The thing is that physical existents are, by virtue of being objects of the senses, able to be modeled in terms of quantity and described in terms of physical qualities. On the other hand things like meaning, love, hope, faith, anger, hatred, beauty, truth, goodness, spirit and so on cannot be quantified or described in terms of physical qualities. But we know they are real, nonetheless, and we intuitively know what they are even though we cannot give determinate accounts of them.

So those indeterminate realities are coherent if you mean that we can feel them and intuitively understand their natures; whereas it might be said that they are incoherent if the criterion of coherence is the ability to quantitatively model and qualitatively describe in terms of physicality.

The indeterminate realities are the subjects of poetic and religious understanding and perfectly coherent as such.

In each case, the meaning is conserved, but the physical representation is different. Therefore, they're different kinds of things, — Wayfarer

(Ignoring some other problems I think this has) Why wouldn't they just be different kinds of physical things?

The problem I have with it is making any sense whatsoever out of what a nonphysical thing could possibly be.

I think you are wondering, in terms of the physical, what a non-physical thing could be. See the problem?

The thing is that physical existents are, by virtue of being objects of the senses, able to be modeled in terms of quantity and described in terms of physical qualities. On the other hand things like love, hope, faith, anger, hatred, beauty, truth, goodness, spirit and so on cannot be quantified or described in terms of physical qualities. — John

The first problem there is that I think "able to be modeled in terms of quantity" is problematic. Maybe we could make that not problematic somehow, but I'm an anti-realist on mathematics, I don't think that anything really amounts to mathematics, and I think that "models" are a matter of interpretation.

Re "in terms of physical qualities," I'd agree with that, but because I think that qualities only are physical. Love, hope, etc. are physical things on my view--they're terms for particular brain states and particular behaviors/behavioral dispositions that accompany those brain states. So it's difficult for me to understand what it could possibly mean to say that they're nonphysical.

I think you are wondering, in terms of the physical, what a non-physical thing could be. See the problem? — John

Yeah, definitely, but what other option do I have if I can't begin to make the slightest sense out of what a nonphysical existent is supposed to be?

That's what I am trying to explain!

I think your problem is not peculiar to you: after Cartesian dualism, philosophy tried to reify the concept of 'res cogitans', the 'thinking thing' as a kind of 'thinking substance' - which is, as you believe, an absurdity. So the counter to that became, let's ditch res cogitans altogether and proceed in terms of what we can see and measure - res extensia. This is in very simplified form one of the main drivers behind materialist theories of mind.

But I am arguing, in the above example, that 'meaning', as in 'the meaning of a sentence' can't be explained or reduced to physical terms (or, if it is to be explained, it will be a truly multi-disciplinary and very complex undertaking). Because a sentence can be encoded in a variety of different media, languages, and forms, and still have the same meaning, than that shows that 'meaning' and 'form' are different. And this is highly relevant to the argument.

Love, hope, etc. are physical things on my view--they're terms for particular brain states and particular behaviors/behavioral dispositions that accompany those brain states. — TerrapinStation

What I'm challenging is that this actually means something. What is 'a brain state'? When asked, you can't even say what it is. It's a 'presumptive explanation' - 'hey, it must be brain state, otherwise I have to deal with all this spooky non-physical stuff.' But what does it mean to say 'a brain state'? Which school of philosophy says that? What are the arguments for it and against it?

I quoted a couple of sources, admittedly without much detail - we can't go into much detail here - but you simply swept them off the table as being 'arrogant and simplistic'. Well, pardon me, but that seems very much like what you're doing here. You're asserting a basic form of philosophical materialism without argument, without reference, as an axiom. What's your grounds for that?

But, it's simply a fact that physical things can be quantitatively modeled in various ways; so I don't understand your objection.

Let's clarify first what we're literally talking about. When we create a quantitative model, what is the object that we produce?

What is going to prevent me from coming into existence again? What's going to keep me dead? — dukkha

It seems there really is no pleasing some people.

Hmm, I can't really ignore what I was ignoring in my earlier response here.

I don't actually agree that multiple instances of sentences, say in different languages, have the same meaning.

In my view, meaning is subjective. It's a mental association that a particular individual makes at a particular time. A meaning at time T2 can't be identical to a meaning at time T1. And a meaning that S has at T1 can't be identical to a meaning that O has at T1, even when S and O are both looking at the same thing.

It might be important to note that I don't buy that there are any real (extramental) abstracts period.

Re brain states, how can there possibly be any confusion over what that's referring to?

You know what, say, "dishwasher state" would refer to, don't you? There's no way I'd be able to believe that you don't know what a state is (or what a brain is).

But this is why I am saying that your argument doesn't make sense. When something 'makes sense', then we both agree on what it means. Furthermore, in the case of a sentence that describes a very specific thing - 'pick up that object and move it 2.3 meters to the left' - then the meaning is invariant, i.e. same for any observers. So the fact that 'it has meaning' is not actually up for debate.

Re brain states, how can there possibly be any confusion over what that's referring to? — TerrapinStation

You're serious? Do you know what 'a brain state' is? The whole issue of the brain/mind problem is a huge controversy, with people lining up on different sides of the debate. The brain itself is, as I said, the most complex known natural phenomenon.

Leading scientists in integrating and visualizing the explosion of information about the brain will convene at a conference commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Human Brain Project (HBP). “A Decade of Neuroscience Informatics: Looking Ahead,” will be held April 26-27 2009 at the William H. Natcher Conference Center on the NIH Campus in Bethesda, MD.

Through the HBP, federal agencies fund a system of web-based databases and research tools that help brain scientists share and integrate their raw, primary research data. At the conference, eminent neuroscientists and neuroinformatics specialists will recap the field’s achievements and forecast its future technological, scientific, and social challenges and opportunities.

“The explosion of data about the brain is overwhelming conventional ways of making sense of it," said Elias A. Zerhouni, M.D., Director of the National Institutes of Health. "Like the Human Genome Project, the Human Brain Project is building shared databases in standardized digital form, integrating information from the level of the gene to the level of behavior. These resources will ultimately help us better understand the connection between brain function and human health.”

The HBP is coordinated and sponsored by 15 federal organizations across four federal agencies: the National Institutes of Health (NIMH, NIDA, NINDS, NIDCD, NIA, NIBIB, NICHD, NLM, NCI, NHLBI, NIAAA, NIDCR), the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the U.S. Department of Energy. Representatives from all of these organizations comprise the Federal Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Human Brain Project, which is coordinated by the NIMH. During the initial 10 years of this program 241 investigators have been funded for a total of approximately $100 million.

More than 65,000 neuroscientists publish their results each month in some 300 journals, with their output growing, in some cases, by orders of magnitude, explained Stephen Koslow, Ph.D., NIMH Associate Director for Neuroinformatics, who chairs the HBP Coordinating Committee.

“It’s virtually impossible for any individual researcher to maintain an integrated view of the brain and to relate his or her narrow findings to this whole cloth,” he said. “It’s no longer sufficient for neuroscientists to simply publish their findings piecemeal. We’re trying to make the most of advanced information technologies to weave their data into an understandable tapestry.”

Now there's disagreement amongst the experts as to what a 'brain state' is. Yet you're comparing it to a dishwasher?

But this is why I am saying that your argument doesn't make sense. When something 'makes sense', then we both agree on what it means. Furthermore, in the case of a sentence that describes a very specific thing - 'pick up that object and move it 2.3 meters to the left' - then the meaning is invariant, i.e. same for any observers. So the fact that 'it has meaning' is not actually up for debate. — Wayfarer

Is it that you don't understand nominalism, or that you're just kind of stubbornly insisting on a non-nominalist interpretation?

I'm a nominalist. I don't agree with your characterization there. I can explain why, but if you don't really care if you understand it, or if you're just going to proceed as if it's not a possible stance or something, then it's probably not worth my time.

Re brain states, by the way, you saying that you don't know what a brain state is doesn't amount to saying that you don't know how it would link up with mental states. Forget about mental states. Do you know what a brain state is outside of that?

Yeah, definitely, but what other option do I have if I can't begin to make the slightest sense out of what a nonphysical existent is supposed to be? — Terrapin Station

And yet you accuse others of not having an understanding of "phil 101" ideas!

You seem to have a naive realist understanding of perception and people are finding it difficult to reconcile this with your identity theory.

Also I think this feigned "non physical things as a concept is just so incoherent like wow I can't even begin to grasp how that would work" inability is just silly. Pinch yourself, in what way is that subjective experience of pain physical? How can you account for that sensation in terms of atoms and forces, or neuronal cells and axon charges?

Also if mind=brain then isn't some sort of panpsychism necessary? If consciousness is the very same thing as a physical brain state then atoms must have as a part of them a conscious aspect, in order for the atoms in your brain to literally be equal to conscious experience.

Or if not, and say conscious experience is an emergent property of particular states of a brain, how do you explain this? How does something which is not conscious - atoms/neurochemical reactions in a physical brain- produce or give rise to consciousness? So a rock isn't conscious right? So why do the atoms/physical 'stuff' which make up a physical rock not give rise to conscious experience, whereas the atoms which make up a living, awake physical brain do? Why are some particular brain states conscious and some not? Why is the state of a physical brain of a person under general anaesthesia not conscious, whereas when it wears off, the particular brain state is conscious? What is so incredibly special about highly specific arrangements/processes of physical matter such that it produces this new magical property of consciousness? This position is basically that physical things are not conscious except when you arrange them in this incredibly specific manner (a living awake brain), which somehow gives rise to a new property of physical things (consciousness) not seen anywhere else in the physical world. How? Why? Where does this new property (consciousness) come from?

You're basically just glossing over the hard problem of consciousness, and then acting like everyone is totally illogical for not doing the same.

And yet you accuse others of not having an understanding of "phil 101" ideas! — dukkha

It's not that I'm unfamiliar with nonphysical existent talk. It's that I think the talk is incoherent.

Wayfarer is asking what identity refers to as if he's unfamiliar with identity talk. If he were to think that the concept of identity were incoherent, that would be a different issue.

You seem to have a naive realist understanding of perception and people are finding it difficult to reconcile this with your identity theory. — dukkha

Well, yeah, I buy (basically disjunctive) naive realism. Why folks would have a difficult time reconciling that with identity theory, who knows.

Pinch yourself, in what way is that subjective experience of pain physical? — dukkha

It's a brain state. Whether one can give a blueprint of how it works so that someone thinks it's a satisfactory blueprint has no bearing on whether it's a brain state or whether it's physical. It's not as if something isn't physical just in case we can't produce a blueprint for it that someone finds satisfactory.

Also if mind=brain then isn't some sort of panpsychism necessary? — dukkha

Because . . . you believe that only brains exist? What??

If consciousness is the very same thing as a physical brain state then atoms must have as a part of them a conscious aspect, in order for the atoms in your brain to literally be equal to conscious experience. — dukkha

So if there are atoms that have some property when they're in particular relations with each other, then all atoms must have that property no matter what sorts of atoms they are, no matter what relation they're in with other atoms, etc.? All physical things have unique properties. Those properties hinge on the specific matter that comprises them and the dynamic, structural relations of that matter. That's not at all something unique to brains and the property of consciousness. Also, for all objects/processes you can only know properties from some reference points and not from others. That's not unique to brains and the property of consciousness either.

Is it that you don't understand nominalism, or that you're just kind of stubbornly insisting on a non-nominalist interpretation? — TerrapinStation

I have studied the history of nominalism, I understand what motivated it. But in itself that doesn't justify what you're arguing. I don't think it will be worth your while to 'explain' what you mean, because as I am saying, I don't think what you're providing by way of explanation makes any sense.

...you saying that you don't know what a brain state is... — TerrapinStation

Did you notice the quoted passage immediately above your response to me? That it not my opinion or judgement. It is about that fact that there are tens of thousands of scientists engaged in trying to understand 'the brain'. And yet, you compare 'brain states' with 'dishwashers'. Do you see why I think that might be problematical?

I don't even know what you're implying

In my view, meaning is subjective. It's a mental association that a particular individual makes at a particular time. — Terrapin Station

How do you deal with the private language argument?

Wayfarer is asking what identity refers to as if he's unfamiliar with identity talk. — TerrapinStation

Do you mean the kind of talk that is in this article? http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mind-identity/ Perhaps if you could point to somewhere in that article as a reference to what you're talking about, it might help make your point.

have studied the history of nominalism, I understand what motivated it. — Wayfarer

That in no way indicates that you understand nominalism.

But that doesn't justify anything you're saying in this thread. — Wayfarer

As if I'm talking about justifying anything. You don't seem to understand the stance.

Do you mean the kind of talk that is in this article? — Wayfarer

No. I mean the general concept of identity period.

How do you deal with the private language argument? — dukkha

By noting that, like usual, Wittgenstein is wrong.

Did you notice the quoted passage immediately above your response to me? — Wayfarer

You asked what a brain state even refers to.

Well, yeah, I buy (basically disjunctive) naive realism. Why folks would have a difficult time reconciling that with identity theory, who knows. — Terrapin Station

How can you be looking directly at the (physical) world, when your sight is equal to a particular brain state? It's like you're saying that we look through our eyes like they're windows onto the world, and yet our conscious experience of sight exists within a brain. You've confined consciousness within a brain and yet you claim we are conscious of the world beyond this brain directly. You can't have your cake and eat it to.

You're claiming that when you touch the keyboard you're typing on you are directly feeling an object in an external physical world, and yet at the same time your experience of touch exists within/as a physical brain state. How can touch experiences be physically located within a brain, and yet when you experience touch/haptic perceptions, you are in direct contact with the physical world existing beyond this brain state.

If when you look at a table you are directly seeing what is physically there in an external world, your visual perception cannot at the same time be confined within/as a physical brain state. How can you directly be perceiving an external world if your perceptions are located within a brain?

Do you mean the kind of talk that is in this article?
— Wayfarer

No. I mean the general concept of identity period.



You mean your concept of identity - which, you've already assured us of, is peculiar to you, as meaning is only ever subjective, and no two people ever share exactly the same meaning.

by noting that, like usual Wittgenstein is wrong —

It's bad philosophy to just arrogantly assert things are right or wrong without argument or justification, which you have repeatedly done in this thread.

Gigantic wall of text removed

You don't seem to understand the stance. — TerrapinStation

I understand it, and I think it's mistaken, and furthermore that your purported explanations don't add up. That's all there is to it.

The article on brain-mind identity might have been more germane to this particular debate but never mind.

Nothing at all unusual, just the normal sense of "state:" the particular (dynamic) conditions, that is, the particular set of materials and their (dynamic) relations at a set of contiguous points of time (or abstracted as a single point of time).

I'm not sure quite what work 'dynamic' is doing here. States, as I understand them, are generally static. Or at least to consider something qua state, is to consider it through the lens of certain fixed properties. Anyway would it be fair to say that 'states' as you here define them could equally be called 'processes'?

But granting this vague dynamism you mention, how long does a brain state last? Can brain states last hours? days? weeks? months?

And, perhaps more to the point, does a single brain state persist for the life of an individual - such that we could say to be Alex is to have brain-state-alex?

A scale model, a perspective drawing, a mathematic or geometric model, an audio or video recording, a photograph, a map, a computer simulation; these are just a few examples.

First, in philosophy of perception debates, do you understand that no one is saying that we don't perceive things, or that perception isn't involved?

I'm not referring to anything unusual by identity. We can simply talk about objective definitions and usage. Definitions are different than meanings.