In my opinion, natural predisposition is the reason why the belief in God, as the creator of the real, physical world, is so prevalent. — alcontali

I like the way you write and your thoughtfulness. Your depth of knowledge is impressive, but I can't help think your way of seeing things makes something which is very simple much more complicated than it needs to be. That is my primary complaint about philosophy, especially western philosophy. I do recognize that I have a lazy man's tendency to want things to be as simple as possible. I always come back to on of my favorite quote from Kafka:

It is not necessary that you leave the house. Remain at your table and listen. Do not even listen, only wait. Do not even wait, be wholly still and alone. The world will present itself to you for its unmasking, it can do no other, in ecstasy it will writhe at your feet.

They do mean something, but the ‘something’ isn’t fixed. That something is always going to be different for a different observer, and will also change in relation to the value structure they employ in interacting with the painting. — Possibility

We're just back to what does "mean" mean.

In my opinion, natural predisposition is the reason why the belief in God, as the creator of the real, physical world, is so prevalent. — alcontali

I left this out of my last response. It's getting late. Natural predisposition? Maybe. I'm not a believer in any specific God, but it seems to me that a belief in God is recognition that our world, universe, reality is fundamentally human. We are mixed up with the physical manifestations of reality in a way that is not separable. The universe did not exist before we, or someone like us, recognized it. I don't mean that in any kind of mystical or magical way. I come from materialism, although I left it behind a long time ago.

So, it would be in keeping with common usage to say in the latter case that the tablet has meaning, even though it may presently have no determinate meaning for us, because we have not deciphered it. — Janus

We're just back to what does "mean" mean. — T Clark

In my view, we can talk about meaning in the same way that we can talk about algebra: as variables in relation to each other. But these variables are themselves algebraic equations, with their own variables that are algebraic equations. That’s enough to do anyone’s head in, and it’s probably why alcontali’s writing is so complicated.

Meaning is about as complicated as it gets for us, and any attempt to simplify it ends up having the same capacity of a photograph in portraying a full concert experience. But that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t show the photographs anyway, with a ‘you had to be there’ disclaimer.

Meaning is about as complicated as it gets for us, — Possibility

As a self-identified lazy person, I can't help thinking that the complications are in the way we ask our questions, not in the underlying nature of meaning. I'm not even sure what that means.

Well we can obviously address different senses of 'meaning', without having to be concerned over whether we have covered every possible sense of the term.

In the case of 'talking about meaning' I remain bemused that you can't see that your exhortation for 'things to be clearly stated' is equivalent to the apocryphal 'turtles all the way down' assertion !

To All
There are one or two respondents here who are observing 'the dancing' for what it is. I refer to those to whom it is obvious that 'meaning' is inextricably enmeshed in the praxis of living. I suggest that it may be only by communing with the neologisms used, or the analysis of living in references like those I cited, that they might avoid being drawn back onto the dance floor.

The universe did not exist before we, or someone like us, recognized it. I don't mean that in any kind of mystical or magical way. — T Clark

There is a sense in which that statement is true, but that's the point; it all depends on what you mean by it. And when people argue over materialism vs idealism, for example, it often comes down to each party insisting on a sense of the terms being used which the other does not agree with or at least is not employing.

You're leading that dance.

Well we can obviously address different senses of 'meaning', without having to be concerned over whether we have covered every possible sense of the term. — Janus

We can.

Well we can obviously address different senses of 'meaning', without having to be concerned over whether we have covered every possible sense of the term. — Janus

Of course you can, but you will have limited your understanding of the term in the process, and you cannot then ‘talk about meaning’ objectively, (in relation to the praxis of living, for instance) from this position.

So, it would be in keeping with common usage to say in the latter case that the tablet has meaning, even though it may presently have no determinate meaning for us, because we have not deciphered it. — Janus

I agree with you here only in some respects. I think that meaning is an aspect of the universe that potentially exists as a relationship between everything, regardless of whether or not anything is aware, connects or integrates that information.

But the tablet in question (or any inscribed mark) does not have a specific inherent meaning as separate from its relationship to both the observer and what is significant to that observer. In ‘deciphering’ the tablet as a text, an observer must attempt to form a relationship with both the signs/symbols and what is significant that most closely resembles that of the original cultural agreement. They then attempt to reflect that relationship in their translation/meaning by referring to a different relationship with different signs/symbols and what is significant to the observer. It is an inexact process that at best reflects meaning, but does not find it in the tablet as such.

The tablet, undecipherable, still has a relationship with the observer, albeit in relation to a slightly different significance: the awareness of a cultural experience that exists in our collective past. And as such, regardless of whether the marks were random or inscribed to convey anything, it is meaningful.

You qoted T Clark's statement about what we call the universe being observer-dependent. For me, his point is self evident without the need for an appeal to contextual 'truth' which impacts on 'agreement about terms'. In short, it is for me the recognition of a quest for a vantage point transcendent of the synthetic dichotomy 'observer-observed' which is only philosophical action worth taking,
(That action has been variously attempted and shows some promise in investigating, for example, Wittgenstein's approach to meaning.: Ref [Rosch "Prototype Theory".)

And as such, regardless of whether the marks were random or inscribed to convey anything, it is meaningful. — Possibility

I agree with that. I look at the world as being replete with meaning, not as lacking it. I still maintain a distinction between a tablet that is inscribed with hieroglyphics that had ikonic or symbolic meaning to whoever inscribed it, and one which has been inscribed with marks which had no ikonic or symbolic meaning. I don't think it matters even if we cannot know.

The fact is that if there is meaning there then it is, in principle at least, decipherable.Of course it could be deciphered more or less correctly or incorrectly, but that possibility does not exist in the case of the meaningless marks; we would simply be making a mistake if we tried to decipher it.

The fact is that if there is meaning there then it is, in principle at least, decipherable.Of course it could be deciphered more or less correctly or incorrectly, but that possibility does not exist in the case of the meaningless marks; we would simply be making a mistake if we tried to decipher it. — Janus

The thing about your perception of ‘deciphering’, though, is that it implies one ‘correct’ meaning, which is unlikely to be the case. If it were about cracking a code, then there would only be one ‘correct’ translation of any biblical text, for instance.

In the case of ‘meaningless’ marks, it would indeed be a mistake to assume they correspond to a written language, but I don’t think any marks are meaningless. They could be patterns that mark the tablet for a particular use, as belonging to a certain family, tribe or social strata, or they could be the random, idle patterns of a skilled artisan’s blade on a bench. They are still meaningful. Forming a relationship with both the sign/symbol and what is significant that most closely resembles that of the original interaction is still what is required in this case, so the process of ‘deciphering’, as you put it, is still important.

To All

Having recently joined this forum seeking a more contemporary approach to 'philosophy', I am somewhat disappointed in what I find.

On the specific issue of 'meaning', where, I ask, (following die Kehre ), is the discussion of Wittgenstein's adage 'meaning is use' ? Where I ask is discussion of the major shift to nonrepresentationalism in language ?...or where is Derrida's point that 'meaning' even for the author of text, dynamically shifts ? (merely dismissing that 'Derrida' on this won't do !).

Hence my accusation of 'dancing' (or as Wittgenstein might have called it, Geschwätz)

We're just back to what does "mean" mean. — T Clark

I think we all know what it means. ... But describing and defining it in words, with any sort of precision? Not so easy. And yet it remains the case that we all know what "mean" means. You see? :wink:

What sorts of things are meaningful? How do these things become meaningful? To whom are these things meaningful? — creativesoul

Things aren't literally meaningful. Rather, people think about them in a meaningful way. A person can think about anything in a meaningful way. And they can also refrain from thinking about anything in a meaningful way. It depends on the person and the situation.

As I posted in another recent thread:

Meaning is something mental that we do. Namely, it's the mental process of associative thinking, of thinking about something so that it implies, refers to, connotes, denotes, suggests or "pushes" or "leans towards", etc. other things. It's not possible to perceive this. Even when you observe things like others literally pointing at something, or you read dictionary definitions, you need to think about those things in those associative ways. This is why the paper that a definition is written on, for example, can't do meaning. You can't perceive thinking about something in those associative ways. In fact, you can't literally perceive others thinking period. We rather abductively conclude that others are thinking.

I think we all know what it means. ... But describing and defining it in words, with any sort of precision? Not so easy. And yet it remains the case that we all know what "mean" means. You see? — Pattern-chaser

I see, but I don't think I agree, at least not in the context of this forum. I want to try this again. What does "meaning" mean?

• Meaning is a mental relationship, connection between a phenomenon (the referent I guess) and a symbol or symbols such that the symbols represent the referent, e.g. the meaning/definition of a word.
• Meaning is a mental relationship, connection between a system of related symbols and a system of related phenomena such that the symbols represent the phenomena, e.g. the meaning of Einstein's theory of Special Relativity. This is a bit clunky. Needs work.
• Meaning is used metaphorically to refer to a mental connection between two phenomena which is similar to the connection between a symbol and a referent, e.g. the meaning of life. Clunky too.

As Charles Montgomery Burns once said - I don't know art philosophy, but I know what I hate. And I don't hate that.

You fail to get my point because you fail to understand that talking about language is in essence an infinite regress equivalent to pulling yourself up by your own bootstraps.
The only 'given' we can start from is that we are clever primates with a complex set of socially acquired behavioral gestures ,we call 'human language' which segments what we call 'the world'. The abstract persistence of 'words' (internalised gestures) act as place markers for focal aspects of that shifting flux we call 'things' allowing us to attempt to predict and control aspects of our world relative to our lifespans and our pattern seeking. Place markers are not 'representational' of 'things in themselves', they are contextual memory aids within potential action plans. — fresco

I've been thinking about this. I really like your formulation, but I think you've broadened the discussion to a point where it isn't reality about meaning anymore. It's about the nature of reality and truth. I think that's why I like it. It struck me a while ago that the primary question of philosophy is not "what is truth" but rather "what do I do now."

Yes..'meaning' is a side issue which might arise in the case of problematic action decisions. Further social transactions (extending the action context) tend to resolve potential ambiguities

Translation problems between languages yield some interesting examples of 'action dilemas', a pertinent example being the word 'representation' itself which can be translated as either Vorstellung or Darstellung in German which have differential connotations within both Kantian and Heideggerian philosophy.
(indeed, i believe one German philosopher, possibly Hegel, even said 'you can't do philosophy without German !)

And 'truth' is surely a word which potentially triggers what happens next...as in a courtroom verdict...or whether to heed a weather forecast....or whether to embrace religious observance.

That is quite an anti-Platonist view. Mathematics deals with counting of not anything in particular. In the abstract, Platonic world of number theory, which is obviously not the real, physical world, there is no need for something to count. Mathematics explores that non-real world. — alcontali

Are you a platonist? Are you comfortable with Kant's notion of math as originating from the a priori categorical formal attributes of a transcendental subject? If so, then quantity may seem to you as something we could think apart from meaningful semantic quality, as arising from a different world, that of the a priori purely empty subjective formalism. For phenomenology, on the other hand, quantity is itself a peculiar species of the meaningfully semantic qualitative. It abstracts away all other properties of objects in order to lay bare its own meaningful organizational properties inherent in what calculation is trying to do, what it aims at in itself, apart from what it is applying itself to.

These specific procedures obviously originate from pragmatic interaction with the world. However, the goal of mathematics is to abstract away the real world. Otherwise, without abstracting the real world away, it is not mathematics, but something else — alcontali

Mathematics would be unthinkable without the notion of the object, which originated with the Greeks and by the time of Galileo became the basis of science with the complete transforming of the phenomenally experienced world into an abstracted realm of 'real' objective bodies, what you call the "real physical world". For Husserl, fundamental experienced reality contains no objects. these are idealizations, formal devices of thinking to organize our world. For him , the entirety of 'real physical reality' is a second order abstraction based on a formal condition of possibility, a thinking which, in the hands of Kantian and platonically oriented philosophers and logicians, is not able to make explicit its presuppositions in order to ground them in a more primordial origin of mathematics. Objectivity presupposes the notion of identity. The idea of an object is that of self-persistence. An objective thing is only an object in that it is considered as identical to itself. Thus, the origin of the 'real physical world' rests on a set of formal presuppositions that include self-identity, which is not a property of the world independent of our theorizing activities. (Even as theorized, pure self-identity masks subtle , continual changes in the sense of what we try to hold as self-identical). Calculation and number would be impossible without this idealization. The thinking of number, as 'same thing, different time' is already implicit in the formal basis of objectivity as identity. In this way, modern empiricism and mathematics presuppose each other and arose together as forms of understanding.

To begin from the 'real physical world' as irreducible leaves us with a schism between quantity and quality, between empirically contingent causal 'objects' and the subjectively and universally formal meaninglessness of math(as well as with subject-object dualism and the hard problem of consciousness). This leads to the view that one can devise out of ones imagination any formal mathematical idea at will without it having to have the slightest practical connection to, or influence from, the 'real' world. After generating such pure ideas out of thin air, we then go on to see if and where such meaningless, purely abstract formalisms apply to this real world, and then shout with astonishment when they miraculously describe aspects of this world. That's platonism in a nutshell.
What I suggest is instead the case is that, a at all periods in human history, the development of mathematics, in its pre-formal as well as recent purely formal incarnations, is as utterly dependent on the intersubjective cultural environment as any science . It is for this reason that each historical innovation in mathematics (Greek geometry, classical logic, analytic geometry and calculus, etc. arise out of the intellectual milieu of their time n the same fashion as does every scientific theory. Classical, medieval, Renaissance, enlightenment and modernist chapter of of the development of mathematical concepts parallel developments in the sciences as well as the arts and all other arenas of culture because all of these interpenetrate and influence each other. It is not the case that the history of mathematics is merely a cumulative enterprise, with new developments merely adding to and building onto previous ones, which would be the case if mat were purely, platonically formal.. There is a continual, subtle reinterpretation of the meaning of all aspects of mathematics just as happens in physics or any other science . But because it is in the nature of the language of mathematics that its formalisms are very general, it is assumed that our practical understanding of them never changes, that their sense stands outside of time, that they in fact have no sense because , of course, calculation is supposed to be empty of all sense. but this is mistaking generality of sense with absence of meaning.

Formalisms , whether of a mathematical or any other nature, stand for a semantic content. They mean something in order to to do something. Self-identiy is not an irreducible basis of the world, it is a semantic gimic. 'Same thing- different time' is a pragamtically meaningful notion. If it is the case that one can ignore every feature of the world that one is applying a mathematical formalism to, then it is equally true of other sorts of categorical generalities. We can think color in general abstracted from all other aspects of the world. All that is necessary is to have the neurological capacity to imagine color. In same fashion, we can think counting part from any features of an object that is to be counted, as long as we have the neural capacity to do this(there are some neural pathologies that prevent the ability to think calcualtively).

But the fact that we can separate our formalisms from specific objects that we want to apply them to does not mean that these forms are not in themselves meaningful, or that they are not always motivated by some purpose which belongs to their meaning in a subtle way. For instance, normally, it only occurs to us to calculate when a need arises for some practical aim. That need does not only motivate the onset of the counting as a background drive that then vanishes the minute we begin to count, it continues to frame the counting. It is a subtle part of what it means, right now, in the midst of the performance of calculating, to continue the activity . If I am interpreted , what brings the task back to mind is the recollection of why I wanted to count in the first place.

Are you familiar with 'Where Mathematics Comes From' (Lakoff and Nunez) ?
Your exposition above may have some points in common.

LATER EDIT
I note your impressive website which imo goes exactly in the 'required' direction to counter the Geschwätz. !

I agree completely about Lakoff and Nunez.. i was going to mention them.

A person can think about anything in a meaningful way. And they can also refrain from thinking about anything in a meaningful way. — Terrapin Station

Meaning is something mental that we do. Namely, it's the mental process of associative thinking, of thinking about something so that it implies, refers to, connotes, denotes, suggests or "pushes" or "leans towards", etc. other things. — Terrapin Station

When we have a dream – does it satisfy your definition of meaningful mental activity? Is it a process of associative thinking? And what about fits of delirium? Also, it is not clear if your understanding of “the mental process of associative thinking” includes just verbal thinking.

Yes, the universe, insofar as it is observed is obviously "observer dependent", no argument about that!

The thing about your perception of ‘deciphering’, though, is that it implies one ‘correct’ meaning, which is unlikely to be the case. — Possibility

Think about a 'stop' sign. If someone found one in the future, after the apocalypse, they might be induced to think it was a human artifact with a meaning, but if English was no longer spoken, they could not translate it. But of course there is one and one only correct translation. Obviously with texts it is not so straightforward, but translations cannot vary that much; if they were too divergent they would lose the meaning of the original text.

In the case of ‘meaningless’ marks, it would indeed be a mistake to assume they correspond to a written language, but I don’t think any marks are meaningless. — Possibility

Say someone was bored and they were just playing around, inscribing marks that looked somewhat like heiroglyphics into a stone; there is no intended meaning there, that's how the artifact differs from a stone tablet that originally had a meaning. The first is not decipherable, whereas the latter is, at least in priniciple.

In another sense, beyond mere semantic meaning, I agree that there are no meaningless marks; they are all signs of something; could be lightning, bushfire, erosion, whatever.

Having recently joined this forum seeking a more contemporary approach to 'philosophy', I am somewhat disappointed in what I find.

On the specific issue of 'meaning', where, I ask, (following die Kehre ), is the discussion of Wittgenstein's adage 'meaning is use' ? Where I ask is discussion of the major shift to nonrepresentationalism in language ?...or where is Derrida's point that 'meaning' even for the author of text, dynamically shifts ? (merely dismissing that 'Derrida' on this won't do !).

Hence my accusation of 'dancing' (or as Wittgenstein might have called it, Geschwätz) — fresco

Interesting that you find what I've put forth as incompatible with those views. By my lights it exhausts them and the older notions alike.

You know where I stand on ancient texts.

The accepted personification pervading some of this thread's discussion about things that have no thought/belief baffles me. As if a plurality were capable of abstracting things away...

Are you a platonist? — Joshs

Yes, but not necessarily outside the realm of mathematics. I believe that mathematics more or less enforces Platonism by its metarules on the declaration of variables. In the following example:

∀ m ∈ A: m² ≥ m

The expression declares a variable m from a domain A. Mathematical notation is strongly typed, and the metarule does not allow the use of m without such prior declaration. Furthermore, the domain A is never the real world, because it is not possible to traverse the real world for all occurrences of a domain. That would cost too much energy. Therefore, the metarule insists on the use of objects from an abstract, Platonic world.

In other words, it is not even possible to write anything about the real, physical world. That impossibility is strictly enforced in mathematics.

Are you comfortable with Kant's notion of math as originating from the a priori categorical formal attributes of a transcendental subject? If so, then quantity may seem to you as something we could think apart from meaningful semantic quality, as arising from a different world, that of the a priori purely empty subjective formalism. — Joshs

Yes, that even follows from the metarules.

It is for this reason that each historical innovation in mathematics (Greek geometry, classical logic, analytic geometry and calculus, etc. arise out of the intellectual milieu of their time n the same fashion as does every scientific theory. — Joshs

The publication of Algorithmi's work, "The Art of Hindu Reckoning", originally published in Arabic, later on translated into Latin in the 12th century, suggests that mathematics trivially traverses cultural and linguistic barriers. Two mathematicians have much more in common with each other, regardless of nationality, than say, two Americans.

Mathematics did not make any significant progress in Europe, beyond what the Greek had developed, until the decimal positional notation ("Hindu Reckoning") and the treatise on algebra ("Liber algebrae") came in from external origin in the 12th century. That was a standstill spanning around a millennium. It was clearly Algoritmi's publications (Muhammad ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi) that kicked off new activity in mathematics.

Formalisms , whether of a mathematical or any other nature, stand for a semantic content. They mean something in order to to do something. — Joshs

A good example of a popular formalism are regular expressions, i.e. Kleene's closure. In term of real-world semantics they do not mean anything, because they were not even abstracted away from anything that exists in the real, physical world.

Kleene algebra is an abstraction that came out of the blue when Stephen Kleene, acting as a consultant for the Rand Corporation, wrote his report on finite automata for the U.S. Air Force in 1951.

Finite automata are again, an abstraction that was never abstracted away from the real, physical world. Automata do not occur in nature. You need to painstakingly build them. They are always artificial.

It was not even clear how to build them -- there were several competing theoretical models -- until in 1945, John Von Neumann wrote his winning proposal, "First Draft of a Report on the EDVAC" for the United States Army Ordnance Department.

Finite automata do not mean anything, really. They are just an abstraction, meaningless (=divorced from the real world) and even useless (=no direct use).

We can think color in general abstracted from all other aspects of the world. — Joshs

Mathematics does not even need to abstract away from the real world, which used to be the primary source for abstraction, but that is no longer the case any more. Many, if not most, 20th century publications in mathematics were not abstracted away from the real, physical world.

For example, I do not believe that anything in Alan Turing's work was ever abstracted away from the real, physical world.

Without connection, no matter how flimsy, to the real, physical world, an abstraction has no meaning, i.e. semantics.

But the fact that we can separate our formalisms from specific objects that we want to apply them to does not mean that these forms are not in themselves meaningful — Joshs

When an abstraction was originally abstracted away from the real, physical world, it is its origin that may still suggest meaning/semantics. If it was never abstracted away from anything real or physical, however, what could possibly be its meaning?

Pre-20th century mathematical theories still had some kind of connection to the real, physical world, if only, their origin. It was not "real mathematics", in Hardy's terminology:

We have concluded that the trivial mathematics is, on the whole, useful, and that the real mathematics, on the whole, is not.

Meaning and usefulness are treated as grave defects in pure mathematics. Seriously, "real mathematics" is necessarily meaningless and useless.