With the risk of sounding annoying... — simeonz
Assuming one is coming from a solipsist attitude, — simeonz
even if one assumes a materialist standpoint, there would be two states - of awareness and of being. — simeonz
My point was - assuming one treats the existence of the mind, rather then the body, as a starting point, wouldn't the theory I described be equivalent to that of eliminative materialism? If it isn't, what position would that be called?Solipsism is dissolved by empathy. — Wayfarer
In retrospect, projection may not have been the right term, because it implies some kind of codomain - a space to project onto. But a brain substate is a very primitive and base notion of awareness that doesn't require it to be separate from the body, and corresponds to the assumption of a medical model of psychology. Wouldn't that satisfy at least some eliminative materialists?I don't think materialists would acknowledge that. And by asking these questions, you're already outside the reductionist circle. — Wayfarer
assuming one treats the existence of the mind, rather then the body, as a starting point, wouldn't the theory I described be equivalent to that of eliminative materialism? — simeonz
I still cannot distinguish eliminative materialism from Spinozian or Leibnizian pantheism. — simeonz
If one subtracts the aspect of personal attitude, and leaves only the ontological content... — simeonz
To me - those are not logically unacceptable consequences. — simeonz
some positions have assumptions that could actually be falsified experimentally — simeonz
I just realized that the posters in this discussion may be concerned with the fact that the mind has only partial awareness of its own being. — simeonz
I am glad that the discussion may see some extra use.Good subject for a term paper! — Wayfarer
You probably allude to the fundamental inconsistency between the pursuit of philosophy and any denial of being. But, as I said, I am not sure that eliminativists are denying the existence of the mind. I think that they deny any distinction between it and nature - they strip it of transcendence. So far, you did not say what is your position on pantheism is, Do you oppose materialism, but tolerate pantheism? Because, if you consider the co-extensiveness of matter and mind that eliminativists prescribe appalling, I assume that you feel the same about pantheists.It might be of relevance that the origin of the term 'ontology' is derived the first person declension of the Greek verb 'to be' (namely, 'I am'); which has somewhat different connotations from today's definition. — Wayfarer
Not really. I am accepting of the idea, that the plants that I eat, or even the doorknob on my door, may possess some extremely small amounts of consciousness. I do not think a world with clear cut distinctions is necessary for people to function in it. But I did concede that such distinctions might exist nonetheless - because, while I do believe that the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative properties of matter has to be smooth (organization, being equal), it does not have to be gradual.Maybe not, but see the quagmire up ahead? — bongo fury
Some hypothetical states might not be empirically verifiable, but the question is - are they epistemically substantive, and if not, why would we arbitrate our philosophical position for reasons that are not purely methodological? I mean, If we can't distinguish two positions in terms of their implications what is the difference between them? (Granted, there are positions that can be distinguished from materialism on that basis, such as the immortality of the soul, the existence of divine miracles, etc, but the notion of a mind existing separately, without further qualifications, does not appear to have immediate consequences in itself.)While I might agree some brain states are experimentally quantifiable, insofar as reactive indicators are present for observation, I disagree that purely abstract mental conditions, that which is theorized as reason and its integrated particulars, will ever be displayed on a screen or graph. That is to say, the result of thought may be externally witnessed, but the machinations for its implementation, won’t. — Mww
For me, the question here is whether the mind is first and foremost a collection of unprocessed emotions and senses, aka the intentionality, or are we biased to prioritize these experiences, because they require less mental effort, whereas the more belaboring means of self reflection that involve logical inspection of the natural world, whilst much more intricate, taxing, and sometimes unreliable, can offer further detail of our state of mind, which we are not capable of perceiving directly through emotions.I mean.....how does one even look for “understanding”? — Mww
There is indeed a complication. Empirical observations as eliminativists would have them are recursive. For the brain to observe itself, it has to already be capable of sensation. But, I am not sure that this is contradiction. After all, the brain does not purport a different image - looking at your brain scan image does imply that your neurons are processing data about themselves. Also - the same recursion does exist backwards. A person can think or emote, or they can think or emote about the nature of their thoughts and emotions. While the latter actions involve greater sophistication, they are usually assumed to be fundamentally realized (whether metaphysically or biologically) in the same way as the former. The entire process could be described as such - through nature we can observe, us observing, us observing, or, observing others, observing us, etc.Me, I just think it’s kinda funny, that physicalists/materialists in general tend to deny the philosophical paradigm, all the while employing the very thing for which the philosophical paradigm stands. — Mww
Still, don't you feel compelled to increase the comprehensiveness of your conceptualization? I mean, are you apathetic towards this particular type of knowledge as opposed to others, because you don't trust it is substantive? Or are you just indifferent towards the issue? I ask, because this is not how human curiosity generally operates. One could imagine what the world would be if Newton said - force is just a notion about a totality of interesting natural phenomenon and I don't have to investigate it any further.Mind is merely a word, a placeholder for some immaterial totality, a sort of catch-all that for which we have no better word. If I reduce my thinking to a unconditioned necessity, I arrive at mind. — Mww
why would we arbitrate our philosophical position for reasons that are not purely methodological? — simeonz
don't you feel compelled to increase the comprehensiveness of your conceptualization? — simeonz
A person can think or emote, or they can think or emote about the nature of their thoughts and emotions. While the latter actions involve greater sophistication, they are usually assumed to be fundamentally realized (...) in the same way as the former. — simeonz
Every intellectual labor needs to commit itself to a manageable scope, that is true. But that does not imply, that the assumptions and methods therein are not consequently subject to further investigations or critical analysis. Furthermore, logical reductionism compels defensive thinking exactly for this reason - it tries to plant theories into sacred foundational assumptions, instead of investigating the logical interrelations between different kinds of statements. I prefer the later methodology, because it compels impartiality.I would say we shouldn’t. Any sound philosophical position would seem to require either subscribing to a method which grounds it, or actually being a method in itself from which something else is grounded. — Mww
Observable, but not necessarily in the empirical sense. What I meant was that the notion should have a definite meaning and a clearly expressed value. Note that I don't consider it necessary for all notions to be of this variety, only those which are subject to critical thinking. But if they are not subject to critical thinking, how can they be subject of philosophy?But from the context, it appears you are saying brain states that are not observable are hypothetical, and the epistemic substance of a hypothetical is questionable. — Mww
Being hypothetical is not an issue for me. My problem is lacking any kind of critical evaluation - logical (because of logical independence), empirical (because of disembodiment), experiential (because of indefiniteness). I am not opposing the idea that the mind can exist independently of reason - many things do. But if it is not planted in some kind of analytical framework, as you propose, then I cannot see how it can be a component of philosophy.I would substitute logical for hypothetical, from which a valid method may follow necessarily, and there arises something on which to base our philosophical positions. — Mww
You meant something more constrictive then I originally imagined. That your notion of the mind can be compared to a kind of bondage, similar to one's reaction to physical pain. Whatever its nature and substance might be, pain does provoke an adverse reaction in us, as this is its intended function.So, yes, I suppose it could be said I am indifferent towards the issue. I really don’t care about mind that much; it is enough that I exist as a thinking subject and if I happen to think about mind, I can only think so far and no further without venturing into the irrational. — Mww
Actually, I was not trying to prove that sensation is recursive, but to weaken the argument that it couldn't be, because of unfoundedness. I wanted to make the argument, that if we assume that sensation cannot articulate its own structure, then we could make a similar argument that thinking about thinking or emoting about emotions is impossible. And the parallels I think hold well, because when I articulate my thoughts by thinking reflectively, the two thoughts are not incident, but the latter contains expressions of the former. I am able to investigate the nature of my thoughts, precisely because I am able to think about them, not merely to think in its own right. Similarly I would not be able to examine the nature of sadness, if I didn't feel any regret for it. But my regret for sadness, despite being a similar kind of emotion, is not coincidental with the sadness that provokes it. It is an expression of it. And our mental faculties are interwoven, such that we can think about our emotions, and emote on our thoughts. My argument is, that it would not be contrary to nature (i.e. paradoxical) if we could observe sensation through sensation. Our senses could express how our mental states work, just like the the rest of our mental faculties can self-reflect. Except that this self-reflection involves a space of greater complexity - the material world, which overwhelms our emotional and contemplative capacity.And to say from that, that the brain is observing itself, may be a conventional easement, it is nonetheless philosophically bankrupt, because it invokes a categorical error. Thinking is one thing, observing is quite another. — Mww
logical reductionism compels defensive thinking exactly for this reason - it tries to plant theories into sacred foundational assumptions — simeonz
I don't logically oppose dualism and idealism (even if I don't believe that all variants are sound), but I challenge the distinction between pantheism (consciousness as intrinsic matter potentiality) and eliminativism (matter in its own right), because I find that such distinction lacks reasonable explanation or definite value. — simeonz
You meant something more constrictive then I originally imagined. That your notion of the mind can be compared to a kind of bondage — simeonz
I am able to investigate the nature of my thoughts, precisely because I am able to think about them, not merely to think in its own right. — simeonz
if we assume that sensation cannot articulate its own structure, then we could make a similar argument that thinking about thinking or emoting about emotions is impossible. — simeonz
I make my assertions corrigibly. I don't believe that I am capable of obtaining immutable principles. I possess modus operandi that is subject to continuous validation and refinement, and that is what make it a comprehension. Is logic corrigible? Could be. I rely on it, because I don't know any better and if I don't foster my conviction in some sensible image of reality, I will not be able to utilize my reason. But I doubt that immutable comprehension of any kind will be obtained by simple organisms such as ourselves anytime soon.And finally, the epitome of logical reductionism is of course, the Aristotelian laws of thought, which makes explicit any theory defended by them does try to plant it right squarely into a sacred foundational principle. — Mww
language, technology, science, arts, literature, philosophy.....what more evidence would you need? — Wayfarer
I think that our opinions may be irreconcilable. — simeonz
I feel that the majority opinion is that humanity is entitled to some kind of exceptionalism — simeonz
But I doubt that immutable comprehension of any kind will be obtained (...) anytime soon. — simeonz
This seems to be an accurate interpretation of the known facts.Just because we’re apex-intelligensia and apex-praedator in this environment through sheer evolutionary happenstance, says nothing about any other. — Mww
Are you hinting that truth implies existence? That any universal statement is implicitly about a model reality, and without reality, all universal statements are equivalent, making non-existence the mathematical definition of contradiction. Or am I misreading you. On a purely technical note - what about existential statements?f you mean by “immutable comprehension” an irreducible understanding, is there no one simple thing for which you have no doubt at all? Or, is there no one simple thing for which the doubt of it contradicts something....or possibly everything.....else? — Mww
What I meant was, exceptionalism in its philosophical significance, which wasn't about a degree of accomplishment, which human beings obviously possess, but about fundamental differences between the species on which such accomplishment would have been predicated. That is - differences that cannot be explained in terms of gradual speciation, as Mww explained.language, technology, science, arts, literature, philosophy.....what more evidence would you need? — Wayfarer
fundamental differences — simeonz
You do realise that the historical origins of an idea are not determinate either of its accuracy, nor its practicality — Isaac
If you actually have an argument that biological reductionism is either a less accurate or a less useful representation of reality, then just make the argument. — Isaac
Darwinism when taken as a philosophy can only ever be a form of utilitarianism. Why? Because there’s only one criterion for success in Darwinism, which is the ability to propagate. — Wayfarer
If not utility, nor accuracy, then by what measure do you propose we judge competing philosophical positions? — Isaac
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