What I am addressing is the referrent: green is a word that refers to the experience of greenness (the quale). Like all qualia, it is subjective - so your experience of greenness may differ from mine (due to subtle differences in our neural wiring). Knowledge of greenness constitutes non-verbal, non-semantic knowledge; only by actually experiencing greenness can we have this knowledge. The ontology of the quale green is different from other objects of the world because it is subjective: it is a personal mental image (whatever THAT is).But they still have some experience- even if not the same as a majority of people. What is this experience as compared to the wavelength/neural states that correspond with the experience? This isn't a semantic question, but a metaphysical one. By simply restating that there are qualia like greenness (or whatever subjective experience the person has, like in the case of colorblindness), and that there are wavelengths associated with green, we aren't saying much except what we already know. So how are you dissolving this problem? — schopenhauer1
What do phenomenal concepts have in common such that that commonality makes them count as being phenomenal, whereas the non phenomenal concepts do not have/share this same common denominator or set thereof? — creativesoul
What do you mean by "reconciled"? The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths.The "concept" of greenness is that mental image that we perceive. The word "green" refers to this quale. The range of wavelengths associated with greenness are those wavelengths that are associated with this quale. — Relativist
Right, and it is these concepts which cannot be reconciled with our scientific concepts. — Marchesk
(whatever THAT is) — Relativist
It's true that there is a range of wavelengths that corresponds to green, but this scientific information is not identical to the experience. A person who has never experienced green can learn everything that can be known about the color from the perspective of science and art, but they will still lack the non-semanticknowledge by acquaintance of the color. — Relativist
What do you mean by "reconciled"? — Relativist
The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths. — Relativist
I expected a response to that! It's a broader topic than qualia. If we can't agree on qualia, we won't get far in a discussion of mental life.(whatever THAT is) — Relativist
THAT is the exact thing that is trying to be understood. — schopenhauer1
It seems to me it's just an accident of evolution (like the rather large size of my nose). The ability to discriminate objects by color has a utility, and this particular means of discriminating color just happens to be what developed as a consequence of genetic drift and environmental factors.Yep, so why is it THAT experience at all (whatever it is) with the physiological phenomena? — schopenhauer1
We know too little about the workings of the brain to truly reconcile that. At this point, all we can do is entertain metaphysical accounts and consider how these might relate to, or emerge from, the physical. The one thing I reject is the argument from ignorance that dualists use: that if we can't provide a full scientific account for the various aspects of mental life then we should accept dualism.The hard and harder problems exist if we take our ontology from science, because it leaves the phenomenal out. Reconciling would mean figuring out a way to include the phenomenal in the scientific, whether that's by reduction, identity, elimination, emergent or expanding the scientific ontology. — Marchesk
What do phenomenal concepts have in common such that that commonality makes them count as being phenomenal, whereas the non phenomenal concepts do not have/share this same common denominator or set thereof?
— creativesoul
Phenomenal are creature dependent. — Marchesk
I showed how qualia fit into a physicalist account (I did not originate this; I'm relating Michael Tye). I realize this isn't a complete account, but it's a piece of the puzzle.The quale "green" is not ontologically identical to the scientific concept of green (e.g. the range of wavelengths), but the two are related to one another: objects that we perceive as matching the green quale of experience are also known (through science) to reflect light in a specific range of wavelengths. — Relativist
Right, but this presents an ontological problem. For physicalists, anyway. — Marchesk
The ability to discriminate objects by color has a utility, and this particular means of discriminating color just happens to be what developed as a consequence of genetic drift and environmental factors. — Relativist
I showed how qualia fit into a physicalist account (I did not originate this; I'm relating Michael Tye). I realize this isn't a complete account, but it's a piece of the puzzle. — Relativist
All concepts are creature dependent. — creativesoul
Consciousness is not the problem. Our account of it is. — creativesoul
It's not a problem if you're down with dualism, or you're an idealist. — Marchesk
Yes.. See below.Does Type support an identity theory of mind? — Marchesk
Here's Tye's basic answer (partly copied, partly paraphrased, from his book, "Consciousness Revisited"):Okay, but the hard problem is showing how a brain state of seeing red is a red experience, or results in a red experience. Saying they're identical is one way to go that would fit with physicalism. But it doesn't explain why some brain states are experiential and others are not. — Marchesk
You are answering the hard question with easy question answers. The question is WHY is it that there is such thing as a subjective feeling of quale in the first place? Or rather WHAT is this subjective feeling of color? If we say it is X, Y, Z physical phenomena, how is it that a physical phenomena IS this quale feeling.. The easy questions deal with simply causal explanations... neural architecture, evolution, correlates of consciousness.. that is not what I am asking though.. — schopenhauer1
3. Having an experience = having physical property P
Next he asks, "How could phenomenal consciousness just be a certain physical property? Surely if something SEEMS phenomenally conscious, it IS phenomenally conscious. "
His answer: we are not aware OF phenomenal consciousness at all. What we are aware of are the qualities (like redness) of which phenomenally conscious states make us aware. — Relativist
Phenomenal is dependent upon senses and a sensory information processor.Phenomenal are creature dependent. We see red not because the world is colored in, but because our visual system evolved to discriminate photons that reflect off surfaces in combination of three primary values. But that still leaves out the experience of red, because a detector or robot can make that discrimination without supposing there is any experience. — Marchesk
Also, what was interesting is that when she thinks of a roof, she thinks of the set of all roofs she's ever seen, and not some abstract roof concept. Therefore, particulars and not universals, with the ability to translate to universals for the purpose of communication. — Marchesk
What I thought was a funny conclusion from much of these philosophies, is that neurons themselves seem to have a sort of magical quality.. If one does not bite the bullet on PANpscyhism, one bites the bullet on NEUROpsychism. In other words, the "Cartesian theater", the "hidden dualism", and the "ghost in the machine" (or whatever nifty term you want to use) gets put into the equation at SOME point. It just depends on exactly what point you want to put it in the equation. — schopenhauer1
f a robot has a similar shape and therefore behavior as you, then why not suppose that it has experiences as well? It seems to me you think that one's hardware (carbon-based vs. Silicon-based) is what determines whether or not there is an experience, and similar behaviors by different hardware are only the result of simulated consciousness. — Harry Hindu
Im not sure what 2 identical to 2 would mean. In the strict, technical way we are talking about here nothing can truly identical to anything else. — DingoJones
Obviously consciousness is a property of something, no? Why would you think of it as being "magic"? — Terrapin Station
There may be no ontological identicality either simply because all things are, as far as we know, always changing. — Janus
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