But your lay term 'aboutness' is vacuous, because unless you are a naive realist you have no 'bedrock'. My 'cordination of coordination' rests on the bedrock of 'action decisions' involved in physical, psychological and social 'prediction and control'. — fresco

How can a term be vacuous when words are only used for coordination? And the reason you gave that it was vacuous isn't that it doesn't coordinate (because you replied back with more scribbles), but because there is no 'bedrock' - whatever that means. What would it mean for a term to be vacuous, or to have no bedrock, if terms are only used for coordinating actions between individuals?

And why would I be asking what your word use means if we are merely coordinating actions? Where is the coordination when I ask, "what do you mean", or say "I don't understand what you mean." It seems to me that coordination comes about only when we agree. But then what would be be agreeing on, or about? What does it mean to agree or disagree?

Now part of that coordination certainly uses the abstract persistence of 'words' to mentally paint shifting snapshots of 'an external world', but my contextual 'snapshot' can never be guaranteed to be synonymous with yours. All that matters is a degree of mutual coordination as to what might happen next (which Maturana calls 'structural coupling'). — fresco

I don't use words to paint shifting snapshots of an external world. I have shifting snapshots of a world in relation to me and I use words to categorize different sensory impressions under one sensory impression - a word - which is a visual scribble or sound. Words are not abstract. They exist out in the world as ink on paper, light on a computer screen, or as vibrations in the air. The abstraction lies in our mental representation for the cause of hearing sounds or seeing scribbles. The abstraction lies in our attempt to simulate the meaning, or the causal relationship between hearing or seeing sounds or scribbles and what caused them. What do the sounds or scribbles mean? How is it that I am having a visual experience of scribbles on a computer screen right now when looking at your post? What are those scribbles about? What are you trying to convey?

I suggest you need to consider some of the empirical studies of language pathology to understand my position. For example, it is well known that the development of twins can be hampered by an ideosyncratic private language. And studies by Merleau-Ponty of brain damaged war veterans showed for example that the command word 'salute' produced no understanding but social situation of an officer entering the room produced immediate saluting action. — fresco

So now you are pointing to states-of-affairs with words - like studies and the development of twins, brain damaged vets, etc. Your words are about things - these states-of-affairs. If not, then I don't know what your are talking about. If you aren't talking about these things that are not words themselves, then you are just making scribbles on a screen that have no meaning other than the fact that you, fresco, put scribbles on a computer screen.

What is the difference between scribbles and words?

You are playing language games without the semantic background of references, such as those cited by me, but apparently not read by you. It is a truism that we are stuck with 'words' to communicate about 'words', but understanding the process of deconstruction (Derrida) of 'word use' per se adds the potential for a vantage point which can, if understood, prevent the game from degenerating into 'semantic dancing' for its own sake.

"Metaphor is not a mere embellishment; it is the basic means by which abstract thought is made possible. One of the principal results in cognitive science is that abstract concepts are typically understood, via metaphor, in terms of more concrete concepts." — Joshs

I agree. A lot of scientists and mathematicians believe that the universe is mathematical, and not in a metaphorical way. Mistaking the map for the territory is a common human failing. Some people also think the universe really, literally consists of information, or is a computer, or a living creature, or consciousness.

Silly, ha, ha, ha, ha. Think that's funny, some even think the universe consists of a four dimensional space formed and distorted by matter and energy.

Falsificationism is in my impression subject to falsification — alcontali

The idea of falsification is not science, it's metaphysics. The scientific method is metaphysics. Induction is metaphysics. If math has no content, none of these things do either.

The idea of falsification is not science, it's metaphysics. The scientific method is metaphysics. Induction is metaphysics. — T Clark

I have always thought of these things as subjects of epistemology, i.e. theory of knowledge.

Metaphysics study is conducted using deduction from that which is known a priori. Like foundational mathematics (which is sometimes considered a special case of metaphysics applied to the existence of number), it tries to give a coherent account of the structure of the world, capable of explaining our everyday and scientific perception of the world, and being free from contradictions.

I don't think that this is possible.

The strong, classical view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist independently of any observer, so that the subject is the most fundamental of all sciences. Some philosophers, such as the logical positivists, and many scientists, reject the strong view of metaphysics as meaningless and unverifiable.

I am afraid that I have to agree with the logical positivist view on the matter. As far as I am concerned, epistemology is the flagship of philosophy, while at the same time it is not clear whether metaphysics even makes sense.

I am afraid that I have to agree with the logical positivist view on the matter. As far as I am concerned, epistemology is the flagship of philosophy, while at the same time it is not clear whether metaphysics even makes sense. — alcontali

I've spent some time thinking about this. To me, epistemology is part of metaphysics. If you look up definitions, it's about 50/50 whether others agree with me. I have always thought of metaphysics as the set of rules we agree on that gives us a common framework for looking at the world. Again, some agree, some disagree.

A paper that I have found very helpful is "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. And by helpful, I mean he and I agree.

And I do agree that epistemology is the key to everything. The heart of the matter. But I think metaphysics is really the only thing that lets us agree on what makes sense and what doesn't.

The strong, classical view assumes that the objects studied by metaphysics exist independently of any observer, so that the subject is the most fundamental of all sciences. Some philosophers, such as the logical positivists, and many scientists, reject the strong view of metaphysics as meaningless and unverifiable. — alcontali

To me, this is completely wrong. Backwards. Metaphysics provides the rules for the application of human conventions of knowledge to the world. It makes the universe a human place. As Lao Tzu might say, it brings the universe into existence.

What if nothing exists? Then first come the notion, the concept, and only then the word (philology/etymology), that supports epistemology, right? ;)

What if nothing exists? Then first come the notion, the concept, and only then the word (philology/etymology), that supports epistemology, right? — James Pullman

But something does exist. Descartes told me so. At least, I think he did.

Ok, i will develop a little more. Epistemology concerns, like you stated, what humans perceive. It does not mean that what humans perceive is real. So, eve if Descartes perceives he thinks, does not mean it is so. Also, existence, in its' essence, does not relieves it self from the possibility of not being.

Something exists, not because he thinks, but because he perceives he thinks. His perception of existence (and also ours) may not be real. And I could go on ;)

Anyhow, this is pointless, right?

Anyhow, this is pointless, right? — James Pullman

Pointless? I don't know about that, but you're opening up a discussion that's much broader than this one. When push comes to shove, Descartes was right, or at least close. I experience something, therefore something is.

You got where i was going to. The point, and the fact, is that we do not know, right? ("I think therefore something is."). And then it all falls into faith (personal belief). I agree with you, more, i also believe that everything we perceive somehow exists, but i´m not completely sure. When I say all is pointless is that meaning can´t (in my faith) be achievable.

Some chose the GOD explanation (it is simple and it works, the guy up there pulling the strings), others go with nothing, others go with the pursuit of it, even knowing if it is out reach.

So, Descartes was Descartes, Nietzsche and Heidegger didn't agreed and Sartre was in loved with the fact that he did not knew. If any of them where right? Can´t tell you. Not yet ;)

It seems the ad hom charge does stick...



:wink:

"An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood — T Clark

It is actually hard, convoluted, and rather pricey to get hold of the publication:

https://www.bookdepository.com/Essay-on-Metaphysics-Collingwood/9780199241415

I do not store paper copies. Someone would have to put in the effort to scan it back first. It would use up space already assigned for other purposes. I would rather store live trees than dead ones in my living room.

Ideally, I use a text file that I can read on my phone while I am at the swimming pool, or so. I usually also simplify pdf files (duh) with the pdftotext utility.

So, I am incompatible with the practices of Oxford University Press. Furthermore, there is no doubt that I am more stubborn than them. There is simply no hope for them that they would defeat me in nay saying. That kind of people cannot make me adjust to them, because I have a long history of doing exactly the opposite, and always winning at that. As Nassim Taleb so beautifully wrote: The most intolerant wins.

So, I am incompatible with the practices of Oxford University Press. Furthermore, there is no doubt that I am more stubborn than them. There is simply no hope for them that they would defeat me in nay saying. That kind of people cannot make me adjust to them, because I have a long history of doing exactly the opposite, and always winning at that. As Nassim Taleb so beautifully wrote: The most intolerant wins. — alcontali

The most intelligent are often the most humorous, and at the same time, inaccessible to the masses.

It's not about good/bad. It's about what all attribution of meaning takes. It's about what being meaningful takes.

It's about how math emerged onto the world stage solely by virtue of our attribution of specific non-negotiable meaning to certain marks and quantities and how that evolved into also talking about non physical things with meaningful marks...

The similarities between math and natural languages are many, but it seems you've neglected to take those into account.

It is actually hard, convoluted, and rather pricey to get hold of the publication: — alcontali

I found it free for download at archive. org. Just type in "Essay on Metaphysics PDF." It's also available at Amazon - $4.61 kindle. $15 paperback.

(meaning/value, what's the difference) — JosephS

Meaning includes values, of course, but it also includes narrative, and perhaps purpose. Self-identity also seems to be integral.

Value is simply the worth of something, or the amount of attraction or repulsion a being may have for something. It could be said, for example, that a plant values sunlight, and this is expressed in its bending towards it.

It's about how math emerged onto the world stage solely by virtue of our attribution of specific non-negotiable meaning to certain marks and quantities and how that evolved into also talking about non physical things with meaningful marks... — creativesoul

Quantities, i.e. numbers, are not even needed for inadvertently dragging in an entire bureaucracy of verifiable formalisms, rules and regulations:


These expression in algebra may have an overly modern look, but they are as much part of mathematics as number theory.

Therefore, just saying "Every man is mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal." already triggers an entire regulatory framework in mathematics.

The similarities between math and natural languages are many, but it seems you've neglected to take those into account. — creativesoul

In my impression, natural language expressions and mathematical language expressions are very compatible Platonic abstractions. I am actually convinced that it is natural language that provides the interface points for mathematics. It is by mixing both types of expressions, even inadvertently, that mathematics kicks in.

It seems the ad hom charge does stick... — creativesoul

The Princess Bride made my point better. Thanks.

I don't have a clue where you get this 'ad hom' nonsense from...
..on the other hand...
...maybe the 'clue' might be that you have invested so much in this 'meaning fixation' of yours (considering your similar thread of 2 years ago) that like a religious believer, your self integrity is dependent on it ? For a believer, an attack on his belief system is taken personally.

The Princess Bride made my point better. — Noah Te Stroete

The Princess Bride always makes our points better.

The Princess Bride always makes our points better. — T Clark

So wise and true.

I don't see how any of this addresses my post. I'm not the one playing games or dancing with language. I'm asking direct questions and you are performing mental gymnastics in order to avoid answering direct questions.

You ask 'what words are about'. They are about 'ephemeral agreement about action decisions' whether in internal or extenal dialogue. They are not about 'things' except insofar that 'things' are contextual focusings of attention towards which action might be directed. 'Things' are actively 'thinged' by thingers !
So to think 'meaning' is about independently existing 'things' is to assume a 'bedrock' which is in essence 'quicksand', because it fails to take into account the subtle dynamics of linguistic interactions which constantly shift or negotiate the focal boundaries of 'thinghood'.

So the 'direct answer' to your question has been given. 'Words' are behavioral markers in the process of organising actions to fulfil human needs. They could be considered to be 'the currency of thought', and like monetary currency their 'value' can change according to context.

So, from that pov, which is supported by my references, any failure to take this on board constitues an incestuous 'language game' involving futile demands for words to define words...futile because its like asking 'how many dollars is a dollar worth' ?
Q: What does a dollar/word mean ? A: What action you can perform with it.

BTW Your 'scribbles' are equivalent to banknotes/coins/poker chips, etc.

Essay on Metaphysics PDF — T Clark

Collingwood writes:

The word ‘science’, in its original sense, which is still its proper sense not in the English language alone but in the international language of European civilization, means a body of systematic or orderly thinking about a determinate subject-matter.

That view is epistemically unsustainable.

Dianetics is not science. There is no way to determine that, using his definition. The collected lyrics by Paul McCartney is not science. How can you derive this conclusion from his definition? Hence, I do not even agree on the definition of the term "definition" with Collingwood.

It is of no importance what the original definition of 'science' may have been. It was wrong and we fixed it, but he apparently didn't.

Science is the collection of propositions that can be tested experimentally.

The sentence "Water boils at 100 degrees Celcius" is part of science if you write that in a test report in which you clarify that you tried it 11 times and you did not manage to black-swan it, i.e. produce a counterexample. Then, someone else can comment that all you need to do, is to reduce or increase the atmospheric pressure and see what happens.

Science is the epistemic domain generated by its distinct epistemic method. So is mathematics. So is history. So is epistemology itself.

While mathematics is indeed all about presuppositionism, since its epistemic method is staunchly axiomatic, science is absolutely not. Everything is science is falsificationist. There are no presuppositions in falsificationism. If you cannot write something as a conclusion in a test report, then it is not science.

Sometimes Collingwood writes things that we would consider utmost strange nowadays: Newtonian, Kantian, Einsteinian physics. Beg your pardon, Kantian physics? That has never been a thing.

Then, he writes: "The business of a metaphysician is to find out that Newtonian scientists presuppose that some events have causes." There is no presuppositionism in Newtonian mechanics. Just go to a laboratory, test something, and report back. If it does not observably emerge out of your experimental test, then you should not write about it in your test report.

Then, he writes: "He can study the presuppositions of Arabic science, of Indian science, of
Chinese science."

I must utterly reject this view.

Science is justified by experimental testing. It does not matter if it is an Arab, an Indian, or a Chinese who repeats the experimental test, writes a test report, and notifies us that he has been able to black-swan some theory.

Mathematics is justified by axiomatic derivation, i.e. proof. Who even cares that a theorem was provably derived by a person of whatever nationality? We just want the theorem and its proof. Hand over, please.

Collingwood utterly confuses nationality with religion. Of course, there are the Jewish, Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist theologies, which are axiomatically brought back to four different defining scriptures -- but note that the Papacy rejects axiomatic theology. So, this is not really or only partially the case for Christianity. There are Christian Arabs, Muslim Indians, and Rabbinically-orthodox Jewish Chinese. Nationality is one thing and religion is another.

Of the various epistemic domains, only the axiomatic one is presuppositional.

Subject matter is a rather arbitrary concept. Unlike Collingwood writes, it is rarely "determined". For example, when is a proposition part of economics, sociology, or psychology? The explanation will invariably revolve around random nonsense.

Furthermore, in my opinion, a subject that does not specify a standard epistemic knowledge-justification method, is not a legitimate academic endeavour.

Universities may teach "marketing", "international relations and dating", "cotton plantation management", "gender and confusion studies", and so on, but as far as I am concerned, they are merely selling snake oil with a view on cashing in on the juicy student loans.

A fool and his money are easily parted. If you don't strip him clean, then someone else will. So, you could as well do it by yourself. Furthermore, if you hesitate too long, the money will be gone already. So, hurry up.

That is why for me the snake-oil industry is not a major issue at all.

Still, I would appreciate it if the university cash-generation machine reined in their sanctimonious, virtue-signalling, pseudo-morality a bit, especially, of how they are going to do good for the world, which they are undoubtedly also going to save.

:lol: Is everything going okay? Your dog didn’t die, I hope.

Here's what I said in my previous post:

I've spent some time thinking about this. To me, epistemology is part of metaphysics. If you look up definitions, it's about 50/50 whether others agree with me. I have always thought of metaphysics as the set of rules we agree on that gives us a common framework for looking at the world. Again, some agree, some disagree.

A paper that I have found very helpful is "An Essay on Metaphysics" by R.G. Collingwood. And by helpful, I mean he and I agree.

And I do agree that epistemology is the key to everything. The heart of the matter. But I think metaphysics is really the only thing that lets us agree on what makes sense and what doesn't. — T Clark

That's all I said. You seem to have taken great offense at Collingwood's essay. Is was not my intent to start a new discussion about it here.

You seem to have taken great offense at Collingwood's essay. Is was not my intent to start a new discussion about it here. — T Clark

I do not "take offence", of course.

There is obviously quite a bit of presuppositionism going on in the field of knowledge, but not where Collingwood says it does. Still, yes, I do not particularly like the term "subject matter", because it is fundamentally arbitrary. I personally believe in the term "epistemic method", i.e. knowledge-justification method. So, I am beholden to epistemism.

Arbitrary stuff invariably allows for lots of mischief; which, again, I am not necessarily up in arms against, because from my lazy chair, I enjoy letting the laws of nature run their course.