From what I understand there’s a distinction to be drawn between philosophical scholarship (what so-and-so actually said and thought) and interpretation ... — AJJ
The objection being made was that the concept of prime matter is hard to grasp, when on the scholastic interpretation is isn’t, really. — AJJ
In fact there is considerable controversy concerning how to conceive the bottom rung of Aristotle’s hierarchy of matter.
There is no clear distinction between them. What so and so said and thought is an interpretation of what so and so said and thought, unless one simply points to the work of so and so in her own words. But even here there is interpretation involved. — Fooloso4
In any case you are not discussing Aristotle but the scholastic interpretation of Aristotle. — Fooloso4
It is not that the concept is hard to grasp but rather that the concept shows itself to be problematic. If the school men interpreted it in such a way that there is no problem then perhaps they miss something or add something. — Fooloso4
From what I understand there’s a distinction to be drawn between philosophical scholarship (what so-and-so actually said and thought) and interpretation ... — AJJ
Or perhaps their interpretation lends the clearest insight. — AJJ
I guess they thought so, and it sounds good to me. — AJJ
There is, however, a clear distinction between reading Aristotle and reading what other people say about Aristotle. — Fooloso4
Or perhaps their interpretation lends the clearest insight.
— AJJ
That is possible but how do you know it is the clearest insight without reading Aristotle? — Fooloso4
The notion of prime matter is just the notion of something in pure potentiality.... And as noted above, what is purely potential has no actuality at all, and thus does not exist at all.
So matter is simply the potential for there to be a form instantiated in the world, as opposed to being a mere abstraction. — AJJ
That is, that matter, or prime matter - It - does not exist at all. And this is what I have seen represented as Aristotle's idea of matter - except that Aristotle apparently did not have a lot to say about matter, and such views are thus made up - inferred - from what he did say.was that the concept of prime matter is hard to grasp, when on the Scholastic interpretation it isn’t, really. — AJJ
"prime" matter? Is prime matter different from matter? — tim wood
That is, that matter, or prime matter - It - does not exist at all. And this is what I have seen represented as Aristotle's idea of matter - except that Aristotle apparently did not have a lot to say about matter, and such views are thus made up - inferred - from what he did say. — tim wood
Is the Scholastic view similar? In a much as the Scholastics held that universals possessed an extra-mental reality, it seem likely that they probably held that matter existed. — tim wood
Above as well we have the compatibility of The Forms, and form(s). If the forms are of the world, and The Forms are not, but are ideal and perfect, and the world is imperfect and imprecise, then how exactly are they compatible? — tim wood
i was almost going to spare you an opinion, but nah! If the forms on earth, which is what I understand Aristotle's - wait a minute - his forms do not exist. Anyway, assuming the thing in question, as to such existence that it may or may not have, if it exists on earth, is thereby imperfect, imprecise. As such, how could a divine intellect also have it, "in mind?" Keeping in mind that the idea of an imperfect nature is a Greek idea. The Christian idea is that God made nature, and therefore, whatever it is, is perfect in its own way.Sure, but what I don’t understand is why the forms on Aristotle’s view shouldn’t also exist perfectly in the divine intellect, where it seems they must originate. — AJJ
If the divine intellect creates the world then all the forms things have must come from it. — AJJ
is utterly irrelevant.natural biological forms is due to the combined operation of spontaneous genetic mutations and the process of natural selection — charles ferraro
Are Forms and forms thought to be incompatible? Can’t material objects be manifestations of Plato’s Forms, while also having form as an essential metaphysical component as conceived by Aristotle? I don’t know their metaphysics well, but at a glance it seems to me that both accounts must (if they are at all) be true; my considerations being that in material objects matter and form are inseparable, and the forms that matter takes must (since both accounts posit a divine intellect) have existed prior to - and so also be separate from - their instantiations. Maybe this is all obvious, but it’s not clear to me why you’d adopt one view but not the other. — AJJ
Although it does still puzzle me why Aristotle would ground abstractions only in the world when the world is grounded in the active intellect - can you tell me where in particular Aquinas or others wrote about that? — AJJ
It is necessary to postulate a power, belonging to the intellect, to create actually thinkable objects by abstracting ideas from their material conditions. That is why we need to postulate an agent intellect. — Thomas Aquinas and the Early Franciscan School on the Agent Intellect
For Aristotle, these abstract objects are ultimately grounded in concrete particulars, not in a Platonic realm. — Andrew M
Aristotle "immanentized" the Forms. This meant, of course, that there still were Forms; it was just a matter of where [or in what sense ~ WF] they existed. So Aristotle even used one of Plato's terms, eîdos, to mean the abstract universal object within a particular object. This word is more familiar to us in its Latin translation: species. In modern discussion, however, it is usually just called the "form" of the object.
The Aristotelian "form" of an object, however, is not just what an object "looks" like [in other words, not just it's shape ~ wf]. An individual object as an individual object is particular, not universal. The "form" of the object will be the complex of all its abstract features and properties. If the object looks red or looks round or looks ugly, then those features, as abstractions, belong to the "form." The individuality of the object cannot be due to any of those abstractions, which are universals, and so must be due to something else. To Aristotle that was the "matter" of the object. "Matter" confers individuality, "form" universality. Since everything that we can identify about an object, the kind of thing it is, what it is doing, where it is, etc., involves abstract properties, the "form" represents the actuality of an object. — Kelly Ross
“EVERYTHING in the cosmic universe is composed of matter and form. Everything is concrete and individual. Hence the forms of cosmic entities must also be concrete and individual. Now, the process of knowledge is immediately concerned with the separation of form from matter, since a thing is known precisely because its form is received in the knower. But, whatever is received is in the recipient according to the mode of being that the recipient possesses. If, then, the senses are material powers, they receive the forms of objects in a material manner; and if the intellect is an immaterial power, it receives the forms of objects in an immaterial manner. This means that in the case of sense knowledge, the form is still encompassed with the concrete characters which make it particular; and that, in the case of intellectual knowledge, the form is disengaged from all such characters. To understand is to free form completely from matter.
Moreover, if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.
The separation of form from matter requires two stages if the idea is to be elaborated: first, the sensitive stage, wherein the external and internal senses operate upon the material object, accepting its form without matter, but not without the appendages of matter; second the intellectual stage, wherein agent intellect operates upon the phantasmal datum, divesting the form of every character that marks and identifies it as a particular something.
“Abstraction, which is the proper task of active intellect, is essentially a liberating function in which the essence of the sensible object, potentially understandable as it lies beneath its accidents, is liberated from the elements that individualize it and is thus made actually understandable. The product of abstraction is a species of an intelligible order. Now possible intellect is supplied with an adequate stimulus to which it responds by producing a concept.
Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that thinking in general (which includes knowledge as one kind of thinking) cannot be a property of a body; it cannot, as he put it, 'be blended with a body'. This is because in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible.
Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.
….the fact that in thinking, your mind is identical with the form that it thinks, means (for Aristotle and for all Platonists) that since the form 'thought' is detached from matter, 'mind' is immaterial too.
The world isn't grounded in the active intellect for either Aristotle or Aquinas. — Andrew M
So matter is simply the potential for there to be a form instantiated in the world, as opposed to being a mere abstraction. — AJJ
Aristotle's concept of hyle is the principle that correlates with eidos (form) and this can be demonstrated in the way the philosopher described hyle, saying it is that which receives form or definiteness, that which is formed.[5] Aristotle explained that "By hyle I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined."[4] This means that hyle is brought into existence not due to its being its agent or its own actuality but only when form attaches to it [ I would prefer 'is given form']. ...
...
The Latin equivalent of the hyle concept - and later its medieval version - also emerged out of Aristotle's notion. The Greek term's Latin equivalent was silva, which literally meant woodland or forest.[4] However, Latin scholars opted for a word that had technical sense instead of the literal meaning so that it became understood as that of which a thing is made but one that remained a substratum with changed form.[4] The word materia was chosen instead to indicate a meaning not in handicraft but in the passive role that mother (mater) plays in conception.
Beyond that is arguing whether the largest number of angels that can fit on the head of a pin is an even or an odd number. — tim wood
to discuss what Aristotle meant by "matter" is a mug's game, because he did not mean any thing by it! — tim wood
ON the contrary, I think it is quite useful to trace how Aristotelian (and other classical) terms and ideas, like 'hyle', 'ousia', 'esse', and so on, have been translated and interpreted over time. — Wayfarer
So in his Physics, Aristotle wanted to be able to explain what we all observe, and say, that a thing remains being the same thing despite the fact that there are changes to it. Matter is the underlying thing which persists, and does not change when a change occurs, and assuming the reality of matter allows us to say that the same thing persists from one moment to the next, but it changes. — Metaphysician Undercover
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.