22:

… reason is purposive doing.

Hegel notes that this claim has fallen into disrepute, because nature is regarded to be above thinking and without external purpose. He says that this misconstrues thinking and that purpose does not entail external purpose. He appeals to Aristotle’s determination of nature as

... purposive doing, purpose is the immediate, the motionless, which is self-moving, or, is subject.

This is important in several ways. It shows that the development of knowledge is not simply a linear progression in which those who come later see more clearly and accurately than the ancients did. Aristotle is taken up again anew, which is not to say ahistorically. In addition, nature as purposive means that nature is not the action of blind forces, there is purpose in its doings. Nature as subject means that thinking is not below or above nature. Aristotle’s unmoved mover is the movement of the subject, the thinking I.

Its abstract power to move is being-for-itself, or, pure negativity. For that reason, the result is the same as the beginning because the beginning is purpose – that is, the actual is the same as its concept only because the immediate, as purpose, has the self, or, pure actuality, within itself.

The beginning is purpose, the result the actualization of purpose. From beginning to end, in moving away from itself the move is back to itself, it is the actuality of purpose, being for itself.

What has returned into itself is just the self, and the self is self-relating sameness and simplicity.

But what is the self? Is it the same or different from myself or yourself?

23:

The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc.

Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)?

In such propositions, the true is directly posited as subject, but it is not presented as the movement of reflection taking-an-inward-turn.

That is, such propositions only reflect the negative movement, the movement away from itself, its otherness, which has not yet reached the moment of the movement when reflection turns back to itself. So, what’s love got to do with it? Love is the desire for unity. In religious terms it is the unity of man and God. In philosophical terms the unity of man and knowledge. In knowledge the desire for unity with God is overcome, for the movement has returned back to the self from the otherness of God.

One proposition of that sort begins with the word “God.” On its own, this is a meaningless sound, a mere name. It is only the predicate that says what the name is and is its fulfillment and its meaning. The empty beginning becomes actual knowledge only at the end of the proposition. To that extent, one cannot simply pass over in silence the reason why one cannot speak solely of the eternal, the moral order of the world, etc., or, as the ancients did, of pure concepts, of being, of the one, etc., or, of what the meaning is, without appending the meaningless sound as well.

Instead of saying: “God is the eternal” or “God is the moral order”, etc., why can’t we just say the eternal or the moral order without appending the meaningless sound God? The answer is provided in the next sentence:

However, the use of this word only indicates that it is neither a being nor an essence nor a universal per se which is posited; what is posited is what is reflected into itself, a subject.

We should keep in mind that Hegel says the subject is self-positing (18).In other words, the positing of God is the self-positing of the subject. But:

... at the same time, this is something only anticipated. The subject is accepted as a fixed point on which the predicates are attached for their support through a movement belonging to what it is that can be said to know this subject and which itself is also not to be viewed as belonging to the point itself, but it is solely through this movement that the content would be portrayed as the subject.

The positing of God is at that moment the positing of something fixed and unchanging, something wholly and completely other. But:

... not only is the former anticipation that the absolute is subject not the actuality of this concept, but it even makes that actuality impossible, for it posits the concept as a point wholly at rest, whereas the concept is self-movement.

The problem is that the subject, God, is thought of as being at rest and unchanging. As the theologians have argued, God is perfect and thus unchanging, for change implies imperfection.

gebildet" means nothing but "formed". It has the second meaning of "educated", true, but Hegel's context leaves it open whether the rationality has simply "formed" and developed itself, or whether it was "educated" from an outside source. And the word "cultural" does not show up at all. — WerMaat

Interesting to read of this translation. However, as you say it is ambiguous.
Within a specific passage it could and probably does take on the particular meaning, as suggested.

I feel that Hegel is leaning more towards the self-formed.
— WerMaat

Yes, I think that this is right, but self-formation is a cultural formation. We are shaped by and within our culture. As individuals we are not wholly separate or other. To use the agricultural root from which we get culture, it is the soil in which we grow and are nourished. — Fooloso4

Agreed. Self-formation is related to recognition and relationships.

I don't see a reference to culture, to society or education in its literal sense. — WerMaat

Would it have been necessary to include such a reference. Isn't it fundamental ?
Aren't we dependent on the

prior existence of a material culture, subject to interpretation.. — Andy Blunden

What I am stressing is the importance of culture in the development of the thinking I. — Fooloso4

Yes, I think we all agree on that, don't we ? Perhaps not.

I have been reading an article by Andy Blunden - ' Hegel, Recognition and Intersubjectivity'.
Number 19 - its download title is 'Mediation and Intersubjectivist Interpretations of Hegel', 2007.
From:
https://ethicalpolitics.org/ablunden/works/on-hegel.htm

It is a broad, pragmatic interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of Spirit.
Blunden distinguishes this from the narrow pragmatism which ignores the meaning already invested in cultural inheritance.

The notions of culture and education that are going back and forth, I'm agnostic on, but I am pretty sure that in as much as Hegelian motion is in things like the plant and the tree, I think he is going to argue that history/culture is similarly shaped and conditioned by impersonal movement - — tim wood

So, are you saying you don't know about - or recognise - the importance of culture ?
What particular notion of 'culture' do you have difficulty with ?

But you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.

Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ?

...

So, are you saying you don't know about - or recognise - the importance of culture ?
What particular notion of 'culture' do you have difficulty with ?
But you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.
Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ? — Amity

The dance is accomplished by people and only people. And I have the dance in mind, but from a slightly different perspective. Simply, if you see one person dancing, at the same time you know all there is to know about the dance that you see that person dancing. You can wonder and infer the steps may not be original, but in that rendition they absolutely are.

Observe a group in dance, ballet, Busby Berkeley spectacular, or even just a square dance, and manifestly there is something more there than meets the eye - in most cases a lot more.

I read Hegel as being hyper-aware of the "more than meets the eye." And that his intent is to give an account of it. Further, that the ερισ - strife, discord, tension - intrinsic to difference leads in sublation eventually to spirit. In such demonstrations as the master-slave dialectic - dialectic being a fancy word for the working out of the strife in sublation - Hegel tries to give a specific example. And I think he's going to analyze a lot of this movement in terms of history.

Or another way, it's all personal, but more accurately considered at the appropriate scale as "impersonal." Whether Hegel also includes natural disasters I'm at the moment unaware. Likely in his time not enough was known about such things, even if, like the plague, it was "in their face."

Pinkard #25

"25. That the true is only actual as a system, or, that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation that expresses the absolute as spirit – the most sublime concept and the one which belongs to modernity and its religion.

The spiritual alone is the actual; it is the essence, or, what exists-in-itself. – It is what is self-comporting, or, the determinate itself, or, otherness and being-for- itself – and, in this determinateness, to be the self-enduring in its being-external-to-itself – or, it is in and for itself.

– However, it is first of all this being-in-and-for-itself for us, or, in itself, which is to say, it is spiritual substance. It has to become this for itself – it must be knowing of the spiritual, and it must be knowing of itself as spirit. This means that it must be, to itself, an object, but it must likewise immediately be a mediated object, which is to say, it must be a sublated object reflected into itself. It is for itself solely for us insofar as its spiritual content is engendered by itself. Insofar as the object for itself is also for itself, this self-engendering, the pure concept, is, to itself, the objective element in which it has its existence, and in this manner, it is, for itself in its existence, an object reflected into itself. Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element." — Hegel

The notions of culture and education that are going back and forth, I'm agnostic on, but I am pretty sure that in as much as Hegelian motion is in things like the plant and the tree, I think he is going to argue that history/culture is similarly shaped and conditioned by impersonal movement - — tim wood

...you are 'pretty sure that...Hegel is is going to argue that history/culture is shaped by impersonal movement'.
Why would you think that ?
How could it be 'impersonal' ? — Amity

...Or another way, it's all personal, but more accurately considered at the appropriate scale as "impersonal." — tim wood

Please clarify.

Well, ok: WW1 was a war of individual people? Jim and Steve and Gunter and Heinrich? Or the immigration/refuge crisis in the world today - a matter of individuals not liking where they are? Or is there some more elemental force at work?

WW1 was a war of individual people? Jim and Steve and Gunter and Heinrich? Or the immigration/refuge crisis in the world today - a matter of individuals not liking where they are? Or is there some more elemental force at work? — tim wood

OK. Good examples of individuals getting caught up in events outwith their control.
Within which there is still that search - desire - for freedom, progress - where hope might prevail as fear encompasses them. Desire and Fear being basic driving forces in human activity.
Reason appears to fly out the window when political rhetoric is used to stir up communal emotion.
Where there was progress, regress steps in.
So far, so human.

To return to the initial metaphor cleverly employed to draw us in; the natural, organic growth of bud, blossom, fruit. This can only take us so far in understanding.
It is not sufficient. It takes no account of all of the above.It is 'impersonal' in the sense of not having human qualities, emotions or reason. We are more than physical, passive growth. We are active, interacting, to grow spiritually, academically, socially, whateverly - interdisciplinary.

So, this 'impersonal movement' you talked of above - which you appeared to specifically relate to the metaphor - why would you think that this is how Hegel will progress his argument or theory ? Or is it a different kind of 'impersonal movement' you have in mind ?

And what is meant by your question: 'is there some more elemental force at work' ?
What do you mean by 'elemental' ? Your 'clarification' needs clarifying.

Take your pick. From:
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elemental

Elemental biological needs.
Essential constituent of something.
Forming an integral part. Inherent.
Resembling a great force of nature. Violent rains or passion.

A supernatural being. Spirit.
An elementary part or principle.Two different epistemologies:
1. Science > strives to understand the elementals of material existence ( empiricism)
2. Theology > our universality, existence described through faith.

Or perhaps none or all of the above...I look forward to your explication.

-----------

And so we return to Hegel and questions arise as to his meaning.

23:

"The need to represent the absolute as subject has helped itself to such propositions as “God is the eternal,” or “God is the moral order of the world,” or “God is love,” etc." - Hegel.

Does Hegel intend for us to draw a connection between “God is love”, “The life of God and divine cognition ... as a game love plays with itself” (19),and the goal of philosophy as moving “nearer to the goal where it can lay aside the title of love of knowing and be actual knowing (5)? — Fooloso4

How do we understand him ?

How do we understand him ? — Amity

I think for him the game is over, unity has been realized.

24:

It is only as a science or as a system that knowing is actual and can be given an exposition; and that any further so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, if it is true, is for this reason alone also false just because it is a fundamental
proposition or a principle.

There is no first principle of philosophy upon which everything else rests and is supported. Both the truth of a proposition and its negation are moments within the movement of the system of knowledge.

Conversely, the genuinely positive working out of the beginning is at the same time just as much a negative posture towards its beginning; namely, a negative posture towards its one-sided form, which is to be at first only immediately, or, to be purpose. It may thereby be taken to be the refutation of what constitutes the ground of the system, but it is better taken as showing that the ground, or the principle, of the system is in fact only its beginning.

Contrary to the assumption that the ground or principles of reason must be firm and unchanging, the movement of reason has no fixed ground. A principle is a starting point. The positive movement is via the negative, the negation of what is taken as true. It is not the truth but in the movement, the development, the working out of truth.

I think for him the game is over, unity has been realized. — Fooloso4

If he is with us in spirit :halo: then he is also in purgatory :groan:
Then again, he could be :rofl:

And what is meant by your question: 'is there some more elemental force at work' ?
What do you mean by 'elemental' ? Your 'clarification' needs clarifying. — Amity

I'll try another way. If you're on the NYC subway at off hours, if someone presses against you, you might well take it personally and perhaps with justification. On the other hand, if your're riding the subway during commuting hours and are there pressed and complain to the person pressing you, the reply you might get then is, "What's your problem, lady!"

The idea is that in the first case you might suspect something personal, while in the second there is nothing at all personal.

In as much as there is nothing personal, still, though, you are pressed for some reason or reasons. I think Hegel is going to investigate those reasons via his analysis of history, in a dialectic of history.

That is, there is a scale appropriate to the actions and motivations of individuals, and that scale not-so-much appropriate for understanding movements on a larger scale.

That is, there is a scale appropriate to the actions and motivations of individuals, and that scale not-so-much appropriate for understanding movements on a larger scale. — tim wood

I think the matter of scale you describe is important to what Hegel is presenting. The "unconditioned" is present in all the instances of determination. But how that is so is not some kind of phenomena without conditions. Self-awareness has to happen in many ways for it to happen in one.

In as much as there is nothing personal, still, though, you are pressed for some reason or reasons. I think Hegel is going to investigate those reasons via his analysis of history, in a dialectic of history.

That is, there is a scale appropriate to the actions and motivations of individuals, and that scale not-so-much appropriate for understanding movements on a larger scale. — tim wood

I think the matter of scale you describe is important to what Hegel is presenting — Valentinus

As already discussed, the movement of history is central to Hegel's system.
Of course, there are matters of 'scale' within this.
Paraphrasing some previous references and thoughts:

We develop from individual consciousness to self consciousness - seeking knowledge from an individual perspective to the universal. Via the development of the culture.
A kind of global humanism dealing with problems of humanity.

We have intrinsic purpose. We follow both intuition, insights and reason on the path to self-realisation.

The scale concerns relative degrees; measuring both the quantitative gradations and the qualitative leaps.

The subject matter of the text is both the Concept of Geist (Spirit) and its working out in real life.
Theory and Practice.

Philosophical theories are neither true or false. They offer different perspectives on progressive development.
Philosophy is viewed and understood from a historical perspective.
Philosophical concepts made by humans who relate to each other in action and reaction.
The practical role is to formulate ideas which might lead to new ways of thinking about the world and our place in it.

There is no first principle of philosophy upon which everything else rests and is supported. Both the truth of a proposition and its negation are moments within the movement of the system of knowledge. — Fooloso4

Yes. It is about the testing of ideas or concepts. The dance of the dialectic.

The dialectic of discussion. In a properly conducted debate, an idea is put forward (the Thesis) and is then countered by the opposing view (the Antithesis) which negates it. Finally, through a thorough process of discussion, which explores the issue concerned from all points of view and discloses all the hidden contradictions, we arrive at a conclusion (the Synthesis). We may or may not arrive at agreement but by the very process of discussion, we have deepened our knowledge and understanding and raised the whole discussion onto a different plane.

https://www.marxist.com/science-old/dialecticalmaterialism.html

Contrary to the assumption that the ground or principles of reason must be firm and unchanging, the movement of reason has no fixed ground. A principle is a starting point. The positive movement is via the negative, the negation of what is taken as true. It is not the truth but in the movement, the development, the working out of truth. — Fooloso4

I think this is a good summary. It relates to my last post regarding the subject matter of the text.
Geist - the concept of and its working out in real life.
The spirit of philosophy.

25:

That the true is only actual as a system, or, that substance is essentially subject, is expressed in the representation that expresses the absolute as spirit – the most sublime concept and the one which belongs to modernity and its religion.

What is the religion of modernity? Without venturing an answer it can be noted that “the most sublime concept” belongs to it, the expression of the absolute as spirit.

The spiritual alone is the actual; it is the essence, or, what exists-in-itself. – It is what is self-comporting, or, the determinate itself, or, otherness and being-for-itself – and, in this determinateness, to be the self-enduring in its being-external-to-itself – or, it is in and for
Itself.

The spiritual is what exists-in-itself and comports itself to itself. But this means it must be to itself other than itself for itself.

However, it is first of all this being-in-and-for-itself for us, or, in itself, which is to say, it is spiritual substance. It has to become this for itself – it must be knowing of the spiritual, and it must be knowing of itself as spirit. This means that it must be, to itself, an object, but it must likewise immediately be a mediated object, which is to say, it must be a sublated object reflected into itself.

Spirit comes to know itself through us, by becoming an object to itself, an other whose otherness is immediately negated so that it is taken back into itself

It is for itself solely for us insofar as its spiritual content is engendered by itself.

It is not us who engender the spiritual content, it is engendered for us. It is as it is for us.

Insofar as the object for itself is also for itself, this self-engendering, the pure concept, is, to itself, the objective element in which it has its existence, and in this manner, it is, for itself in its existence, an object reflected into itself.

I take this to mean that the object, that is, spirit becoming an object to itself, is self-engendering, it conceives itself. It is pure concept, reason, logos.

Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element.

Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it.

I take this to mean that the object, that is, spirit becoming an object to itself, is self-engendering, it conceives itself. It is pure concept, reason, logos.

Spirit knowing itself in that way as spirit is science. Science is its actuality, and science is the realm it builds for itself in its own proper element.

Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it. — Fooloso4

When I think of spirit, beginnings and qualitative leaps, Goethe comes to mind. With his:
In the beginning was the act. Im Anfang war die Tat - Faust.
As opposed to the Word of the Bible.

(He opens a tome [of the New Testament] and begins.)
It says: ‘In the beginning was the Word [Wort].’
Already I am stopped. It seems absurd.
The Word does not deserve the highest prize,I must translate it otherwise
If I am well inspired and not blind.
It says: In the beginning was the Mind [Sinn].
Ponder that first line, wait and see,
Lest you should write too hastily.
Is mind the all-creating source?It ought to say: In the beginning there was Force [Kraft].
Yet something warns me as I grasp the pen,
That my translation must be changed again.
The spirit helps me. Now it is exact.
I write: In the beginning was the Act [Tat]
— Goethe's Faust

His qualitative leap ? Perhaps this:

Ten years of office work, of literary projects left incomplete, finally took their toll. In 1786, in a spirit of adventure characteristic more of a young poet than of a middle-aged civil servant, Goethe abruptly threw aside his work and left Weimar without telling friends and colleagues where he was going. Travelling under an assumed identity, he made his way to Italy, where he spent the next two years studying art and enjoying the country that he described, in one of his most famous poems, as “the land where lemon blossoms blow, / And through dark leaves the golden oranges glow.”

— Adam Kirsch

And here, the concept of Bildung : ( discussed earlier, para 21 )

The concept of Bildung—a word that means learning and education but also implies a cultivation of the self and of maturity—was central to Goethe’s thought, and he, in turn, made it central to German culture. For Thomas Mann, whose admiration of Goethe took the form of spiritual imitation, Goethe was above all an educator, but one who had first to learn, through experience, the wisdom he taught. Mann wrote that a “vocation towards educating others does not spring from inner harmony, but rather from inner uncertainties, disharmony, difficulty—from the difficulty of knowing one’s own self.” — Adam Kirsch

When I think of spirit, beginnings and qualitative leaps, Goethe comes to mind. With his:
In the beginning was the act. Im Anfung war die Tat - Faust.
As opposed to the Word of the Bible. — Amity

The Greek word used by John in the New Testament is logos. It seems likely Hegel in using the term is mindful of both the Greek and Christian tradition, and since both are historically important his use reflects the full range of meaning.

As used by John it connotes the tradition of revelation, what God speaks to man. It is primarily what man is told by and about God. For the Greeks logos is an ordering of words intended to give an account or explanation, literally to gather together and lay out. One who is wise is able to give a logos that reflects the intelligible order of the cosmos, why and how all things are as they are. But the logos is not simply ordered speech, it is the ordering of what speech is

Perhaps what Goethe was getting at is the impotence of mere words. Actions not words are primary. Hegel's use of terms such as 'logos', 'reason', and 'concept' are self-generative, that is, not passive descriptions of something separate and other.

Perhaps what Goethe was getting at is the impotence of mere words. Actions not words are primary. Hegel's use of terms such as 'logos', 'reason', and 'concept' are self-generative, that is, not passive descriptions of something separate and other. — Fooloso4

No, I don't think that's it. Goethe was a poet and thinker. Faust was the character trying to translate the New Testament into German. From what I remember, he was seeking inspiration having dried up in more ways than one. Then came the Spirit...

@WerMaat will probably know more than I do.

What I can share is one of Goethe's short poems which speaks to his understanding of natural process.
Paraphrased from 'Goethe - poet and thinker' by Wilkinson and Willoughby, pp21-25.

3 brief statements of facts (no metaphors or similes) are followed by an assertion for the future.

Uber allen Gipfeln
Ist Ruh.

In allen Wipfeln
Spurest du
Kaum einen Hauch.

Die Vogelein schweigen im Walde,
Warte nur, balde
Ruhest du auch.

By the very order of the poem, Goethe is embraced in it, the last link in the chain of being.
From the inanimate to the animate, from the mineral, through the vegetable, to the animal kingdom, from the hilltop, to the treetops, to the birds, and so at last to man.

The subjective and objective experience are completely fused.
The appearances of Nature are rendered, but also the organic relations between them; man's mind is shown as the final link in the chain of creation, Nature become conscious of itself, but it also takes its place within nature. It does not stand outside or over against it.

It was Goethe's way of being - the poet; not here offering conscious opinions, intellectual convictions and philosophical beliefs. The latter don't always express the self, they may even disguise.
At the level of his deepest thought, the subjective and objective modes are quite evidently harmonised.' — Wilkinson and Willoughby

Man does not engender the concept but thinks it, develops it dialectically, actualizes it. — Fooloso4

Depends what you mean by 'the concept'.
If Man does not engender the concept, then who ?
God ?
Or what ?
Cosmic Consciousness ?

No, I don't think that's it. Goethe was a poet and thinker. Faust was the character trying to translate the New Testament into German. From what I remember, he was seeking inspiration having dried up in more ways than one. Then came the Spirit... — Amity

I am not sure I follow. I am at a disadvantage not having read Goethe (and have been scolded by you for this omission). Isn't it the translation of logos that Goethe's Faust is grappling with, the term translated as wort in German and word in English, as in: "In the beginning was the ..."?

Inspiration is, literally, the indwelling of spirit. If I understand you, Faust is moved the the spirit. If that is the case then doesn't this point to the insufficiency of words, that words alone are not what provides the movement both for him and in the beginning? I take it as being for this reason that he translates logos as deed or act, something done rather than something said.

This may be off though, since what God does to begin is to speak, to say: "Let there be ...". [Added: Perhaps Goethe shares Hegel's view of continuous development. It is not simply what was said or done at the beginning, but the continued active doing. From what you presented it also seems that Goethe shares Hegel's rejection of a transcendent God who acts upon the world.

It was Goethe's way of being - the poet; not here offering conscious opinions, intellectual convictions and philosophical beliefs. The latter don't always express the self, they may even disguise.
At the level of his deepest thought, the subjective and objective modes are quite evidently harmonised.' — Wilkinson and Willoughby

There is much in what you quote that is consonant with Hegel. I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science, he does not:

... [posit] that the true shape of truth lies in its scientific rigor – or, what is the same thing, in asserting that truth has the element of its existence solely in concepts –

Of course one might claim that this reflects the superiority of poetry. With Hegel we are still within what Socrates calls the ancient battle between philosophy and poetry.

If Man does not engender the concept, then who ? — Amity

Self-engendering spirit. Man's role is in the articulation and working out of the absolute. As a teleological movement, what comes to be, what develops is the potentiality that is realized or actualized in what is there from the beginning.

Isn't it the translation of logos that Goethe's Faust is grappling with, the term translated as wort in German and word in English, as in: "In the beginning was the ..."? — Fooloso4

Yes. That is word for word translation. So, no difficulties there. I guess there was more to it.
Anti-religion ? What comes first...not words. Nor a Bible.

Faust is moved the the spirit. If that is the case then doesn't this point to the insufficiency of words, that words alone are not what provides the movement both for him and in the beginning? I take it as being for this reason that he translates logos as deed or act, something done rather than something said. — Fooloso4

I am no Goethe scholar. I would need to read it again. The pact with the devil spirit I think came after that point. And it wasn't the literary spirit they engaged in. In the words of Elvis:

'A little less conversation, a little more action, please
All this aggravation ain't satisfactioning me
A little more bite and a little less bark
A little less fight and a little more spark...'

I hope the sparkling spirit of @WerMaat is visited upon us, soon.

I think you have a better handle on this than I have, even if you haven't read Goethe.
You are right. It takes more than words alone.

I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science — Fooloso4

Goethe does that elsewhere. Possibly even at the same time. One can write poetry even as one studies rocks. He was multi-talented that guy. I mentioned his theories earlier.

Self-engendering spirit. — Fooloso4

Yeah, I got that. I just don't get it. What is there at the beginning...

Pinkard #s 26, 27

26. Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether (sic) as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality. The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness is situated in this element. However, this element itself has its culmination and its transparency only through the movement of its coming-to-be. It is pure spirituality, or, the universal in the mode of simple immediacy.

Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because it is the substance of spirit, it is transfigured essentiality, reflection that is itself simple, or, is immediacy; it is being that is a reflective turn into itself. For its part, science requires that self-consciousness shall have elevated itself into this ether in order to be able to live with science and to live in science, and, for that matter, to be able to live at all.

Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being. However much the standpoint of consciousness, which is to say, the standpoint of knowing objective things to be opposed to itself and knowing itself to be opposed to them, counts as the other to science – the other, in which consciousness is at one with itself, counts instead as the loss of spirit – still, in comparison, the element of science possesses for consciousness an other-worldly remoteness in which consciousness is no longer in possession of itself.

Each of these two parts seems to the other to be an inversion of the truth. For the natural consciousness to entrust itself immediately to science would be to make an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk upside down all of a sudden. The compulsion to accept this unaccustomed attitude and to transport oneself in that way would be, so it would seem, a violence imposed on it with neither any advance preparation nor with any necessity. – Science may be in its own elf what it will, but in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness, it presents itself as an inversion of the latter, or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality.

Accordingly, science has to unite that element with itself or instead to show both that such an element belongs to itself and how it belongs to it. Lacking actuality, science is the in-itself, the purpose, which at the start is still something inner, at first not as spirit but only as spiritual substance. It has to express itself and become for itself, and this means nothing else than that it has to posit self-consciousness as being at one with itself.

27. This coming-to-be of science itself, or, of knowing, is what is presented in this phenomenology of spirit as the first part of the system of science. Knowing, as it is at first, or, as immediate spirit, is devoid of spirit, is sensuous consciousness. In order to become genuine knowing, or, in order to beget the element of science which is its pure concept, immediate spirit must laboriously travel down a long path.

– As it is established in its content and in the shapes that appear in it, this coming-to-be appears a bit differently from the way a set of instructions on how to take unscientific consciousness up to and into science would appear; it also appears somewhat differently from the way laying the foundations for science would appear. – In any case, it is something very different from the inspiration which begins immediately, like a shot from a pistol, with absolute knowledge, and which has already finished with all the other standpoints simply by declaring that it will take no notice of them." — Hegel/Pinkard

Science may be in its own self what it will, but in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness, it presents itself as an inversion of the latter, or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality. — Hegel/Pinkard

This observation strikes in many directions. I will throw out two.

It recasts the argument between Hume and Kant regarding causality. If Hume's skepticism is a "natural" development in the advance of "science", Kant's rejection of that argument is another one.

Arguments about free will versus various expressions of necessity tend to misrepresent why the proposal of a system that ties them together would be rejected out of hand. At the very least, Hegel is asking for the problem to be approached from a different direction.

The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being. — Hegel/Pinkard

If I had the opportunity to cross the river and pour some of my blood into Kierkegaard's bowl in Hades, I would ask him about this passage.

Para 26

The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being.
— Hegel/Pinkard

If I had the opportunity to cross the river and pour some of my blood into Kierkegaard's bowl in Hades, I would ask him about this passage. — Valentinus

Oh no, not your blood - that is a sacrifice too far !
Perhaps we could all chip in...and pray for a positive outcome.

Why Kierkegaard and not Hegel himself ? ( assuming that wasn't an error )

What position did Kierkegaard take - for or against Hegel. Or a little of both?
Curious about this, and philosophical, historical developments.
Also how sure can we be that what is reported or criticised is the correct version. Bring on the blood.
I think it helpful to look at objections to Hegel as a way to understand him.

Some thoughts here:

According to standard interpretations of 19th-century European philosophy, a stark ’either / or’ divided Hegel and Kierkegaard, and this divide profoundly shaped the subsequent development of Continental philosophy well into the 20th century. While left Hegelians carried on the legacy of Hegel’s rationalism and universalism, existentialists and postmodernists found inspiration, at least in part, in Kierkegaard’s critique of systematic philosophy, rationality, and socially integrated subjectivity. In Kierkegaard’s Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Jon Stewart provides a detailed historical argument which challenges the standard assumption that Kierkegaard’s position was developed in opposition to Hegel’s philosophy, and as such is antithetical to it. — Matthew Edgar review

https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/kierkegaard-s-relation-to-hegel-reconsidered/
Review of:
Jon Stewart, Kierkegaard's Relation to Hegel Reconsidered, Cambridge University Press, 2003

I guess there was more to it.
Anti-religion ? What comes first...not words. Nor a Bible. — Amity

I cannot say what more there is for Goethe but for Hegel it is the sublation of both the Greek logos and John's logos. Some read Hegel as anti-religious and others as religious. At this point perhaps it is prudent to just suggest that Hegel sublates religion.

I think Hegel's response might be that Goethe represents it but does not raise it to the level of science
— Fooloso4
Goethe does that elsewhere. — Amity

Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole?

Yeah, I got that. I just don't get it. What is there at the beginning... — Amity

If I remember correctly and understood it correctly (it has been a very long time since I last read Hegel) it begins with the eternal negating itself and giving rise to time. In its embryonic stage it contains all that it will come to be, but must work itself out over time, eventually there is the development of consciousness and finally self-consciousness and knowledge of itself as the whole.

Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole? — Fooloso4

I don't know. I doubt it is exactly Hegel's approach. Goethe wasn't such a brilliant, mad philosopher.

It would be interesting to see how they compare.

A few bits and bobs:

The method of science that Goethe practiced was in certain respects diametrically opposed to the objective science described above. Goethe believed that the outer physical world and the inner world of our senses were mirror images of each other, the inside view and the outside view of the same reality.  Therefore, paying attention to the outer world leads to necessary inner responses in us that tell us directly about qualities of what we are observing. The science that Goethe advocated was also one of deep observation. The difference that Goethe brought was that the scientist, while observing the outside world, would pay attention to their own inner responses which would reveal essential elements of what was being observed. It was in a sense a science of subjectivity, or what you might see as a mystical approach to science. — Jeff Carreira

https://philosophyisnotaluxury.com/2013/06/14/goethes-method-of-doing-science/

His literary works certainly addressed contemporary philosophical concerns: Iphigenie auf Tauris (Iphigenia in Tauris) (1779–86) seems a prophetic dramatization of the ethical and religious autonomy Kant was to proclaim from 1785; in his novel Die Wahlverwandtschaften (The Elective Affinities) (1809) a mysterious natural or supernatural world of chemistry, magnetism or Fate, such as ‘Naturphilosophie’ envisaged, seems to underlie and perhaps determine a human story of spiritual adultery; in Faust, particularly Part Two, the tale of a pact or wager with the Devil seems to develop into a survey of world cultural history, which has been held to have overtones of Schelling, Hegel or even Marx. But whatever their conceptual materials, Goethe’s literary works require literary rather than philosophical analysis. There are, however, certain discrete concepts prominent in his scientific work, or in the expressions of his ‘wisdom’ – maxims, essays, autobiographies, letters and conversations – with which Goethe’s name is particularly associated and which are capable of being separately discussed. Notable among these are: Nature and metamorphosis (Bildung), polarity and ‘intensification’ (Steigerung), the ‘primal phenomena’ (Urphänomene), ‘the daemonic’ (das Dämonische) and renunciation (Entsag — Nicholas Boyle

[my bolds]
https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/goethe-johann-wolfgang-von-1749-1832/v-1


Goethe's Faust and Hegel's Phenomenology: A Comparison

In two different media, poetic drama and philosophic prose, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) explored the same subject: man's perilous journey to discover his consciousness along a course of doubt and despair. — Ingrid Poole - abstract

http://journal.telospress.com/content/1968/1/34.abstract

On Goethe's vision, a science of wholeness:

The basis of this new epistemology was the “fundamental conviction that the relation of the human mind to the world was ultimately not dualistic but participatory…. In this view, the essential reality of nature is not separate, self-contained and complete in itself, so that the human mind can examine it ‘objectively’ and register it from without. Rather, nature’s unfolding truth emerges only with the active participation of the human mind. Nature’s reality is not merely phenomenal, nor is it independent and objective; rather, it is something that comes into being through the very act of human cognition. Nature becomes intelligible to itself through the human mind” (Tarnas, 1991).

https://blog.usejournal.com/goethes-science-of-wholeness-55282a462bbe

If I remember correctly and understood it correctly (it has been a very long time since I last read Hegel) it begins with the eternal negating itself and giving rise to time. In its embryonic stage it contains all that it will come to be, but must work itself out over time, eventually there is the development of consciousness and finally self-consciousness and knowledge of itself as the whole. — Fooloso4

Eh ? :chin:
Huh ? :confused:
OK... :nerd: