in principle, we ought to be able to predict human behavior, though I can't say I have had much success myself. The trouble is that the human brain contains far too many particles for us to be able to solve the equations. But it is comforting to think we might be able to predict the nematode worm, even if we can't quite figure out humans.
The scientific revolution of the 17th century, which has given rise to such extraordinary progress in the understanding of nature, depended on a crucial limiting step at the start: It depended on subtracting from the physical world as an object of study everything mental – consciousness, meaning, intention or purpose. The physical sciences as they have developed since then describe, with the aid of mathematics, the elements of which the material universe is composed, and the laws governing their behavior in space and time.
We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe, composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
However, I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
So the physical sciences, in spite of their extraordinary success in their own domain, necessarily leave an important aspect of nature unexplained. 1 — Thomas Nagel
Science, on the other hand, cannot even investigate if science would be complete. There are no equivalent scientific incompleteness theorems in science about the scientific method. That alone makes science very, very incomplete.
A mathematical problem underlying fundamental questions in particle and quantum physics is provably unsolvable, according to scientists at UCL, Universidad Complutense de Madrid - ICMAT and Technical University of Munich.
It is the first major problem in physics for which such a fundamental limitation could be proven. The findings are important because they show that even a perfect and complete description of the microscopic properties of a material is not enough to predict its macroscopic behaviour.
because they are beings, and not simply objects. — Wayfarer
A couple of common things I could put under the banner of scientism would be:There are definitely people who treat science as a religion. I'm not sure if there's actually anyone with the view you describe in quotation marks above. — Terrapin Station
but something else, where you would say the person is both employing empirical methods and is not doing science — Moliere
Some examples that come to mind for me: A machine operator. A lighting technician. A cook. — Moliere
where you would say the person is both employing empirical methods and is not doing science? — Moliere
What is it that makes these activities not-scientific, in your view? — Moliere
More in a way that it (science) answers everything. Yet the fact is that we have extremely important and necessary questions that are simply subjective.Scientism is the idea that there is only one knowledge-justification method, i.e. the scientific one. — alcontali
A mathematical problem underlying fundamental questions in particle and quantum physics is provably unsolvable, according to scientists at UCL
Generally mathematics is grouped in with the sciences. — Moliere
A lack of making observations, formulating and testing hypotheses, and then revising beliefs and hypotheses in response to evidence. — Terrapin Station
And if there be more to science than just these qualities I'd wonder -- how would you differentiate theoretical discussions on the existence of the ether from, say, discussions on the existence of God? — Moliere
I'm afraid I do not believe what Karl Popper believed about science. — Moliere
Let's put this to you, then: You wouldn't call theoretical discussions scientific knowledge. But would you still count theoretical publications in physics as doing science? It is still science, even if it is not knowledge, right? — Moliere
As long as we clearly distinguish between hypothesis/conjecture (no experimental test available) and theory (experimentally testable), I am ok with the hypothetical-theoretical discussions.
We need to be able to black-swan a scientific theory, i.e. search for a counterexample, otherwise it is not a scientific theory.
Since all scientific theories obviously start their life cycle as mere conjectures, I am certainly not against the activity of conjecturing. So, yes, it is "pre-science". Conjectures are the staging area for science. They are therefore necessary. — alcontali
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.