Take the example of the problem of universals. A philosopher might ask why language is full of universal concepts if the world is full of individuals. This leads to attempts to resolve the paradox such as nominalism, conceptualism, and platonism. But the Wittgenstein approach would be that attempting to answer such questions is pointless. Instead, the question should be dissolved by understanding that universal talk is a generalizing short-cut for having to specify everything about an individual. — Marchesk
So we see that the problem isn't an abuse of language — Marchesk
Here we need to ask ourselves how did philosophy arise? — Marchesk
If it's the latter, then the problem is ordinary language, not philosophy. — Marchesk
Ah! the problem again. What IS the problem? — god must be atheist
Philosophers playing with their feces. — Bitter Crank
If Wittgenstein is right that a certain use of language is misleading, how did that start? — Valentinus
Here we need to ask ourselves how did philosophy arise? Was it that some ancient folks starting taking words out of context? Or was it because there is a loose fit between language and the world, leading to all sorts of interesting puzzles? If it's the latter, then the problem is ordinary language, not philosophy. — Marchesk
I don't understand this. I frankly admit it. What's universalism? Nominalism? Conceptualism? Platonism? — god must be atheist
What IS the problem? Shouldn't we spell out in plain, simple language, what the problem is, before attempting to solve it? — god must be atheist
It is a very different approach from those who tell you where and when things went south. — Valentinus
but the functions exist prior to the language and that can be examined for philosophical analysis. — Forgottenticket
A lot of times in philosophy, I stumble upon something I came up with before on my own but didn't know the communal terms to describe it. — Forgottenticket
That is, universals were an attempt to solve a problem that the ancient Greeks had with their understanding of nature. — tim wood
Marchesk
2.6k
I don't understand this. I frankly admit it. What's universalism? Nominalism? Conceptualism? Platonism?
— god must be atheist
The problem of universals. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/universals-medieval/
I used it as an example, because it's easy to say how it might be stated as philosophers playing with feces while missing the deeper point it raises.
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Marchesk
2.6k
What IS the problem? Shouldn't we spell out in plain, simple language, what the problem is, before attempting to solve it?
— god must be atheist
The NY Times had a good article on this a few years ago: https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/03/was-wittgenstein-right/ — Marchesk
Me too. At a first cut into the notion of language games, understood in the pejorative sense, I submit that most problems arise out of a failure to approach the question with circumspection. First is to understand the question, which involves either understanding the words or (re)-defining them as necessary so that at the least folks know what the subject matter actually is. Next the history, if there is one, and there usually is, and its effects on the subject. Then perhaps a statement of purpose and goals. And so on.But I'm skeptical that casting philosophical problems as misunderstanding language games really gets at the issue those concepts are expressing — Marchesk
I am awfully sorry, Marchesk, but in my favourite universe when someone introduces a topic, they describe the situation in their own words, and not simply insert a link to a (probably) very lengthy script. — god must be atheist
topic, it's Wittgenstein's approach to dissolving philosophical problems by saying that language goes on holiday when philosophers fail to understand words in their proper language games. — Marchesk
However, this misses the point. The problem of universals is asking the question what is it about individuals, if anything, which makes generalizing useful or even possible? And that leads to talk about properties, essences, similarity and what not. So we see that the problem isn't an abuse of language, it's a question about language's relation to the world. — Marchesk
6.52 There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.
6.53 The right method of philosophy would be this. To say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had given no meaning to certain signs in his propositions. This method would be unsatisfying to the other—he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy—but it would be the only strictly correct method.
His work is opposed, as he once put it, to “the spirit which informs the vast stream of European and American civilisation in which all of us stand.” Nearly 50 years after his death, we can see, more clearly than ever, that the feeling that he was swimming against the tide was justified. If we wanted a label to describe this tide, we might call it “scientism,” the view that every intelligible question has either a scientific solution or no solution at all. It is against this view that Wittgenstein set his face. 1 — Ray Monk (biographer)
That's the sense in which Wittgenstein's philosophy is more like Protestant than Catholic mysticism, but it still has that mystical side to it. — Wayfarer
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