Anyway, it's tangential to the thread and the OP seems to have no interest in the Buddhist account of the matter, so I'll leave it at that. — Wayfarer
So the OP isn't really talking about whether he as the same person will exist, but, rather, whether he'll emerge into existence again - whether he'll get 'caught back up in' existence. Even as something different. The focus on pronouns misses the problem entirely - it's a problem that is difficult to pose due to the limitations of grammar. — csalisbury
I don't really grasp how the Buddha says there is no self, and yet you come back to the world in the next lifetime, and what you come back as depends upon your karma.
If there's no self, what lives the next lifetime? What accumulates the karma? — dukkha
So the OP isn't really talking about whether he as the same person will exist, but, rather, whether he'll emerge into existence again - whether he'll get 'caught back up in' existence. Even as something different. The focus on pronouns misses the problem entirely - it's a problem that is difficult to pose due to the limitations of grammar. — csalisbury
It's so much more interesting and difficult than it first appears! — csalisbury
I know you're not impressed by the OP's line of thought. Rather than try to sway you to that line of thinking, I think it'd be more fruitful to ask you to elaborate your own. What do you mean by 'states'?Your consciousness, your sense of self, etc. are simply brain states re your particular brain.
The only way we will be able to know if we will never be able to upload our consciousness into computers or robots is to try it by experiment. I see no reason to dismiss the idea of a gradual introduction of synthetic processors into the brain, if there is a continuation of consciousness. Although it does occur to me that there would be some psychological issues, or a alteration on personality developing into a "different" person. But the critical issue is that the continuous living experience of me would be maintained. I would still be here, although feeling different. Rather than having entirely ceased to exist, when my apparatus stop working.So, no need to worry about it. If something wakes up and thinks it is you, it won't be you. It also leads to the fact that we will never be able to "upload" our consciousness into computers or robots or inhabit other bodies
I know it's difficult to articulate with the language we have. But I think we all know instinctively what you are thinking about and I have puzzled over it for a long time too.So the OP isn't really talking about whether he as the same person will exist, but, rather, whether he'll emerge into existence again - whether he'll get 'caught back up in' existence. Even as something different. The focus on pronouns misses the problem entirely - it's a problem that is difficult to pose due to the limitations of grammar.
Also a lot of people don't seem to get that if consciousness is simply the state of your brain, this means that the body and the world around you perceive - being conscious experience - must itself be a particular brain state. — dukkha
This is a horrible epistemic position to be on, because from the position of the onboard self/world model, you do not have any access to anything BUT the model. — dukkha
How can something experiential be literally also a non experiential physical thing? — dukkha
Actually, that is not at all established - it is the basic idea of philosophical materialism, in the form of what is called 'identity theory'. However it's not by any means scientifically established, and can be challenged on many grounds. — Wayfarer
What do you mean by 'states'? — csalisbury
How do you know that? What's your argument to support such a belief? — John
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