If they had a choice, then the speech wasn't the cause. Their decision was. — Terrapin Station

Decisions are influenced causally by a wide range of factors, and that can include hearing a speech.

Better for people in general? and/or 'is having less laws better in the sense that more laws cause a net gain in worse effects?' — Coben

Better is always in someone's opinion. "Better for people in general" is ambiguous because of that. I think it's better with respect to people in general. People in general might not have that opinion (as a consensus or whatever).

Less laws is better because most laws, in my opinion, infringe upon behavior they shouldn't infringe on.

Decisions are influenced causally by a wide range of factors. — S

For the 100th time, influences are not causes.

And I'd not making any influencing illegal.

If they had a choice, then the speech wasn't the cause. Their decision was. — Terrapin Station

No. If they had what appears to be a choice, then it only shows that the speech is one cause among others and if those others are not present no violent action will ensue. Its really not that complicated. A carburettor requires both fuel and air to cause the engine to turn. If it is missing the fuel it will not turn, but hat doesn't mean the air is not a cause at all, it's just not a sufficient one. You really need to read up about sufficient and necessary causes.

No. If they had what appears to be a choice, — Isaac

Why are you introducing "appear"? Either it's an ontological fact that they had a choice or it is not.

I'm not sure what you're thinking here. People will have preferences for approaches to government. You can prefer fewer laws. — Terrapin Station

Right, but it's a political level discussion. In most cases when people argue for a political level option in policy, they will argue that Policy A is good becasue it causes X and Y and Policy B or not having policy A is bad because it causes Z and Ä. But for you, given your very strict sense of what can be called a cause, such things are very hard to demonstrate. IOW I was raising the issue of whether it is good or better to have few laws to see if you would justify this in terms of causes and effects. Even in a single person demonstrating that something causes a specific effect is hard because we are so complicated entities. To demonstrate net effects at a societal level is even more complicated. You responded that it was a preference. Which steps to the side of causes and effects. Now perhaps if pressed you would say you prefer it because having more laws causes X. I think that would be tough to demonstrate, most of the those potential Xs.

For the 100th time, influences are not causes. — Terrapin Station

You repeatedly claiming that doesn't start to make it true. If the confluence of 100 factors is sufficient to cause an event, then each one of them can be termed a 'cause', each could equally be termed an 'influence'. This is normal language use, and pretty much all the other posters seem to understand it. Does that not at least give you pause to think that it might be your understanding of the meaning that is wrong?

If in your view influences are causes, and you want me to accept that, then you need to present an argument that there's no distinction.

Either it's an ontological fact that they had a choice or it is not. — Terrapin Station

Yes, but we might not know the truth of that fact, hence "appears".

your understanding of the meaning that is wrong? — Isaac

That has wrong what meaning and understanding are.

Yes, but we might not know the truth of that fact, hence "appears". — Isaac

What I'm talking about is the ontological situation where there's a choice.

What I'm talking about is the ontological situation where there's a choice. — Terrapin Station

We can't say, without making un-agreed upon commitments, that such a situation can exist, hence we must proceed in the absence of such certainty. We have to act despite it. That's what I'm questioning, how we do that. Why presume a genuine free choice can be made when there is zero evidence to support that view?

Better is always in someone's opinion. "Better for people in general" is ambiguous because of that. I think it's better with respect to people in general. People in general might not have that opinion (as a consensus or whatever).

Less laws is better because most laws, in my opinion, infringe upon behavior they shouldn't infringe on. — Terrapin Station

Don't make me chase you down. Is there are argument somewhere in there that says that more laws cause bad things and could you run through the causal chain if there is one?

That the effects of these causes would be that things are worse for us. Not just correlation and not just based on your preferences but I suppose either on ours in general or the states we would be in would be objectively worse.

That has wrong what meaning and understanding are. — Terrapin Station

Not according to my understanding of the terms 'meaning' and 'wrong'

We can't say, without making un-agreed upon commitments, that such a situation can exist, hence we must proceed in the absence of such certainty. We have to act despite it. That's what I'm questioning, how we do that. Why presume a genuine free choice can be made when there is zero evidence to support that view? — Isaac

So again, you don't buy free will? Just be upfront about that if so. There are a lot of people on this board who'd agree with that.

Sorry, I overlooked your second-to-last post and I'm just seeing the new one. I'm looking at them now.

No worries and my don't make me chase you down is not cranky. I am trying to put my cards on the table all the time because I think this is interesting. I assume you know, more or less, where I am going most of the time - despite whatever free will I might have - so if you can jump a step or two please do.

Right, but it's a political level discussion. In most cases when people argue for a political level option in policy, they will argue that Policy A is good becasue it causes X and Y and Policy B or not having policy A is bad because it causes Z and Ä. But for you, given your very strict sense of what can be called a cause, such things are very hard to demonstrate. IOW I was raising the issue of whether it is good or better to have few laws to see if you would justify this in terms of causes and effects. — Coben

No. It's purely a matter of a lot of laws being about stuff that I think government has no business intruding on. For example, "saggy pants laws," or laws about whether you can sublet a property you own, or whether you can operate it as an Airbnb.

Not according to my understanding of the terms 'meaning' and 'wrong' — Isaac

My comments are about what's the case ontologically. Not understanding terms.

So again, you don't buy free will? Just be upfront about that if so. There are a lot of people on this board who'd agree with that. — Terrapin Station

It's not about buying free will or not. It's about what course of action we take in the self-evident situation that we cannot tell for certain if we do have free will or not.

We must, as a community, still take action despite that uncertainty. Hence the burden of proof discussion. To act as if we have free will require some, as yet undiscovered force which initiates action other than environmental variables. Since we have no evidence of such a force, I'm arguing the default position should be to presume it is not there, or at least not to rely entirely on it.

I'm asking you what your reasoning is as to why we should assume free wiil, apart from just that you 'reckon it's right.

It's not about buying free will or not. — Isaac

Sure it is. I don't believe it's uncertain whether free will obtains.

Apparently you do.

I don't buy strong determinism in general (in physical terms), and I'm not a realist on physical laws.

No. It's purely a matter of a lot of laws being about stuff that I think government has no business intruding on. For example, "saggy pants laws," or laws about whether you can sublet a property you own, or whether you can operate it as an Airbnb. — Terrapin Station

So, we could say you reach your political position (of legal parsimony) as a deontologist not as a consquentialist. (?)

So, we could say you reach your political position (of legal parsimony) as a deontologist not as a consquentialist. — Coben

I'm not sure that putting it in those terms works . . . I think they'd both be misleading for how I think about it.

For the 100th time, influences are not causes. — Terrapin Station

Yeah they are. Example: the writings of Marx influenced my thinking, which in part caused me to purchase a number of books on the topic.

Why are you introducing "appear"? Either it's an ontological fact that they had a choice or it is not. — Terrapin Station

When you can't distinguish between a choice and what just appears to be one, then you can't rightly call it a choice, unless you alter the definition.

which in part caused me to purchase a number of books on the topic. — S

You didn't choose to purchase the books?

(And seriously, by the way--you're a Marx fan?)

You didn't choose to purchase the books? — Terrapin Station

In common parlance, we could say that I chose to purchase the books. But whether or not that's true or false depends on interpretation and on what's the case with regards to the free will debate.

Or we could just say that it seemed as though I had some choice in the matter.

Sure, so I'm asking your opinion. You don't believe that you chose to buy the books? Or are you agnostic on this issue?

Sure it is. I don't believe it's uncertain whether free will obtains. — Terrapin Station

So the sum total of your argument as to why we should not legislate against hate speech despite the clear correlation with violence is that hate speech cannot be a cause of violent action because violent action is actually caused by some magical force which we can't detect but you just 'reckon' is there.