I assume however, that even eliminative materialism recognizes consciousness as a concept, referring to our awareness. So, my question is - to what does eliminative materialism ascribe awareness, in what amount, and what physical criteria are involved?
This is what I fail to fully understand. I mean, not just the argument, but the very statement. Is this similar to relationalistic pantheistic position?I believe some eliminative materialists contend that “consciousness” doesn’t even exist, that it is folk psychology. To them, the concept should or will be eliminated in time and with new neuroscientists discoveries. — NOS4A2
I will, thanks. From a brief reading, I am not sure whether they are trying to localize the awareness to physical form or delocalize it, but it is related.But check out “embodied cognition”, which I believe is superseding the computational theory of mind. — NOS4A2
The first is spiritualism, which asserts that the mental states cannot be completely explained physically. — simeonz
In philosophy of mind and consciousness, the explanatory gap is the difficulty that physicalist theories have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel when they are experienced. It is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine. In the 1983 paper in which he first used the term, he used as an example the sentence, "Pain is the firing of C fibers", pointing out that while it might be valid in a physiological sense, it does not help us to understand how pain feels.
t is undeniable that some organisms are subjects of experience. But the question of how it is that these systems are subjects of experience is perplexing. Why is it that when our cognitive systems engage in visual and auditory information-processing, we have visual or auditory experience: the quality of deep blue, the sensation of middle C? How can we explain why there is something it is like to entertain a mental image, or to experience an emotion? It is widely agreed that experience arises from a physical basis, but we have no good explanation of why and how it so arises. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. — David Chalmers
Eliminative materialism sounds like a regurgitation of behaviorism
— T Clark
:up: That’s exactly what it is. — Wayfarer
I believe some eliminative materialists contend that “consciousness” doesn’t even exist, that it is folk psychology. — NOS4A2
Which is such a bizzarre idea. All their conclusions are based on, well, experience. Or, they are based on direct intuition. Either way, since they would still have to experience the intuition and be aware of it, ALL their conclusions are fruit of a poison tree. — Coben
You are saying that the mind is common sense, I suppose. This would be fine if the definition of the term "mind" was technical - as in a collection of empirical facts. But whose facts are those - are they the facts perceived by the very mind that they define?I don't believe in the mind, I experience it and observe its effects in the behavior of myself and other people. — T Clark
You are saying that the mind is common sense, I suppose. This would be fine if the definition of the term "mind" was technical - as in a collection of empirical facts. But whose facts are those - are they the facts perceived by the very mind that they define? — simeonz
I think I probably understand your general sentiment, as a practical matter, but I am unclear about some of the details. Do you mean that the mind is co-extent with any collection of animated brain tissue? If the mind is always incidental with a brain, is it distinct from the brain? What about animal brain, or a brain with a handicap, or an electrical circuit?I think I probably wasn't clear. We know the mind - what it is and how it works - the same way we know other things, by observing the world, in this case, primarily the behavior of other people, including their words. We also know it from the inside, from our own personal experience. Then, those two get combined as we imaginatively come to understand that other people have internal experiences that are similar to ours. — T Clark
I think I probably understand your general sentiment, as a practical matter, but I am unclear about some of the details. Do you mean that the mind is co-extent with any collection of animated brain tissue? If the mind is always incidental with a brain, is it distinct from the brain? What about animal brain, or a brain with a handicap, or an electrical circuit? — simeonz
To say that the mind is distinct from the brain, to me at least, infers that the brain can manifest without a mind, or that the mind can exist separate from its physical embodiment. Otherwise, I feel that they will be simply co-extent.It's clear to me that the mind is different from the brain. — T Clark
That is why I used the term "common-sense" previously. I meant, that albeit privately experienced, the mind is a widely observed phenomenon. But I still struggle to find the scientific value of this statement.I guess I'd say "obvious," although I acknowledge that what's obvious to one person isn't to another. — T Clark
But since the facets are related, you might be talking about picture quality, but mean leaked capacitor. How do you differentiate? Unless you can switch the program broadcast or change the TV. But, for the analogical mind-body case, I think this is the real problem, that it cannot be done.The metaphor I often use is of a television. When I talk about the television device, I talk about LEDs, antennas, and speakers. When I talk about the program I'm watching on the TV, I talk about the sound quality, the colors, the images, and I guess even the basketball game I'm watching. — T Clark
Nothing sounds obvious to me anymore. Epistemologically, that is. :)Does that seem obvious to you? — T Clark
To say that the mind is distinct from the brain, to me at least, infers that the brain can manifest without a mind, or that the mind can exist separate from its physical embodiment. Otherwise, I feel that they will be simply co-extent. — simeonz
That is why I used the term "common-sense" previously. I meant, that albeit privately experienced, the mind is a widely observed phenomenon. But I still struggle to find the scientific value of this statement. — simeonz
But since the facets are related, you might be talking about picture quality, but mean leaked capacitor. How do you differentiate? Unless you can switch the program broadcast or change the TV. But, for the analogical mind-body case, I think this is the real problem, that it cannot be done. — simeonz
My stance is that mental states are identical to physical brain states. — Terrapin Station
I confess this is my omission, but I thought that my general idea was suggested in the spirit of my question. Let me restate it. Do you think that a properly functioning brain, in all its biological aspects, can exist without a mind?Well, clearly the brain can exist without the mind. People die or sink into a permanent vegetative state. The mind is gone, but the brain continues. As for the mind existing without the brain - life cannot exist without chemical processes. Do you think life is just chemistry. Can you tell the difference between chemistry and biology? If not, I doubt you and I will be able to discuss this subject very productively. — T Clark
The problem is, that according to a materialist, the mind is not perceived first hand by itself, but is only attested by the brain. Since the brain does not always attest externalities, but sometimes emotions and intuitions, the mind stops being an observation, but a shared sentiment. (Mind you, I am not defending materialism as a belief necessarily, just its deductive method.)"The mind is a widely observed phenomenon" says everything that needs to be said. Everything is "a widely observed phenomenon." That's how they come to exist for the observers. — T Clark
Ok. But the image is ultimately the result of leds and liquid crystals and capacitors and antennas and electromagnetic processes. The "image quality" is just an aspect of the end result presented on the screen, which is also a facet of the events produced by the underlying mechanisms. The term conceptualizes this aspect, but it does not change the nature of the televising process in substance. An eliminative materialists would argue that there is no image (even less so, image quality) as a separate phenomenon, just a variety of actual events and mechanism, being treated when conceptualized.Sorry - but a leaked capacitor is (I imagine) a piece of metal with goo all over it. Poor color quality is a term applied to an image of something when the color of the image doesn't match the color of the original. They're completely different things. Is an iron bar something different from 10E +24 iron atoms? "Hey, please hand me 10E +24 iron atoms." — T Clark
Let me restate my question. Do you think that a properly functioning brain, in all its biological aspects, can exist without manifesting a mind?Well, clearly the brain can exist without the mind. People die or sink into a permanent vegetative state. The mind is gone, but the brain continues. As for the mind existing without the brain - life cannot exist without chemical processes. Do you think life is just chemistry. Can you tell the difference between chemistry and biology? If not, I doubt you and I will be able to discuss this subject very productively. — T Clark
Yes, but if I were a materialist, I would claim that the the mind is not perceived first hand (such as by itself), but is merely attested to by the brain. And the brain does not always attest to externalities. Sometimes it purports intuitions and emotions. A materialist would then argue, the mind is simply a shared sentiment or concept."The mind is a widely observed phenomenon" says everything that needs to be said. Everything is "a widely observed phenomenon." That's how they come to exist for the observers. — T Clark
Yes, but the TV is still a system of leds, liquid crystals, capacitors, antennas, electromagnetic events, etc. The image is an aspect of the end result as seen by the viewer, which is one facet produced by underlying processes. A materialist would argue that the "image quality" is just term or conceptualization. That there is no "image quality", but just a state of the screen crystals and a number of preceding steps that evoke it.Sorry - but a leaked capacitor is (I imagine) a piece of metal with goo all over it. Poor color quality is a term applied to an image of something when the color of the image doesn't match the color of the original. They're completely different things. Is an iron bar something different from 10E +24 iron atoms? "Hey, please hand me 10E +24 iron atoms." — T Clark
Let me restate my question. Do you think that a properly functioning brain, in all its biological aspects, can exist without manifesting a mind? — simeonz
Yes, but if I were a materialist, I would claim that the the mind is not perceived first hand (such as by itself), but is merely attested to by the brain. And the brain does not always attest to externalities. Sometimes it purports intuitions and emotions. A materialist would then argue, the mind is simply a shared sentiment or concept. — simeonz
Yes, but the TV is still a system of leds, liquid crystals, capacitors, antennas, electromagnetic events, etc. The image is an aspect of the end result as seen by the viewer, which is one facet produced by underlying processes. — simeonz
So, the light from my flashlight is identical with the flashlight. — T Clark
I think, actually, they are nuts. Not on everything, but on this part.I think they mean something different when they say "exist" than I, and apparently you, do. — T Clark
Eliminative materialism sounds like a regurgitation of behaviorism
— T Clark
:up: That’s exactly what it is.
— Wayfarer
... hold noses... access handkerchiefs, gas masks... — bongo fury
Then what would differentiate eliminative materialists from pantheists or panpsychists, aside from sentiment? — simeonz
In particular, does materialism deny awareness and self-awareness as a continuous spectrum for systems of different complexity? — simeonz
Would they consider an ecosystem or a social system to be aware or have sense experience, at least in principle similar to ours? — simeonz
Or to put in simpler terms, assuming the position of eliminative materialism, how would they precisely differentiate our sense experience from any other abstract system, simpler or more complex? — simeonz
Does ontological eliminative materialism ascribe awareness to everything or nothing? — simeonz
Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of them?
I am not proficient with the pantheist theories enough to speak of them. But I cannot imagine that any mature philosophy would ascribe the property of mindfulness/awareness to a kilogram of matter in itself. A heavy lifeless planet shouldn't be more intelligent than a significantly lighter human being. I presume, one would rather ascribe to matter the potentiality of consciousness, which would then manifest to a different degree in layers through emergent structures. For example, the ability to capture information, perform analytical processing, and produce anticipatory responses, could be used as criteria for the realization of this potentiality. I don't understand, how an eliminative materialist would differ from a pantheist with respect to any such criterion.Well, a pantheist or panpsychist believes that all things have mental activity while an eliminative materialist might believe that only things and beings capable of decision making and autonomous action has the capacity to experience things. — TheHedoMinimalist
That is completely fair. But then they must, at least in principle (even if currently unknown) hypothesize a function that maps states of matter to degrees of being aware/conscious/sentient, a set of states, which are considered non-sentient, and a boundary between the two. There is nothing incoherent in that, but it poses interesting questions.They do not deny that it is a spectrum but they don’t have to think that it begins on a molecular level or that all objects are part of the spectrum. — TheHedoMinimalist
I would like to illustrate how I think societies and ecosystems are similar with respect to consciousness using a thought experiment. Suppose that we use a person for each neuron in the brain, and give each person orders to interact with the rest like a neuron would, but using some pre-arranged conventional means of human interaction. We instruct each individual what corresponding neuron state it has initially, such that it matches the one from a living brain (taken at some time instant). Then we also feed the peripheral signals to the central nervous system, as the real brain would have experienced them. At this point, would the people collectively manifest the consciousness of the original brain, as a whole, the way it would have manifested inside the person? Or to put differently, do eliminative materialists allow for consciousness nesting?Probably not because ecosystems and social systems are not unified systems in the same way that an organism is. An organism is a unified embodied system which is composed of parts called organ systems which are composed of smaller parts called organs. All these organs work very closely together to maintain the organism. The same cannot be said of social systems. People who are part of a social system sometimes contribute to it and sometimes they don’t and they don’t make their entire existence about the social system. The very concept of a social system or ecosystem is a lot more vague than the concept of an organism. — TheHedoMinimalist
The term "abstract" was probably inaccurate, but the idea was to be able to describe all types of conscious structures not by exhaustion, but using a principle. In other words - not to name the human condition as conscious, or the animal one, but to use a rule that incorporates structures of various scales and appearances.Or to put in simpler terms, assuming the position of eliminative materialism, how would they precisely differentiate our sense experience from any other abstract system, simpler or more complex? — simeonz
I don’t fully understand this question. What do you mean by an abstract system? — TheHedoMinimalist
I know the question wasn't posed to me. But albeit not focusing on AI, I actually am a software engineer by trade, so I thought I could interject. :)Doesn't ascribing consciousness to any machines with "software" set the bar a bit low? Are you at all impressed by Searle's Chinese Room objection? — bongo fury
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