If we want to know why consciousness arose, and by 'why' mean to find a necessary and sufficient set of causes, then we must look to physical chains of events and eliminate each until the phenomena is no longer present. That is an empirical investigation, not a philosophical one. — Isaac

In other words, from outside.


Good luck with that!

In other words, from outside. — Wayfarer

Yes, from outside. If other people are conscious then we can examine their consciousness from outside of it.

In humans, it’s a meaning process. — Wayfarer

Mind explaining?

In other words, from outside.


Good luck with that! — Wayfarer

Why do you think that’s impossible?

Also, on a related note, I'm not sure I can agree with this use of "self-awareness", "feels like something", "experience of redness" and "meaning" type of expressions as if we were conducting some taxonomic exercise.

The language (it seems to me) is as if there were an already existent thing "self-awareness" and we're surprised to discover that the experience humans have falls into that category "why would it do that?" being the question.

But that's not how language and concepts work. We first experience a thing which we determine, entirely subjectively, to be separate enough from other things to have its own name. We then call that thing "self-awareness". So the question "why are we self-aware? " makes no sense at all. We are "self-aware" because 'self-aware' is the word we decided to give to the thing we are.

There's nothing pre-existantly surprising about the way we are, there is not a pre-existing probability space of "ways things can be" such that it would be surprising to find that a thing that is the way we are. At the risk of having taken a long-winded route to T Clark's jug analogy, we are the way we are because that is one of the possible ways to be. Its like being surprised the dice lands on a six, its one of the faces to land on, it's only a surprise in need of explanation if we have some reason to doubt that it was one of the possible ways to be.

In humans, it’s a meaning process.
— Wayfarer

Mind explaining? — khaled

I was responding to T. Clark's statement that 'consciousness is a mental process'. What I said was kind of a play on words, but makes a serious point: that as language-using beings, we see the world through meanings. We couldn't even be having this discussion otherwise. Meaning is thoroughly embedded in consciousness, and vica versa; whenever we speak or discursively analyse, then we're implicitly or explicitly drawing on our understanding of meaning. And the reason that is different in humans, is that we do speak, think, tell stories, and so on - we don't simply respond to stimuli or act instinctively, as do non-rational creatures; we weigh things up and say 'well, what I mean is....'

In other words, from outside.
— Wayfarer

Yes, from outside. If other people are conscious then we can examine their consciousness from outside of it. — Isaac

But that is cognitive science, not philosophy as such. When you study consciousness as a function of behaviour and so on, you are studying it, as it were, a step removed. And it's a big step!

We first experience a thing which we determine, entirely subjectively, to be separate enough from other things to have its own name. We then call that thing "self-awareness". — Isaac

We don't experience self- awareness. Awareness is the condition for any kind of experience. The hard problem is precisely that the 'experience of awareness' is never an object of awareness - although that is not the way that David Chalmers puts it, unfortunately. Instead he engages in the circumlocution of 'what is it like to be....'.

But that is cognitive science, not philosophy as such. — Wayfarer

Yes. That was the point I was making.

you are studying it, as it were, a step removed. And it's a big step! — Wayfarer

No, I don't agree with this. You are not studying your own consciousness, you're studying someone else's. We don't have any problem studying the phenomena of rain simply because we are not ourselves rain. Why should consciousness be any different?

Awareness is the condition for any kind of experience. — Wayfarer

Again "awareness" is a word. We apply the word to some thing. The concept of 'awareness' didn't pre-exist for us to discover, to our surprise, that our experience required it as a condition.

Using your definition (and it us just your definition, not the definition), it is the name given to a phenomenon you posit the existence of as part of your theory. It doesn't exist outside of your theory such that those who posit a different theory have made a mistake by not accounting for it.

We don't have any problem studying the phenomena of rain simply because we are not ourselves rain. Why should consciousness be any different? — Isaac

Because rain (etc) is 'other' to us. Phenomena are 'what appears'. The subject is what (actually who) phenomena appear to.

[Awareness] doesn't exist outside of your theory such that those who posit a different theory have made a mistake by not accounting for it. — Isaac

Awareness obviously must exist before any theory. One cannot theorise when unconscious.

The Scientific and Physicalist view is that Consciousness is somehow located in the Neurons. It is a reasonable assumption given that Conscious Activity is Correlated with Neural Activity. But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons. — SteveKlinko
This is not true. There is a well-developed branch of cognitive science which studies the biological and neurological basis of consciousness. They have developed models that describe plausible mechanisms for the manifestation of consciousness. — T Clark

They study the Neural Correlates of Consciousness. They have no idea How something like the Experience of Redness happens.

Science has not been able to show for example, how something like the Experience of Redness is some kind of effect of Neural Activity. In fact, the more you think about the Redness Experience and then think about Neural Activity, the less likely it seems that the Redness Experience is actually some sort of Neural Activity. Science has tried in vain for a hundred years to figure this out. If the Experience of Redness actually was in the Neurons, Science would have had a lot to say about it by now. Something has got to be wrong with their perspective on the problem. — SteveKlinko
This is a false problem caused by an unwillingness or inability to imagine consciousness as just another process. I can certainly understand that. It takes a conceptual leap and a realization that our precious sense of self is nothing special. People, including scientists, used to believe that biological life could never arise out of physical mechanisms. They sometimes hypothesized undetectable vital forces that brought matter to life. Consciousness is not different. There is not hard problem of consciousness, just a lack of awareness. — T Clark

Biological Life is made out of matter so it is only Logical that it arose from Physical Processes. Sit down, relax, and think more Deeply about the Redness itself, as a thing in itself. After that you might begin to understand the magnitude of the Gap that there is between anything we know about Neurons and the Experience of Redness. Science does not know how the Redness can come from Neural Activity. I can tell by this post that you really do not understand the Hard Problem of Consciousness.

The Inter Mind Model (http://TheInterMind.com) can accommodate Consciousness as being in the Neurons, but it can also accommodate other concepts of Consciousness. The Inter Mind Model is structurally a Connection Model, in the sense that the Physical Mind (PM) is connected to the Inter Mind (IM) which is connected to the Conscious Mind (CM). These Connections might be conceptual where all three Minds are actually in the Neurons. But these Connections might have more reality to them where the PM, the IM, and the CM are separate things. — SteveKlinko
I did read the "Inter Mind Model" section of the article you linked. I didn't find it convincing and I didn't see any evidence for the IM concept — T Clark

Thank You for reading the article. The Arguments sections that follow provide the evidence.

Science has tried in vain for a hundred years to figure this out. — SteveKlinko
True, but probably because the private realm is near impossible to get at from the public realm.

I'm not sure it helps to move the mysterious explanatory gap to another processor with special power, as there is still the gap.

Some have it that the dispositions underlying reality are occasions of experience, yet, our instruments seem to detect waves, as ubiquitous in nature even. — PoeticUniverse

This is because the Gap might more specifically be a Processing Gap rather than being a general Explanatory Gap.

Because rain (etc) is 'other' to us. Phenomena are 'what appears'. The subject is what (actually who) phenomena appear to. — Wayfarer

Yes, and if we're studying someone else's consciousness they are 'other' to us and we are not the ones to whom the phenomena in question is appearing, so studying someone else's consciousness meets both of your criteria.

Awareness obviously must exist before any theory. — Wayfarer

How can awareness possibly exist before any theory, there must first be a theory as to what 'awareness' is in order for us to name it thus.

the problem with the common interpretation of 'idealism' is that it tries to conceive of mind as something objectively existent. But the mind is not an object of perception, rather 'that which perceives'. You can't get behind 'it' or outside 'it' to see what 'it' is, but such is the habit of 'objectivism' that this is the only way we can consider the matter. This is what leads to the typical 'ghost in the machine' criticism of Cartesian dualism.

Looked at this way, the whole 'problem of consciousness' arises from a flawed perspective, specifically, that of treating the subjective reality of experience as something objective. Mind is not objectively existent, but (as Husserl points out in his critique of naturalism) it is what discloses or reveals anything objective whatever; it is the condition or foundation of objective knowledge, while itself not being an object of knowledge.

If you can see that, you save yourself a lot of needless bother — Wayfarer

I believe you are saying that the Flowed Perspective is thinking that there even is such a thing as Consciousness. If I could only ignore myself then everything would become clear to me. Ok I'll try that ... Sorry that didn't work. I need a better Premise than that.

Yes, but you're encouraging a fair deal of witting and unwitting dualistic woo. — bongo fury

If you think Dualism is Woo then you must be a Physical Monist (Physicalist) or a Spiritual Monist (Spiritualist). In either case you would be promoting the Oneness of everything. For the Phyisicalist everything is Physical and for them there is no Conscious aspect to the Universe. If you are a Spiritualist then you think everything is Consciousness and there is in fact no Physical aspect to the Universe. Neither of these Oneness beliefs make sense in the manifest Universe that we live in. There is clearly a Physical part of the Universe with all it's Physical Phenomena and there is clearly a Consciousness part of the Universe with all its Conscious Phenomena. I think the Oneness premise is Woo.

You said: "As I said, I don't think the hard problem of consciousness is hard. I don't even think it's a problem".

Speaking of logic, how do you explain that consciousness defies the law of excluded middle (our ability to do two things at once-conscious and subconscious cognition) ?? Is there an exceptional formula that explains that phenom? Or is it existential and just is.

Yup. We can agree those processes are sufficient for mental processes to arise. — khaled

I don't think we do agree. I don't think biological processes are either necessary or sufficient for mental processes to develop. Unless you believe that all living things have mental processes, which I don't, there are lots of biological processes that don't lead to mental processes. So it's not sufficient. Also, I think it's possible that mental processes can develop without biological processes. One possible candidate would be AI. So it seems likely to me it isn't necessary either.

Unless you believe that all living things have mental processes, which I don't, there are lots of biological processes that don't lead to mental processes. So it's not sufficient — T Clark

My bad. I meant the particular biological processes we have, not just any

I suggest you wait to respond to this post. I'm way behind on this thread and I'll have more comments in additional posts. It might make sense to wait till I'm finished to send out your responses.

Also, I'm eating my first bacon, lettuce, and tomato sandwiches of the season with tomatoes from our garden. I may be delayed a bit as I wipe tomato pulp, mayonnaise, and bacon grease from my keyboard.

But that's a separate issue. It's as if you don't need to justify since he hasn't. If he has asserted it comes from other processes or sources, sure, he needs to justify that. But that doesn't take away your onus. Now you both need to justify. — Coben

Apparently you and I have different understandings of what it means to justify something. Here are some from the web:

• to prove or show to be just, right, or reasonable
• to defend or uphold as warranted or well-grounded
• to show or prove that it is reasonable or necessary.

It seems clear to me that justification doesn't have to mean absolute certainty. That's not possible. There will always be uncertainty. I would go further. I think the level of justification required varies from situation to situation based on the consequences of being wrong. If people will die if I get things wrong, I need much stronger justification than I will if I'll fail to convince someone on a philosophical forum.

On that basis, I am satisfied that the level of justification I've provided is acceptable. I have been very up-front about the amount of uncertainty involved in my opinion. That gives others the information they need to evaluate what I have to say.

he fact that T Clark finds the existence of scientific conclusions about consciousness to be sufficient to justify his position and Khaled doesn't, does not make T Clark's position unjustified, simply not justified to Khaled's satisfaction. — Isaac

Yes.

I'm just showing that what you presented isn't scientific evidence, it's opinion. — khaled

Not to be flip - ok, ok, to be flip - I think there is pretty good scientific evidence that all the people in the world are not chatbots.

biological processes are sufficient for consciousness not that they are necessary. — khaled

You and I seem to be disagreeing on something, but I want to make sure I know what it is. We've agreed that biological activity in the human nervous system, including the brain, is sufficient to explain how mental processes, including consciousness, arise. Is that correct? That means there are no additional factors that have to be taken into account.

If what I've said in the above paragraph is correct, where do we disagree? What is the hard problem?

No, it wasn't justified in T Clark's own estimation. He told Khaled that if he wanted answers he would need to talk to someone else. Which means that he cannot justify his own conclusions to himself. — Coben

You're misrepresenting what I said, putting words in my mouth. Bad boy!!.See my previous response:

https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/320986

I don't see how a philosophy forum benefits from people saying 'consensus science believes X' conversation over. And this would be a lay person analyzing science, and in the specfiic case of T. Clark above, saying that he can't remember that much and hasn't read that much. — Coben

And again, he said this without admitting that he didn't know. What a simple thing to say? You can't no this? No, you're right Khaled, it is my impression from what I read, though it was not a broad reading of the relevent research. — Coben

Again, picking on me behind my back. Boo hoo. And again, misrepresenting what I said. Everybody hates me except @Isaac. I didn't say anything about the consensus of science. I only responded to a specific statement by SteveKlinko:

But Science has no Theory, Hypothesis or even a Speculation about how Consciousness could be in the Neurons — SteveKlinko

In response I said "That is not true." In order to justify that statement, all I have to show is that "science" has theories, hypotheses, and speculation about it. I propose all I have to do is show that at least one reputable scientist has. The book I read is "The Feeling of What happens," by Antonio Damasio. Whether or not he is correct in what he thinks, he is a reputable scientist with theories, hypotheses, and speculations. It is my understanding he is not the only one. Again, I am not qualified to give a scientific review of the book, but Damasio's ideas seemed plausible.

What if explaining the science is beyond his ability (apologies if it isn't, — Isaac

No apology needed. The explanation provided in Damasio's book was not difficult and I think I understood it, but I can't present it here off the top of my head.

We are discussing ideas and from perspectives that sometimes scientists are not the only ones equiped to look at, and often also do not have the philosophical tools to see their own assumptions. — Coben

As I've claimed, I believe I am justified in saying there is credible scientific work being done to establish a biological basis for mental processes. I can understand that philosophy may have a role in judging whether the conclusions of that work are adequately justified. Other than that, what role does philosophy have in the process?

And now you are entering this particular exchange and making it seem like that's a stopping point. — Coben

Oddly enough, I welcome Isaac's input. Just because he suggests we may be at a stopping point, that doesn't mean you have to stop.

In humans, it’s a meaning process. That’s what makes human consciousness different. — Wayfarer

I don't see any reason to believe that human consciousness is any different from any other mental process. Meaning isn't something inherent in mental processes, it is created by them.

Speaking of logic, how do you explain that consciousness defies the law of excluded middle (our ability to do two things at once-conscious and subconscious cognition) ?? Is there an exceptional formula that explains that phenom? Or is it existential and just is. — 3017amen

I can juggle and whistle at the same time. Does that violate the Law of the Excluded Middle? Actually, I can't juggle. Also, LEM applies to propositions, not the physical world.

The language (it seems to me) is as if there were an already existent thing "self-awareness" and we're surprised to discover that the experience humans have falls into that category "why would it do that?" being the question.

But that's not how language and concepts work. We first experience a thing which we determine, entirely subjectively, to be separate enough from other things to have its own name. We then call that thing "self-awareness". So the question "why are we self-aware? " makes no sense at all. We are "self-aware" because 'self-aware' is the word we decided to give to the thing we are. — Isaac

Are all of you as tired of my responses as I am of writing them?

I agree with what you've written, but I think you and I are missing something that bothers @khaled and others. Apparently it's the jump between biology and mentality. They seem to think there's another step required. I don't understand why that would be so. Seems like you don't either.

By the way, I think I'm all caught up. If anyone wants to respond, it's all clear.

LOL! Ok I'll offer two different examples/ propositions viz. our consciousness and maybe you'll be able to answer them:

The ball is red and the ball is green. Is that logically impossible?

Love is an objective truth. Is that a true statement?

This statement is a lie. Is that true or false?

LOL! Ok I'll offer two different examples/ propositions viz. our consciousness and maybe you'll be able to answer them:

The ball is red and the ball is green. Is that logically impossible?

Love is an objective truth. Is that a true statement? — 3017amen

I don't really want to get in a discussion of LEM unless it has something to do with the issue being discussed, which is....something to do with consciousness or whether I'm justified in saying something about consciousness or something.

I think the discussion has run out of steam, at least for me.

Ok no worries. You came across as if there were no mysteries or using your words "no hard problems" associated with our consciousness. I just wanted you to support your belief.

You and I seem to be disagreeing on something — T Clark

That would be whether or not the hard problem is hard

We've agreed that biological activity in the human nervous system, including the brain, is sufficient to explain how mental processes, including consciousness, arise. Is that correct? That means there are no additional factors that have to be taken into account. — T Clark

Agreed. Except the hard problem asks what are the necessary conditions not what are the sufficient ones. Answering that is pretty hard

Except the hard problem asks what are the necessary conditions not what are the sufficient ones. Answering that is pretty hard — khaled

But only if you make certain assumptions which are not necessary. Conditions which are necessary for consciousness appear to be located in the brain, and for evidence of this we have the fact that what we recognise as consciousness in others stops when brain activity stops. It's only a problem if you then go on to make the unwarranted assumption that what we recognise in others a signs of consciousness are, in fact, not exhaustive signs. But why would you presume that?

So long as we have defined consciousness as "that which causes us to...", then we can easily find necessary causes by examining common traits in those with and without consciousness. Indeed some really interesting work is being done at the moment by Susan Greenfield examining people as they wake from sleep and anaesthesia identifying the brain patterns associated with gaining consciousness.

If, rather, you want to define consciousness as some mystical woo, then it's hardly surprising that science can't find it's necessary causes, it never will, but that's to do with your definition, not consciousness.

Conditions which are necessary for consciousness appear to be located in the brain — Isaac

Sufficient*. Just because brain causes consciousness doesn’t mean brain is necessary for consciousness. You’re claiming the brain is necessary and sufficient for consciousness, I’m claiming it’s only sufficient so my hypothesis makes fewer assumptions

for evidence of this we have the fact that what we recognise as consciousness in others stops when brain activity stops. — Isaac

Claim: when “is conscious” is false, “certain brain activity is occurring” is false

You can’t go from that to saying that when “is conscious” is true, “certain brain activity is occurring” must be true. Because you have to show that the ONLY way consciousness can occur is through certain brain activity. What the statement above shows is that certain brain activity occurring is sufficient for consciousness, not that it isn’t necessary.

In other words, you made a claim and assumed its inverse is true. Which is not always the case.

It's only a problem if you then go on to make the unwarranted assumption that what we recognise in others a signs of consciousness are, in fact, not exhaustive signs. But why would you presume that? — Isaac

Why would you presume they ARE exhaustive. Unlike length and weight, you can’t “measure” consciousness. That we all assume others are conscious is great and all, but let’s not make the further assumption that the only consciousness possible is human consciousness unless we have some reason to believe our brain is NECESSARY not sufficient to cause consciousness.

So long as we have defined consciousness as "that which causes us to..." — Isaac

I don’t think anyone here defined consciousness that way. Usually people define it as “is there an observer there/ is there something that has experiences there”

Just because brain causes consciousness doesn’t mean brain is necessary for consciousness. You’re claiming the brain is necessary and sufficient for consciousness, I’m claiming it’s only sufficient so my hypothesis makes fewer assumptions — khaled

Ah. So you'd also describe the 'hard' problem of rain (just because we only see rain when there's clouds doesn't mean that clouds are the only way rain can form), the 'hard' problem of gravity (just because we only see matter in motion without other force in the presence of gravity, doesn't mean that's the only other force), the 'hard' problem of death by jumping off a cliff (just because the only outcome we've ever seen from jumping of a 600m cliff is death, doesn't mean that's the only outcome).

Basically, every scientific investigation whatsoever becomes a 'hard' problem because we cannot be certain that our experimental conditions cover all possible conditions. Fine, science is hard. so why is consciousness special?

just because we only see rain when there's clouds doesn't mean that clouds are the only way rain can form — Isaac

Correct. Any source of dripping water can be described as rain. Clouds aren’t necessary for rain. Though it’s safe to assume no one is artificially making rain.

just because we only see matter in motion without other force in the presence of gravity, doesn't mean that's the only other force — Isaac

Correct. But in physics you can add up forces so if you call the net force on this object in question “gravity” then it would be the only force.

just because the only outcome we've ever seen from jumping of a 600m cliff is death, doesn't mean that's the only outcome — Isaac

Correct. Theoretically you can survive with enough things in the way.

Basically, every scientific investigation whatsoever becomes a 'hard' problem because we cannot be certain that our experimental conditions cover all possible conditions — Isaac

No. Science makes assumptions like these all the time. And most importantly it never claims to be correct, it just claims to be able to describe the patterns what we see. Did newton say that the gravitational force is the only possible force upon discovering it? No he didn’t. But you’re doing something akin to that. You’ve discovered a way consciousness arises them claimed it is the only way.

Fine, science is hard. so why is consciousness special? — Isaac

Because you can’t measure it. You can’t tell for sure anything else is conscious other than yourself. So it’s especially hard. Imagine trying to make a theory of everything in physics with your data being a ball falling from 2m and that’s it. Just a single data point.

Consciousness is whether or not there is an experiencing subject for the object in question. Whether or not there is an experiencing subject for the object in question says nothing about the properties of the object in question. We can reasonably assume that since consciousness comes and goes based on certain properties of a certain conscious object that those properties are sufficient for consciousness. But we cannot assume, based on that, that no other objects have experiencing subjects nor can we assume that if another conscious object is discovered that it would share properties with the one we know.