Augustine, in contrast, explicitly rejected the body as the source of ignorance or error, neither of which, in any case, could in his view ever account for sin. — StreetlightX
What was Augustine rejecting? It's not an ancient Greek conception of responsibility. — frank
Whether or not he meant to reject it or not, that's what he effectively did, and that's what we were addressing. — StreetlightX
RA, I think you may be overlooking the obvious. Would you not agree that raising the ' scientific question' in itself is a necessary part of the evaluation process?
And if so, is that not called human wonderment? But if not, then why choose to evaluate at all?
Point is: Christianity is pervasively self-contradictory. That's why it's impossible to trace any particular historic trend back to it. — frank
Again, the relavence is? — StreetlightX
Take 'choose' out of it, and this becomes a tautology: "We are never able to do... other than what we actually do". — StreetlightX
But what would it mean to do otherwise than what we do? Say doing otherwise were 'possible'. And then you did otherwise. But then, you could not have done otherwise than that. — StreetlightX
So, no, obviously, you can't have done otherwise than what you did, or do. — StreetlightX
"We are never able to choose or do anything other than what we actually do".
There's alot of weird modal shit going in a statement like this. Take 'choose' out of it, and this becomes a tautology: "We are never able to do... other than what we actually do". But what would it mean to do otherwise than what we do? Say doing otherwise were 'possible'. And then you did otherwise. But then, you could not have done otherwise than that. So, no, obviously, you can't have done otherwise than what you did, or do. — StreetlightX
The issue with moral responsibility is different, though. Moral responsibility is predicated on the idea that we could have done otherwise than we did; that an alternative course of action under the control of the actor was actually, and not merely logically, possible prior to the act. — Janus
The argument, then, is that in order to provide a framework for moral culpability (to explain evil), theologians had to introduce a conception of being able to do other than we actually do despite the fact that the entire question of whether we are or aren't able to do other than we actually do isn't even coherent. — Isaac
The two logical possibilities are that we could have done differently than we did or that we could not have done differently than we did. Whether we could have done differently than we did is a question the answer to which, for obvious reasons cannot be empirically determined, but I don't see why that should lead us to think the question is incoherent. — Janus
unless we wish to either dispense with moral culpability, or dispense with the requirement to have a rational justification for holding people morally responsible. — Janus
That an alternative course of action under the control of the actor was actually, and not merely logically, possible prior to the act. — Janus
What is a puppet responsible for?Isaac is entirely right that 'free will' is destructive of responsibility, and not in any sense an enabling condition — StreetlightX
If we were to conclude that one's behaviour is entirely determined, then it would follow exactly from that the we should create circumstances (including deterrents to crime) which become those very determining factors for the behaviour we desire.
If we conclude the opposite end of the spectrum, that people are entirely free-willed and make their own choices without determining influences, then there's no point in punishing them at all, it's not going to determine any better behaviour in those observing the punishment. — Isaac
there could be no rational moral justification for such punishment, there could only be practical justification. — Janus
The protection of society would be moral, making the lock-up necessary for other than punishment, although somewhat 'punishing', hoping for learning. — PoeticUniverse
It is one thing for choices to be influenced and another for them to be entirely determined. — Janus
My point was simply that moral culpability or responsibility is logically predicated on the idea that moral agents could have acted other than they did. It is only on that basis that a coherent and consistent distinction could be made between moral acts and merely natural events. If the murderer could not, actually as opposed to merely logically, have refrained from murdering, then the act of murder is logically no different than a natural event. — Janus
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