Take the example of the problem of universals. — Marchesk
Is the problem that of working out what a universal refers to? What sort of thing? — Banno
But in the case of universals, if you're right that meaning is grounded by them, then we can't so easily dismiss them, since it goes deeper than playing language games. Universals make language games possible, if I understand you correctly. — Marchesk
Do ordinary objects like tables and chairs exist? — Marchesk
how are we able to discriminate them from greens? — Marchesk
Could it be that what red things have in common is just that we have learned to use the word "red" when talking about them? That what they have in common is our use of a certain word? — Banno
Sometimes we don't. At the edges, we do differ as to our opinions of which colour word is appropriate. — Banno
Because it sounds like our use of red and green are arbitrary, and we could have divided up color space differently, and it would have been just as useful. — Marchesk
You and I presumably do agree on what is green and what is red, in the main; is it because we have learned to identify some essence of red that permeates certain things, or is it just simply that we have learned how to use the word "red" in our English speaking community? — Banno
perhaps this discussion will help you to see why someone such as I would come to the conclusion that the problem of universals dissipates if one deals with it as a language issue. — Banno
but then does this mean the problem arise because philosophers took universal concepts out of context? — Marchesk
For my part, I remain unconvinced that there is a useable distinction to be made between phenomenal red and plain ordinary red. — Banno
How does neuroscience account for an experience of red when you're not seeing a red object? — Marchesk
But that does not bear directly on the case in hand: that he whole philosophical exercise of explaining universals is based on a certain picture of how words work, and dissipates when that picture is dropped. — Banno
f red is not the name of a thing, then there is no need for there to be a thing that is red. That is, we can make sense of talk of red in dreams; and that's all there is. We do not need to invoke red dream-things. — Banno
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