I read the article, but I have to say, I disagree with a lot of it. I will present my critique.A lot of modern thinking comes about because evolutionary biology occupies the place that was once occupied by religion. But whereas Western religion incorporated a sophisticated moral philosophy, derived from the Greeks as well as Biblical lore, evolutionary theory is really only a biological theory. So the attempt to shoehorn an explanation of all human nature into evolutionary theory is biological reductionism which is the default view of the secular-scientific culture. About which see this comment. — Wayfarer
The evolutionary hypothesis does not mean to guide the population in its choice of ethics, It tries to support an explanation of how ethical choices are formed in a large statistical sample. What ethical choices should receive one person's privileged consideration is beyond its scope.I have no beef with entomology or evolution, but I refuse to admit that they teach me much about ethics. — Richard Polt
Considering only the biological level of the individual when interpreting natural selection is artificially limiting. There certainly are sustainable and unsustainable types of collective behaviors and group interactions. In that sense, choices are influenced by both biological and cultural speciation. I use the latter term in the sense that, for the purposes of natural selection, we don't inherit just our genes, we inherit our culture, our social context, even the state of the environment, which interact with the survival of the species in pretty much the same way. That is, selection of the fittest is capable of explaining what drove people to complex social order, cultural conservatism, and in the ethical plane (ontology of divine miracles set aside), religion as well.But since the human race has evolved to be capable of a wide range of both selfish and altruistic behavior, there is no reason to say that altruism is superior to selfishness in any biological sense. — Richard Polt
Natural selection recognizes that cooperative (but competitive) member contributes to the thriving of its group. Species that act in pure chaos, driven only by self-interest, are not likely to persevere. Of course, evolution doesn't prescribe the range of ethical choices, but recognizes that choices that resolve poorly for the group won't have continuing place in history, as their presence will be eliminated through social ostracization or general extinction.In fact, the very idea of an “ought” is foreign to evolutionary theory. It makes no sense for a biologist to say that some particular animal should be more cooperative, much less to claim that an entire species ought to aim for some degree of altruism. — Richard Polt
The author frequently relates to some ant analogy, which apparently have been used to illustrate an evolutionary approach to social behaviors. Whoever used ants as an explanatory device, I am sure did not mean to assert that the human species are similar in their social dimension, but only that ants can be used to illustrate the formation of collective behavior or herd instinct from an evolutionary standpoint.I prefer to conclude that ants are anything but human. — Richard Polt
Human beings are at the top of the evolutionary scale for a reason. The formation of social attitudes, of cultural norms, of instructional ideologies and religions produce more coherent group behavior (albeit not in every single instance). We all know that homo sapiens defeated (and ate) the neanderthals, because the latter, being averse or inept to the formation of large social groups, were forced to defend themselves in isolation. (To think of it, I am more of a neanderthal.)Whether we’re talking about ants, wolves, or naked mole rats, cooperative animal behavior is not human virtue. Any understanding of human good and evil has to deal with phenomena that biology ignores or tries to explain away — such as decency, self-respect, integrity, honor, loyalty or justice. — Richard Polt
The author takes for granted that the structure of machines is incapable of sentience. This may or may not be true, but the author elaborates on the particulars of electrical circuitry, as if there is something inherently profane about them, which makes it unworthy of hosting sentient life. However, why electrical construction is fundamentally incompatible with life is not discussed.Siri may find the nearest bar for you, but “she” neither approves nor disapproves of drinking. The word “bar” doesn’t actually mean anything to a computer: it’s a set of electrical impulses that represent nothing except to some human being who may interpret them. — Richard Polt
I am not aware of any accepted test that determines the presence of those attitudes in a non-human. And if the fact that we cannot test those qualities in machines with certainty is cause to withdraw speculations of machine sentience, then what tests have we used to confirm the universality of human sentience? Shouldn't the author present, in the context of his contrasting comparison, balanced empirical criterion for people and machines, and illustrate its failed application to machine behavior. Or otherwise, what criteria were used here - instinct?None of these devices can think, because none of them can care; as far as we know there is no program, no matter how complicated, that can make the world matter to a machine. — Richard Polt
Again, essentially the same issue. The author is vague what type of demonstration would be sufficient. Admittedly machines today are still rather primitive, but in the hypothetical future when machines start to behave more elaborately, what test would satisfy the author or will he reject machine sentience purely definitionally? (On the other hand, machines may not be capable of sentience. But from my point of view, the author did not attempt to rationally prove this point.)Show me the computer that can feel the slightest twinge of pain or burst of pleasure; only then will I believe that our machines have started down the long road to thought. — Richard Polt
I wouldn't limit the causes of natural selection to genetics and biological structures. The factors are all encompassing - sociology, ecology and even cosmology can ultimately play a role. But even if ethical choices are explained by natural selection, that stillWithout a brain or DNA, I couldn’t write an essay, drive my daughter to school or go to the movies with my wife. But that doesn’t mean that my genes and brain structure can explain why I choose to do these things — why I affirm them as meaningful and valuable. — Richard Polt
Are you hinting that truth implies existence? — simeonz
Whose existence - the subject or the object - is a requirement for a statement to be true? — simeonz
Exactly my point. I would have said "necessitates the subject's existence", but the problem is - I am not sure that the subjective (in principle) is not an emergent, complex, partially distributed, potentially mutable property. I speculate that the subjective may depend on the relationship between constituents, as an expression of their organizational independence. Since I cannot be sure that the subjective is intrinsic indivisible immutable property, I cannot say "I think therefore I am", but rather "something thinks, therefore something is". For the latter, I can sort-of argue logically, using the necessity of logical models for the soundness of a statement, but still with many caveats.Nahhhh.....I was just wondering if you held some unassailable truth. So as not to extend the concept of existence into the far reaches of dumb, an analytic proposition, which begins merely as something one thinks, would be true when its negation is impossible. The most famous one of all being cogito ergo sum. — Mww
My point is - the subject (speaking now in a more narrow conventional sense) need not even comprehend the correlation as it applies, for it to be true. But if the subject doesn't comprehend the statement, what is their relation to the statement. One might say, that they still will experience the truth as an effect, but this bounds truth to experience. I am not sure this is the case, as it seems to me that truth may exist in its realization, without requiring knowledge. For example, simple mechanisms form a correct expression of some reality. An electronic thermoregulator can be "correct", in the sense that its internal representation of the environment state is amorphous to the actual state. The two states can be observed, their correlation or mutual information measured. In contrast, an "incorrect" thermoregulator would have states that exhibit less correlation, which is independent of the notion of its utility. So, in some primitive sense, one can talk about truth, even without awareness, just based on state correlations. There still has to be some state space for those correlating states, Thus even in this primitive case, you need some realization or existence. I am not arguing here whether correctness has value without a sentient subject. Neither whether reality without sentient subject can be ever validated, even if the truth would hypothetically still have proper mathematical definition.I think the criteria for truth is the relation between subject and object, not always the existence of one or the other. The statement every effect has a cause is true, but neither cause nor effect exist. At least in the strictest sense. If we mean anything that is an object of thought exists just as objects of experience exist, such as concepts or ideas, then the answer to your question would have to be....both. — Mww
but the problem is - I am not sure that the subjective (in principle) is not an emergent, complex, partially distributed, potentially mutable property. — simeonz
Since I cannot be sure that the subjective is intrinsic indivisible immutable property, I cannot say "I think therefore I am", but rather "something thinks, therefore something is". — simeonz
the subject (...) need not even comprehend the correlation as it applies, for it to be true. — simeonz
Considering only the biological level of the individual when interpreting natural selection is artificially limiting. ... selection of the fittest is [also] capable of explaining what drove people to complex social order, cultural conservatism, and in the ethical plane — simeonz
The author takes for granted that the structure of machines is incapable of sentience. — simeonz
Whoever used ants as an explanatory device, I am sure did not mean to assert that the human species are similar in their social dimension. — simeonz
the author has not convinced me that science has chosen the wrong methodology to explain the emergence of ethical considerations, from an empirical standpoint. If the argument was non-empirical, then the essay should have established what logic would be used to validate it. — simeonz
I am not sure that the subjective (in principle) is not an emergent, complex, partially distributed, potentially mutable property. — simeonz
The point I'm making about your posts in particular, is that they seem to presume the mere existence of a counter-argument constitutes an argument in itself. — Isaac
The less I try to postulate, the closer I become to the materialist view. Which is not to say, that I am against postulations that are undeniable by reason or nature. But the more I think about a statement, the more corrigible it seems. Hence, I drift towards materialism, as the most void philosophical position.You along with every physicalist/materialist worth his lab coat, property herein meaning something that belongs to a real substance. Not that you gave any indication you are one, just that experience informs me they think along the same lines you just spoke. — Mww
Depending on our definition, the subjective might be possible to stretch (in ways that actually interest me), and still maintain the capacity for reason.I rationalize the situation by coming at it from behind....I don’t have to prove subjectivity, but rather all I have to do is show how everything else becomes immediately unintelligible if there isn’t such a thing. — Mww
This certainly leans closer towards a definition of subject, that will resist attack, if awareness turned out to be potentially (or in some sense actually) impersonal.I take that “something thinks, therefore something exists” and turn it into “I” am that which exists as thinking subject. “I” taken to represent the spontaneity of all thought in general, also called “ego” in empirical psychology, and the thinking subject taken to represent consciousness itself, which is the totality of conscious thought in general. — Mww
Tautologically, without the subject, the truth has no value to that subject. The necessity or capacity to make distinctions is lost to a non-extant subject, but does that preclude the truth from being in its own right? One could say, that we don't have to make such judgement, assuming the nature of truth does not impact our use of it. I am not sure of that.Perhaps, but what good would a truth be if it wasn’t comprehended as such? — Mww
The way I understand it, the real backbone of evolution is natural selection, not biology. Natural selection is determined by some biological traits, but it also involves all the particulars of the speciation process, including sociological or ecological factors. For example, the pollution of the ocean by plastic contaminants is not a biological phenomenon. However, it emerges as a product of collective behaviors that interact with the species' continuing adaptation and fitness.But then, for us, nothing is beyond the scope of biology, as we're material beings, and so ultimately explicable in scientific terms. — Wayfarer
This is a very substantial postulate, that needs to have some rational grounds for me to accept it.Machines are devices, and devices are not beings. But again, you're explanatory framework may not permit the distinction. — Wayfarer
What is the alternative methodology? The least of what I want is to conclude at my premises, but I will not be convinced through sentiment either.In other words, if you claim that empirical method is the arbiter in such issues, then you're basically want an empirical argument against empiricism. — Wayfarer
As I said before, I am willing to allow that matter could be self-perceiving, under certain conditions. Our familiarity with matter is insufficient to make such judgement, but for me, it is a possibility. And I think that it requires the least amount of extraneous philosophical content. Considering the states of mind that an individual can experience, due to illness, or age, I can hypothesize a plethora of mental states. And since I am skeptical that our characteristic mental state is the only one that can sustain reason, I prefer to generalize philosophical arguments beyond the typical frame of mind.A property of what? Perceived by whom? — Wayfarer
The way I understand it, the real backbone of evolution is natural selection, not biology. — simeonz
Machines are devices, and devices are not beings. But again, your explanatory framework may not permit the distinction.
— Wayfarer
This is a very substantial postulate, that needs to have some rational grounds for me to accept it. — simeonz
I am willing to allow that matter could be self-perceiving, under certain conditions — simeonz
Whatever the originally intended scope was, natural selection can justify the emergence of social order and ethical standards in the social groups. In the article you referred me to, the author was arguing that the emergence of ethical standards is independent of the process of natural selection, wasn't he?But natural selection is a theory of the origin of species, and, as such, a biological theory. — Wayfarer
You were arguing about the ontological content associated with different physical forms. You resolved this question by a dictionary lookup?The dictionary should suffice. The definition of machines, devices, beings, and organisms, demonstrate that they are different in kind. — Wayfarer
We have developed the skill of engineering and have the resolve to embody the material expression of our intelligence into an artificially produced vessel. This will change the time scale significantly. For better or for worse, it has become essentially unavoidable at this point.As far as science knows, this is only ever evident in the case that it forms the physical aspect of sentient beings. Took several billions of years, and stellar explosions, to happen, however ;-) — Wayfarer
You were arguing about the ontological content associated with different physical forms. You resolved this question by a dictionary lookup? — simeonz
In other words, if you claim that empirical method is the arbiter in such issues, then you're basically want an empirical argument against empiricism.
— Wayfarer
What is the alternative methodology? The least of what I want is to conclude at my premises, but I will not be convinced through sentiment either. — simeonz
That is why I cannot argue that it is true. Only that it is self-consistent and plausible. Which you don't seem to agree to.Is 'eliminative materialism' an empirical hypothesis? Is there any conceivable way of determining whether it's true by empirical means? — Wayfarer
I drift towards materialism, as the most void philosophical position. — simeonz
if awareness turned out to be potentially (or in some sense actually) impersonal. — simeonz
The necessity or capacity to make distinctions is lost to a non-extant subject, but does that preclude the truth from being in its own right? — simeonz
What methodology do you use to justify your disagreement with elminativism's self-consistency and plausibility, or is it a matter of incompatible premises of your philosophical position? — simeonz
The abstract notions, such as equivalence, causation, correspondence, etc, can be considered predicated by nature's reproducible conditions. For a naturalist, abstraction can be explained as emergence of generalizing faculties in the human cognitive apparatus, as optimal response to the exhaustible external varieties. If you imply that human sentience is irreducible to information processing, then you will not be satisfied with this answer.I gave an argument, very early in this thread which is that there is no physical equivalent of the "=" sign. It can be extended to the argument that symbols, generally, which are the basis of language and abstract thought, can't be meaningfully reduced to physical laws (an observation which is the basis of the discipline of biosemiotics). — Wayfarer
The implied premise of the question, however, is that the search for (universal and eternal) meaning is not a rational need for foundational permanence. If it were, then it would make the universe meaningful by definition for a naturalist, because it is permanent, and a foundation onto itself. Such hypothesis may be overreaching, but so is the idea that the universe was conceived by an omnipotent creator, that is permanent and a foundation onto itself. The constructions are so similar, they end up being different on what seems like a technical note.Put another way, if the universe is, as materialism tells us, intrinsically meaningless, then how is meaning and reason grounded in it? — Wayfarer
Human knowledge is fragile. You are correct, that any theory that supports that knowledge is corrigible attacks its own foundations. But given that human knowledge is indeed imperfect, shouldn't any sound epistemic theory have the obligation to model our understanding in such a way, as to seed reasonable doubt in its own validity, in consideration of its origin?And, as remarked by one of Dennett's critics, 'if reason is a product of natural selection, then how much confidence can we have in a rational argument for natural selection ?' — Wayfarer
I don't understand how reducing the subjective states (mind) to objective states (matter) attacks the existence of the mind. This is the same as believing that allowing your doctor to examine your cough will destroy your cough from existence. I think it merely attacks the mind-body distinction. Allowing the mind to be understood empirically, does not disregard it. It rather appears to me, that dualism has a notion of the human soul, which is being attacked. But this is not the same thing as attacking the mind, except for a dualist. I dare say, I am an existentialist. I believe that if your values depend on your irreducibility, your ethical choices rest on the wrong premises. This explains why I don't subscribe to the objections against the "meaninglessness" of the material world onto itself.What it all comes down to, is that eliminative materialism doesn't succeed in eliminating the subjective reality of being; it basically ignores it, and then says 'what's the problem?' — Wayfarer
I am still thinking about it :) But I don't have the answers. Mutual information, correlation, isomorphism, etc, could help in defining mathematically a purely material concept of representation. Which I believe to be the objective component of the notion of fact awareness, which predicates understanding.Truth is a distinction, insofar as it is a member of a complementary pair, and if the capacity to make distinctions, that is, recognize a complementary pair, becomes lost, doesn’t that make the complement itself moot? If there is no making or comprehending a distinction, how can it be said there is one? — Mww
But from there on, how the subject emerges, and what additional faculties are necessary for them to experience and evaluate this fact awareness, I don't know. — simeonz
we know that understanding requires awareness, but not self-awareness. — simeonz
If I am going to talk about what a subject is, I would prefer a definition that doesn't rely on actual existence (, but rather just plausibility) of the subject, creating an epistemic reference context of some kind and a mapping to a material context. — simeonz
The assignment of truth values is a different matter, which requires something more, which if materially expressed, is very hard to define. — simeonz
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