This is muddled. WHAT is the "qualitative state" then? That is the hard question. Qualitative states exist, you are proposing. I agree. — schopenhauer1
By saying they have a different referent, you are just restating that it appears to be a different phenomena. How is it that these two things are related, or are one in the same though? Hence the hard question. If they are not related, then you still have the question, "What are the qualitative states"? What is quale, as compared with the scientific explanation that causes or corresponds with quale? — schopenhauer1
It's been the human experience since at least philosophical inquiry began and the distinction between appearance and reality was a thing. — Marchesk
But you're not addressing this: wouldn't consciousness have to be a property of something? Some sort of existent? — Terrapin Station
The problem, as it is, is simply that there is not yet adequate language for what you want to explain. It's the beetle-in-a-box. Co-opting existing public language and giving it a private interpretation doesn't help, it just muddies the waters. As we've seen with modern physics, it's continued scientific investigation that exposes hidden assumptions and forces us to rethink the kinds of questions we're asking and whether they even make sense. — Andrew M
Yes, I am. It is existent, but how is it that this property is metaphysically the same as the physical substrate. If properties are just "something" of the ethereal realm that are "slapped" onto the physical, you don't have much of a theory outside plain old dualism. — schopenhauer1
Don't you believe that all physical existents "have" various properties? For example, wouldn't ice with a melting surface layer be much more slick than a tar pit, so that a rock on its surface will much more easily be transported across the surface by, say, a steady 20 mph wind? — Terrapin Station
Those are not properties of experience. — schopenhauer1
Right. At the moment I'm just trying to clarify whether you agree that all physical things "have" various properties. Because it wasn't clear to me on the earlier comment whether you'd agree with this. — Terrapin Station
I think the problem lies more along the lines of figuring out if the hardware really exists as we perceive it. I'm sure my mind exists. Not so sure about brains. Brains could be mental models (the hardware) of others mental processes. The "hardware", ie the "physical" world, are mental models - the way minds model the world. It's not hardware (material or physical) all the way down. It's processes all the way down.I don't know what determines consciousness and I would be fine with saying Data is conscious. It's the epistemological problem that Block explains which is we can't know either it's the hardware or the functions the hardware performs. It doesn't matter whether Data is convincing. We still have the same philosophical problem. — Marchesk
This is assuming that appearances aren't part of reality. How does that make any sense?It's been the human experience since at least philosophical inquiry began and the distinction between appearance and reality was a thing. — Marchesk
So then we'd have to figure out why you'd think that consciousness can't be properties of physical stuff, but consciousness can be properties of nonphysical stuff, whatever nonphysical stuff would be. — Terrapin Station
This is assuming that appearances aren't part of reality. How does that make any sense? — Harry Hindu
Yes, things aren't always as they seem. We agree on that. However the distinction doesn't imply dualism (i.e., of ontologies or worlds). Adopting dualism is a philosophical choice. — Andrew M
Im not sure I understand the problem. Why would you expect a part of the world, ie appearances, to be the same as the entire world? What do you mean by "the same"?And when we try to understand the nature of the world, we want to know what is the same and what is different from how the world appears to us. Of course ultimately that understanding needs to include appearances — Marchesk
What do X-Rays look like? — Marchesk
Dualism exacerbates the problem, not answer it. How do two different things interact? It seems the answer to that question is monism.Right, dualism is just one possible answer to the hard problem. — Marchesk
Im not sure I understand the problem. Why would you expect a part of the world, ie appearances, to be the same as the entire world? What do you mean by "the same"? — Harry Hindu
Theres no game here.I'm not sure I understand why people don't understand the basics of these discussions. But okay, I'll continue to play along. — Marchesk
I asked:And when we try to understand the nature of the world, we want to know what is the same and what is different from how the world appears to us — Marchesk
In other words, what do you expect or imagine to be the same between a part of the world and the whole world?What do you mean by "the same"? — Harry Hindu
I guess I'm asking about the ontological differences and similarities between a part and the whole? — Harry Hindu
Nonphysical stuff would be like "imagination", — schopenhauer1
So is imagination an example of nonphysical substance on your view? — Terrapin Station
We want to know to what extent the world is like our experiences and to what extent it's different. So for example, we've determined that an object's shape is a property of the object, but not its color and only partially it's solidity. — Marchesk
Youre not answering the question and I dont know if id agree that shape is a property of objects. It certainly is a property of our perception of objects. — Harry Hindu
If you can't tell what properties exist in perception and what exist in objects, then why be a realist? — Marchesk
But we can make it broader than that. It's fitting the subjective into the objective, on the empirical grounds that the objective is what gives rise to minds that have experiences. — Marchesk
I think we also have no warrant to assume dualism simply because we cannot answer a question which seems on analysis to be incoherent. The assumption of monism or physicalism may be equally flawed. Our models simply have their limits, and we have no way of deciding if or how they might accord with the human mind-independent real. — Janus
We want to know to what extent the world is like our experiences and to what extent it's different. So for example, we've determined that an object's shape is a property of the object, but not its color and only partially it's solidity. — Marchesk
Is there no room for indirect realism? You seem to think the only viable options are dualism or naive realism.If you can't tell what properties exist in perception and what exist in objects, then why be a realist? — Marchesk
s there no room for indirect realism? — Harry Hindu
You seem to think the only viable options are dualism or naive realism. — Harry Hindu
Do minds have shapes? — Harry Hindu
Why do minds take the shapes of brains when I look at them? — Harry Hindu
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