizes him for subordinating repetition to faith and the grace of God. Speaking of Kierkegaard and Charles Peguy (French poet/essayist) together:

"Athough Kierkegaard and Peguy may be the great repeaters, they were not ready to pay the necessary price. They entrusted this supreme repetition, repetition as a category of the future, to faith. ... How could faith not be its own habit and its own reminiscence, and how could the repetition it takes for its object - a repetition which, paradoxically, takes place once and for all - not be comical? Beneath it rumbles another, Nietzschean, repetition: that of eternal return."

This is why Deleuze ultimately opts for Nietzsche as his ultimate point of reference, rather than Kierkegaard: while both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche oppose the generality of law to the singularity of repetition, only in Nietzsche does repetition remain a properly temporal and hence immanent category. Kierkegaard's recourse to faith on the other hand, "invites us to rediscover once and for all God and the self in a common resurrection. Kierkegaard and Peguy are the culmination of Kant, they realise Kantianism by entrusting to faith the task of overcoming the speculative death of God and healing the wound in the self".

This though, all comes after a long interlude where Deleuze heaps praise upon Kierkegaard for coming really close to thinking repetition in the way he thinks it ought to be thought of as: as a faith in the future as such, a future without Grace (à la Abraham)

Beneath it rumbles another, Nietzschean, repetition: that of eternal return." — StreetlightX

Actually, I think K's faith is the acceptance N talks about. Anyway... they both talked a lot about the significance of the image of Christ. A mash-up of the two is interesting.

This though, all comes after a long interlude where Deleuze heaps praise upon Kierkegaard for coming really close to thinking repetition in the way he thinks it ought to be though — StreetlightX

Cool.

You also have to respect the shift from epistemology to ontology. So if we are talking about ontic strength semiosis - as biosemiosis and pansemiosis do - then the map is actually in a relation that is adaptively making the world. It is not just a description (to be interpreted by a transcendent mind) but the act of interpretance itself by which a world is achieving crisp and stable existence.

Yes, not only do I appreciate how your view leads to this shift, but that's precisely what I'm trying to hone in on. Like Von Neumann's measuring tools, the model is both map and territory. But it's kind of this unstable thing, right? like it's both - but it can't be both at the same time. That's the first parable: As a being in time, you can only choose one or the other - you can't have it both ways. And if you try to, you lose yourself in recursion.

But, so in the von neumannian scenario cited by Pattee, we're dealing with the circumscription of a local region (that recursive explosion - where one would need a new tool, M', to measure M+S, and so forth - requires an indefinite expanse which would allow one to keep 'zooming-out'. The regions keep getting larger but, for all that, always remain finite, bounded areas. You have this infinite spatiotemporal matrix which always allows for a larger field)

The theory of everything, on the other hand, deals with universal principles. It's not trying to measure a contingent, ontic* state. It's trying to provide a rulebook. The rulebook of all rulebooks.

But, if we're good immanentists, then any TOE is simultaneously an attempt to provide a rulebook and a (dynamic, unfolding) example of those rules in action. As you've said.

So when you say this:

You will first note of course that Pattee is saying the map is an atemporal truth. It is the rate independent information or model used to constrain the rate dependent dynamics, ie: the world of material possibility.

well, yes, that which constrains has to be atemporal, but it's a weird kind of atemporality isn't it? It's out of time, yet of time - precipitated from temporal dynamic material processes (tho always implicit within them), yet able to turn around, as it were, and regulate them. (The poetic image is a sort of golem, whose mud frame (look closely!) is continuous with the mud ground, as he stands regulating or explaining the actions of smaller, simpler golems)

But a model qua TOE isn't merely constraining and controlling a local set of dynamic processes - it envelops everything - both the dynamic processes and the atemporal. It is somehow outside of the dialectic, touching the absolute**, and invites the very idea of the transcendent mind you rightfully decry. It's a fixed thing - a holy trinity of sorts - which explains the fixity/nonfixity/relation-between-the-two which characterizes everything.




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* side-note, but I don't think I understand your usage of 'ontic.' I think we may have different understandings of the term. I think you may understand by 'ontic' what I understand by 'ontological.' But I may be wrong. How would you define 'ontic'?

**If there's an ancient feud I see playing out in new terms it's not Wordsworth versus Newton but Kierkegaard versus Hegel

Kierkegaard's recourse to faith on the other hand, "invites us to rediscover once and for all God and the self in a common resurrection. Kierkegaard and Peguy are the culmination of Kant, they realise Kantianism by entrusting to faith the task of overcoming the speculative death of God and healing the wound in the self

I've always wondered about this. Because it's not quite clear what Kierkegaard meant by God.

(He did a lot with God. A lot of it was leveraging God qua absolute against his fellow protestants. There was def this kind of radical-fuck-you-with-the-twist-of-I'm-playing-your-game-more-faithfully-than-you-ever-could thing going on. So that's part of it. For me that's the real significance of his analysis of Abraham and Isaac. But ----)

Couldn't this be recast as passive versus active thing? While both doing similar things, Nietzsche would be active and Kierkegaard would be passive. Granted, this would get a little complicated because Kierkegaard would be adovocating the active assumption of one's passive role in relation in god. And Nietzsche would be advocating the passive acceptance of that which one has to then actively affirm.

At the limit, they kind of bleed into each other (and you then think of Heidegger's whole active/passive solicitation of being, where it's not quite one or the other)

Peguy is interesting, though. And I only know him through Deleuze. But: the celebration repeats that which it celebrates - while the event itself only exists to generate its future celebrations. This seems somehow closer to Deleuze's own analysis, only I can't quite put my finger on it.* What's your take on the peguy/celebration thing?

*He invokes this same Peguyian analysis, in the ABC interview, in order to explain alcoholism. I find this fascinating and I think he's right. The first drink anticipates the drinks to come - and each drink to come looks nostalgically back to a blissful early intoxication. It's not just alcohol - this is a perfect model of all addiction. I'm getting a little rhapsodic, but it's too perfect.

Like Von Neumann's measuring tools, the model is both map and territory. But it's kind of this unstable thing, right? like it's both - but it can't be both at the same time. — csalisbury

I don't understand your objection. The model describes a territory that is itself being viewed as a modelling relation. Seems simple enough.

that recursive explosion - where one would need a new tool, M', to measure M+S, and so forth - requires an indefinite expanse which would allow one to keep 'zooming-out'. — csalisbury

But that is the argument for the epistemic cut or semiotic sign relation. It is because the measurement function - the observer - can't be understood as "just physics" (because recursion ensues) that the observer/measurement has to be understood in terms of a symbolic level of action.

So the passage you cite identifies the fundamental problem of physicalist explanation. And that homuncular regress is what semiosis fixes.

well, yes, that which constrains has to be atemporal, but it's a weird kind of atemporality isn't it? It's out of time, yet of time - precipitated from temporal dynamic material processes (tho always implicit within them), yet able to turn around, as it were, and regulate them. — csalisbury

Again, there seems no problem at all. That is how a memory functions. You have all these regulative habits you've learnt - like perhaps the rules of cribbage. Then along comes a cribbage playing situation and all your dormant skill gets a chance to do its thing.

But a model qua TOE isn't merely constraining and controlling a local set of dynamic processes - it envelops everything - both the dynamic processes and the atemporal. It is somehow outside of the dialectic, touching the absolute**, and invites the very idea of the transcendent mind you rightfully decry. It's a fixed thing - a holy trinity of sorts - which explains the fixity/nonfixity/relation-between-the-two which characterizes everything. — csalisbury

A TOE would be maximally general. And it would then encompass all the more constrained physical models.

A model of quantum gravity unifies quantum field theory and general relativity. General relativity unifies special relativity and Newtonian gravity. So physics already is organised in this nested hierarchical fashion.

And it is definitional of a TOE that spacetime becomes an emergent feature, not a fundamental ingredient. That is the point.

So being "outside" of time, and space, and matter, are all desirable properties.

And that in turn is the argument for pansemiosis. The fundamental problems of physics can't be fixed with just "more physics". That risks the recursion that can only be "solved" by the appeal to mystic transcendent causes.

And so the trick that worked for human self consciousness and biological autonomy - semiosis/the epistemic cut - would be the way to fix physics as well.

Physics is at an impasse with quantum theory because it cannot offer a formal model of the observer that collapses the wavefunction. And semiotics is precisely that - a formal model of observers.

Sorry. Gods that exist in ways that don't make a difference don't exist according to my definition of existence. So all you are doing is trotting out the modern theistic formula which seeks to avoid the cold hard facts of science by pretending cold hard facts can be both true and yet not really matter.

No this is not what I'm doing, you assumed that I was going to talk about God, that I am a believer and that my line would be what you allude to here.

I'm not going to talk about God, it's you who brought it up. Perhaps you will respond now to what I did say which is and was in bold when I said it.

Which is why the only consistent position I could hold is that if God does in fact exist in ways that don't make a difference, then my metaphysics is holed below the waterline. No lame excuses.

Again incorrect, as I said the world including your metaphysics would be identical. Anyway I didn't say God doesn't make a difference, I said we can't determine what that difference would be.

If I don't accept lame excuses from theists, I can hardly accept them from myself.

I'm not interested in discussing the presence of God with you, its rather an irrelevance.

Remember the world of my cat, she is living a life which all makes purfect sense, all is known and understood. But she is unaware that there is a concealed layer of agency in her world which is veiled from her, as I pointed out;

impossibility for her to know this aspect of her world and the extent to which it is subtly controlling and manipulating her life and circumstances. She is securely veiled from participating in my intellectual world

Now as I said to begin with, like the cat we cannot know what is behind the veil. This means we cannot answer the philosophical questions about our existence. We cannot say that circles are universal, or that squircles don't exist.

You forget that I am arguing the pragmatist view and so Occam's razor applies. You can pretend to worry about invisible powers that rule existence in ways that make no difference all you like. You are welcome to your scepticism and all its inconsistencies. But as I say, if whatever secret machinery you posit makes no difference, then who could care?

Peguy is interesting, though. And I only know him through Deleuze. But: the celebration repeats that which it celebrates - while the event itself only exists to generate its future celebrations. This seems somehow closer to Deleuze's own analysis, only I can't quite put my finger on it.* What's your take on the peguy/celebration thing? — csalisbury

I pretty much know nothing about Peguy either, but I've puzzled over that passage for a long time too. What I make of it is this: repetition (in the strong, Deleuzian sense) belongs to the order of singularities. Only singularities repeat, and what they repeat is precisely their own singularity. The new always retains it's status as new, rather than becoming subsumed as a particular in an order of generality. Moreover, this 'spiritual' repetition is the very condition which enables what Deleuze calls 'bare' or mechanical repetition - one can celebrate Bastille day to the extent that the fall of the Bastille eternally repeats its own singularity, outside of the order of extensive, historical time (Aeon, and not Chronos).

Zizek has a nice passage about this in his otherwise rather meh book on Deleuze: "the standard opposition of the abstract Universal and particular identities is to be replaced by a new tension between Singular and Universal: the Event of the New as a universal singularity. What Deleuze renders here is the (properly Hegelian) link between true historicity and eternity: a truly New emerges as eternity in time...* To perceive a past phenomenon in becoming (as Kierkegaard would have put it) is to perceive the virtual potential in it, the spark of eternity, of virtual potentiality that is there forever. A truly new work stays new forever—its newness is not exhausted when its “shocking value” passes away. For example, in philosophy, the great breakthroughs—from Kant’s transcendental turn to Kripke’s invention of the “rigid designator”—forever retain their “surprising” character of invention". (Organs Without Bodies)

Moreover, singularity itself belongs to the order of difference - pure, aconceptual or sub-representative difference (difference-in-itself) - insofar as (this kind of) difference is precisely what resists subsumption into conceptuality and identity. Singularity is the hinge which relates difference and repetition to one another.

*In What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze, following Peguy, will actually refer to a time of the 'aternal', rather than either the eternal or the temporal, and also to a 'dead time' that corresponds to a 'meanwhile' or 'para-time' (un entre-temps), a kind of dimension of time that runs diagonal to our usual concepts of time and eternity.

--

As for Kierkegaard, I'm sure at some point it's possible to read him as meeting Nietzsche down the line - there's enough richness and ambiguity there to last for millennia - but at some point it's a choice between Christianity and not, no? It's the difference between "God is Dead" and "God is effectively Dead, You're On Your Own and All You've Got Is Your Faith, But Really, Imperceptibly, In A Way I Cant Really Talk About Because Its Not a Matter of Talk... God is There, He Really Is".

but at some point it's a choice between Christianity and not, no? — StreetlightX

Jesus. No. You're tangling yourself up in the clothes. The whole point is standing there naked. What is the wound in the self?

It a bit like answering the question "What causes God?" Yes, we can say that such a notion is incoherent. But saying "nothing" is also truthful. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's not at all like asking what causes God, because God is conceived of as a real actuality, you are talking about "nothing".

Does being selected by nothing somehow mean a selection hasn't occurred? — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, being selected by nothing means that a selection has not really occurred. Selection is an action, and if nothing carries out this action, then the action has not occurred. It is very common to have a described action, like "going to the store", but if nothing carries out this action, it has not occurred, and it is just a fiction. It appears like you are trying to reify "nothing" so that nothing is a thing which acts. Then you say "nothing selects", and claim that selection is a real action, rather than a fiction.

think I know what you're getting at, and part of the complexity here is that Deleuze ontologizes the selective principle. That is: if every metaphysics implies a selection, Deleuze's whole objection to the history of metaphysics is that it never sufficiently justifies it's particular 'method' of selection. — StreetlightX

If you have an inkling of what I'm saying, I'll proceed deeper to what really concerns me. What is at issue here is the nature of "the same". "The same" is very important epistemologically, as the basis of "identity", the basis of "one, of "unity", of "the set", all the geometrical figures, etc.. "The same" is the foundation of all of these, and therefore the foundation of epistemology itself. Identity is how we know that you and I are talking about the same thing, and unless we are talking about the same thing, any knowledge which we may claim to have, is really nonsense.

So consider your quote of Aristotle to Nagase:

"We call contraries (1) those attributes that differ in genus, which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject, (2) the most different of the things in the same genus, (3) the most different of the attributes in the same receptive material, (4) the most different of the things that fall under the same capacity, (5) the things whose difference is greatest either absolutely or in genus or in species.

...Things are said to be other in species if they are of the same genus but are not subordinate the one to the other, or if, while being in the same genus they have a difference, or if they have a contrariety in their substance; and contraries are other than one another in species (either all contraries or those which are so called in the [5] primary sense), and so are those things whose formulae differ in the infima species of the genus (e.g. man and horse are indivisible in genus, but their formulae are different), or which being in the same substance have a difference. ‘The same in species’ is used correspondingly." (Book Δ, 10).

And in book Zeta: "Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence--only species will have it, for these are thought to imply not merely that the subject participates in the attribute and has it as an affection, or has it by accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there be a formula of its meaning--viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; or instead of a simple formula we shall be able to give a more accurate one; but there will be no definition nor essence" (Book Z, 4). — StreetlightX

Notice that all the differences referred to are said to be different, because they are observed to be not the same. So for Aristotle, difference is really just a determination of "not the same". What is "selected for" is similarity, whatever is noticed to be "the same". This is what produces essence, properties which are the same, and are selected for. If X,Y, Z attributes can be predicated of the subject, it is of species A. This is a determination of "the same". If the subject lacks attribute Z, it is different, but by means of X and Y, it may still be the same in genus.

So what Aristotle describes here is selecting for similarity, not difference. Something which is different is outcast from the species, it is not selected, but it might still be selected for the same genus, on the basis of similarity though, not difference.

These are "subjects", which Aristotle refers to, subjects of the mind, the subject matter of knowledge. I think, that Deleuze is looking from an ontological perspective, from the perspective of being an object itself, rather than a subject, and claiming that what is essential to the object, as a particular individual, is difference. So difference inheres within the being, as essential to its nature as a particular object. Therefore selection, even if it is an act of selecting for the same, like we do as rational human beings in the act of identification, is an act of difference itself, as the difference inheres within the act of the object.

Let me put "difference" and "same", with respect to selection, into a temporal perspective now.

As I said to Moliere earlier in the thread, the associations of language here might lead us astray, because despite it's 'voluntarist' tenor, 'selection' is anything but voluntary in Delezue, and selection is always the result of an 'encounter' with or 'interference of' a 'question-problem complex' which forces one to creatively engage and fabulate responses as a result (the quoted phrases are Deleuze's). The kind of 'phenomenology' - if we may call it that - of Lewis being 'gripped' by the necessity of imposing the sorts of divisions he does is very much in keeping with the Deleuzian conception of philosophy as involving a 'pedagogy of the concept', where creation - or in this case selection - is very much a matter of imposition, of 'subjective dissolution', if we may put it that way. — StreetlightX

The Deleuzian perspective of selection which you put forward here is non-voluntary. There is a selection which is imposed at each moment of time. This is the object's existence in time. One might say that selection is necessitated by the passing of time, and that selection is a selection of difference, such that the object is different with each passing moment. But if we consider voluntary selection now, this type of selection has the assistance of "will-power". Will-power is the power not to choose, not to select. When we use will-power not to select, then no difference is selected for, and we maintain the status quo, the same. This is how voluntary choice, as a form of selection, is based in a principle of "the same". It is based in will-power, which is inherently the desire not to select, avoiding the difference which is created by the selection which is inherent within the passing of time.

The naïve argument would be that the will-power, the power not to select, is itself a selection, the choice not to choose. But this position is untenable when selection is seen as a selection of difference as Deleuze assumes, because the will-power not to choose is not a selection of difference, it selects to have things maintained as the same, undecided. Therefore the will-power is a non-selection when selection is defined by difference.

What I see is two sides of the same coin, the Deleuzian side in which difference is necessitated and therefore selected, by the passing of time, and the free-will side, by which we choose, or select things to remain the same. The problem with the Deleuzian perspective, as you present it, is that you have provided no basis for consistency in metaphysics. Consistency is provided for by maintaining the same principles, not difference. So this perspective portrays metaphysics as having no principles of consistency. But clearly when we do metaphysics, we seek rational clarity, and we select according to some principles of consistency. This is extremely evident in the op. The op mentions numerous philosophers, referring to a vein of similarity. These similarities have been selected in order to create a consistency. Without this, metaphysics would be inconsistent nonsense.

You forget that I am arguing the pragmatist view and so Occam's razor applies. You can pretend to worry about invisible powers that rule existence in ways that make no difference all you like. You are welcome to your scepticism and all its inconsistencies. But as I say, if whatever secret machinery you posit makes no difference, then who could care? — apokrisis

So makes a difference here, meaning counterfactual? To broaden your idea, I think this notion that if there are no counterfactuals, it has no value or useful understanding is skipping over a large amount of phenomena. For example, though for example, mental illness can often be described in systematic inventories of this or that mental phenomena, each individual human has experiences so nuanced as to have no alternative for counterfactual examples. It just "is". It can be described, analyzed, modeled, but the actual experience, the first person perspective of that particular person is unique. It is unique in that no one else can experience it, but even more importantly, it is unique in that no matter how much detail in framing the experience into information, the event itself can never be replicated into information.

If you have an inkling of what I'm saying, I'll proceed deeper to what really concerns me. What is at issue here is the nature of "the same". "The same" is very important epistemologically, as the basis of "identity", the basis of "one, of "unity", of "the set", all the geometrical figures, etc.. "The same" is the foundation of all of these, and therefore the foundation of epistemology itself. Identity is how we know that you and I are talking about the same thing, and unless we are talking about the same thing, any knowledge which we may claim to have, is really nonsense.

Notice that all the differences referred to are said to be different, because they are observed to be not the same. So for Aristotle, difference is really just a determination of "not the same". — Metaphysician Undercover

You couldn't have set out any better the exact premises that Deleuze's philosophy explicitly sets out to undermine. Showing these assumptions to be illusory is precisely the project that is announced at the very beginning of Difference and Repetition, and is carried out throughout the rest of the book:

"[The concepts of] difference and repetition have taken the place of the identical and the negative, of identity and contradiction. For difference implies the negative, and allows itself to lead to contradiction, only to the extent that its subordination to the identical is maintained. The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation. But modern thought is born of the failure of representation, of the loss of identities, and of the discovery of all the forces that act under the representation of the identical. The modern world is one of simulacra. Man did not survive God, nor did the identity of the subject survive that of substance. All identities are only simulated, produced as an optical 'effect' by the more profound game of difference and repetition. We propose to think difference in itself independently of the forms of representation which reduce it to the Same, and the relation of different to different independently of those forms which make them pass through the negative".

So what you call out as bugs are exactly the features of the Deleuzian philosophy of difference, one which is at every point opposed to the primacy of the Same and of Identity: opposed, in other words, to the entire Aristotelian schema of Being. Central to the arguments of D&R is also an attempt to point out that far from the Same as being the 'foundation of epistemology', thinking epistemology in terms of the Same is absolutely ruinous for any critical thought, and it's only by thinking the Same on the basis of the Different that thought as such can get off the ground. As it stands, I've not relayed any of those arguments here, but then, neither have you in your assertions about the primacy of Identity. In any case, what you call your 'concerns' are exactly what Deleuze joyfully assents to.

You haven't yet addressed the key point of my argument though, and that is the nature of selection itself. Deleuze characterizes selection as non-voluntary, necessary, whereas I consider selection as a free act of will. As an act of free will, we have to allow for will-power, which is to resist the temptation to choose, and to resist the habituated choice. As I described, the act of will-power is resistance to change and difference, therefore a selection of the status quo, lack of change, the same.

Sure, just to be different, Deleuze can but forth a metaphysics of difference, and claim all the things which you have stated, identity and the Same have failed us, so we must base epistemology in difference, but who is going to select such a metaphysics? If selection is characterized as non-voluntary, and individual human beings experience selection as voluntary, then why would any human being choose such a metaphysics which is contrary to one's own experience? And as soon as one allows that selection is voluntary, then there is no apparent reason for one to choose Difference over Same. As I described above Same is what allows us to communicate, proceed with logic, and obtain knowledge. If we choose Difference we select to isolate ourselves within our own thoughts unable to communicate.

So here's the point, as I said in the last post, the two perspectives are two sides to the same coin, two different ways of looking at the very same thing. Each of the two perspectives are inherently different, and this validates Deleuze's argument for difference. One cannot dismiss Deleuze on any claim of unsoundness. However, I assume that we are talking about the same thing, and this allows us to have intelligent communication. I validate my assumption of "the same thing", by referring to similarities. Of course one can focus on the differences, and insist that this is not two different perspectives of the same thing, moving to deny the validity of the Same, but what good is this? The thing I am talking about is metaphysics. If Deleuze wants to talk about something which is different, not the same thing as what I am talking about, that's fine. But if he calls it "metaphysics" he is acting in deception, implying that it is the same thing which I am talking about, while claiming that all he refers to is difference, without the assumption of difference within the same thing. I know that my metaphysics is the real metaphysics because it allows for voluntary selection, Deleuze characterizes selection as other than voluntary.

I think this notion that if there are no counterfactuals, it has no value or useful understanding is skipping over a large amount of phenomena. — schopenhauer1

It is illogical to claim that there could be phenomena that aren't distinct and therefore counterfactual in the fact that, given different conditions yet to be discovered, they wouldn't be there.

It is illogical to claim that there could be phenomena that aren't distinct and therefore counterfactual in the fact that, given different conditions yet to be discovered, they wouldn't be there. — apokrisis

People have individual, personal experiences that cannot be shared. How can that be communicated? No other thing can have these experiences.. It may change some event to communicate and participate in these experiences, but the actual experience is only experienced by the individual. There is something that cannot be made a map, but is simply territory.

Perhaps you don't understand what it means when I say I am defending a pragmatist epistemology? If you believe instead in private revelation, go for it.

Perhaps you don't understand what it means when I say I am defending a pragmatist epistemology? If you believe instead in private revelation, go for it. — apokrisis

Go ahead and school me if you think I mischaracterize you apokrisis. "Private revelation", personal experience or anything else is still had by the individual and cannot be experienced by anyone else and cannot be mapped to anyone else either. Prove me wrong if you like.

Why would I dispute the very problem pragmatism sets out to resolve?