My bolds. I had read previously that 'mother' and 'matter' were etymologically related but never knew how. — Wayfarer
Another point: that Aristotelian dualism comprised 'matter and form', not the Cartesian 'matter and mind'. — Wayfarer
I don’t understand the above though. Since matter isn’t composite, doesn’t that mean the same matter underlies every object? In which case the only way to distinguish between objects is by their forms; but why then do individual objects remain the same objects as their forms change? — AJJ
I understand matter as the continuity of time itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle assumed "matter" as the principle of continuity of existence. Ultimately, it accounts for the fact that the world cannot be randomly different from one moment to the next. — Metaphysician Undercover
Therefore, to discuss what Aristotle meant by "matter" is a mug's game, because he did not mean any thing by it!
— tim wood
But in the second paragraph you shared he explicitly says what he means by it; Augustine and Aquinas appear to have gotten it right. — AJJ
Stanford.edu: "By “matter” I mean that which in itself is not called a substance nor a quantity nor anything else by which being is categorized. For it is something of which each of these things is predicated, whose being is different from each of its predicates (for the others are predicated of substance, and substance is predicated of matter). Therefore this last is in itself neither substance nor quantity nor anything else. Nor is it the denials of any of these; for even denials belong to things accidentally. (1029a20–26) — tim wood
In other words: pure potentiality. — AJJ
Except that for "useful" I'd say interesting. Not to deny use, but rather to acknowledge that its use was particular to certain ideas and certain times, the way a touch-hole is particular to muzzle-loaded cannon, but itself of no use in modern artillery, the mention of which in modern context must be "quaint" - meaning odd - at best.I think it is quite useful to trace how Aristotelian (and other classical) terms and ideas, like 'hyle', 'ousia', 'esse', and so on, have been translated and interpreted over time. — Wayfarer
In other words: pure potentiality.
— AJJ
Whose words? — tim wood
The traditional interpretation of Aristotle, which goes back as far as Augustine (De Genesi contra Manichaeos i 5–7) and Simplicius (On Aristotle’s Physics i 7), and is accepted by Aquinas (De Principiis Naturae §13), holds that Aristotle believes in something called “prime matter”, which is the matter of the elements, where each element is, then, a compound of this matter and a form. This prime matter is usually described as pure potentiality
And what is the being of "pure potentiality" if you trouble to make sure that it has no being? — tim wood
Well, no. This sounds good, but in the next paragraphit’s rather the potential to be. — AJJ
(Stanford.edu) Nor is it the denials of any of these; for even denials belong to things accidentally. — tim wood
But here I think you've got it, and said it shortest and best!Or I guess that it has no actuality is the better way to put it. — AJJ
it’s rather the potential to be.
— AJJ
Well, no. This sounds good, but in the next paragraph
(Stanford.edu) Nor is it the denials of any of these; for even denials belong to things accidentally.
— tim wood — tim wood
Or I guess that it has no actuality is the better way to put it.
— AJJ
But here I think you've got it, and said it shortest and best! — tim wood
The quotes in this post are all exactly about that, and, I must confess, make perfect sense to me. — Wayfarer
The individuality of the object cannot be due to any of those abstractions, which are universals, and so must be due to something else. To Aristotle that was the "matter" of the object. "Matter" confers individuality, "form" universality. — Kelly Ross
I guess I don’t see why it does account for that; if matter is pure potentiality then it can be anything from one moment to the next. — AJJ
So this is where I like Platonism: the notion that there is an organising principle (Soul), which fashions the world after the Forms. That way it seems an object remains the same object throughout changes so long as it’s participating in the same Forms. — AJJ
What is it he says explicitly matter is? — tim wood
However, we observe that there is actuality, so it is impossible that there ever was pure potentiality. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem with the theory of participation, which Plato uncovered, and becomes evident from The Republic on, into his later work, is that the thing which is participated in is passive, as the thing participating is active. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle actually distinguishes two primary senses of "form", the form which we grasp, the universal, or the essence of the thing, and the form of the particular. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle actually distinguishes two primary senses of "form", the form which we grasp, the universal, or the essence of the thing, and the form of the particular. The form of the particular includes all the accidentals, which are left out from the essence. We do not grasp the entirety of the thing's form. So it is not matter which confers individuality, it is form, but it is the property of a material thing, to be an individual. — Metaphysician Undercover
Besides, whether formless matter ever was doesn’t change the fact that pure potentiality is the what prime matter is conceptualised as; and being so means it must be whatever is actualising it that prevents the world from being drastically different from one moment to the next, which is what I was quibbling about. — AJJ
That’s fine. From reading a bit about Plotinus I take participation to mean being fashioned by Soul in imitation of whatever Forms. — AJJ
Those quotes I referred to make a very clear point: the material senses (eyes, ears) perceive the particular being, the intellect perceives the form. The material thing must always, of necessity, be apart from us - in modern terms, an object to us, something outside of us. But 'the form' is known directly by nous, as the form is basically an idea, not a thing. That is the 'rational intellect' in operation. — Wayfarer
The form is 'the type of thing it is'. — Wayfarer
My thought is that there is no 'form of the particular' because 'forms' by definition are *not* particular but universal. Read this passage again: 'The proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized; the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized.' And 'a particular being' is precisely a combination of accidents and universals, of (individualised) matter and (universal) form. Hence, hylomorphic, matter-form, dualism. — Wayfarer
The senses, and the intellect are both powers of the soul. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point though, is that it is impossible to conceptualize something which is logically impossible. You can say it "prime matter", but you cannot conceptualize it. — Metaphysician Undercover
I believe Plotinus uses a system of "emanation", and some other Neo-Platonists refer to a "procession". But this is a participation of Forms, strictly, and I don't think material existence is even necessitated in Plotinus' system. — Metaphysician Undercover
What is it he says explicitly matter is?
— tim wood
Is this a trick question? The whatness of a thing is the thing's form. Matter is distinct from form. So it makes not sense to ask "what is matter", because asking "what", is asking for a form. If someone tried to tell you what matter is, they'd be handing you a form, saying "this is matter". — Metaphysician Undercover
↪Fooloso4 What do you think? — Wayfarer
Nope. One is material, the other intellectual. Otherwise, why is it ‘dualism’? And why doesn’t the soul simply die with the body? — Wayfarer
I guess I just don’t see why conceiving of prime matter as pure potentiality is problematic. The concept seems fairly straightforward to me; I mean whatever exists materially must have the potential to do so, right? So that potential is prime matter. — AJJ
Plotinus has it that the One, being beyond the constraint of ignorance, creates freely and not of some necessity beyond its control; an important distinction I guess, although it seems to me it amounts to the same thing - since to not create would presumably then be an error made in ignorance, and so not free, and so impossible. — AJJ
And btw, the "what" referred to what Aristotle says about matter. It's right there above: "What is it he says...? So the question stands: what does he say about it? — tim wood
Now I make a claim about Aristotle. He was operating with wrong presuppositions... — tim wood
As a matter of the history of ideas, his conclusions are interesting. But they're not modern science. As noted above, his "matter" is that which not only isn't, but isn't even an isn't, and cannot even be asked about. it's a plug-placeholder for a problem that Aristotle encountered in giving an account that he did not solve and that he knew perfectly well that he did not solve. — tim wood
I’ve been confusing terms - I thought the active intellect was another way of describing the unmoved mover. — AJJ
So it seems to me on Aristotle’s view that universals must be ultimately grounded in the unmoved mover, rather, which is why I don’t fully understand the rejection of Plato’s Forms. — AJJ
My own view is that the unmoved mover should be understood in terms of Aristotle's hylomorphism and naturalism and not in Platonic terms. — Andrew M
I think the question would have to be asked, then, why Aristotelian philosophy is not nominalist. Because nominalism denies that 'forms' or 'types' have any reality outside the things which instantiate them; — Wayfarer
Pure potential would be infinite, and this is what is impossible to conceive of as being real. It can't be real, because as I said this would mean that at this time, when there was infinite potential there would be nothing actual. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle was a student of Plato, he was not educated in modern naturalism. — Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle's immanent realism means his epistemology is based on the study of things that exist or happen in the world, and rises to knowledge of the universal, whereas for Plato epistemology begins with knowledge of universal Forms (or ideas) and descends to knowledge of particular imitations of these. — Aristotle - Wikipedia
My own view is that the unmoved mover should be understood in terms of Aristotle's hylomorphism and naturalism and not in Platonic terms. That would be consistent with his rejection of Plato's forms. — Andrew M
Aristotle's immanent realism means his epistemology is based on the study of things that exist or happen in the world, and rises to knowledge of the universal, whereas for Plato epistemology begins with knowledge of universal Forms (or ideas) and descends to knowledge of particular imitations of these. — Aristotle - Wikipedia
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