For its part, science requires that self-consciousness shall have elevated itself into this ether in order to be able to live with science and to live in science, and, for that matter, to be able to live at all. — Hegel/Pinkard
or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality. — Hegel/Pinkard
This coming-to-be of science itself, or, of knowing, is what is presented in this phenomenology of spirit as the first part of the system of science. Knowing, as it is at first, or, as immediate spirit, is devoid of spirit, is sensuous consciousness. In order to become genuine knowing, or, in order to beget the element of science which is its pure concept, immediate spirit must laboriously travel down a long path. — Hegel/Pinkard
In any case, it is something very different from the inspiration which begins immediately, like a shot from a pistol, with absolute knowledge, and which has already finished with all the other standpoints simply by declaring that it will take no notice of them." — Hegel/Pinkard
I brought up Kierkegaard since he emphasized the centrality of the Single Individual. In the passage I quoted by Hegel, I wonder if the statement can be be seen as a shared point of departure, a moment of agreement before struggling with each other. — Valentinus
So, in addition to the specific arguments made in regards to what must exist, there has been introduced a psychological register where some models fit better than others. The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody. — Valentinus
It is this almost religious sense of the importance of Western, European or German philosophy in our historical development or culture that I take exception to. So very narrow...and it is not available to all, even if it were so desired. — Amity
Your statement has been articulated in many ways. Hegel, himself, said many things that compared his "culture" in a better light than others. — Valentinus
But, as a matter of intellectual inheritance, his work paved the way for you to express your objection. — Valentinus
Yes it does. Sarcasm too. Especially when there are difficulties in communicating ideas from one brain to another in writing. And through the lens of bias.Irony abounds. — Valentinus
The "long path" reference in Hegel's text is an acknowledgment that experience is not a simple thing given to anybody. — Valentinus
Is it science in Hegel's sense of the term, that is, knowledge of the whole?
— Fooloso4
I don't know. I doubt it is exactly Hegel's approach. Goethe wasn't such a brilliant, mad philosopher.
It would be interesting to see how they compare. — Amity
Yes it does. Sarcasm too. Especially when there are difficulties in communicating ideas from one brain to another in writing. And through the lens of bias. — Amity
"However, the task of leading the individual from his culturally immature standpoint up to and into science had to be taken in its universal sense, and the universal individual, the world spirit, had to be examined in the development of its cultural education. – With regard to the relationship between these two, each moment, as it achieves concrete form and its own figuration, appears in the universal individual.
However, the particular individual is an incomplete spirit, a concrete shape whose entire existence falls into one determinateness and in which the other features are only present as intermingled traits.
In any spirit that stands higher than another, the lower concrete existence has descended to the status of an insignificant moment; what was formerly at stake is now only a trace; its shape has been covered over and has become a simple shading of itself.
The individual whose substance is spirit standing at the higher level runs through these past forms in the way that a person who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory studies which he has long ago internalized in order to make their content current before him; he calls them to mind without having his interest linger upon them. In that way, each individual spirit also runs through the culturally formative stages of the universal spirit, but it runs through them as shapes which spirit has already laid aside, as stages on a path that has been worked out and leveled out in the same way that we see fragments of knowing, which in earlier ages occupied men of mature minds, now sink to the level of exercises, and even to that of games for children.
In this pedagogical progression, we recognize the history of the cultural formation of the world sketched in silhouette. This past existence has already become an acquired possession of the universal spirit; it constitutes the substance of the individual, or, his inorganic nature. – In this respect, the cultural formation of the individual regarded from his own point of view consists in his acquiring all of this which is available, in his living off that inorganic nature and in his taking possession of it for himself. Likewise, this is nothing but the universal spirit itself, or, substance giving itself its self-consciousness, or, its coming-to-be and its reflective turn into itself. — Hegel/Pinkard
I had a teacher who once asked me how I could separate using tools made by others from one's I forged myself. I used to think the question was about authenticity versus imitation. An Hegelian point of view says to me that the new is both.
If I use something made before for my purposes, that is a new "determination." If I organize elements in a way that gets other people to start talking in a new way, that too, is a kind of new "determination."
The "Concept" beyond the boundaries of an individual are developed by both kinds of change. It introduces a Z axis where previously there was only X and Y. — Valentinus
Pure self-knowing in absolute otherness, this ether as such, is the very ground and soil of science, or, knowing in its universality.
The beginning of philosophy presupposes or demands that consciousness is situated in this element.
However, this element itself has its culmination and its transparency only through the movement of its coming-to-be. It is pure spirituality, or, the universal in the mode of simple immediacy. It is pure spirituality, or, the universal in the mode of simple immediacy.
Because it is the immediacy of spirit, because it is the substance of spirit, it is transfigured essentiality, reflection that is itself simple, or, is immediacy; it is being that is a reflective turn into itself.
For its part, science requires that self-consciousness shall have elevated itself into this ether in order to be able to live with science and to live in science, and, for that matter, to be able to live at all.
Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being.
However much the standpoint of consciousness, which is to say, the standpoint of knowing objective things to be opposed to itself and knowing itself to be opposed to them, counts as the other to science – the other, in which consciousness is at one with itself, counts instead as the loss of spirit – still, in comparison, the element of science possesses for consciousness an other-worldly remoteness in which consciousness is no longer in possession of itself.
Each of these two parts seems to the other to be an inversion of the truth.
For the natural consciousness to entrust itself immediately to science would be to make an attempt, induced by it knows not what, to walk upside down all of a sudden. The compulsion to accept this unaccustomed attitude and to transport oneself in that way would be, so it would seem, a violence imposed on it with neither any advance preparation nor with any necessity.
Science may be in its own self what it will, but in its relationship to immediate self-consciousness, it presents itself as an inversion of the latter, or, because immediate self-consciousness is the principle of actuality, by immediate self-consciousness existing for itself outside of science, science takes the form of non-actuality.
Accordingly, science has to unite that element with itself or instead to show both that such an element belongs to itself and how it belongs to it. Lacking actuality, science is the in-itself, the purpose, which at the start is still something inner, at first not as spirit but only as spiritual substance. It has to express itself and become for itself, and this means nothing else than that it has to posit self-consciousness as being at one with itself.
Conversely, the individual has the right to demand that science provide him at least with the ladder to reach this standpoint. The individual’s right is based on his absolute self-sufficiency, which he knows he possesses in every shape of his knowing, for in every shape, whether recognized by science or not, and no matter what the content might be, the individual is at the same time the absolute form, or, he has immediate self-certainty; and, if one were to prefer this expression, he thereby has an unconditioned being — Hegel/Pinkard
The individual in his conscious awareness is not aware of his awareness but of what is given immediately in awareness. His absolute self-sufficiency, his being unconditioned, his immediate self-certainty of being, requires for its self-sufficiency self-knowledge. He must be both knower and known. — Fooloso4
Both Plato and Aristotle say that philosophy begins in wonder (‘thaumazein’) (Theaetetus 155c-d; Metaphysics 982b). There can be no wonder without a sense of the otherness of what engenders wonder. It is what lies beyond or outside of what can be understood or taken within consciousness, what remains a mystery. — Fooloso4
In that the claim is that it is philosophy alone which is supposed to lead to increased understanding of self via others. — Amity
If this is the case, then it should provide the means, the ladder - the structure of reason - to facilitate this process. The path to knowledge or science. — Amity
... curious to know more ... — Amity
The image of the ladder reminds me of the Wittgenstein thread you participated in.
In that case, wasn't the ladder kicked away ? Do you think that it might be a different kind of ladder ?
I can't remember the details. — Amity
29.
Science of this culturally educative movement is the detail and the necessity of its shaping, as what has been diminished into a moment and a possession of spirit. The aim is spirit’s insight into what knowing is.
Impatience demands the impossible, which is to say, to achieve the end without the means. On the one hand, the length of the path has to be endured, for each moment is necessary – but on the other hand, one must linger at every stage on the way, for each stage is itself an entire individual shape, and it is viewed absolutely only insofar as its determinateness is viewed as a whole, or, as concrete, or, insofar as the whole is viewed in terms of the distinctiveness of this determination. – Both because the substance of the individual, the world spirit, has possessed the patience to pass through these forms over a long stretch of time and to take upon itself the prodigious labor of world history, and because it could not have reached consciousness about itself in any lesser way, the individual spirit itself cannot comprehend its own substance with anything less.
At the same time, it has less trouble in doing so because in the meantime it has accomplished this in itself – the content is already actuality erased to possibility, immediacy which has been mastered. That content, which is already what has been thought, is the possession of individuality. It is no longer existence which is to be converted into being-in-itself. Rather, it is just the in-itself which is to be converted into the form of being-for-itself. The way this is done is now to be more precisely determined.
30.
In this movement, although the individual is spared the sublation of existence, what still remains is the representation of and the familiarity with the forms.
The existence taken back into the substance is through that first negation at first only immediately transferred into the element of self. The element thus still has the same character of uncomprehended immediacy, or, of unmoved indifference as existence itself, or, it has only passed over into representational thought. -As a result, it is at the same time familiar to us, or, it is the sort of thing that spirit has finished with, in which spirit has no more activity, and, as a result, in which spirit has no further interest. However much the activity, which is finished with existence, is itself the immediate, or, however much it is the existing mediation and thereby the movement only of the particular spirit which is not comprehending itself, still in contrast knowing is directed against the representational thought which has come about through this immediacy, is directed against this familiarity, and it is thus the doing of the universal self and the interest of thinking — Hegel/Pinkard
However much the activity, which is finished with existence,is itself the immediate, or, however much it is the existing mediation and thereby the movement only of the particular spirit which is not comprehending itself, still in contrast knowing is directed against the representational thought which has come about through this immediacy, is directed against this familiarity, and it is thus the doing of the universal self and the interest of thinking — Hegel/Pinkard
Experience or knowledge? My preference and instinct is to not wrestle with this aspect at the moment, but to see what comes.component of individual experience. — Valentinus
Kant's "knowledge," then, is based in perception. Hegel places it in reason; he seems to take perception uncritically and for granted. That is, there is what we know and how we know it - which for Hegel seems to happen after perception, while for Kant it's all in one batter, baked together. — tim wood
background of negation and exclusion being the default — Valentinus
I am not sure how to read that against the background of negation and exclusion being the default position — Valentinus
the logic of both the stuff in time combined with the idea of a dialectic as producing results through a process suggests that "exclusion" is a very important activity in what Hegel has in mind. — Valentinus
The inclusion part only gets recognition after the conflict is over. — Valentinus
The individual whose substance is spirit standing at the higher level runs through these past forms in the way that a person who takes up a higher science goes through those preparatory studies which he has long ago internalized in order to make their content current before him; he calls them to mind without having his interest linger upon them. In that way, each individual spirit also runs through the culturally formative stages of the universal spirit, but it runs through them as shapes which spirit has already laid aside, as stages on a path that has been worked out and leveled out in the same way that we see fragments of knowing, which in earlier ages occupied men of mature minds, now sink to the level of exercises, and even to that of games for children. — Hegel/Pinkard
Hegel now relates human beings to the process of knowledge. The individual, who participates in the knowing process, does so from both individual and universal perspectives. What was earlier central, as the current view of knowledge, afterward subsists as a mere trace (Spur), like Jacques Derrida's own view of the trace (la trace ).18 We cannot separate prior from present views of knowledge. The process of education consists in making our own what was already known by our predecessors, "a past existence" now described as "the already acquired property of universal Spirit which constitutes the substance of the individual" (§28, 16). Human history records the immense efforts of human beings over a period of many centuries to know the world and themselves through the elaboration of a satisfactory view of knowledge. "The goal is Spirit's insight into what knowing is" (§29 , 17).
In the course of human history, mere existence is transformed into a series of shapes. To transform experience into knowledge, we must consider the movement of shapes preserved in memory, which must be represented and with which we must become acquainted. Through representation, we arrive at what is familiar to us, but which, to become scientific knowledge, requires the more refined cognitive "activity of the universal self, the concern of thinking" (§30, 18). — Tom Rockmore
With these paragraphs, Hegel draws in sharp relief the comparison of individual experience to what makes that possible. — Valentinus
This "universal self" is central to what is being presented but is very hard for me to understand. — Valentinus
Universality of Self-Consciousness.
38. The universal self-consciousness is the intuition of itself, not as a special existence distinct from others, but an intuition of the self-existent universal self. Thus it recognises itself and the other self-consciousness in itself, and is in turn recognised by them.
39. Self-consciousness is, according to this its essential universality, only real in so far as it knows its echo (and reflection) in another (I know that another knows me as itself), and as pure spiritual universality (belonging to the family, the native land, &c.) knows itself as essential self. (This self-consciousness is the basis of all virtues, of love, honour, friendship, bravery, all self-sacrifice, all fame, &c.)
Experience or knowledge? My preference and instinct is to not wrestle with this aspect at the moment, but to see what comes.
And that it has got to be possible to re-say Hegel in more accessible language - to be striven for. And gained, though perhaps through successive approximations. — tim wood
EXPERIENCE ( Erfahrung). In the Phenomenology, experience refers to the experience of consciousness on its way to Science. It does not have the usual implication of restriction to the sensory but rather hinges on thought; so it does not mean for Hegel what it means for the emliricists or for Kant. Hegel originally planned to give Phenomenology the title 'Science of the Experience of Consciousness'. — Gardner
CONSCIOUSNESS ( Bewusstsein). Note that Hegel sometimes uses consciousness as a generic term for cognitive awareness, of which self-consciousness is one species; and sometimes as a species of consciousness in the generic sense, where it contrasts with self-consciousness. — Gardner
SCIENCE (Wissenschaft). In Hegel, Science refers not to natural science but to philosophical knowledge, which must be in a systematic, articulate form. Thus it refers to his own philosophy. — Gardner
Science is the in-itself but must become for itself, that is, it must move from self-consciousness as being something inner, by which substance is other or object to self-consciousness, to self-consciousness being for itself, the whole as the union of substance and subject. Here spirit is no longer substance, that is, object of consciousness but the actualization of spirit, as in itself and for itself; not something that is mine or particular, or even as universal, but as absolute, the identity of difference, one with itself. — Fooloso4
what I am still struggling with the concept of absolute otherness. It seems to be a contradiction in terms. What is other is so relative to something, but if relative then it is not absolute. — Fooloso4
ABSOLUTE adj.,n. (absolute, das Absolute). Complete, self-contained, all-encompassing. Per Inwood, the Absolute 'is not something underlying the phenomenal world, but the conceptual system embedded in it'.
FOR ITSELF (fur sich). Reflective, explicit, self-comprehending, fully developed. Contrasts with: in itself, in-and-for-itself.
IN ITSELF (an sich). Merely potential or implicit...Something is 'in itself' when it is considered separately from other things, and ( in the case of a form of consciousness) when it is unreflective. That is why, for Hegel, the in itself is mere potentiality: actuality requires determination, negation, relations with other things. Note that a thing may be 'in itself for us'...an expression Hegel uses often: this just means that we are considering it as it is separate from other things. Contrasts with: for itself, and in-and-for-itself.
IN-AND-FOR-ITSELF (an und fur sich). Completely developed; both at home with itself, and finding itself in the other. It contrasts with mere being in itself and being for itself. Being in-and-for-itself is the condition of the Absolute, God, Spirit actualised. — Gardner
Absolute otherness must be the otherness of the whole within itself as the condition for the whole's self-knowledge. The circle of self-knowledge plays out on the levels of the individual, the culture, and the whole. The first two are limited wholes, the last the whole of wholes. — Fooloso4
Well, the logic of both the stuff in time combined with the idea of a dialectic as producing results through a process suggests that "exclusion" is a very important activity in what Hegel has in mind.
The inclusion part only gets recognition after the conflict is over.
Or put another way, there is factor in play that Kant was not able to locate. And Hegel tried to. — Valentinus
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