Free will and consciousness are synonymous. Consciousness is the manifestation of free will — Pantagruel

I don't agree. Where did you get this. I don't even see them as related.

Claiming that free will does not exist would be a self contradictory action, because who could be making the claim? — Pantagruel

The meat machine that just moved it's meat jukebox in a way that said "free will doesn't exist" while having it's meat CPU think that statement is correct

Postulating something is an event of free will.

Isn't it? — Pantagruel

AI can postulate things. Chat bots can postulate things. It really doesn't take much to postulate things.

If consciousness does anything at all, it must be because it is free to have done so, otherwise it would not be responsible for what it had done.

As far as AI postulating things, you are talking about a system that is a construct of free will, so the fact that it mimics free will isn't surprising. That's what AI was designed to do.

So arguing against the existence of free will is kind of like arguing for solipsism. If solipsism were true, why would anyone ever argue it? Who would they be arguing with? If free will isn't true then how could we be having a discussion?

If consciousness does anything at all, it must be because it is free to have done so, otherwise it would not be responsible for what it had done. — Pantagruel

Yes and I'd say it's not responsible. I'll repost my argument from another thread here if you want to read it

P1: All subjectively understood information must be transmitted through a physical means. Be it words on a screen or on paper or sound waves. I cannot "will" an idea into your mind directly, you have to see it/ read it/ etc. One cannot think without those physical means because there would be nothing to think about. I'm basically saying you need a physical brain to think or that you need a brain (or some other processing unit) for a mind. Even mathematics requires a physical brain even though it is not describing anything physical. In order to understand what a line is you need a sense of space which doesn't come without a body and a brain. In order to understand numbers you need to know what counting is or what a "thing" is or what sets are which doesn't come without the ability to distinguish objects, which doesn't come without the physical senses

P2: The production of these physical means requires a physical cause. I cannot "will" ink onto a paper, I need to physically move my arm.

P3: The outcome of a physical interaction is not determined by a subject. It is determined by the laws of physics or by chance. This is not to say the laws of physics we have currently are correct, but that there is SOME sort of combination of laws and random chance that determines the outcomes of physical interactions.

C: Since a subject cannot influence a physical interactions and since physical interactions can only be caused by other physical interactions, the subject cannot influence any course of events unless the subject itself is a physical entity, isolatable and testable.

You could not have read what I wrote without light waves being incident on your eyes, which then changes the chemical formula of retinol in your eyes which causes it to irritate certain neurons etc etc until it reaches your brain. How that reaching your brain bit results in your subjective understanding I do not know but what I do know is HOWEVER YOU REPLY must ultimately be caused by physical effects. If you reply by typing something must have moved your fingers and that something must have been physical all the way back to your brain. When you formulated what you were about to type, there had to have been a physical interaction that culminated in you typing it. I don't know how you formulated what you were about to type subjectively but ultimately, the chain of causailty ending with you typing must have started with a physical cause because typing is physical. That's why I believe if such a thing as free will exists then we could literally find a force or field in the brain which directly causes certain chemical/physical interactions. There has to be a "free will force" whose results you can predict and control beforehand with sheer will and it has to be controllable. That's the only way I can conceive of free will existing. Or else how does it interact with the physical world?

Your ideas didn't cause the words I'm seeing, ultimately your fingers did and something physical must have caused those fingers to move. That's why I believe free will is either a physical force explanable by some formulation of the laws of physics or it is literally voodoo magic because I cannot think of a way something non physical can PUSH something physical.

I am not denying the reality of physical mechanisms, far from it. But what you are doing is denying the reality of subjectivity because you cannot explain how consciousness interacts with matter. What I am saying is that, taken as a whole, the sum total of the world as we experience IS, in fact, an instantiation of the phenomenon of consciousness interacting with physical reality. Our material universe now is infinitely more complex than that of our essentially physically identical ancestors 100,000 years ago. And in measurable, physical terms. So the cumulative history of humanity is itself evidence of the influence of mind on matter. Consciousness defines itself experimentally via the success/failure of it's ongoing interactions with reality, and codifies these experiments as the product which is culture.

It's Idealism, Dilthey really brings these themes to the fore for me.

But what you are doing is denying the reality of subjectivity because you cannot explain how consciousness interacts with matter — Pantagruel

No what I'm doing is denying any connection between subjectivity and matter. I have no idea what is and is not conscious other than me. My couch is conscious for all I know. The point is I CAN explain most of the world using physical laws and have great success doing so but I cannot using subjective experiences. Physical laws never predict the wrong phenomena. Our CURRENT physical laws might but whatever the "correct" conception of physics is (if that even is a thing) it predicts everything physically possible. And I have yet to see someone cause directy physical change through sheer will.

So since
A: I can explain almost everything using physical laws (not necessarily the current ones)
B: I have no evidence of subjectivity ever directly acting as a force to move any atoms

Then either free will doesn't exist or it is another force, one we can predict and control individually. Because ultimately, if free will is to be a relavent conception, it has to CAUSE something to happen in the physical world which means it must directly interact through a physical mechanism. So that leaves me with either: It doesn't exist and I have no idea how subjectivity arises. or: There is the "free will force" testable and documentable (and I still have no idea how subjectivity arizes but at least I know it can cause something now)

Our material universe now is infinitely more complex than that of our essentially physically identical ancestors 100,000 years ago — Pantagruel

I don't think it's more complex, we just understand it better. In many ways I'd say current cities are LESS complex than jungles and ravines

So what you are saying is your explanatory framework has no correlate for "whatever links subjectivity and objectivity".

That's fine. My framework does. It is called "consciousness" in the sense that is used by popular tradition, myriad sciences which make it the object, a very long tradition in philosophy, and the basic, prima facie experience accepted by billions of people every day.

You cannot prove a negative, scientific discoveries are discoveries about what is. So I accept (subject to specific validation) any and all mechanistic science you would care to cite. I just offer a more expansive framework within which to study facts which are in evidence, such as culture and introspection.

You should check out the science of intertheoretic reductionism. Explanatory frameworks are many.

seriously, moot discussions take place all the time. there is no necessary connection between the mootness of a discussion and whether the discussion can take place.
all of these claims and no argument for any of them. Oh my.

what I am saying is the explanatory framework is not within the mechanistic paradigm that accounts for the being there of being in the world. And until you can grasp that concept, you will be forever lost within the framework of your always present yet necessarily hidden nihilism. And that is no way to live a life. Just saying.

As I mentioned, there are a wide variety of explanatory frameworks. The discipline of intertheoretic reduction explores various ways in which these differing schemas may sometimes be reconciled through "bridge theorems".

The most widely revised explanatory framework is the scientific, and rightly so, since it is by design self-correcting. After several hundred years, whatever was the accepted scientific mythology comes to look primitive in comparison to the current. To think that somehow the state of our current science is any different is not just hubris, it is close-minded

Mechanistic explanations are by their nature appropriate to mechanisms. Clearly I believe that consciousness (which minimally requires free-will to be what it is) is something more. If you don't believe in that 'something more' oh well. Many people do. And the entire framework of the 'human studies' (or Geistwiessenschaftlehre as Dilthey describes) is devoted to elaborating and refining the evolution of the phenomenon of historical human consciousness.

You don't like this project. I get it. Feel free not to participate. As I said, my explanatory framework reconciles with everything I know about thermodynamics, evolutionary biology, cognitive science, quite neatly.

First, note that I believe there is free will.

However:

If there is no such thing as free will, then everything is moot, most importantly, any discussion about it, which could not be taking place. — Pantagruel

"If there were no free will, then no discussion about free will could take place" is false.

Without the concept of free will there can be no responsibility for anything,

That's a common view, but I don't agree with it.

and consequently no meaning.

That's not a common view, and it seems completely arbitrary.

Free will and consciousness are synonymous.

What??? No.

Consciousness is the manifestation of free will.

Again, a completely arbitrary idea.

One of the most fundamental interpretations of life is self-direction,

That's a common value, but it's not an "interpretation of life."

Claiming that free will does not exist would be a self contradictory action,

No. That's just nonsense.

Postulating something is an event of free will.

No.

Your post is a complete mess of false, arbitrary nonsense.

Boy, that's a whole lot of criticism without much substance. Pot meet kettle.

For, to take an example, if I consider the faculty of understanding which I possess, I find that it is of very small extent, and greatly limited, and at the same time I form the idea of another faculty of the same nature, much more ample and even infinite, and seeing that I can frame the idea of it, I discover, from this circumstance alone, that it pertains to the nature of God. In the same way, if I examine the faculty of memory or imagination, or any other faculty I possess, I find none that is not small and circumscribed, and in God immense and infinite. It is the faculty of will only, or freedom of choice, which I experience to be so great that I am unable to conceive the idea of another that shall be more ample and extended; so that it is chiefly my will which leads me to discern that I bear a certain image and similitude of God.

I'll stick to the company I have though. Thanks for playing.

I can't fathom how anyone can believe that you could do something, and not be free to do it? It's a fundamental transcendental argument. I guess I thought you were joking.....

Boy, that's a whole lot of criticism without much substance. Pot meet kettle. — Pantagruel

Well, because it's a complete mess. We'd have to tackle one small thing at a time.

if I consider the faculty of understanding which I possess, I find that it is of very small extent, — Pantagruel

And here you're making even more of a mess. To sort through all of this we'd have to tackle just very small bits at a time. For example, you find that it's "of a very small extent"? What the heck is that even saying?

It's Descartes. I assumed it would require no elaboration.

Transcendental argument: If A does x, A must be free to do X. Asserting A is not free to do x and A does x is self-contradictory. Most reasonable people embrace the principle of non-self-contradiction.

It could (logically) be the case that you're determined to do x.

Again, I am effecting a definition of the domain which for which this assertion is fundamental. Consistent with the reality that most people, including myself, experience every day.

John Searle remarked in an interview that 'the average man on the street is a Cartesian.' There's a reason for that.

I'm certain that in our day to day experience of the executive function we are definitely not as free as we believe ourselves to be. It's well established that our minds are subject to numerous 'cognitive biases' that preformat our perceptions and decisions. As well experiments have shown that a supposedly free choice can be anticipated in the brain by as much as several seconds.

However I believe consciousness is more akin to a cybernetic system in its role as mediator of input and output. It's behaviours are essentially rule-governed and these rules are cognitive habits. So in my view, the most powerful form of conscious freedom consists in one's ability to modify one's own cognitive habits.

The problem with free will is that you cannot have it if you exist...
Your person is a compilation of the things that you lived and your tastes, so all your decision making all your free will is the sum of things that you did not choose or control, think about it like a poker game the dealer gives you your cards and than you can as you choose to play it and if you think that reacting is free will than you are correct but In my opinion the absolut of freedom is the possibility of not playing at all.

I'd agree entirely, we are born into a context. But it is my opinion, based on the sum total of my reading and experience, that with time, knowledge, and effort, we are able to modify or redirect the causal flows within at least some contexts. The whole reason that the experimental method works is that we are interacting with something.

Again, I am effecting a definition of the domain which for which this assertion is fundamental. Consistent with the reality that most people, including myself, experience every day.

John Searle remarked in an interview that 'the average man on the street is a Cartesian.' There's a reason for that.

I'm certain that in our day to day experience of the executive function we are definitely not as free as we believe ourselves to be. It's well established that our minds are subject to numerous 'cognitive biases' that preformat our perceptions and decisions. As well experiments have shown that a supposedly free choice can be anticipated in the brain by as much as several seconds.

However I believe consciousness is more akin to a cybernetic system in its role as mediator of input and output. It's behaviours are essentially rule-governed and these rules are cognitive habits. So in my view, the most powerful form of conscious freedom consists in one's ability to modify one's own cognitive habits. — Pantagruel

Do you understand, though, that it could (logically) be the case that you're determined to do x? So A doing x implies nothing about freedom/free will.

Remember that I'm not trying to convince you that there is no free will--I buy free will myself; I'm not a determinist. I'm simply addressing whether the arguments you're forwarding work as arguments.

It is my opinion that, if my mind were constrained in the way you describe, I would not be capable of having the fundamental experience of consciousness. Cogito ergo sum. This was the exact point at the heart of Descartes' philosophy. 1. Doubt everything (a very rigorous way to conduct yourself epistemically). 2. What cannot possibly be doubted? That I am having this experience now.

Consciousness is the experience which is by its very nature necessarily free from compulsion.

I do believe that people can allow themselves to become subject to determinisms at various levels (as I described). Some more than others (addicts for example). But I think at its core, there is a fundamental freedom.

I hope that clarifies why I believe what I do, and reconciles it at least partly with your beliefs about determinism. I would say I espouse a variety of 'soft-determinism.'

It is my opinion that, if my mind were constrained in the way you describe, I would not be capable of having the fundamental experience of consciousness. Cogito ergo sum. This was the exact point at the heart of Descartes' philosophy. 1. Doubt everything (a very rigorous way to conduct yourself epistemically). 2. What cannot possibly be doubted? That I am having this experience now.

Consciousness is the experience which is by its very nature necessarily free from compulsion. — Pantagruel

The idea of determinism isn't that it seems like there are no choices, that there is no freedom phenomenally. The idea is that the reality behind the phenomena is deterministic, where part of what's deterministically occurring is just the phenomenal character in question (of seeming to have choices, freedom, etc.)

So you'd need an argument (if you're going to claim an argument for this), not just an opinion, as to why determinism couldn't produce consciousness with the phenomenal illusion of freedom. If determinism were the case, you couldn't have (conscious) experiences, you couldn't doubt things, etc. because?

So, and for the last time, I will assert: we have a fundamental disagreement about definitions. What you call the "phenomenal illusion of freedom" is a contradiction in terms in the domain in which I am operating. And I did supply an argument:
A is not free to do x; A does x - is self contradictory. To do something I must be able to do it. To be able to do it, I must be free to do it. I cannot throw a switch if my hands are tied.

I think we must agree to disagree in this regard.

A is not free to do x; A does x - is self contradictory. To do something I must be able to do it. To be able to do it, I must be free to do it. I cannot throw a switch if my hands are tied. — Pantagruel

If A is causally forced to do x, must A be able to do x?

The sense of the word "do" is what as at question here.

I am asserting that there is such a thing as subjective causation. I'm sure that it does 'mesh' with the deterministic schema within which your evaluations take place, but in some supervenient context. ie. Just as the deterministic processes of chemical interactions are not inferable from the laws of quantum mechanics.

The laws of quantum mechanics play out, eventually systems emerge (at a different scope and scale) in which different sets of laws dominate (baryonic matter). Again more complex systems emerge with new laws not entailed by those of the 'parent system'. Etc. Eventually you get to chemical systems, biological systems, life, consciousness. Ultimately I believe these systems can be reconciled under a broad enough theoretical framework. Intertheoretic Reduction should be possible. The process I described is, in broad strokes, an accurate depiction of how the universe has evolved.

For me, all facts are provisional, in that our knowledge is only ever approximate (a priori excluded, I'm more interested in 'experimentalism' as a philosophy of existence). One thing that history shows us is that we never know as much as we think we do. Once our context of understanding expands sufficiently some facts may assume a whole new meaning. Paradigm shift.

I'm sure that it does 'mesh' with the deterministic schema within which your evaluations take place, — Pantagruel

Again, I'm not a determinist. I'm addressing whether arguments work logically.

I am asserting that there is such a thing as subjective causation. — Pantagruel

I understand that. I'm addressing whether you have an argument for it that is valid and sound logically.

When I asked you this: "If A is causally forced to do x, must A be able to do x?" I wasn't asking in the context where we're necessarily talking about a person. It includes things like starting automobiles, opening doors, etc., too.

If a door is causally forced to open, must it be able to open? Yes. Of course. That doesn't logically imply ontological freedom. The notion of ontological freedom is something different than things doing whatever they must do causally/deterministically. (Or basically, you were equivocating the word "free(dom).")

My argument is that if the thoughts in my head were not caused by me, there would be no me to have them, ergo they would not be occurring. And it isn't my argument, it's Descartes'.

In nature, the distinction between causal sequences and objects is arbitrary. Any "thing" exists for a finite duration, or from a specific perspective of scale. Eventually, it becomes something else. Thought is toto caelo different. And from my perspective, if you are saying you are not the author of your own thoughts, then I'm not talking to you, I'm talking to whoever the author of those thoughts is.

It just seems like you're quibbling.

Descartes is the funny little guy on the 1937 French postage stamp that is my avatar. Interesting trivia. There are two versions of that stamp. One labeled 'Discours de la method' and the other 'Discours sur la method' - I have them both in my collection. :)

If determinism were the case, you couldn't have (conscious) experiences, you couldn't doubt things, etc. because? — Terrapin Station

I think the short answer, in the context of this argument, is that there'd be no you. Without free will, there can be no attribution (of thoughts, experiences etc.) so there is no self.

It's not really an ontological argument the way I understand it. It simply states that free will is as fundamental, perhaps more fundamental, that any other phenomenon.

Precisely