So, what is the formalism that Hegel rejects? That "in the absolute everything is one ... in the absolute everything is the same" or, as he mocks it in #7: " to stir it all together into a smooth mélange". — Fooloso4
In so doing, this formalism asserts that this monotony and abstract universality is the absolute ...
... the universal Idea in this form of non-actuality
... what counts as the speculative way of considering things turns out to be the dissolution of the distinct and the determinate, or, instead turns out to be simply the casting of what is distinct and determinate into the abyss of the void, an act lacking all development or having no justification in its own self at all.
... whereas in the absolute ...
... in the A = A, there is no such “something,” for in the absolute, everything is one.
To oppose this one bit of knowledge, namely, that in the absolute everything is the same, to
the knowing which makes distinctions and which has been either fulfilled or is seeking and demanding to be fulfilled – that is, to pass off its absolute as the night in which, as one says, all cows are black – is an utterly vacuous naiveté in cognition.
Now, I'm not an expert, but this part reminds me of Plotin a little. It sounds like substance is To Hen, the platonic oneness which is totally abstract, and according to Hegel it requires a notion of being a subject, an awareness, a reflection on itself - as the platonic "nous", intellect.everything hangs on
grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject. — tim wood
"inert simplicity" - I think this is what Hegel tries to avoid at all cost. He likes the idea of there being a universal principle, but an unchanging, abstract oneness is useless in his eyes. He wants this highest notion to be aware, dynamic, "begreiflich" (graspable...)if thinking only unifies the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, or intuition grasped as thinking, then there is the issue about whether this intellectual intuition does not then itself relapse into inert simplicity — tim wood
And here we have another notion of change, of constant movement and reflection, right? The living substance.it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself. — tim wood
it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself. — tim wood
In my view … everything hangs on grasping and expressing the true not just as substance but just as much as subject.
By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception. (Ethics , Part One, Definitions, III)
At the same time, it is to be noted that substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.
However, in part, the opposite view, which itself clings to thinking as thinking, or, which holds fast to universality, is exactly the same simplicity, or, it is itself undifferentiated, unmoved substantiality.
But, thirdly, if thinking only unifies the being of substance with itself and grasps immediacy, or intuition grasped as thinking, then there is the issue about whether this intellectual intuition does not then itself relapse into inert simplicity and thereby present actuality itself in a fully non-actual mode.
However much taking God to be the one substance shocked the age in which this was expressed, still that was in part because of an instinctive awareness that in such a view self-consciousness only perishes and is not preserved.
the true not just as substance but just as much as subject. — tim wood
or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing. — tim wood
I see that Fooloso4 has posted already. He quotes Spinoza, "By substance, I mean that which is in itself, and is conceived through itself: in other words, that of which a conception can be formed independently of any other conception."
Our hazard here - maybe just my hazard - lies in accepting something like this from Spinoza as explanation. — tim wood
Were Hegel here, I'd say, "Wha-at," and ask him to go through it again. — tim wood
My problem is that I have no idea what it means to have a single unitary conception "formed independently of any other conception. — tim wood
I think Fooloso4 just above has got some of it, but not all. — tim wood
But at the moment it seems to me Hegel is allowing himself to float a bit, no feet on the ground. — tim wood
Nice resource. Maybe not a Dummy's Guide, but helpful. — tim wood
One thing we can do is go through it again and again and again ourselves. — Fooloso4
One assumption that guides my reading of the philosophers is that when things do not make sense to me the problem is probably with me and not the text. — Fooloso4
One disadvantage of the way we are proceeding is that we have not read the whole of the preface or the whole of the book. — Fooloso4
... looking at Hegel to supply that clarity. — tim wood
This group discussion is a bit of a mix. Apparently taking place during a first read, hence the advice to carry on and not get bogged down. It seems we carry on - in various stages of ignorance - and return later, having gained an overall picture. Or in the perhaps vain hope of
... looking at Hegel to supply that clarity. — tim wood — Amity
Good idea. If we can at least keep track of some key words, that's a big step already, and the glossary is a huge help there.I like to note and understand key words first... — Amity
Until here, we continue from before, right? Abstract universality is nice, but useless, because it's somehow incomplete (not sure I get the "otherness" and the overcoming of that alienation, though).However, this in-itself is abstract universality, in which its nature, which is to be for itself, and the self-movement of the form are both left out of view. — Hegel
Now, this is actually rather clear, isn't it?Precisely because the form is as essential to the essence as the essence is to itself, the essence must not be grasped and expressed as mere essence, which is to say, as immediate substance or as the pure self-intuition of the divine. Rather, it must likewise be grasped as form in the entire richness of the developed form, and only thereby is it grasped and expressed as the actual — Hegel
(I take this from the way I tackle Latin translations... I go with my first vague understanding of a sentence, and then check the grammar in detail to see if it matches my thesis. A lot of times I have to discard my first idea, or at least revise it significantly, but it gives me a starting point) — WerMaat
I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains. — WerMaat
For example, my association with Plotin is probably nonsense if we have much closer, more contemporary candidates in Spinoza and Kant. — WerMaat
For that reason we should probably rely on our more knowledgeable participants as well as secondary literature to point us in the right direction — WerMaat
I myself like to use a kind of falsification method... not sure how to describe that in English, an "Ausschlussverfahren"? As in, I see what ideas, associations and hypotheses I can come up with myself, and then check if they hold up under scrutiny: Test them against the text itself, and with external sources, shave them with Occams razor and see what remains. — WerMaat
Furthermore, the living substance is the being that is in truth subject, or, what amounts to the same thing, it is in truth actual only insofar as it is the movement of self-positing, or, that it is the mediation of itself and its becoming-other-to-itself.
... substantiality comprises within itself the universal, or, it comprises not only the immediacy of knowing but also the immediacy of being, or, immediacy for knowing.
... must be justified by the exposition of the system itself ...
Fichte is suggesting that the self, which he typically refers to as "the I," is not a static thing with fixed properties, but rather a self-producing process. Yet if it is a self-producing process, then it also seems that it must be free, since in some as yet unspecified fashion it owes its existence to nothing but itself. https://www.iep.utm.edu/fichtejg/
As subject, it is pure, simple negativity, and,as a result, it is the estrangement of what is simple, or, it is the doubling which posits oppositions and which is again the negation of this indifferent diversity and its opposition.
That is, it is only this self-restoring sameness, the reflective turn into itself in its otherness.
The true is not an original unity as such, or, not an immediate unity as such. It is the coming-to-be of itself, the circle that presupposes its end as its goal and has its end for its beginning, and which is actual only through this accomplishment and its end.
just great... now I don't just have Hegel to read and reread again, now I need to do the same AGAIN with your posts.. — WerMaat
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