Well, my meta-ethical position is moral nihilism. — BrainGlitch

That stands to reason. It is just what Nietzsche correctly predicted all those years ago.

The charge against what you'd said was that you applied naturalistic epistemic standards in one case of a reported religious experience, but rejected naturalistic epistemic standards as insufficient for other cases, which you judged to be authentically religious. I understand what naturalistic epistemic standards are, but I don't know what standards you employed in your judgment that certain cases really are authentically religious. — BrainGlitch

If they're authentically religious, then they're not amenable to a naturalistic explanation, right? And the example I provided was the case of the Vatican examinations of purported miracles, which proceed by attempting to discredit the miracle by providing a naturalistic explanation for it, and, only when that fails, declares that 'supernatural intervention' has occured. Now you may think Catholicism a crock, but that is not the point; these are clear cases of 'judging spiritual experiences according to both naturalistic and supernatural explanations'.

This may be the case, that we can make such subjective judgements without the need for an absolute, but that's not "all that really matters". What really matters is the capacity to make objective judgements, and it is the absolute which allows such judgements to be objective rather than subjective. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, that isn't what really matters. It doesn't really matter if it can't be knowingly applied, and it can't be knowingly applied if all you know is that there is an absolute good, or that there is an objective standard, without knowing what it is, or how to make comparisons to it.

So take, for example, temperature. We can subjectively judge something as warm or cold, but not until we produce a scale, which is an absolute, do we have an objective judgement of temperature. Likewise with any measurement, we make a subjective judgement of big or small, but when we produce a scale, we have an absolute which acts to give us objectivity. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, if you can produce such a scale. But that is a big if. The temperature scales we use are scientific, and, the last time I checked, ethics wasn't. So this analogy of yours only goes so far.

Another point is that the concept of an absolute can form part of a scale, but need not exist in actuality. In fact, it can even be the case that, not only does it not actually exist, but it cannot possibly exist in actuality. Consider a perfect circle, for example. Perhaps God, like a perfect circle, doesn't actually exist - even if we can use the concept as part of an objective scale.

And, like Brainglitch rightly noted, and which should not be glossed over, the desirability or benefit that having recourse to such a scale would bring about cannot be a reasonable basis upon which to judge the truth of the matter. That is a known fallacy.

How would you know whether one good is really higher than another, unless you assume a principle for comparison? Such a principle is an absolute, and it is the assumption of the absolute which allows you to know that one is higher than the other. Otherwise it is just your subjective opinion that one good is higher than the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, such a principle need not be absolute. It can be fallible, and it can be conditional. And the assumption of the absolute does not allow you to know that one is higher than the other. That would be begging the question. It only really allows you to assume that one is higher than the other.

Subjective standards may well be all we have recourse to in contexts such as moral judgement. If so, then your criticising it in comparison to a purely hypothetical alternative would be rather pointless.

If they're authentically religious, then they're not amenable to a naturalistic explanation, right? And the example I provided was the case of the Vatican examinations of purported miracles, which proceed by attempting to discredit the miracle by providing a naturalistic explanation for it, and, only when that fails, declares that 'supernatural intervention' has occured. Now you may think Catholicism a crock, but that is not the point; these are clear cases of 'judging spiritual experiences according to both naturalistic and supernatural explanations'. — Wayfarer

Blatant non seq.

The fact that a naturalistic explanation is not known does not entail that therefore Goddidit. And the claim that Goddidit is a blatant logical fallacy of argumentum ad ignorantiam--as the Catholic scholars would say.

This is a ridiculous epistemic standard.

Ah, OK - so it can't be an epistemic standard, because it's Catholic, and you're a nihilist, therefore it doesn't make sense!

I can follow your reasoning, but please do not condescend by saying that a perfectly sound argument is a non sequitur simply because it offends your anti-religious sensibilites.

Yeah, most creationists seem to subscribe to scientific realism, hence the conflict. I'm just saying it's not mandatory, and you can resolve the conflict another way - subscribing to scientific instrumentalism.

So, being a creationist you'd take religious accounts to be true/false. Whereas you wouldn't take scientific theories to be true/false descriptions of reality. Therefore there's no conflict. — dukkha

There might still be a conflict of a different kind: between professed belief/disbelief and behavioural expectation. In other words, there might be a performative contradiction at play. If you believe creationism, then act like it, and if you don't believe scientific theories, then act like it. Otherwise, it is suspicious, and might understandably lead to accusations of disingenuity.

Isn't that what morality is all about, consequences? I think it would be odd to attempt to base moral principles on something other than an appeal to consequences. Don't you? — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between consequentialism and the fallacy of appealing to the consequences. Consequentialism is a normative ethical theory for determining the moral value of an act, whereas you were talking about the truth value of meta-ethical theories.

Ah, OK - so it can't be an epistemic standard, because it's Catholic, and you're a nihilist, therefore it doesn't make sense!

I can follow your reasoning, but please do not condescend by saying that a perfectly sound argument is a non sequitur simply because it offends your anti-religious sensibilites. — Wayfarer

It us a fallacious argument because it violates the rules of logic.

It does not logically follow that if we don't have a naruralistic explanation for something, then, therefore Goddidit.

It's an empirical argument, because it is based on data and observations of recorded cases, over several hundred years. In each of those cases, the very same question was asked which you are asking me: is there a natural explanation for this observed apparent religious phenomenon? And in these cases, the question was indeed 'was this a consequence of a supernatural cause', which, I note, you can't help but belittle.

So it doesn't violate any rules of logic. What it challenges is your nihilistic sense of what is or isn't possible, because, according to you, no such thing ought to be possible. In fact you're prepared to say that without even considering any evidence, as for you it's an a priori truth, right?

No, that isn't what really matters. It doesn't really matter if it can't be knowingly applied, and it can't be knowingly applied if all you know is that there is an absolute good, or that there is an objective standard, without knowing what it is, or how to make comparisons to it. — Sapientia

Huh? How does that relate to what I said? Are you saying that the thermometer is useless if you don't know how to read it? I think that's kind of obvious, and it's equally obvious that ethical standards are useless if you don't know the language which they're communicated in

Yes, if you can produce such a scale. But that is a big if. The temperature scales we use are scientific, and, the last time I checked, ethics wasn't. So this analogy of yours only goes so far. — Sapientia

I don't see the basis of your claimed difference. Scales, codes, and rules are produced by human beings as principles to be followed. Why would you say that we should follow scientific rules, but not follow ethical rules. Your insinuation, that rules for measuring temperature are somehow better than ethical rules, because they are "scientific", doesn't make sense.

Another point is that the concept of an absolute can form part of a scale, but need not exist in actually. In fact, it can even be the case that, not only does it not actually exist, but cannot possibly exist. Consider a perfect circle, for example. Perhaps God, like a perfect circle, doesn't actually exist - even if we can use the concept as part of an objective scale. — Sapientia

Of course, the ideal, or absolute, doesn't exist in such a limited sense of the word "exist", it only exists through definition, but this doesn't make the absolute any less necessary. Pi is defined as the ratio of the circumference of the circle to the diameter of the circle. It cannot be given in its exact numerical form, because it is an irrational ratio, but that doesn't mean that it is not necessary. This point you make does nothing to deny the necessity of God.

And, like Brainglitch rightly noted, and which should not be glossed over, the desirability or benefit that having recourse to such a scale would bring about cannot be a reasonable basis upon which to judge the truth of a proposition. It is a known fallacy. — Sapientia

And as I replied to brainglitch, we are not judging truth here, we are judging justification, so this point is irrelevant.

No, such a principle need not be absolute. It can be fallible. And the assumption of the absolute does not allow you to know that one is higher than the other. That would be begging the question. It only really allows you to assume that one is higher than the other. — Sapientia

Why do you think that an absolute is necessarily infallible? That doesn't make sense. What about being absolutely fallible? But if absolutes help us reduce fallibility, why deny them?

And, yes the absolute does allow you to know that one is higher than another, just like you can know that 3 is higher than 2, by means of knowing number, which is an absolute. When there is an absolute, then if any given good is described, it can be known by means of that description to be higher or lower than another described good, just like the number which is described as 3 can be known to be higher than the number described as 2. When there is an absolute, then each good receives its definition, and description as "good", by being related to the absolute, like 3 receives its definition by being related to the absolute. By your argument, the absolute of number only allows you to assume that 3 is higher than 2, and it is begging the question to say that 3 is actually higher than 2.

Consequentialism is a normative ethical theory for determining the moral value of an act, whereas you were talking about the truth value of meta-ethical theories. — Sapientia

As I just said, I don't think we were discussing truth values at all. This claim of "truth value" is a diversion from the subject.

It's an empirical argument, because it is based on data and observations of recorded cases, over several hundred years. In each of those cases, the very same question was asked which you are asking me: is there a natural explanation for this observed apparent religious phenomenon?

So it doesn't violate any rules of logic. What it challenges is your meta-ethical nihilist sense of what is possible, because, according to you, no such thing ought to be possible. In fact you're prepared to say that without even considering the evidence — Wayfarer

Each time the devil's advocate concluded that since there is no known naturalistic explanation for the healing, then the healing was a confirmed miracle, he committed the logical fallacy, becasue it does not logically follow that if we don't have a naruralistic explanation for something, then, therefore Goddidit

There might still be a conflict of a different kind: between professed belief/disbelief and behavioural expectation. In other words, there might be a performative contradiction at play. If you believe creationism, then act like it, and if you don't believe scientific theories, then act like it. Otherwise, it is suspicious, and might understandably lead to accusations of disingenuity. — Sapientia

I don't think there would be this conflict because for the scientific instrumentalist, scientific theories are simply not truth-apt. He doesn't not 'believe' in evolution because he thinks it's false, rather he doesn't believe in it because for him scientific theories are simply not the type of thing one believes (or not) in. There is no particular way the creationist here ought act in respect to what scientific theories he takes to be true or not, because for him they are not the kind of thing which are truth apt.

A tool is neither right or wrong so there can not be a contradiction with something which is.

Each time the devil's advocate concluded that since there is no known naturalistic explanation for the healing, then the healing was a confirmed miracle, he committed the logical fallacy, becasue it does not logically follow that if we don't have a naruralistic explanation for something, then, therefore Goddidit — Brainglitch

Isn't a miracle just something which doesn't have a naturalistic explanation? Claiming its a fallacy to invoke god to explain something which doesn't have a naturalistic explanation seems wrong. What principle of logic/reasoning is being violated here?

Huh? How does that relate to what I said? Are you saying that the thermometer is useless if you don't know how to read it? I think that's kind of obvious, and it's equally obvious that ethical standards are useless if you don't know the language which they're communicated in. — Metaphysician Undercover

You said, only a few pages back, that you "think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be". I have argued otherwise, but now you seem to have forgotten what you said.

I don't see the basis of your claimed difference. Scales, codes, and rules are produced by human beings as principles to be followed. Why would you say that we should follow scientific rules, but not follow ethical rules. Your insinuation, that rules for measuring temperature are somehow better than ethical rules, because they are "scientific", doesn't make sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have misunderstood, and then attacked your own misunderstanding. I am not saying that we should not follow ethical rules. But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. If not science, then what else? Because human judgement varies considerably on this, unlike with regards to temperature via temperature scales. A 'moral scale' equivalent to, or even comparable to, the temperature scales that we use has not, to my knowledge, been produced.

Of course, the ideal, or absolute, doesn't exist in such a limited sense of the word "exist", it only exists through definition, but this doesn't make the absolute any less necessary. Pi is defined as the ratio of the circumference of the circle to the diameter of the circle. It cannot be given in its exact numerical form, because it is an irrational ratio, but that doesn't mean that it is not necessary. This point you make does nothing to deny the necessity of God. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't really care whether or not God is necessary if God is just a definition or a concept. I care whether or not God actually exists.

And as I replied to brainglitch, we are not judging truth here, we are judging justification, so this point is irrelevant. — Metaphysician Undercover

Justification for what?! It is just as fallacious as a justification for reasonable acceptance over an alternative, even if we put truth to one side. So, basically, if you're trying to be reasonable, then no, it isn't irrelevant at all. It is very relevant.

Why do you think that an absolute is necessarily infallible? That doesn't make sense. — Metaphysician Undercover

Jesus Christ. Did I say that? No. Go and look again and see for yourself. I said what I said because the term 'absolute' is ambiguous, and one possible interpretation is that it is infallible.

What about being absolutely fallible? — Metaphysician Undercover

What about it?

But if absolutes help us reduce fallibility, why deny them? — Metaphysician Undercover

I am not simply denying absolutes. Please stop with these straw men. The specific context in which I have discussed absolutes, or one or more particular absolute, is important. I have not denied the use of the concept, or that it may be beneficial. I have just suggested that there is reason to believe that in at least some cases, such as that of a perfect circle, they might not actually exist, and that the same might be true of God, if conceived of in this way.

And, yes the absolute does allow you to know that one is higher than another, just like you can know that 3 is higher than 2, by means of knowing number, which is an absolute. When there is an absolute, then if any given good is described, it can be known by means of that description to be higher or lower than another described good, just like the number which is described as 3 can be known to be higher than the number described as 2. When there is an absolute, then each good receives its definition, and description as "good", by being related to the absolute, like 3 receives its definition by being related to the absolute. By your argument, the absolute of number only allows you to assume that 3 is higher than 2, and it is begging the question to say that 3 is actually higher than 2. — Metaphysician Undercover

And all of that can be dismissed because, once again, you're not responding to what I actually said, which is quite annoying and a waste of both of our time. I was directly addressing your own wording, which was not about the absolute, but rather about the assumption of the absolute. Missing out that important detail changes everything. Why would you do that? Perhaps you regret wording it that way, but that is not my problem. You can't just switch to a different, perhaps more preferable, wording when that is not what I was addressing.

Each time the devil's advocate concluded that since there is no known naturalistic explanation for the healing, then the healing was a confirmed miracle, he committed the logical fallacy, becasue it does not logically follow that if we don't have a naruralistic explanation for something, then, therefore [God did it]. — Brainglitch

That is a statement of belief, or should we say 'un-belief'; because, according to you there is no God, so there must be a 'natural explanation' which simply hasn't been found in these cases.

That nicely illustrates that it is impossible for anyone to answer your question as to how to differentiate between natural and other kinds of explanation. Your view is: there are no other kinds of explanation; the only possible kinds of explanation must be natural. If science hasn't found them yet, then it will one day. More of the 'promissory notes of materialism'.

The following article was what drew my attention to the book mentioned previously:
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/06/opinion/pondering-miracles-medical-and-religious.html

I don't think there would be this conflict because for the scientific instrumentalist, scientific theories are simply not truth-apt. He doesn't not 'believe' in evolution because he thinks it's false, rather he doesn't believe in it because for him scientific theories are simply not the type of thing one believes (or not) in. There is no particular way the creationist here ought act in respect to what scientific theories he takes to be true or not, because for him they are not the kind of thing which are truth apt.

A tool is neither right or wrong so there can not be a contradiction with something which is. — dukkha

If they act like someone who believes that scientific theories are true, then that is reason to doubt their professed absence of belief. How do people who believe that scientific theories are true act? Well, for one thing, they tend to use scientific theories as explanations.

If the creationist believes creationism, but does not believe in scientific theories (and that they don't believe them to be false is irrelevant, and doesn't change that, by the way), and he was asked how the universe came to be, then he should explain how the universe came to be through creationism, and not through any scientific theory, which he would never have any reason to use as an explanation for anything - except, for example, when playing devil's advocate or being ironic or otherwise insincere - but only ever to mention it and what it purports to explain.

You have misunderstood, and then attacked your own misunderstanding. I am not saying that we should not follow ethical rules. — Sapientia

At least you're not accusing me of straw manning.

Please stop with these straw men. — Sapientia

Oh, I take that back.

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. — Sapientia

Science is objective, and ethics is not. Could you justify that assertion?

Justification for what?! It is just as fallacious as a justification for reasonable acceptance over an alternative, even if we put truth to one side. So, basically, if you're trying to be reasonable, then no, it isn't irrelevant at all. It is very relevant. — Sapientia

OK, so explain to me, how truth, which deals with "what is", is relevant to ethics, which deals with what ought to be.

I have just suggested that there is reason to believe that in at least some cases, such as that of a perfect circle, they might not actually exist, and that the same might be true of God, if conceived of in this way. — Sapientia

All you are doing is defining "exists" in such a way that things like circles, squares, numbers, and all concepts in general, immaterial things, do not exist.

I don't really care whether or not God is necessary if God is just a definition or a concept. I care whether or not God actually exists. — Sapientia

Since God is known to have the same type of existence as these things which your definition of "exists" excludes, i.e. immaterial things like concepts, then I think it is quite clear that God does not exist. That is, unless you are ready to change your definition of "exists", to allow that things like circles, squares, numbers, and other concepts actually exist. If you're ready to change your definition of existence, then the question of whether God actually exists might become meaningful.

The same as we always had: knowledge of ethics, expressed in particular cultural discourses (e.g. various religious traditions, social movements, ethical concepts themselves, etc., etc.) over human history.

Ethical nihilism is actually an extension of the traditional understanding of ethics. One which views the world to be innately lacking in moral significance, until some presence (e.g. God, nature) adds it to the world.

The concern of "but what are we left with?" shows the poverty of the traditional understanding of ethics. A stance which is wholly sceptical of ethical significance, which denies there is any expressed by the world, to a point where there must be the force of God or else there are no ethics. It treats ethical significance like it were a state of the world, something to be added or lost on the whim of a force-- nothing more than a cultural norm that lives or dies by the presence and command of God.

There is no understanding of ethics themselves. The traditional understanding fails to recognise ethical significance is necessary, true regardless of what exists or is present (either in our world or any other realm). Thus, we get this absurd situation where we have the traditionalist demands ethics won't be true if the presence they claim isn't so.

It's worse. "God did it" is a "natural" explanation. If (unobserved or not) God changed the world, then God is causal. Causality cannot function outside itself. "Supernatural explanations" are incoherent by definition. If present theories do not describe how an event occurred, then how it happened has another description. Something else happened in reality. If "God did it," then that's what the world does.

Miracles and magic are entirely possible, but they are always only "nature": the world acting how it does. What logically follows is that if a "naturalistic"explanation is not accurate (e.g. it's a hallucination), then a different "naturalistic" explanation will be (e.g. an experience which is an ad hoc reduction of the world to a concept of "God," an entity of God speaking to someone, etc., etc.).

At least you're not accusing me of straw manning.

Oh, I take that back. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not just an accusation though, and I challenge you to show otherwise. I haven't even had much reason to accuse anyone of committing that fallacy lately, but then someone like you comes along with a post like that...

Science is objective, and ethics is not. Could you justify that assertion? — Metaphysician Undercover

You see?! You've just done it again! Why would you ask me to justify an assertion that I haven't made? Is that what I said? Yes or no? The answer is no. It is a simplified, weaker version of what I said, which is that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective.

Now, anyone - yourself included - can see what I said and what I didn't say, and I invite them to do so. You might not think that these details are important, but I think that they are, and it shouldn't be too much to ask of you to not misrepresent what I have claimed in such a way. It's not difficult. Don't you have the copy and paste functions on your computer?

OK, so explain to me, how truth, which deals with "what is", is relevant to ethics, which deals with what ought to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is relevant to meta-ethics, which is what we were discussing. Moral objectivism and moral subjectivism are meta-ethical positions. I have explained that once already.

All you are doing is defining "exists" in such a way that things like circles, squares, numbers, and all concepts in general, immaterial things, do not exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I'm specifying that I'm talking about what exists in actuality, rather than in any other sense.

Since God is known to have the same type of existence as these things which your definition of "exists" excludes, i.e. immaterial things like concepts, then I think it is quite clear that God does not exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

I dispute your premise. That is, I don't agree that God is known to have the same type of existence as immaterial things like concepts. But I do accept that God, defined that way, does not exist in actuality.

That is, unless you are ready to change your definition of "exists", to allow that things like circles, squares, numbers, and other concepts actually exist. If you're ready to change your definition of existence, then the question of whether God actually exists might become meaningful. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why would I do that? Actuality is what distinguishes other things from those things and vice versa. And, on the contrary, that would lose a vital distinction and trivialise the question.

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. If not science, then what else? Because human judgement varies considerably on this, unlike with regards to temperature via temperature scales. A 'moral scale' equivalent to, or even comparable to, the temperature scales that we use has not, to my knowledge, been produced — Sapientia

The negative reactions to this are a pretty good example of how advocates of "subjective" ethics can be frequently misread as nihilists. What is Sapientia saying here? Is there a claim that ethics are somehow untrue? Or even that ethical responsibility does not apply in some cases? The objectors claiming of "objective" morality say so, but it's not actually in Sapientia's words.

Rather Sapientia is drawing the distinction between empirical and ethical knowledge. In this context, "objective " means "observed in the world." Instead of saying there are no ethics or arguing a contradiction of ethics, Sapientia is pointing out ethical knowledge is not a question of observation. We can't look at the world, at a holy book, at the God shouting at us and simply say: "Ah, that means the ethical." Ethics are not like measuring temperature or describing what someone has said to you.

Here to say "ethics are subjective" means we need something other than the observed to understand ethics: ethical knowledge.

As I just said, I don't think we were discussing truth values at all. This claim of "truth value" is a diversion from the subject. — Metaphysician Undercover

It was perhaps unwise of you to challenge me in this way, because, unlike you, I have been paying close attention to what my interlocutor has been saying.

Let's take a look, for example, at the first post of yours that I replied to, which began our discussion:

But I think the issue is whether or not there is an absolute good, not exactly what such a good would be. If we are of the opinion that there is an absolute good, we can forever seek higher goods, always in pursuit of that absolute good. But if we are of the opinion that there is no absolute good, then the good determined today, or yesterday, as the highest good, might be continually forced upon us, into the future, as the highest good, denying the possibility that we could discover higher goods, And if we allow that there are higher goods, how would we create any hierarchical system without any direction toward an assumed absolute good? — Metaphysician Undercover

Now, let's compare that to your own claim about what truth deals with:

OK, so explain to me, how truth, which deals with "what is", is relevant to ethics, which deals with what ought to be. — Metaphysician Undercover

Furthermore, I already said that this criticism about appealing to the consequences stands - even if it isn't about truth, but instead about a reasonable means of accepting one over the other, in the meta-ethical context of our discussion - but you haven't addressed this counter point. Either your intention is to be reasonable, in which case you would have failed, or your intention is not to be reasonable, but instead go with whichever one you prefer based on how appealing you find the consequences, which you're free to do, but which would be no good reason for any reasonable person to do likewise.

You don't seem to have the slightest familiarity with the discipline of philosophy, otherwise you would understand that the concept of 'uncreated creator' has been part of the subject for millennia. You will understand why I'm no longer going to reply to your posts. — Wayfarer

If that means that I won't have to read any more of your ad hoc hypotheses to prevent your failing explanations from being falsified, then good riddance.

You don't seem to have the slightest familiarity with the discipline of philosophy, otherwise you would understand that the concept of identity has been part of the subject for millennia. You will understand why I'm no longer going to reply to your posts.

Seems harsh, but I can see why you'd say that.

There's gotta be an existential comic that describes the angst in this thread, I know there is!

It's called Punch, or should I say Punch and Judy.

Miracles and magic are entirely possible, but they are always only "nature": the world acting how it does. What logically follows is that if a "naturalistic"explanation is not accurate (e.g. it's a hallucination), then a different "naturalistic" explanation will be (e.g. an experience which is an ad hoc reduction of the world to a concept of "God," an entity of God speaking to someone, etc., etc.).

The trouble with this discussion is that if there is a God, the world would be identical in every way as it would if there is no God, namely as we find it. So if there is a God, some people who experience revelation or epiphany might well be experiencing, or witnessing god. Alternatively if there is no God, those same people are mistaken. There is no way to determine if someone claiming to know god, actually does know God. So the only alternative solution is to say there is no God. But this also fails because it can't be proved that there is no God either.

So as has been pointed out repeatedly through the thread, Colin's experience has to be taken on faith. Either in the acceptance of God, or in the denial of God.

It's very difficult having a discussion with you Sapientia. You keep making unsupported assertions, and when I ask you to justify them, you insist that you never made such an assertion.

You see?! You've just done it again! Why would you ask me to justify an assertion that I haven't made? — Sapientia

This is what you did claim:

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. — Sapientia

Clearly your claim is that science is objective, and ethics is not. So I asked you to justify this claim. If you meant something other, than justify what you meant. Can I assume that you mean that science is more objective than ethics? Then justify this. If this is not what you mean, then tell me what you do mean, and justify that.

Let's take a look, for example, at the first post of yours that I replied to, which began our discussion: — Sapientia

Right, I was talking about "goods".

Now, let's compare that to your own claim about what truth deals with: — Sapientia

Right, truth has not been shown by you, or me, to be related to "good". Yet you seem to be somehow linking the two. What's your point?

Furthermore, I already said that this criticism about appealing to the consequences stands - even if it isn't about truth, but instead about a reasonable means of accepting one over the other, in the meta-ethical context of our discussion - but you haven't addressed this counter point. Either your intention is to be reasonable, in which case you would have failed, or your intention is not to be reasonable, but instead go with whichever one you prefer based on how appealing you find the consequences, which you're free to do, but which would be no good reason for any reasonable person to do likewise. — Sapientia

When we are discussing "goods", we are necessarily discussing consequences, so I really don't see what you are criticizing. It appears like you would like to dismiss "consequences" in favour of "truth". But we are talking about "goods", and I see how consequences are related to goods, but I don't see how truth is related to goods. So I wish you would stop trying to change the subject, and then telling me that I am the one straw manning.

I'm lost for words. I can't continue this discussion with someone such as yourself. That is all I'm going to say.

But I am saying that the case for considering temperature to be objective is stronger than the case for considering morality to be objective, because the former has been demonstrated scientifically, and the latter has not, and therefore they are not analogous in that way. — Sapientia

Right! This is actually the basis of Hume's famous 'is/ought' problem

Which is central to the entire debate about naturalism and ethics. Basically it is the 'fact-value' dichotomy; that matters of fact are amenable to precise measurement and public agreement, where matters of value - what one ought to so - are not.

Religious ethics are oriented around a 'supreme good', whether that be expressed in theistic terms (such as in Christianity) or non-theistic religions such as Buddhism where the highest good is depicted as a state (namely, Nirvāṇa). This provides an overall rationale for a code of ethics, embodied in the corresponding way of life.

I don't see how truth is related to goods. — Metaphysician Undiscovered

In Plato, the contemplation of the true and the good is the highest state of felicity. Again, the philosopher's life is oriented around this state, so that whatever wants he or she has are subordinated to the higher cause of the 'pursuit of the good'.