It may or may not be relevant, depending on your angle here, but from a physics standpoint, processes do not recognize an absolute measure of time. Real time is not a concept for the current theories.It’s kinda hard to imagine such slow responses would be influenced by mental states. Unless, the being experiences time really fast. But, how would experience time fast with such a slow brain. Having a slow brain doesn’t seem to make time go fast. So, I think it’s more plausible to think that the being is simply not conscious. — TheHedoMinimalist
If you ran into one, do you think you would owe it an apology? — Wayfarer
I believe that you are claiming some ontological basis for placing human beings (or at least human organisms) in a distinct category here. There are physical hypotheses for this, e.g. the quantum mind. Or it could be a transcendental assumption, which is generally fine, but speaking in the context of my original question, this would not be acceptable for an eliminative materialist.Do we hope that this society replaces its vague binary (automotive/non-automotive) with an unbounded spectrum, and stops worrying about whether automotivity is achieved in any particular vehicle that it builds, because everything is guaranteed automotive in some degree? — bongo fury
Now, I could not contend whether, if the environment operates at a normal pace, but the peripheral or central nervous systems slow down, the subject might feel being in a haze or slowing. However, if the environment stimuli slowed down together with the entire nervous system, I do not see how the subject would notice any difference. And in my thought experiment, the stimuli are artificially slowed down in their arrival to the brain - as if reality slows down together with the cognitive and perceptual functions. — simeonz
You know his propositions better, but isn't he implying that we are self-aware by construction, and not intrinsically?But he doesn't, really. He says we appear to be subjects, but the appearance of subjectivity is, in reality, the sum of millions of mindless processes. — Wayfarer
Actually, you can switch the participants as many times as you want, as long as they keep notes of their neuronal state and pass them to their replacement.For example, humans can only survive for about 80 human years. How long could the giant being survive in human years? — TheHedoMinimalist
I am not claiming soundness, only the following implication - that if machines can develop mental state, and since we can build machines out of people, it follows that mental states can be composited from other mental states with separate experiences. This would apply in the context of eliminative materialism, panpsychism, functionalism, etc. Although, I fail to distinguish those very well.It’s hard for me to comment on consciousness in a scenario which is so alien to me. Either way, I’m skeptical that this thought experiment would imply that ecosystems or social systems might have mental activity. — TheHedoMinimalist
If your embodiment is completely coextent with you, and you are equivalent, how can you be not yourself. Or why would you be considered any more mechanical then your embodiment conscious? — simeonz
The twist in the Chinese room, I guess, is to reveal a human (Searle) who is then revealed to be, in relation to the outer behaviour of the creature, a mere machine himself.
— bongo fury
I’m not really understanding how this twist is relevant. — TheHedoMinimalist
The Chinese AI would have to be programmed to know how to learn Chinese instead through interactions with Chinese speakers because it’s impossible to simply hard code the knowledge of Chinese into the AI. — TheHedoMinimalist
But I actually think that being able to follow very complicated instructions would also require consciousness. — TheHedoMinimalist
Just as the human in the thought experiment cannot follow his instructions without mentally understanding them, — TheHedoMinimalist
Well, I actually don’t consider cars to be autonomous or having consciousness as a whole. — TheHedoMinimalist
If the post-apocalyptic world had self-driving cars, how would the reductionist sages of that world explain them in terms of simpler mechanical processes? — TheHedoMinimalist
I believe that you are claiming some ontological basis for placing human beings (or at least human organisms) in a distinct category here. — simeonz
There are very few things I can be completely sure about, but here are two: I'm not mindless, and I have conscious experience. I can't be mistaken about that. — RogueAI
Dennett asks us to turn our backs on what is glaringly obvious—that in consciousness we are immediately aware of real subjective experiences of color, flavor, sound, touch, etc. that cannot be fully described in neural terms even though they have a neural cause (or perhaps have neural as well as experiential aspects). And he asks us to do this because the reality of such phenomena is incompatible with the scientific materialism that in his view sets the outer bounds of reality. He is, in Aristotle’s words, “maintaining a thesis at all costs.” — Thomas Nagel
Dennett’s first book, Content and Consciousness, was published in 1969. At the time it was ground-breaking. I can remember suggesting it to a graduate reading group in the early 1970s. “It’s jolly interesting”, said one of the group, “but is it philosophy?”
I see now. First, let's agree that a vehicle and a vessel have some similarities, such as that they carry cargo and passengers. Of course, their method of transportation differs. Let's say that this aspect is fundamental for the purposes of the analogy. Then, for me at least, a human brain is to an insect brain, or to a plant's perception, more like a ship is to a boat, or a raft. A vehicle and a vessel would compare (in the sense that they are considered functionally different here), more like a person's brain compares to a person's leg. The gradual boundary between the two would be difficult to define indeed.The analogy was, "when does a vehicle become truly automotive i.e. a true automobile?". — bongo fury
I thought, the mind-body dualism. Which I believe they refer to (obviously disparagingly) as the "common-sense" mind. But not the entire experience of life as such.Ask yourself this question - what does eliminative materialism eliminate? — Wayfarer
If the mind is co-extent with its embodiment's behavior, how can it not be real. (Not that I personally claim that the mind coincides with its embodiment, necessarily.) If the person is metaphysical solipsisist, it wouldn't be real. But then he wouldn't be eliminative materialist at the same time.The word ‘mind’ doesn’t correspond to anything real: what we take to be ‘mind’ is simply the snap, crackle and pop of billions of neural connections programmed by Darwinian algorithms for the sole purpose of propagation of the genome. That’s all there is to it. — Wayfarer
Is physicalism a repudiation of mental objects after all, or a theory of them? Does it repudiate the mental state of pain or anger in favor of its physical concomitant, or does it identify the mental state with a state of the physical organism (and so a state of the physical organism with the mental state)?
On the other hand, the same philosophers also claimed that common-sense mental states simply do not exist. But critics pointed out that eliminativists could not have it both ways: either mental states exist and will ultimately be explained in terms of lower-level neurophysiological processes or they do not.
, which then refers to Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here, where the following statement is made:Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from people's thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from people's thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.
I still cannot fathom the nuance here. Isn't this just a re-phrasal with a different attitude. Unless the first group denies experience and existence. But I doubt it.Given these two different conceptions, early eliminativists would sometimes offer two different characterizations of their view: (a) There are no mental states, just brain states and, (b) There really are mental states, but they are just brain states (and we will come to view them that way).
Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from people's thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from people's thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.
There are no mental states, just brain states
Modern eliminativists have much more clearly expressed the view that mental phenomena simply do not exist and will eventually be eliminated from people's thinking about the brain in the same way that demons have been eliminated from people's thinking about mental illness and psychopathology.
The analogy was, "when does a vehicle become truly automotive i.e. a true automobile?".
— bongo fury
I see now. First, let's agree that a vehicle and a vessel have some similarities, such as that they carry cargo and passengers. Of course, their method of transportation differs. Let's say that this aspect is fundamental for the purposes of the analogy. — simeonz
Then, for me at least, a human brain is to an insect brain, or to a plant's perception, more like a ship is to a boat, or a raft. — simeonz
That said, I must agree to some extent. The spectrum of sentient qualities may have a sharp slope at some point. Even with a lot of structural complexity. I do not consider this likely - sophisticated information processing structure suddenly being vastly less aware when compared to a somewhat more complex different one. But I cannot fully disregard the possibility. — simeonz
I fear that the scope of the discussion will broaden dangerously, if we include epistemology into the mix. My personal opinion, assuming a materialist point of view - equality can be considered a mostly evolutionary cerebral construct, supporting our ability to forecast and infer conditions in our environment, made possible by the local reproducibility of the natural patterns on a global scale of space and time.Notice something here. 'Mental states = brain states'. Now, I ask you, what kind of physical object is '='? Where in the physical world, where in nature, do you find anything at all remotely resembling "="? You won't find it, because it relies on abstraction, on assigning values to things, and then saying that ‘this means that, therefore this equals that.’ — Wayfarer
For me, this does yet falsify eliminative materialism, but makes it a theory that awaits further judgement. Isn't that true for most of philosophy?What kind of 'brain state' could equal 'equal'? And how would you go about finding that out? Even to ask the question, you have to make a lot of judgements about neural images and incredibly complex data - the brain being the most complex thing known to science. — Wayfarer
To me - those are not logically unacceptable consequences. I feel obligated to stoically allow their consideration. The only thing I claim at the moment is that neither possibility appears fallacious. I make some speculations, but primarily in order to expand on their logical content.Any interest shown in this positive matter and I'll happily roll over and tolerate what strike me as more or less unacceptable consequences of an unbounded spectrum... e.g. conscious phones, insects etc. at one end, and literal talk of mental pictures, concepts, beliefs etc. at the other. — bongo fury
If you are eliminative materialist, you do not admit the possibility of zapping the qualia away. The closest thing you would have to that is harming your body. Since the eliminativist does not believe in a transcendent mind, you can only suppress their qualia by killing them.Suppose we developed a machine that zaps your qualia away. You'll still function the same but just without any conscious experience. — RogueAI
The assumption that there is such a machine, already renders the eliminative materialism wrong, which voids the question. If you are asking, if they would take the chance, without knowing - this will be like like a "sell me your soul for a dollar" type of child prank. Some people would refuse on a principle.Would eliminative materialists actually use such a machine? Even if you paid them a lot of money? Or would they view it, as I do, as the equivalent of death? I think, when push comes to shove, you'd have to drag them to it, kicking an screaming. — RogueAI
I fear that the scope of the discussion will broaden dangerously, if we include epistemology into the mix. — simeonz
equality can be considered a mostly evolutionary cerebral construct, supporting our ability to forecast and infer conditions in our environment, — simeonz
For me, this does yet falsify eliminative materialism, but makes it a theory that awaits further judgement. Isn't that true for most of philosophy? — simeonz
I generally agree with the attitude of the statement, but wanted to remark, that some positions have assumptions that could actually be falsified experimentally. At least to the extent to which experimental information can be trusted. Some could even be considered logically inconsistent. Some of them, indeed, cannot be distinguished through consensus observations. And I personally cannot distinguish some even conceptually. It is a separate issue, that a position can be adapted to a new variant in order to survive a striking blow.Both are met with impossible circumstance: the one cannot prove with apodeictic certainty the mind is nothing but illusion, and the other cannot prove its apodeitically certain reality, so they both fall back on insisting they don’t have to. — Mww
This assumes that life can only be realized with a mind-body distinction. That is, that the material world is not capable of being the realization of consciousness.If you think that 'knowing you're alive' is a matter of faith then there's something the matter with your logic. :wink: — Wayfarer
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.