The primary experience was never claimed to be transferred (i.e. to literally be the other person's experience). — TheWillowOfDarkness

Go back and read the arguments with apokrisis. Then see if what you are objecting to is really what the argument was about.

Schop: So makes a difference here, meaning counterfactual? To broaden your idea, I think this notion that if there are no counterfactuals, it has no value or useful understanding is skipping over a large amount of phenomena. For example, though for example, mental illness can often be described in systematic inventories of this or that mental phenomena, each individual human has experiences so nuanced as to have no alternative for counterfactual examples. It just "is". It can be described, analyzed, modeled, but the actual experience, the first person perspective of that particular person is unique. It is unique in that no one else can experience it, but even more importantly, it is unique in that no matter how much detail in framing the experience into information, the event itself can never be replicated into information.

Apo: It is illogical to claim that there could be phenomena that aren't distinct and therefore counterfactual in the fact that, given different conditions yet to be discovered, they wouldn't be there.

Schop: People have individual, personal experiences that cannot be shared. How can that be communicated? No other thing can have these experiences.. It may change some event to communicate and participate in these experiences, but the actual experience is only experienced by the individual. There is something that cannot be made a map, but is simply territory.

Apo: Perhaps you don't understand what it means when I say I am defending a pragmatist epistemology? If you believe instead in private revelation, go for it.

Schop: Go ahead and school me if you think I mischaracterize you apokrisis. "Private revelation", personal experience or anything else is still had by the individual and cannot be experienced by anyone else and cannot be mapped to anyone else either. Prove me wrong if you like.

Apo: Why would I dispute the very problem pragmatism sets out to resolve?

Schop: That we have a private experience that cannot be mapped? That's what I dispute about what I perceive to be your pragmatist stance.

Apo: Yeah, but as soon as your private experience is framed by yourself as an argument, it is social, even if never in fact articulated publicly. So to be mapped is already crossing the line that is the epistemic cut upon which human introspective "self consciousness" is constructed. It invokes the "self" as the interpreter of a sign, the sign being now the observable, the claimed phenomenon.

You seem to imagine that naive experiencing of experiences is possible. But to talk about the self that stands apart from his/her experiences is already to invoke a pragmatist's sign relation.

Schop: How is the actual experience experienced by the experiencer "framed"? Only afterwards in analysis or description, not the experience itself.

So you see.. this conversation was about whether what apo called "personal revelation" was possible.. I took that to mean some sort of closed off event that cannot be shared.. and yes primary consciousness is closed off and cannot be mapped.. it is pure territory.. One can try to map it by communicating it, but the map is not the territory of course..

So the crux of the fight was around whether there is actual any territory or if everything is map.. Apo seems to say everything is map.. Territory is not real or something of that nature.

Well see, you are denying knowledge there. You claim that experiences cannot be modelled, as if it were impossible to have a map of what someone was thinking or feeling. So I more or less agree with apo here. Information (though not experiences) can certainly be replicated. Even feelings can be replicated. (that's how empathy or "lived" awareness of other people's feelings work).

To use the famous thought experiment, any of us may know what it's like to be a bat. All we need to do is think or feel in a way a bat does. While I don't think it has happened very often, if at all, it is certainly possible. It's no more tricky than knowing someone else is in pain. All it takes is the right experience, one of replicated thoughts, sensations or information.

More broadly, the "first person" and "third person" distinction is a red herring. The experience of "there is a computer" is no less "first person" than "I am hungry." Both of instances of private experiences which cannot be replicated. But the information and sensation of either is wholly public: they may be replicated in the experience of anyone.

Even feelings can be replicated. (that's how empathy or "lived" awareness of other people's feelings work). — TheWillowOfDarkness

I wonder what consequences this has for personal identity theories. If I die, and then the brain states that my brain was in, in the past, are observed beforehand and then replicated, I essentially could come back to life. It's not "me", though there actually isn't any "me" at all. There's only the phenomenon of appearing to have a "me", i.e. there are multiple specimens all believing themselves to be special in their own little way, that are in fact the exact same little way. Do I have two arms and two legs? Yes, and so does my clone. Do I have green eyes? Yes, and so does my clone. Do I believe myself to be an autonomous self with a sense of personality and uniqueness? Yes, and so does my clone in the exact same way.

In this sense, ownership becomes reproducible.

But what I think Schop1 find problematic (as do I) with some accounts is how they try to get around the fact that feelings can only be replicated, they cannot be shared. The mind is a private world in itself. The external world is public. Feelings are a totally different thing than material objects; whereas an everyday object can be shared between many different observers and still be the same thing, a mental event must be cloned in order to be "shared".

We don't need to go to clones to know ownership is reproducible. Ownership of experiences have been reproduces for many thousands of years, many millions if we are counted all lifeforms who are aware of something. The reproduction of such ownership is what the continuing presence if experiencing entities means. When I came into existence, a new owner was formed. Thoughts, feelings and ideas were reproduced. They continue to be so was long as I live.

Rather than the dissolution of personal identity, it is its absolute expression. No matter what thoughts and feelings are reproduced (or not reproduced), they are mine and cannot be taken. If a thought of feeling occurs within in someone else, it is their reproduction rather than my experience. In the sense feared, my feeling are never shared. If you think and feel like I do, you do it on your own terms.

Feeling are material objects. Such experiences are no less an existing state of the world than a rock or bookshelf we might see. All experiences are owned, are private, including those of empirical observation. If we are looking at the same mountain, we only see or understand the same thing (mountain). We never are the same thing. My experience of the mountain is not yours and visa versa, even if what we see is identical. Observation of empirical objects must be "cloned" to be shared too. In the passing of knowledge and understanding, there is only replication. "To be shared" means for someone else to have their own experience of a particular thought or feeling, a replication of what someone else knows, thinks of feels.

Feeling are material objects. Such experiences are no less an existing state of the world than a rock or bookshelf we might see. All experiences are owned, are private, including those of empirical observation. If we are looking at the same mountain, we only see or understand the same thing (mountain). We never are the same thing. My experience of the mountain is not yours and visa versa, even if what we see is identical. Observation of empirical objects must be "cloned" to be shared too. In the passing of knowledge and understanding, there is only replication. "To be shared" means for someone else to have their own experience of a particular thought or feeling, a replication of what someone else knows, thinks of feels. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Yes, this is what I was getting at. Replication, copies. Objectivity (particular universality) can only be shared via subjectivity (universal particularity). Thus subjectivity, or private "closed" states, is a very real part of reality. The relations between things are objective, but the things themselves are subjective. It's not just this way with minds. There is literally a subjective "what is it like to be a rock". Thus the world itself is an array of impossibly deep objects, signaling to each other. This is a very, very rough sketch of the object-oriented ontology presented by Graham Harman.

That's doesn't go far enough though, for each subjective states is also universal. No matter what what anyone thinks, my experiences are mine, for example. Similarly, a rock remains a rock, in all the ways it may appear, no matter what anyone thinks. Effectively, the subjective state is, the sense usually used, is the objective.

Any state, in-itself, is objective. In knowledge (as opposed to existence), nothing is closed. All it takes is the right experience (a subjective state) which is, objectively, an understanding of the state in question. Rather than being impossible deep (unknowable), the world is full of states which may be known and understood. Minds are no exception. Just as we know rocks without becoming "the subjective of the rock," we may know minds without becoming the "subjective of the mind."

That's doesn't go far enough though, for each subjective states is also universal. No matter what what anyone thinks, my experiences are mine, for example. Similarly, a rock remains a rock, in all the ways it may appear, no matter what anyone thinks. Effectively, the subjective state is, the sense usually used, is the objective. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It is only objective and universal for the subjective itself. So it is an objective fact that there are subjective systems spread universally across the world.

Minds are no exception. Just as we know rocks without becoming "the subjective of the rock," we may know minds without becoming the "subjective of the mind." — TheWillowOfDarkness

We can only observe a shadow of the subjective. There is an inherent isolation at play here. So we may know that someone is experiencing pain if we understand the common behavior indicating that they are experiencing pain, but this is merely knowledge of, not knowledge as.

No, it's not. It's objective for all subjectivities. If I am upset, for example, then it's true I'm upset for any subjectivity, not just my own. For everyone, it's true I'm upset, whether they recognise it or not. I don't suddenly become not upset merely becasue a subjectivity doesn't think or thinks the opposite. Even with respect to the rock, I am upset Willow.

We can only observe a shadow of the subjective. There is an inherent isolation at play here. So we may know that someone is experiencing pain if we understand the common behavior indicating that they are experiencing pain, but this is merely knowledge of, not knowledge as. — darthbarracuda

It's not a question of observation. The issue is feeling, experience or knowledge. People may feel someone else's pain without observing them at all. All it takes is for them to have the experience: "My friend is in pain." It can even take the form of the same pain within themselves (i.e. knowledge as).

There is always an isolation, my experiences are never yours, but that has no impact on what may be known of other's experiences.

No, it's not. It's objective for all subjectivities. If I am upset, for example, then it's true I'm upset for any subjectivity, not just my own. For everyone, it's true I'm upset, whether they recognise it or not. I don;t suddenly bemuse not up set merely becasue a subjectivity doesn't think or thinks the opposite. Even with respect to the rock, I am upset Willow. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I don't think this is the correct way to use subjectivity. If you are upset, then it is an objective fact that you are upset, i.e. anyone theoretically can go out and discover that you are upset. "From the point of view of the universe", you are upset.

But to say that "for everyone" it is true that you are upset is incorrect because some people might not know you are upset.

It's not a question of observation. The issue is feeling, experience or knowledge. People may feel someone else's pain without observing them at all. All it takes is for them to have the experience: "My friend is in pain." It can even take the form of the same pain within themselves (i.e. knowledge as).

There is always an isolation, my experiences are never yours, but that has no impact on what may be known of other's experiences. — TheWillowOfDarkness

Correct, but this is what I had been saying earlier. That subjective experiences can be known but only through duplication (or inference), not through the sharing of a numerically identical thing.

Sorry. which of those questions is about pragmatism rather than being an expression of pragmatism?

I am talking around the subject of pragmatism because I am still familiarising myself with metaphysical debate. If for example you were to ask me how I make pragmatic selection in my contemplation, I would probably not be able to express it in commonly used metaphysical terms. I would have to rely on using common parlance in creative ways and would probably not be tolerated, cause confusion and misunderstanding, or fail to convey it.

As I am reading it in this thread at this point, pragmatism is an approach or system of choice or selection in the centre of thought of the practicing subject. Wherein, in what appears to be a mysterious way, one direction, or concept is chosen, selected out of a number of possible alternatives and built into a conceptual framework, or map. Rather like the way a chip processes information in a computer.

Does that get anywhere near the mark?

So in my question, "matter to what?", I am asking for whom, or for what purpose is the selection made?

How logical distinctions are defined. How is it there is difference between myself and the computer screen? Why is one me and the other one not? I'd say "selection" is used because it refers to the presence of one difference over another. If we consider the uniform (e.g. substance, the world) which has no distinction), any distinction that occurs is but one possibility over many.

How come within the unity the world, I am distinct from my computer monitor rather than not? Why are those logical meanings "selected" rather than not? What makes it so that I have a different meaning than the computer monitor? — TheWillowOfDarkness

We say that they are different because we notice that they are not the same. The reason why you are distinct from the computer screen is that we perceive these as be being not the same. So it is a matter of choice, to use one word to refer to "you", and other words to refer to "the computer screen". Such "logical meanings" are "selected", as you say, but that is a voluntary selection. To characterize these as non-voluntary is an error, because I can if I want, switch the names and refer to thing which we call the computer screen, "you", and the thing which we call you, "the computer screen"..

The problem though, is that if I start to switch up words like this, and choose to use them randomly, it makes my speaking incoherent and unintelligible, rendering communication impossible. I have no desire to make communication between us impossible, so I choose to use words in a more acceptable way.

You act like you don't know what I'm talking about, but I don't think this is true. I think you are aware of what I'm talking about and want to say it's impossible. What I think you want to say is that logical distinction depends on the act of experience. That for selection to occur, for difference to be defined, it has to be performed by an act of will. — TheWillowOfDarkness

I think it's quite clear that defining difference is an act of will. The use of words is voluntary activity, isn't that quite clear? If it is not voluntary acts which create definition, then what is it? I think I know what you are talking about, you are trying to characterize the use of words as involuntary, but I think that this is an error. To characterize the use of words in this way is simply to avoid the true essence of word use, which is as a willful activity. And this avoidance will simply produce an unreliable metaphysics.

So while my usage of "selection" is not yours, I suspect you think your usage of "selection" is the one which applies to the topic we are discussing. — TheWillowOfDarkness

It's very clear to me that my use of "selection" is the one which applies here. The use of words is clearly a voluntary activity. If there is another type of "selection" which is non-voluntary, as you and StreetlightX seem to believe, then this is not the type of selection which applies here. It appears like you and StrretlightX are operating on some form of equivocation whereby you introduce a definition of "selection" which is non-voluntary, then proceed to discuss voluntary acts of selection as if they are classed as your newly defined "non-voluntary selection".

The point is, more or less, than the identity of a thing is wider than merely empirical manifestation or idea. I am different to everyone else. A truth not defined by a a decision of will (e.g. "I now think the distinction of Willow the poster on ThePhilosophyForum" and it happens) or particular empirical distinction (The distinction of Willow is defined by their location in time and space, what other people observe of them, etc., etc.), but given necessary by logic. I am a distinct thing-in-itself. A non-voluntary difference. A "selection" in which I, nor anyone else, had any choice. — TheWillowOfDarkness

The only reason why you are a "distinct thing-in-itself", is that the living functions of the creatures which apprehend you, their perceptive capacities, produce a separation, or distinction between that particular aspect, or part, of reality, and the surrounding environment. This is called individuation. You, as a thing distinct from the rest of reality are created by this process of individuation. That you, as a distinct entity, are called "Willow" is a matter of voluntary choice. Since all logic relies on the use of names and symbols, and the use of such is a matter of choice, then the necessity of logic is reduced to a matter of choice.

This is how living creatures operate, through choice. If you desire to argue that the individuation which the creatures perform, in distinguishing you from the rest of reality, as a particular entity, is a type of "selection", which is non-voluntary, then I would like to see some logical support for this idea. Since it is clear that the naming of these entities is a matter of volition, and the individuating of the entities is intricately entwined with the naming of them, then you will need to provide a clear separation between the naming and the individuating, in order to support your position that individuating is non-voluntary.

There is always an isolation, my experiences are never yours, but that has no impact on what may be known of other's experiences. — TheWillowOfDarkness

No, I think it does.. Upset is a broad category.. the mix of other emotions or the nuance of exact kind of upset that the person was feeling may be indescribable and if describable, not similar to what your version of upset may be when you interpret it as you a) may have misinterpreted it or more importantly b) do not understand the nuanced experience as it was lived by the original experiencer. So while broad categories can be shared, the nuanced version of the event as seen by the observer cannot be completely shown or at the least shown to be the same as the how the interpreter is interpreting the nuanced event from the original experiencer.

Also, I don't think you understood my original argument with apo.. Apo seemed to be claiming that there is no territory.. that all is map. I was trying to say that at the least there is territory, that of individual experiences which are not a map.. they just "are".

But what I think Schop1 find problematic (as do I) with some accounts is how they try to get around the fact that feelings can only be replicated, they cannot be shared. The mind is a private world in itself. The external world is public. Feelings are a totally different thing than material objects; whereas an everyday object can be shared between many different observers and still be the same thing, a mental event must be cloned in order to be "shared". — darthbarracuda

Yes, why is this particular conversation with Willow so frustrating? Right when I think we are agreeing he has this congenital need to disagree for the sake of it almost..

You are forgetting that the knower also as an experience beyond words. The sort of emotion and nuance you are talking about isn't just reserved for the person's experiences someone might know about. It can also occur within the experience of the person who knows. When someone knows the experience of another, they do not just have a "category." They have an experience.

So while there is no doubt my understanding of what someone felt may show something different, it is also true that it may show the same. The knower's experience may be a map of another's which has a precise emotion and nuance that words do not do justice.

at the least shown to be the same as the how the interpreter is interpreting the nuanced event from the original experiencer. — schopenhauer1

This notion is incoherent because experiences do not manifest empirically. When we understand the experience of another, we never observe experience. We might observe bodies doing something, but that always relies on our understanding of experiences and their relationships to bodies. Such "interpretation" actually relies on already knowing about experiences.

Also, I don't think you understood my original argument with apo.. Apo seemed to be claiming that there is no territory.. that all is map. I was trying to say that at the least there is territory, that of individual experiences which are not a map.. they just "are". — "schopenhauer1

No, I understand that. My point is that, about knowledge, apo is right. Any instance of knowledge is a map. If we are speaking about knowledge, what is known or may be known, we are only talking about maps.

You are right about experiences being "just there," a territory (a state of existence which is not representation) which experiences of knowledge never "access (i.e. to know something is never to be it)." It just has no consequence for what may be known. To what is known, only the maps matter.

The idea that all knowledge is in the form of maps or models is the paragon notion of objectification; in other words, it is the keystone of the scientistic paradigm.

I'd say more than that. It goes deeper. Rather than just a empirical approach, it is a metaphysical one: materialism. When it is recognised anything may be known, transcendent philosophy collapses. It no longer has any wisdom to offer. There is nothing "mysterious" or "inexplicable" anymore. Such notions merely become our reactions to thing we do not expect, rather than a hidden realm of power or truth.

The great prejudice towards recognising the existence of the subject exists for more of less this reason. If that without empirical manifestation (e.g. experiences, logic) may be known without restriction, then the impossible is recognised as impossible. We understand "miracles" are incoherent. In every case, the are just the world doing what it does, rather than a "rescue" from inevitably terrible nature. The wonder of "doing the impossible" is lost. It's revealed to be an illusion of our limited knowledge and expectations.

I love the way you always try to kid yourself and others that what you have to say is something "more" or "deeper".

You make the mistake of thinking that what is posited as "mysterious" or "inexplicable" is posited as something to potentially be discursively known. The mystery of life consists in the ineluctably limited nature of discursive knowledge. That limitation on discursive knowledge is not something that may be overcome; and it is precisely at this boundary that mystery opens up.

I believe you will never get that, though, and will continue raising your perennially irrelevant objections.

I meant in the sense that what was at stake wasn't just science, but a whole logic of metaphysics. What's at stake isn't the practice of science (plenty of people who think something is a "mystery" or "inexplicable" do science perfectly well), but a tradition of metaphysics (i.e. the transcendent vs the immanent).

And it because of what you describe there. The materialist 's point is that there is nothing which cannot be known discursively. They don't mistake "mystery"as something that's meant to be discursive, they argue it's incoherent because there is no knowledge that is not discursive.

Here they agree the limitation of discursive knowledge cannot be overcome: all knowledge is discursive for the materialist. Those positing "mystery" aren't wrong for claiming discourse where it is not, they are mistaken for claiming there is knowledge outside discourse.

I was a little hasty with my replies yesterday, so let me explain a bit better the way I see this issue. I am actually very interested in the idea of non-voluntary selection, that's why I asked you for an explanation of eternal return. I was hoping you could assist me in understanding.

As I tried to explain, I find the essence of volition to be found in will-power, which is a resistance to selection. So the idea of non-voluntary selection is very consistent with what I understand as will-power, the will actually being opposed to selection. Like I said, we have two different perspectives of the very same thing. You characterize selection as non-voluntary, I characterize will, as being opposed to selection.

The result of this, is that selection, though it is non-voluntary, must be something other than necessary. It cannot be necessary because the will has the power to resist selection.

I am actually very interested in the idea of non-voluntary selection, that's why I asked you for an explanation of eternal return. — Metaphysician Undercover

For what it's worth.. an example of return can be found in the elements of this moment... now. Where I am it's Sunday night. Sunday night has returned... obviously there have been a bunch of them. Yet in some ways this Sunday night is unique. I may be completely and totally wrong, but I think what's been intended by "selection" in this thread is about the ways this Sunday night is unique.

I'd be happy to find out that's not what it means.. because selection is a very confusing way to put it.

.

You are wrong to claim there is no knowledge via intuition, feeling, experience. All you are entitled to claim is that you recognize no such knowledge. If you did recognize such knowledhe you would know what I am talking about.

There are inherent limits on discursive knowledge, and there are self-imposed limits on non-discursive knowledge. Of course it stands to reason that a person will not see beyond the limits they have imposed on themselves.

Each moment in time is a return, like you say that each Sunday is a return, but there is difference in each moment, and so it is unique. I would say that the "selection" referred to in this thread is the selection of which differences will occur at each moment. My argument has been that the return itself is an instance of the same. And further, that volition, or will-power, is the capacity to resist this natural selection of difference, which occurs at each moment, in preference of the same, return.

I'd didn't deny there was knowledge by intuition, feeling or experience. Indeed, that is the only means of knowledge: all instances of awareness are our experiences.

The materialist claim is the knowledge of any of those means is discursive, a representation which is never the underlying reality.

I don't understand your position at all. If you agree there is non-discursive knowledge, then I can't identify what the disagreement is.

My argument has been that the return itself is an instance of the same. And further, that volition, or will-power, is the capacity to resist this natural selection of difference, which occurs at each moment, in preference of the same, return. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not that every moment is a return. You have to name the thing. Sunday. Night. House. Tree. Man. Woman. You should be noticing something Platonic going on.

But which is more real? The Singular Sunday or the unique Sunday? The Singular Will or the unique will?

My position is there is no non-discursive knowledge.

Our experiences (feelings, thoughts, intuition, etc.,etc.) are non-discursive (states of existence) which are the means of knowledge (models, representation, understanding, discourse), which is always discursive. Means of knowledge and knowledge are not the same.

If the states you refer to have no elements of non-discursive knowledge about them at all, then how can it be supportable to say they are related to knowledge? How can any non-linguistic knowledge at all exist if there is no non-discursive knowledge? How could animals then be said to know anything?

The way I see it discursive knowledge consists in giving an account of what you know; of knowing that you know. It is reflective knowledge made possible only by the kinds of categories and generalizations enabled by conceptual language. but in order to know that you know, you must first know, no?

I'd say more than that. It goes deeper. Rather than just a empirical approach, it is a metaphysical one: materialism. When it is recognised anything may be known, transcendent philosophy collapses. It no longer has any wisdom to offer. There is nothing "mysterious" or "inexplicable" anymore. Such notions merely become our reactions to thing we do not expect, rather than a hidden realm of power or truth.

This is a naive interpretation of wisdom. Wisdom is a simultaneous awareness and realisation of one's position in a real world, a known world, and an understood world. The wisdom comes through in the cognitive synthesis of these three perceptions/views/maps. The wise man(or woman) performs an intellectual dance within this synthesis and in so doing reveals deeper insights than can be provided from them individually in their current state of knowledge.
This can be developed into a process of transcendent insight in which the wise man metaphorically climbs a ladder of intuition through this synthesis and recovers insights which are creatively unique. Which are in an epistemological way transcendent.

This definition of wisdom lies in contrast to your naive description above.

My comment wasn't so much on the nature of wisdom as it was the emptiness of the transcendent once things are known to be understandable. Wisdom is a bit of a different topic. It involves more than just knowing things. There are questions of actions, how people are treated and living in a way which avoids damage or suffering. In every case though, it is the self which lives these wise actions. They are given by oneself, not the transcendent. When I say the transcendent no longer offers wisdom, I mean that materialism understands that wisdom and knowledge are expressions of the self.

People may certainly have knowledge and wisdom in the practice of transcendent belief, but the materialist understands that it is them who have the knowledge and wisdom, rather than it being beyond understanding.

What you've described there is not the practice of wisdom. It's a concept of becoming wise. You've generalised and reduced wisdom to the idea of escaping unwise practices. Those who are unwise become wise by exploring and devloping new wise habits which are (as of the unwise state) beyond them (either in understanding or practice).

You are then misreading this feature of the self (and future self) as something which presents beyond the self. As if becoming wise were a matter of access something that was never you or something you grasp. An idea that the self is necessarily unwise, such that wise living can only be given by what is never a part of the self. The confusion of the unwise self for any future self. So, supposedly, wisdom can only be obtained through the transcendence.

This definition precisely the prejudice of the transcendent belief I talked about in my last post in the Living with the noumenon thread. Rather than understand wisdom as something people know about and live, you reduce it to nothing more than a narrative or tradition about becoming wise.

To be wise, you say, we must sit around thinking about how wisdom is necessarily beyond us, else we are nothing but naive fools-- believe or else you are not worth listening to and are living foolishly. What you have defined is not wisdom. It is the tradition that practicing this concept of becoming wise through belief in the transcendent, as if practicing that concept was exhaustive of wisdom. A tradition which pulls so strongly that you can't see wisdom anywhere else.

If someone is already wise, and so doesn't need to go on a grand search of discovery, you claim they lack wisdom. People who come by wisdom easily, without having to go through a laborious process of self-doubt and confusion, you accuse of being naive. Those who describe wise living, and who can then present that knowledge to directly to others (stepping over the doubting and long stringing along of "mystery"), you accuse of not providing any substance.

What you speak about here is not wisdom. It's idea and tradition wisdom is only given in transcendent belief, a notion that we have to live with transcendent belief to be wise because wisdom is limited to being what we are not. A misunderstanding of the self (that which is necessary foolish) that leaves our understanding of wisdom in poverty.

Yes there is natural, innate wisdom in some selves and one could also interpret that every being is wise. My cat for example is a font of wisdom, she knows what I am going to do before I do.

But in a human self there is the addition of an educated self conscious intellect. This results in a clouding of natural wisdom, especially when the teaching is philosophically, or religiously directed. This is because the teaching and effort to learn is impinging of the intellectual understanding of the self who is learning. In this mist, or fog of the processes involved in the building of the intellect, natural wisdom can be lost. Also there is an intellectual wisdom to be learnt, which is in a sense, an aptitude, or tutored process of fine tuning the intellect. This is historically undertaken in religious organisations, and I suspect occurs in academic philosophy. In the esoteric schools, this was developed to a further level in transcendent insight, which you misrepresent.

So in the development of a human being as they grow up, there is a process of seeking/teaching/learning knowledge and wisdom. Which is understood to be sought/discovered/ deduced/realised.

The discursive isn't only a question of spoken language. It's experience. Any understanding or awareness is a discourse, a representation of meaning, rather than a state itself. Rather than merely giving an account of what you know, it is true of any instance of awareness, knowledge and understanding, even non-linguistic experience.

If I have an awareness I cannot put into words, I know something, I aware of something, I understand something. It's still discursive. Words even relate to it-- right now I'm pointing out I can't put it into words. Not only do I know it, but I can tell you there is no way to know it by me giving description in words.

It is reflective knowledge made possible only by the kinds of categories and generalizations enabled by conceptual language. but in order to know that you know, you must first know, no? — John

Are we talking about reflective knowledge here? Indeed, how can it be said that reflective knowledge even makes sense? Supposedly, I meant to know a tree's is a tree by relying on a "category" or "generalisation," but how can this be given that any tree in front of me is not any such concept?

I mean how do even know that the object infront of me fits into the category of tree? No doubt you would point out that I can observe the tree an not that it has various attributes that mean it fits into the category of "tree."

But this causes incoherence. If I am noting the leaves, truck, etc.,etc. of the object in front of me, I have knowledge of it prior to using the "category" or "generalisation" of tree. What's more, I must know that combination of leaves, truck, etc.etc., equals a tree (as opposed to anything else), so I must know the object is a tree (i.e. these are the leaves, trunk, etc.,etc of a tree) prior to applying judgment on the basis "category" or "generalisation," else I couldn't conclude either applied to the state in front of me.

Logic shows us knowledge cannot be reflective. We can't derive it from other instances of knowledge. Any instance of knowledge must be its own state, not enabled by something prior, but given in-itself.