Neurophenomenology is this mapping between rich conscious descriptions and brain processes. It allows for a chipping away at the explanatory gap between the hard problem and neuroscience, which may end up suggesting the cause and not just an in-depth correlation. — Marchesk
I think it's worth asking why are people who think that there's an "explanatory gap" likely to accept explanations that are "mapping between rich conscious descriptions and brain processes"? — Terrapin Station
How is a person aware/conscious of their own awareness/consciousness?
How do we perceive our own perceptions?
Because many of them like Chalmers want a science of consciousness where it's taken seriously, and they think there is a strong correlation between brain activity and consciousness, so it would be informative to map that out. — Marchesk
especially because they'll give no clear criteria for what fhey require of explanations. — Terrapin Station
but part of the problem with not knowing what it's like to be a bat is that no description is going to put you into the state of having a sonar experience. — Marchesk
Exactly, and sometimes it seems like that's what critics are demanding. — Terrapin Station
ell, it's akin to asking why any physical stuff has just the properties it does. — Terrapin Station
Well, it's akin to asking why any physical stuff has just the properties it does. — Terrapin Station
Anyway, nobody has jumped on the inferential view of perception yet. Perhaps I should have made the thread about that instead of another hard problem one. — Marchesk
In my own research, a new picture is taking shape in which conscious experience is seen as deeply grounded in how brains and bodies work together to maintain physiological integrity – to stay alive. In this story, we are conscious ‘beast-machines’, and I hope to show you why. — Anil Seth
What this inference allows is a mapping of phenomenology onto mechanism — Marchesk
so I'm not sure what's all that new here. — StreetlightX
People consciously see what they expect, rather than what violates their expectations
We can never see past the choices we don't understand.
An altogether terrifying prospect. This seems to imply that the real universe is different to the one that exists inside our heads. — Mark Dennis
Imagine though if atoms had a special property only under certain situations, and we couldn't give a scientific reason for that. — Marchesk
No, it's not; because physical properties are generally well understood — Janus
So if we replaced your brain with sawdust, you'd still be conscious? — Marchesk
Nevertheless, neuro-phenomenology can potentially have sense in the first-person, in terms of an association between sensory experiences and brain-probing-experiences, as for example in an experiment in which the subject records his experiences when probing his own brain. — sime
Therefore this empiricist is likely to reject your question as meaningless and inapplicable in the first-person. — sime
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