if he wants Y he ought to do X — tim wood
How does "he ought to do X" enter the picture? — Terrapin Station
Yes it does, if he wants it. I think you're adding something to the ought - an implication of moral imperative maybe. It's up to you to make that explicit, so that either I may gently correct you, or you being correct, fall on my own sword.That doesn't tell us anything about what he ought to do. — Terrapin Station
Yes it does, if he wants it. — tim wood
If they want to achieve it, maybe that's what you're dropping out.Why ought someone do something if they want something? — Terrapin Station
try reading the definitions provided. Try reading my posts, Try for some comprehension.
Maybe this. If you want to saw a piece of wood, than you ought to use a saw.
Why ought someone do something if they want something? — Terrapin Station
If they want to achieve it, maybe that's what you're dropping out. — tim wood
if you want to accomplish it!It seems like you just take it as a given that if you want x, you ought to do, — Terrapin Station
So that when Joe says, "I want to eat an ice cream, and it's necessary for me to go to the store to buy an ice cream to be able to eat it, BUT I ought not go to the store," we can say that he's getting a fact wrong, and we can somehow justify that he's getting a fact wrong. — Terrapin Station
Where is he getting anything wrong? — tim wood
Near as I can tell, then, you're tangled in your understanding of implication, and that you yourself haven't settled on exactly what is mean by "ought," or even what you mean by it.If it's the case that a fact in this case, "I want x," implies an ought, "I ought to do y," — Terrapin Station
Perhaps I misunderstood what you were up to. I was affected by the comment that if you tell a geometrist that the angles of a triangle don't add up to 180 they won't listen to you. I thought you were heading in the direction of there being some parallel in ethics. It seems not. I don't think the math analogies, if that's what they are, are helping the conversation. And since geometrists would know about non-Euc. geometry I think this led me to beleived you were confused.I can only suppose that is because you have confused the nature of geometry with morality/ethics.. — tim wood
is true and I argued that in my previous post, but you didn't respond to that, I don't think. I take that up again below.If there is one, any, universally held value, then the whole field comes into view. It's then your business to show that there is not a single one.
The point here being that the failure to "regularize" mathematics did not cause mathematics to revert to being whatever anyone "felt" like it should be as a matter of personal opinion. 2+2 was, and is, still 4. — tim wood
But as with mathematics, that in no way means that morality/ethics becomes free-floating and entirely arbitrary. — tim wood
In certain bases, like base 10, but not in others. — Coben
My point was, again, that something you seem to be putting forward as the only way something can be taken, isn't the only way. I am not exactly sure what your point was, but it seemed like you were saying that,and it doesn't really matter if in most bases it would be 2+2=4, just that it is not universal. Similarly when you said no geometrist would take me seriously if I said the angles of a triangle did not add up to 180 degrees,when in fact they very well might. How exactly this all relates to ethics for you, I am not sure. Doing my best?In most bases, actually in all bases, except that in a very few, "4" is called something else. If your point is that it's always possible for someone to be distracted and go off track, I agree. But don't worry about it, it's just a sign of youth. — tim wood
I have been. I know these bad people for example have friends who think they are good people. But in any case, you just told me I didn't have certain experiences, but haven't explained why this must be the case.But to our point as I understand it: are you supposing there are no absolute shoulds or oughts? You have never been around children, then, have you. Or apparently around bad people. — tim wood
If you have two things here and two other things there, and you put them together, then you have four things, universally and necessarily so — tim wood
The case is different with shoulds and oughts. There are some things you ought to do - for whatever reason. And that's a first difference. It's a should or an ought for a reason. If that reason does not apply, then neither does the moral constraint or obligation. — tim wood
For example. I claim 2+2=4, always. You say, not so; I have one thing here and two things there, and that's three, not four. Sounds silly, but the confusion in this case lies in not distinguishing between the abstract arithmetic proposition, and the on-the-ground reality. — tim wood
And no matter what the quality of the argument, you might just decide, "The hell with it, I'm not going." And from that people draw the conclusion that because the absolute moral constraint or obligation was not also absolutely compelling in force, that it on that account is not absolute - in any sense. — tim wood
which means it is deontological, and many people are not this, and also objective. So if you think there are absolute morals, you need to show you have a process to demonstrate this isn't just your value, but acutally you know what is objective good.Moral Absolutism is the ethical belief that there are absolute standards against which moral questions can be judged, and that certain actions are right or wrong, regardless of the context of the act.
What I am trying to do here is get you to understand "absolute" in what may be for you a new way. How can something be absolute if it is not always the case that it must necessarily be so? First, look at the language (to make sure you understand it - and in the case of translations, that it is correctly translated(!)). Second, realize that if you do something wrong, it does not mean that, or cause, the right to be no longer right. — tim wood
I am not by any means sure that I'm making an epistemological claim. From you I get it that without care in speech an auditor can almost always find alternative meanings based on alternative understanding of the words used. So, if I say the sum of the interior angles of all Euclidean triangles is 180 degrees, you can then observe that there are non-Euclidean geometries where they don't. Sometimes that's useful; sometimes that's counterproductive; sometimes destructive, and sometimes intended to be destructive.Now that may not be how you decide what is absolute good and bad. I don't know. But what is your way of knowing what it is? What backs up your epistemological claim? — Coben
Morality is a matter of human values. To the extent those values are universal, I guess you could say they're "absolute." But to the extent they are cultural and personal, they are not.
It's still not clear to me why you keep bringing in math. It seemed like you were saying that certain things were simply true in math, period. I pointed out that what you presented as simply true - absolute, universal, objective - were not that. Perhaps this was a tangent on my part. Just doing my best to understand what the point was/seemed to be and point out what would be the flaws if that is what you meant. Even here it seems like you make no attempt to clarity. You tell me that my act might even be intended to be destructive or acts like mine. But then you don't explain how or why or how I misinterpreted your math analogies, if that's what they were.I am not by any means sure that I'm making an epistemological claim. From you I get it that without care in speech an auditor can almost always find alternative meanings based on alternative understanding of the words used. So, if I say the sum of the interior angles of all Euclidean triangles is 180 degrees, you can then observe that there are non-Euclidean geometries where they don't. Sometimes that's useful; sometimes that's counterproductive; sometimes destructive, and sometimes intended to be destructive. — tim wood
That is extremely abstract. Could you apply that to morals in some specific way. If it is meant to apply to morals.The point I am making is that if a thing is so in some regard - and we're not simply mistaken - then with respect to that circumstance, it is absolutely so — tim wood
At this rarified abstract level I agree. People's beliefs do not necessarily change the truth of something. IOW if something is objectively true, then even if someone does not agree that it is, it doesn't change the fact that it is objectively true. However universal means that every has that value. A universal value is one that is held by everyone. By definition. It can even be wrong, but as long as it is held by everyone, it is universal.Which means that the following is confusedDoesn't matter who likes it or doesn't, buys it or doesn't, or how anyone votes or how many votes there are, or how many fallacious arguments are made against. — tim wood
I go back to T Clark, above
Morality is a matter of human values. To the extent those values are universal, I guess you could say they're "absolute." But to the extent they are cultural and personal, they are not. — tim wood
Their might be a value that everyone shares. Perhaps some extremely harsh punishment of someone with no benefits to others. That value would then be universally held. This would not mean it is absolute or objective. It does not mean that those people will necessarily agree on much else or that all or even some conflicting ideas of the good can be resolved.Are you prepared both to claim and defend the claim that there are no universal values? — tim wood
Next, as toThat is extremely abstract.... At this rarified abstract level I agree. — Coben
This identifies morality is being a matter of human values. I take that to mean what matters to humans. After some thought - not necessarily final or conclusive - I think mattering is a sine qua non of morality. If it matters then it falls in some way under morality. If it does not matter, then it's hard to see how it could be a matter of morality. There may be some things that should matter and don't right now. But it seems to me that if they should, then they will, soon enough. Which means that ignorance can confound but not deny morality. And ignorance itself, I'll argue, is in all cases a failure of reason, whether theoretical, practical, or applied. Ultimately, then; i.e., in terms of consequences, ignorance is never exculpatory; may be explanation, but not excuse.Morality is a matter of human values. To the extent those values are universal, I guess you could say they're "absolute." But to the extent they are cultural and personal, they are not.
Kant works through a refinement of the idea of suicide in different lectures. And it's clear that he moves from suicide itself, to what purposes it might properly serve. And he finds a class of such.Kant's categorical imperative is usually expressed in three forms... — tim wood
I'm content to leave this here - you? — tim wood
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