That was one part, that he is making statements about my perception. But really the main point I am making is he is making statements about OR. He told me we can't know OR only AR, yet he tells me what OR must be like, since he describes me. I am a part of OR, yet he tells me what I can know - not just me, I simplified it. And I am quite sure that the reason he thinks he knows this is because he has a model of OR - a perceiving self interacting with sense impressions and beyond this perceiving self a reality we do not perceive. That is a model of OR. Not just a model of AR. He uses that model of OR to tell me that I only know AR. I think that's a contradiction. He could make this less contradictory is he said 'It seems like you couldn't know....' But even that is a claim. That there is a seeming. That this applies to everyone. That other seemings, like that one is in contact with OR, are wrong seemings and this seeming is more likely to be true about the OR.The Subject in the subject-object relation is necessarily private. Is that what you’re saying? I don’t think he would disagree with this, but you are also saying there is another kind of knowledge, viz. self knowledge. Right? — Noah Te Stroete
Let me assume you mean that the OR is consistant in the sense that I should be like him, my perception is like his. If that assumption is not correct, let me know. — Coben
You told me a fact about me. — Coben
I said that a number of times to Noah. That it wasn't just about me, or just my perception. That is was a model of reality in general.It's not all about you. :wink: I told you a fact about the real world. — Pattern-chaser
But anyone reading your posts would think you think you can approach knowledge of OR. In fact, even this quote is an example of it.The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,
Let me quote him referring to scientists....Forgive me, but I think you’re being pedantic. One cannot “know” things in themselves (OR) but still have a model of OR from AR. You might call that a contradiction. I call it two types of “knowing”. One is modeled socially (OR), but what is known is really AR. — Noah Te Stroete
We have no way of knowing if it is OR. If we have no way of knowing, then we cannot decide which models are likely and which are less likely.No, they're dealing with AR, which could be objective reality, but we have no way of knowing
If that is the case how can we have models of it? How can he?The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,
So presumably his model is subjective, but I am not sure that is meaningful, and then you'd think it would be heavily qualified. Like 'the following model seems to fit my experience and I'm guessing other people's.' — Coben
That's easily sorted out.Maybe. Or maybe he was trying to work things out as he was going. — Noah Te Stroete
Anyway, I think his model is really inter-subjective in that people seem to agree on science which deals with sense data as well as theories explaining sense data. — Noah Te Stroete
I think that's a very hard position to defend, because he will need to show why science can't reach OR and this will require him to explain the nature of OR and scientists to show the latter cannot approach the former. Fruit of the poisoned tree and all that.The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,
I think that's a very hard position to defend, because he will need to show why science can't reach OR and this will require him to explain the nature of OR and scientists to show the latter cannot approach the former. Fruit of the poisoned tree and all that. — Coben
I just realized that intersubjective doesn't work, because most people experience their model that they can know things about objective reality as working for them. — Coben
What is meaningful? — fishfry
Meaningful may not be the best word but in the context of philosophy, meaningful discussions use clear terms and the people have a common understanding of the usage of words. — Wittgenstein
The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,
But anyone reading your posts would think you think you can approach knowledge of OR. In fact, even this quote is an example of it. — Coben
I would say scientists do not agree in the least that they are merely drawing conclusions about sense data, nor would they think that the scope of science is related to that. He disagrees, I get that. And if someone was saying to him Science paints every increasing accurate pictures of objective reality, he has a case to be made. But that's a different situation.
Here he is saying that one cannot know, one has no way of knowing and.....
The nature of Objective Reality is not something science can even approach,
I think that's a very hard position to defend, because he will need to show why science can't reach OR and this will require him to explain the nature of OR and scientists to show the latter cannot approach the former. Fruit of the poisoned tree and all that. — Coben
Science is fundamentally knowledge of what's what, of objective reality if you will. — T Clark
nothing I've read indicates Schopenhauer read Lao Tzu. — T Clark
For example many ethical systems include either in practice or openly the idea that greatness exempts one from the necessity of this axiom. — Coben
Postulate 5 in Euclidian geometry about angles at the intersection of lines or about parallel lines never crossing, is an assumption, now, and not really an axiom, any more, since non-Euclidian geomtries work just peachy while contradicting this one. — Coben
The parallel postulate is more a stipulation than an axiom. Parallel straight lines are defined as being non-convergent. Non-Euclidean geometries do not "contradict" Euclidean geometry; they are contexts in which the axioms of Euclidean geometry simply do not apply. — Janus
As to causation; it is axiomatic just because events cannot be understood non-causally. — Janus
On the other hand, I don't agree with this. Or am I being inconsistent? Maybe knowing causes is part of the definition of "understanding." Now I'm confused. — T Clark
The idea of ontological indeterminacy is confusing. I'm not a determinist and can accept that nature is, or at least may be, at bottom indeterministic, but I have no clear idea what that would means, beyond saying that microscopic probabilities average out to produce macroscopic causal determinations. — Janus
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