What if we construe "cause" as an event(s) or set of contingencies, without which, a subsequent event we call the "effect" would not have occured, and with which, the effect reliably occurs?

Yes, I think that's the David Lewis counterfactual account. It's a neat sidestep:) If I don't take my umbrella it's sure to rain.

I am reading a rather technical account by Nancy Cartwright which seems at heart Witty rather than ontological: that there are many languages of causation, most of which appear to work in some circumstances. It feels to me as if 'the moment' may be a use of language that befuddles such languages, for it forces a micro view of a non-micro phenomenon. Still you'd think there'd be a way of putting it and still get your bread toasted.

But language use takes place in time, doesn't it? Propositions aren't linguistic entities exactly. Their expression is linguistic.

It feels to me as if 'the moment' may be a use of language that befuddles such languages, for it forces a micro view of a non-micro phenomenon. — mcdoodle

Could you expand on that?

What if we construe "cause" as an event(s) or set of contingencies, without which, a subsequent event we call the "effect" would not have occured, and with which, the effect reliably occurs? — Brainglitch

Answering the question why? means identifying a relationship, right? Maybe it's not always between two different things. Maybe it's.. how does this car of the train relate to the whole train? Is it the caboose? The engine?

it has no spatial extension then what's the point? To a physicist if you say something has no properties then it just doesn't exist. Either you can describe it in some demonstrable terms or its gibberish. — wuliheron

Now I think we're getting to the point of the op. The geometrical "point", being non-dimensional, and occupying no space, really can't exist, in the sense that a physicist would say "exists", it is purely conceptual, theoretical. But we can describe it in a demonstrable way, like the exact centre of a circle, or the point where a tangential line meets the arc of a circle, so it is not gibberish. It's good theory, but cannot have physical existence.

Now the op proposes that unlike the point in space, the point in time has real physical existence. What exists at a point in time can be nothing other than a state, because no time is passing, so no change occurs. What we observe as change and motion is a series of such states, like the still-frame movie. Real change occurs between these still frame moments, such that we do not observe real change. It's what happens between the still-frame states which we observe in rapid succession as movement.

I believe I'm in a similar zone to MU. A moment is one of those artificial notions that leads to paradoxes and other confusions, because you can't sum the moments and get a quantity - whereas causes and effects are surely quantifiable and seep through time.

The geometrical "point", being non-dimensional, and occupying no space, really can't exist, in the sense that a physicist would say "exists", it is purely conceptual, theoretical. But we can describe it in a demonstrable way, like the exact centre of a circle, or the point where a tangential line meets the arc of a circle, so it is not gibberish. It's good theory, but cannot have physical existence. — Metaphysician Undercover

You can describe it merely in terms of gibberish! Mathematical gibberish, but gibberish just the same that has no demonstrable physical reality. Along the lines of me saying you have an invisible pixie on your shoulder that can't be detected which can just as easily be described as inhabiting the center of a circle and having no spatial dimensions.

Now the op proposes that unlike the point in space, the point in time has real physical existence. What exists at a point in time can be nothing other than a state, because no time is passing, so no change occurs. What we observe as change and motion is a series of such states, like the still-frame movie. Real change occurs between these still frame moments, such that we do not observe real change. It's what happens between the still-frame states which we observe in rapid succession as movement. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's again, just gibberish. Either you can show how it makes any difference with empirical evidence or its nothing more than fanciful speculation. I could also come up with any number of complex ways of describing time that are perfectly workable, but nobody would give a crap because it can't be proven and there's no point in adopting a more complex view of something without evidence when a simpler view will produce identical results.

Sorry, but I never claimed to have anything more than fanciful speculation. However, that should never be equated with gibberish. Are mathematics and geometry gibberish to you, because they're abstract? Come on now, do you know what gibberish means?

Either you can show how it makes any difference with empirical evidence or its nothing more than fanciful speculation. — wuliheron

I already explained the empirical difference that it makes. Since it makes an empirical difference, it ought to be testable. Were you listening, or do you simply reject, and forget, everything which is not consistent with your belief?

Well that's part of the problem, how do we independently conceptualize time, since it's inherent in our conveyance of thought, our expressions in language, which is why people like Augustine talk about it conceptually and not linguistically.

Augustine's point which I think holds is that all time is present. The past can only possibly be remembered in the present and what we anticipate, the future can only be anticipated in the present, this is his distension of time. He was interested in our phenomenal understanding of time.

Aristotle also talks about time in his Physics where he is interested in its basis, its quantification, there he says that motion occurs in time, and is never found separate from time, motion is in time but is not time, rather time is a measure, he uses the term 'number of change' . He presents time as the fleeting instant of the present where before and after meet, the present as a vanishing point. This is an ontological, quantative sense of time.

I already explained the empirical difference that it makes. Since it makes an empirical difference, it ought to be testable. Were you listening, or do you simply reject, and forget, everything which is not consistent with your belief? — Metaphysician Undercover

Speculation is not philosophy and claiming nothing changes when everything demonstrably changes is not making an empirically testable hypothesis. Mathematics must be demonstrable, self-consistent, and nontrivial and so far what I hear is merely trivial speculation.

Yes I agree with your reading of Augustine and Aristotle. I have a way of thinking of time which might add another twist. It's around the idea of an ooze, so if you imagine there is something, quite simple going on somewhere where there is no timespace bubble. It is a self perpetuating changing thing, which provides its own time and space within itself, perhaps contorted dimensions, like the surface of a lava flow.

motion is in time but is not time — Cavacava

Does he give an argument for that? I don't recall. At any rate, I do not agree with him.

Physics Book IV part 11.
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.4.iv.html

Thanks.

Re his argument:

"Now (a) the change or movement of each thing is only in the thing which changes or where the thing itself which moves or changes may chance to be. But time is present equally everywhere and with all things." — Aristotle

His second sentence is incorrect. Time doesn't obtain insofar as something doesn't change/isn't in motion.

Again, (b) change is always faster or slower, whereas time is not: for 'fast' and 'slow' are defined by time-'fast' is what moves much in a short time, 'slow' what moves little in a long time; but time is not defined by time, by being either a certain amount or a certain kind of it. — Aristotle

"Fast" and "slow" are simply measured relative to some other sort of change. But all of those changes/motion are simply time

So his argument fails on my view.

Speculation is not philosophy — wuliheron

What? To dismiss speculation as unphilosophical is a big mistake.

In his Physics Aristotle describes time in two different ways, 1) as the thing by which we measure, like number, and 2) the thing which is measured.

His second sentence is incorrect. Time doesn't obtain insofar as something doesn't change/isn't in motion. — Terrapin Station

As the thing which is measured, there is no necessity for something to change when time passes. Change is the means by which we measure time passing, and it is possible that time could be passing without us being capable of measuring it.

What? To dismiss speculation as unphilosophical is a big mistake. — Metaphysician Undercover

Philosophy is defined as the study of the fundamental nature of knowledge, reality, and existence, especially when considered as an academic discipline, while Socratic philosophers like myself prefer to define it as the love of wisdom. Speculation is neither knowledge nor wisdom, although, it can be useful for making money or any number of other ventures such as writing fantasy novels.

As the thing which is measured, there is no necessity for something to change when time passes. Change is the means by which we measure time passing, and it is possible that time could be passing without us being capable of measuring it. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm a bit confused by your first sentence. Time doesn't pass insofar as something doesn't change. Insofar as it does, time passes. When you measure something (temporally, I'm assuming we're saying), you're quantifying changes. We can imagine that we're temporally measuring something not changing for some period, but the only way that makes sense is if something (else) IS changing--say that a clock is ticking or whatever we might be looking at for our change quantification base.

On my view, time occurring is simply those changes, and time doesn't occur insofar as there are not changes. So what we're really saying is that time didn't occur in x (the unchanging thing) relative to n changes in y (however many ticks of the clock for example).

I don't agree with "change is the means by which we measure time passing" because I'd say that "time passing IS change" (and then we simply quantify those changes--that's the measurement).

Re the last sentence, sure, changes can occur without us being capable of quantifying those changes.

. Time doesn't pass insofar as something doesn't change. Insofar as it does, time passes. — Terrapin Station

I'm saying that this statement is not sound. One is the means by which we measure the other. But a thing does not have to be measured, or even measurable, to be real.

When you measure something (temporally, I'm assuming we're saying), you're quantifying changes. We can imagine that we're temporally measuring something not changing for some period, but the only way that makes sense is if something (else) IS changing--say that a clock is ticking or whatever we might be looking at for our change quantification base. — Terrapin Station

What you describe here is using time to measure something, this is definition 1). The second definition is that time is something which is measured. We measure time passing by referring to change. But it is possible that time could pass so fast, an extremely short period of time for example, that no change could possibly occur in this short period of time, so we'd have time passing with no change occurring.

I don't agree with "change is the means by which we measure time passing" because I'd say that "time passing IS change" (and then we simply quantify those changes--that's the measurement). — Terrapin Station

That's why you disagree with what Aristotle said. I do not disagree with that. It assumes that time is a real, objective thing, which is everywhere, and which can be measured.

Re the last sentence, sure, changes can occur without us being capable of quantifying those changes. — Terrapin Station

That's not what I'm talking about though. I'm talking about time passing without change occurring. I could word it differently for you. Let's say that time passing is itself a change. But time is not a physical thing, it is everywhere, as Aristotle said, so this is not a physical change. Now we have a change which we are not capable of quantifying, because it is not a physical change. This is the change which is called time passing. The problem though, is that we do quantify time passing, so this is not a good representation. Instead, we should represent time passing as something other than change.

I'm saying that this statement is not sound. One is the means by which we measure the other — Metaphysician Undercover

Well, yeah, it's clear that you think it's false. I think it's true. But if you think it's false, you're going to think it's not sound, since soundness refers to whether it's true (at least in this sort of context). One isn't the means by which we measure the other in my view. The relation is one of identity rather.

But a thing does not have to be measured, or even measurable, to be real. — Metaphysician Undercover

That I certainly agree with.

But it is possible that time could pass so fast, an extremely short period of time for example, that no change could possibly occur in this short period of time, — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not possible on my view, since time is identical to change. It's simply contradictory to say that "no change could possibly occur in this short period of time," because it amounts to saying, "no change could possibly occur in this short period of change."

so we'd have time passing with no change occurring. — Metaphysician Undercover

With this also being simply contradictory as it is saying, "So we'd have change (passing) with no change occurring."

It assumes that time is a real, objective thing, which is everywhere, and which can be measured. — Metaphysician Undercover

Definitely it's a real objective thing. Not all real, objective things can necessarily be measured, however. That would be about our limitations as the sorts of creatures that we are in the world.

But time is not a physical thing, it is everywhere, as Aristotle said, so this is not a physical change. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't agree with this, though. Nothing exists that is not a physical thing on my view.

Now we have a change which we are not capable of quantifying, because it is not a physical change. — Metaphysician Undercover

So that is contradictory. If something isn't physical, you don't have it--it doesn't exist.

Not sure I understand do you meaning. I looked up time space bubble and found:

The concept of Alcubierre drive, which (as I understand it) is the shifting the space around an object, contracting the space in front of a space craft and expanding space in the rear,or something along these lines. Enabling the craft to go faster than the speed of light without upsetting physical laws.

That's not possible on my view, since time is identical to change. — Terrapin Station

Well, time and change are quite clearly two distinct things. Change refers to difference, and time refers to a continuance of existence. So they are closer to being opposed to one another than to being the same. And this conflation of yours is totally unwarranted and unjustified.

Interesting, actually I thought I was replying to mongrel, but I'll carry on with what I was thinking anyway. Yes it's a distortion of spacetime. I have come across the idea in some science literature before but I can't find it now. It was described as an ooze and the way I see it is if you imagine at the point of the Big Bang, at the initial stage of expansion space and time might have been distorted and contorted with extreme curvature. So that there is extension and physical activity, but not in an external manifold of time as we understand it as spacetime. But within many small isolated bubbles, incorporating their own space and time and self perpetuating, extruding, or oozing. As I am writing this, I am thinking of quantum foam, which seems to have equivalence.

So the idea is that there might be a material that can exude its own time and space independent of any other manifold of spacetime.

"Continuation of existence through time" is a matter of genidentity--it has to do with (a) how contiguous, causally-connected development occurs, and (b) conceptual abstraction with respect to what an individual's criteria are for calling x @ T1 and x' @ T2 "the same x."

So on my view it's no conflation, of course, it's rather a matter of ontological verisimilitude rather than myth-building based on mistaken or misconceived views such as buying logical identity through time.

"Continuation of existence through time" is a matter of genidentity--it has to do with (a) how contiguous, causally-connected development occurs, and (b) conceptual abstraction with respect to what an individual's criteria are for calling x T1 and x' @ T2 "the same x." — Terrapin Station

This is the point of the op though. What allows you to assume a T1 and a T2? Unless you can justify your premise that T1 is separate, or different from T2, then you have no basis for the claim that x is different from x'. So it is only by taking the position described in the op, that there is a real separation between T1 and T2, that they are actually individual objects, with separation between them, that you can support such a claim, as a difference between x and x'. So it is only by means of the unstated premise, that there is a real difference between T1 and T2, that you can support your claim of a real difference between x and x'.

Now that earlier statement of yours, is supported only by circular logic:

Time doesn't pass insofar as something doesn't change. Insofar as it does, time passes. — Terrapin Station

According to this earlier statement, time can only pass if something changes. But according to this latest statement, that x @ T1 is different from x' @ T2 unless proven otherwise, it is the assumed difference between T1 and T2 which allows you to premise that x is actually different from x'. This is a clear cut case of circular logic. Your notion of change is support by the assumption that there is a difference between T1 and T2 (i.e. time passes), yet you insist that time can only pass if something changes.

So, I'll reiterate. This assumption, that time can only pass if something changes, is unsound. Your conclusion, that x is different from x' ,i.e. that change has occurred, is based in the assumption that there is a difference between T1 and T2, time has passed. Where is the premise which allows you to say that time only passes if change occurs?

I'll suggest that this unsound premise is based in empirical evidence, and inductive reasoning. In all your instances of experience, if time is passing, change is occurring, so you conclude inductively that if time is passing, then change is occurring. But inductive reasoning cannot rule out the possibility that things could be otherwise. Therefore, if this proposition is supported only by inductive reasoning, then to properly proceed in analyzing this subject, time, you must allow the possibility that time could pass without change occurring.

So on my view it's no conflation, of course, it's rather a matter of ontological verisimilitude rather than myth-building based on mistaken or misconceived views such as buying logical identity through time. — Terrapin Station

What is "buying logical identity through time" supposed to mean?

This is the point of the op though. What allows you to assume a T1 and a T2? Unless you can justify your premise that T1 is separate, or different from T2, then you have no basis for the claim that x is different from x'. — Metaphysician Undercover

What?? It's no assumption. You, for example, look at a clock. The clock reads "10:42" and then it reads "10:43". That's all the justification you need. "10:42" is T1. "10:43" is T2. The clock with "10:42" displayed is x, the clock with "10:43" displayed is x'. "10:42" is different than "10:43"

Unless you do not agree with this, we can move on (and I'll answer the rest of your post) (Since we've solved what justifies T1 vs T2, x vs x')

What?? It's no assumption. You, for example, look at a clock. The clock reads "10:42" and then it reads "10:43". That's all the justification you need. "10:42" is T1. "10:43" is T2. The clock with "10:42" displayed is x, the clock with "10:43" displayed is x'. "10:42" is different than "10:43" — Terrapin Station

No, the clock indicates "10:42" is, the clock indicates 10:42, just like the clock indicates "10:43" is the clock indicate 10:43. You need another premise, to allow you to say that one is T1 and the other is T2. I suggest we premise that time is passing. You do not like this premise, care to suggest another?