Still, the objects that the concepts refer to are real. — BlueBanana

I don't see how (insofar as 'real' means something like 'outside of subjective artifice).

You don't answer "why does this chair I'm sitting on exist?" with "the question is meaningless because the chair doesn't exist, it's a concept that exists because you named it; the answer is 'because you call the thing you're sitting on right now a chair'." — BlueBanana

Exactly. So how does the concept of a thing called 'consciousness' which we cannot properly identify/do not understand, make any sense at all. If we cannot identify it, it doesn't exist, things only exist because we've identified some pattern in reality which we think deserves a name. If we cannot understand what it is, then what is it we are we giving a name to?

If we look at empirical knowledge, when we say we don't 'understand' some force, we mean something like that we can see x causes y, but we don't know how. What's being argued here is that there exists some thing 'consciousness', but we cannot identify it such that we can correlate its presence with brain states. That seems to me putting the cart before the horse. If we cannot identify it, how do we know there is even anything there to be named?

patient reports are not trustworthy because a p-zombie would lie and say anything to make it seem like they're a conscious being. — BlueBanana

Again, you're presuming hat consciousness is a thing this p-zombie could potentially have and yet claiming that there is no phenomena there for us to identify. Either consciousness is the name we give to some phenomena we observe in others (in which case we can identify it by those phenomena), or it is the name we give to the way we, and only we, feel. Which, being entirely subjective cannot be discussed at all. How would you even know my 'consciousness' was the same as yours when we use the term in an exchange of sentences. See Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Besides, is that indicative of consciousness? — BlueBanana

The question makes no sense. It still presumes there exists a thing called 'consciousness' and then seeks to ask how we might identify it. If we can't identify it, how do we know there is even a thing to be named?

So you're honestly saying we have no way of knowing what is the difference between an aware being and an object? — Wayfarer

No. I'm saying there is no such thing as an 'aware' being prior to us defining the characteristics which identify 'aware being' and saying "well, that is one of those things". Responds when poked with a stick is a good start.

You know what experience means. — khaled

Are you that convinced that what you personally mean by 'experience' is the same thing everyone else means by it?

self evident concept that no one asks for definitions for seriously. — khaled

This sort of nonsense only ever seems to get by in philosophy. Do you realise any contradiction at all in you explaining to me a concept which is self-evident?

I don’t define consciousness as the feeling I have per se. I define it as the capacity to have a feeling — khaled

That's even worse. How do you identify the capacity to have a feeling without actually having a feeling?

Disagreements about concepts don’t change the world. — khaled

I'm not sure what this is aimed at. I didn't say that disagreements about concepts do change the world, so I'm not sure why you would be refuting it.

Only one seven billionth of our evidence for consciousness comes from introspection. — T Clark

Yes, for a concept that is being painted as entirely internal and one which we have no idea that other people share, there isn't half a lot of 'sharing' going on. One wonders why we fill entire bookshelves talking to each other about a concept that we apparently have no reason to believe anyone else shares.

I got to my understanding with some help from Lao Tzu. Any eastern philosophy in your porfolio? — T Clark

Not really, not as much as I'd like.

Not really, not as much as I'd like. — Isaac

I suggest you take a look at the Tao Te Ching. You can read the whole thing in an hour and it's broken up into 80 short verses. Free on the web. Look for Stephen Mitchell's translation. It's very American.

First verse:

The tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name. The unnamable is the eternally real.
Naming is the origin
of all particular things. Free from desire, you realize the mystery.
Caught in desire, you see only the manifestations. Yet mystery and manifestations
arise from the same source.
This source is called darkness. Darkness within darkness.
The gateway to all understanding.

You can read the whole thing in an hour and it's broken up into 80 short verses. — T Clark

Thanks. That's jumped the queue on the reading list. I like stuff that's short, can't stand philosophers who take half a page to say something three well-chosen lines would have got said.

Are you that convinced that what you personally mean by 'experience' is the same thing everyone else means by it? — Isaac

Pretty sure yea. I'll take ANYTHING as long as it can be labeled "experience" in some reasonable manner

This sort of nonsense only ever seems to get by in philosophy. Do you realise any contradiction at all in you explaining to me a concept which is self-evident? — Isaac

There would be a contradiciton had I attempted to explain it.

Also I don't think this is a philosophy only thing. What would you tell someone if they asked you to "prove" that if A=B and B=C that A=C. Every field has to start with certain "packets of sense" like these.

That's even worse. How do you identify the capacity to have a feeling without actually having a feeling? — Isaac

Uhhhhh wot? I have feelings very much T.T

I'm not sure what this is aimed at. I didn't say that disagreements about concepts do change the world, so I'm not sure why you would be refuting it. — Isaac

Nevermind then. Must have misunderstood you somewhere

Pretty sure yea. I'll take ANYTHING as long as it can be labeled "experience" in some reasonable manner — khaled

But what I take to be an 'experience' is the logging of some sensory input into memory, but you've dismissed that as not constituting 'experience'?

There would be a contradiciton had I attempted to explain it. — khaled

I think we've misunderstood one another here. I'm referring to the argument you are currently making which involves telling me stuff about conscious experience that you apparently think I don't know. I'm struggling to marry that with the idea that all this is self evident.

What would you tell someone if they asked you to "prove" that if A=B and B=C that A=C. — khaled

Those are just rules of logic, deduction is tautology, it's not the same as induction. Ramsey wrote an excellent paper showing how we can benefit from looking at things this way, I will dig out a reference for you.

Every field has to start with certain "packets of sense" like these. — khaled

I think what you've referring to here is more like Wittgenstein's hinge propositions, or (coincidentally) Ramsey sentences, but nothing here makes the packets 'sense', they're just axioms.

Uhhhhh wot? I have feelings very much — khaled

I wasn't asking if you had feelings. I was asking how you identify the capacity to have feelings distinct from feelings themselves (which you already dismissed as your measure).

I wasn't asking if you had feelings. I was asking how you identify the capacity to have feelings distinct from feelings themselves (which you already dismissed as your measure). — Isaac

The capacity to do X is distinct from X. If something has a feeling, it obviously has the capacity for feeling right? My capacity to raise my arm is distinct from the experience of raising my arm for example. But if I raise my arm I have demonstrated the capacity to raise my arm.

I think what you've referring to here is more like Wittgenstein's hinge propositions — Isaac

“Hinge propositions” certainly sounds like it but I’m not familiar with them exactly. I’ll look it up later.

But what I take to be an 'experience' is the logging of some sensory input into memory, but you've dismissed that as not constituting 'experience — Isaac

Do you feel anything when the information is being logged that is caused by the logging of the information? I say no, an example would be sleep (logging short to long term). The logging of information can happen without any feeling involved.

The capacity to do X is distinct from X. If something has a feeling, it obviously has the capacity for feeling right? My capacity to raise my arm is distinct from the experience of raising my arm for example. But if I raise my arm I have demonstrated the capacity to raise my arm. — khaled

Yes I understand that, but in our discussion we when I referred to your having feelings, you dismissed that as being incorrect as a means of identifying consciousness, instead you said it was more like the capacity to feel. If the capacity to feel is only identifiable by having feelings then the identification of feelings remains the main criteria, so I'm confused as to why you dismissed it.

“Hinge propositions” certainly sounds like it but I’m not familiar with them exactly. — khaled

The key thing about hinge propositions, or similar concepts, so far as this discussion is concerned with is that they are not "sense, they are nit right or wrong and do not have any bearing on what is 'real'. They are just propositions we have to agree on in order to be able to talk, do science etc.

Do you feel anything when the information is being logged that is caused by the logging of the information? I say no, an example would be sleep (logging short to long term). The logging of information can happen without any feeling involved. — khaled

I would say that the 'feeling' something is what the logging is, that process is what I'm describing when I say I 'experienced' a piece of music, the complex logging and filing of the sensory inputs into various parts of my brain (and the various further memories and imagined senses that process might trigger). That is the sum total of what it is to 'experience' something as far as I'm concerned. As yes, I'd say I 'experience' my dreams.

or it is the name we give to the way we, and only we, feel. Which, being entirely subjective cannot be discussed at all. How would you even know my 'consciousness' was the same as yours when we use the term in an exchange of sentences. — Isaac

Well that's the thing, we can't, thus the argument that everyone else might not have a consciousness. I suppose people assume the existence of other people's consciousness partly due to Occam's razor, partly due to everything observable about humans having such similarities that it is natural to assume likeness to one another, partly due to that the same parts of our minds that others can't observe are the ones we don't observe in others, and partly due to the fact that without doing so discussing the whole topic is impossible so the assumption is taken as a premise within the framework of which the discussion is had.

I don't see how (insofar as 'real' means something like 'outside of subjective artifice). — Isaac

It seems you accept that the patterns that we refer to and the concepts refer to exist (because how could we identify a pattern and give it a name if the pattern didn't exist beforehand). I see it as the pattern that defines the existence of a thing. For example, there's a lamp on the table next to me that exists, but also its left half together with 10cm of air to its side is a pattern that's a part of reality and exists, despite not being seen as any coherent thing by an observer.

Exactly. So how does the concept of a thing called 'consciousness' which we cannot properly identify/do not understand, make any sense at all. If we cannot identify it, it doesn't exist, things only exist because we've identified some pattern in reality which we think deserves a name. If we cannot understand what it is, then what is it we are we giving a name to?

If we look at empirical knowledge, when we say we don't 'understand' some force, we mean something like that we can see x causes y, but we don't know how. What's being argued here is that there exists some thing 'consciousness', but we cannot identify it such that we can correlate its presence with brain states. That seems to me putting the cart before the horse. If we cannot identify it, how do we know there is even anything there to be named? — Isaac

I just disagree on whether consciousness is that hard to define. It's the part of mind that gives it subjective experiences and isn't directly observable by an outside observer. We know its existence, or at least a single instance of it, from a direct observation of it and the observation of the observation itself.

In my opinion it says something of both the way language surpasses its direct meaning in communication and the subjective mind that people manage to use the word "consciousness" among others in a consistent way, as if they were talking of something they had by observation confirmed to be the same thing; the meaning of the word is so heavily implied between the lines that to try and understand or confirm it through an exact definition is often unnecessary.

Then again, that does hold true for all the words. The difference is merely whether they can be given clear definitions afterwards.

The topic reminds me of that one quote of Kierkegaard: “The self is a relation which relates itself to its own self, or it is that in the relation that the relation relates itself to its own self; the self is not the relation but that the relation relates itself to its own self.”

All I said was that we know that biological processes are sufficient for consciousness, from that we can't claim that they're necessary for it. — khaled

I think this should be the other way around. From everything that has been observed biological processes appear to be necessary for consciousness. From that it does not follow that they are sufficient.

How can awareness possibly exist before any theory, there must first be a theory as to what 'awareness' is in order for us to name it thus. — Isaac

Of course awareness exists before theories about it. Perhaps you mean instead the idea of awareness, but even then the idea exists before any theory to explain it does.

Yes I understand that, but in our discussion we when I referred to your having feelings, you dismissed that as being incorrect as a means of identifying consciousness, — Isaac

Did I? My bad then

I would say that the 'feeling' something is what the logging is, — Isaac

And I’m saying that from there, you cannot say that the only way to feel something is through the logging

biological processes appear to be necessary for consciousness — Janus

How has this been observed? What HAS been observed is that, when consciousness arises, certain biological processes are required. This does not imply that those processes are necessary for consciousness to arise

Claim: When certain biological processes are occurring, something is conscious
You can’t go from that to:
When those biological processes are not occurring, something is not conscious

The inverse of a true statement is not always true

From that it does not follow that they are sufficient. — Janus

When I say “biological processes” I’m referring to the ones we suspect cause consciousness not just all biological processes.

biological processes appear to be necessary for consciousness — Janus

How has this been observed? What HAS been observed is that, when consciousness arises, certain biological processes are required. This does not imply that those processes are necessary for consciousness to arise — khaled

What has been observed is that biological processes are always present wherever consciousness is to be found. This shows that biological processes appear to be necessary to produce consciousness. It does not show that biological processes are sufficient to produce consciousness; there might be something else in play that we are not aware of.

I suppose people assume the existence of other people's consciousness partly due to Occam's razor, partly due to everything observable about humans having such similarities that it is natural to assume likeness to one another, partly due to that the same parts of our minds that others can't observe are the ones we don't observe in others, and partly due to the fact that without doing so discussing the whole topic is impossible so the assumption is taken as a premise within the framework of which the discussion is had. — BlueBanana

Right. So if all that can be taken as a presumption for further philosophical investigation without even mentioning the caveat, why is it then considered such a massive error when scientific investigation presumes the same starting point? Apparently science can't know anything about consciousness because it can't identify it because of those very assumption. So if philosophical investigation can be of use based on those presumptions, why cannot scientific investigation?

For example, there's a lamp on the table next to me that exists, but also its left half together with 10cm of air to its side is a pattern that's a part of reality and exists, despite not being seen as any coherent thing by an observer. — BlueBanana

Yes. That is how I see things too. So for there to be a thing in our realm of concepts which we believe to be part of reality, it can only be so on the basis of some such pattern and nothing else. This makes the idea of there being some real phenomena, but one which we can't identify, incoherent.

It's the part of mind that gives it subjective experiences and isn't directly observable by an outside observer. — BlueBanana

Again, you're presuming that such a part exists without any evidence of it's doing so. your naming a part of reality (a pattern) without having observed any actual pattern to name.

We know its existence, or at least a single instance of it, from a direct observation of it — BlueBanana

You'll need to be more clear about this, I don't understand the metaphor (obviously you don't mean observation literally - seeing with our eyes) but I'm not sure here what sense or detection it is standing in for.

people manage to use the word "consciousness" among others in a consistent way, as if they were talking of something they had by observation confirmed to be the same thing — BlueBanana

Really? That's your experience of the philosophical debate around consciousness? Form people like Dennet and Hood considering it to be little more than an illusion, through the pan-psychics, to the Berkeleian idealists considering it to be the essence of the whole of reality in the mind of God. You think people are all using the word consistently?

Of course awareness exists before theories about it. Perhaps you mean instead the idea of awareness, but even then the idea exists before any theory to explain it does. — Janus

For a start, I didn't say a theory that explains it, I said a theory concerning what it is. They key is identifying it, not explaining it (by which I would mean, being able to make some predictions about it).

Taking Wittgenstein's private language argument, we cannot privately identify a concept in any reliable sense, we have no way of knowing if we're identifying the same concept today as we did yesterday, so the identification of it becomes meaningless - why would we refer to it rather than simply identify all over again? So 'awareness' is just a pattern that is referred to to bring it to the attention of others, who, in doing the same, gradually refine just that pattern which the word is referencing among all the other possibilities.

So it is not possible to say that some thing, some particular pattern, existed as distinct from all the other patterns prior to us circumscribing it by language. It's like saying a wave exists prior to us having a concept of waves. All that exists is sea, what shape it is in is irrelevant until we make it so.

For a start, I didn't say a theory that explains it, I said a theory concerning what it is. — Isaac

Then I think you use the term "theory" inaptly. A better way of saying it would be " an idea of what it is".

Taking Wittgenstein's private language argument, we cannot privately identify a concept in any reliable sense, we have no way of knowing if we're identifying the same concept today as we did yesterday, so the identification of it becomes meaningless - why would we refer to it rather than simply identify all over again? — Isaac

I have no clear idea what you are trying to say here. Why can't we know if we are identifying the same concept from one act of identification to another. Are you claiming, for example, that the concept <two> might be somehow different each time we think of it or use it? What could such a purported difference even mean?

So it is not possible to say that some thing, some particular pattern, existed as distinct from all the other patterns prior to us circumscribing it by language. It's like saying a wave exists prior to us having a concept of waves. All that exists is sea, what shape it is in is irrelevant until we make it so. — Isaac

So, from this does it follow that the sea (or anything else for that matter) did not exist prior to our having a concept of it?

Really? That's your experience of the philosophical debate around consciousness? Form people like Dennet and Hood considering it to be little more than an illusion, through the pan-psychics, to the Berkeleian idealists considering it to be the essence of the whole of reality in the mind of God. You think people are all using the word consistently? — Isaac

I meant in colloquial usage, but yes, even in philosophical discourse, wildly different theories about something doesn't necessarily imply that it's not the same thing people are talking about.

Right. So if all that can be taken as a presumption for further philosophical investigation without even mentioning the caveat, why is it then considered such a massive error when scientific investigation presumes the same starting point? — Isaac

It doesn't take the same starting point. Science looks at things associated with consciousness, like brain activity, or in psychology for example, behaviour. Until it's possible to cause identical observations with identical qualia in different people and science is done by experiencing those experiences directly, it's not correct to say that any branch of science is dealing with consciousness directly.

Yes. That is how I see things too. So for there to be a thing in our realm of concepts which we believe to be part of reality, it can only be so on the basis of some such pattern and nothing else. This makes the idea of there being some real phenomena, but one which we can't identify, incoherent. — Isaac

"Can't identify" as in can't, in practice, so far as we know, identify, and so far haven't, or as in are fundamentally impossible to be identified?

I'm not talking of existence in our realm of concepts, I'm talking of objective existence in which the patterns exist before we recognize them as such. If such objective reality exists, things in it can be referred to by other means than exact descriptions of structure, such as by their relationships with other, more recognized, patterns.

You'll need to be more clear about this, I don't understand the metaphor (obviously you don't mean observation literally - seeing with our eyes) but I'm not sure here what sense or detection it is standing in for. — Isaac

How do you know you have a mind? When you perceive something about the reality, how do you know you've made that perception? English isn't my first language so I'm sorry if observation isn't the best word for what I mean, but anyway, the feeling/experience/perception/observation by which that knowledge is gained is what I was referring to.

Then I think you use the term "theory" inaptly. A better way of saying it would be " an idea of what it is". — Janus

Fair enough, a poor choice of expression. I shall remedy in future.

Why can't we know if we are identifying the same concept from one act of identification to another. Are you claiming, for example, that the concept <two> might be somehow different each time we think of it or use it? What could such a purported difference even mean? — Janus

Have you read Wittgenstein's private language argument? I don't want to repeat the whole thing if you've actually read it but just disagree. We might as well jump straight to the disagreement if that's the case. Notwithstanding that, it's not that we can't know if we're identifying the same concept (we can't of course because our memories are flawed), but it's that we'd have nothing to check it against but our current identification of the concept. Which means we are not creating a consistent demarcation of the world, but rather re-interpreting it continuously.

So, with your example of <two>. The concept might be predicated on the division of objects (two is when only a single action means I can't go any further without destroying the objects), or it might be based on set theory (two is the class that is the class of all classes similar to it - to paraphrase Russell), or it might be a learned ordinality (two is where I get to after one object's boundary is reached and another starts).

Which you choose will affect what you can do with it mathematically, but when you come to determine if something is <two> you are not being any more faithful to a pattern to refer to your memory of yesterday's choice than you are to re-make that choice today, because the only way you have of checking yesterday's choice is by comparing it to today's.

So, from this does it follow that the sea (or anything else for that matter) did not exist prior to our having a concept of it? — Janus

Yes, to mix metaphors slightly, the sea (as opposed to the land) is just one pattern of changing material and form among others we could equally have chosen. How far one takes this concept depends on one's fundamental principle. I don't believe it is possible to devise a philosophy using rationality alone. One must start from some axiom which is unsupported. Mine is that there is an external reality. For others, I suppose, they might go to saying that even internal/external is just a pattern dividing thought and so doesn't exist until we define it.

What has been observed is that biological processes are always present wherever consciousness is to be found. — Janus

No. Consciousness has never been found. It has been assumed so far. We don't have a consciousness-o-metre. What has actually been observed is that (assuming humans are conscious), whenever a human was conscious, there happened to be certain biological processes at play.

and even if we take your statement as true.

What has been observed is that biological processes are always present wherever consciousness is to be found. This shows that biological processes appear to be necessary to produce consciousness. — Janus

This is still an incorrect inference. "It has been observed that whenever a box moves, it is at a high altitude. That means that a high altitude is necessary for a box to move" (assuming we actually never see boxes move in any other cirucumstance) would be wrong

If A causes B. A is sufficient for B
If !A means !B. A is necessary for B

So far we know that certain mental processes cause consciousness (A causes B)
We do not know that not having those mental processes results in no consciousness (!A means !B)
Why do we not know this? Because we have no actual measure of consciousness

Until it's possible to cause identical observations with identical qualia in different people and science is done by experiencing those experiences directly, it's not correct to say that any branch of science is dealing with consciousness directly. — BlueBanana

But you just said that consciousness can be identified in philosophy by presuming the experiences of others are the same as ours, that's how we can talk to each other about the topic. So why can't science presume that when people say they're experiencing something, they are experiencing what we experience, and call the same thing? If science can't make that presumption (and still claim to be investigating 'consciousness'), then how can philosophy claim to be talking about 'consciousness with other philosophers without having the same identification problem?

"Can't identify" as in can't, in practice, so far as we know, identify, and so far haven't, or as in are fundamentally impossible to be identified? — BlueBanana

Yes, but "so far haven't" doesn't even make sense here either. What I'm asking is how can there possibly be coherently a concept which we presume is there but can't properly identify. On what grounds do we presume it's there other than having identified some pattern which we wanted to give a name to?

If such objective reality exists, things in it can be referred to by other means than exact descriptions of structure, such as by their relationships with other, more recognized, patterns. — BlueBanana

I agree, but where I disagree is in saying that if some pattern in reality exists but we can only identify it by it's relation with other patterns, not by its structure, then it's relationship with other patterns is all it is. That is what we've identified and given a name to, so that is what the name refers to and nothing more. It doesn't then go on to refer to some imagined structure which we simply presume is the way we imagine it to be.

So to dial back the metaphors a bit. If 'consciousness' refers to the posited cause of certain phenomena, but not an identified phenomena in itself, then what 'consciousness' is is a posited cause of phenomena. It is a placeholder in our minds not a thing itself. Personally I don't think that's either an honest, nor a useful definition, but it's at least consistent.

What I'm arguing is impossible, or incoherent, is a clear definition in philosophy objective enough for us all to somehow identify with sufficient consistency to discuss the matter with each other, but that such a definition is then somehow out of the reach of science to say whether some material activity correlates with it.

c

Again, justify is a subjective state. The fact that one person (requiring more information) is redirected by another only demonstrates that that second person does not have information sufficient for the first. It does not tell us anything about whether they have information sufficient for them. — Isaac

for themselves, I assume you mean. Sure. But T Clark doesn't know what Khaled needs for justification. Khaled asked him for the source of the theories. That presumably is within the abilities of T Clark. It is not, as T Clark made it seem, like being asked to walk him through the research. It is asking for someone to specify. IOW then Khaled would have a similar amount of justification as T Clark. Right now, he has been presented with an abstract non-specific 'theories'. He has less justification that TC, or let's say, he has less view of what justification led to T Clark drawing a conclusion.

Also part of the context was T Clark saying: you can't know this. I think the answer for most of us would be, no, I don't. But here's why I have this belief. Perhaps he meant the response to implictly acknowledge this, but I don' t think it's clear.

Yes, because the science is indeed out there, and the estimation included was that he could not justify it to Khaled's satisfaction — Isaac

He couldn't know that yet. So his, yes, honest self-evaluation, seemed to me a general one. I cannot satisfy interlocuters. And even telling you which theories I read would not do it, so find someone else. I am taking his demurral in this context. He doesn't even get Khaled up to speed on which theorists he means. Perhaps he forgot them.

But then one wonders why respond. What is the substance of his previous post. I read some stuff and it satisfied me that the issue is resolved as X. But if you want to know anything further I am the wrong person. That makes it seem like a poll. IOW that doesn't seem to me like an adequate response as if one is countering the other person's arguments. Of course we can all weigh in with opinions, but I think it should be made clear that the role of the posts is not to justify, but rather to just put forward one's take.

Your not "taking" their conclusion, and your claiming their conclusion is not justified are two different things. You may not belive T Clark when he says he has read such conclusions. That is a matter of trust, not logic. In a situation like this, I can't think of any reason why he might lie — Isaac

I never even considered that. I did think that it was possible that whatever theories he had read might not actually cover the issue the way he presented it. And that whatever research he read did not actually have as its conclusions what he was saying. That would be my interest in relation to Khaled's request for which theories. Is it a mere impression that that's what they meant? Did they come out and say it in the conclusions of their peer reviewed paper? Who are these people? What kinds of documents were they? There are models out there which carry the presumptions of many scientists but even by the scientists themselves may not be considered the justified conclusions of repeated testing.

Perhaps that discussion would be beyond T Clarks abilities. Peachy and understandible. But that wasn't even on the table. We don't even know what his justification was and he doesn't know if it would satisfy Khaled. Khaled didn't get to see whatever it was. And that was not even an issue.

So the issue of justification being subjective seems not on the table to me. It was a non-issue whatever degree would be necessary. Which is why I raised the issue of why he is himself convinced. I think I framed it as a question.

If we want to know why consciousness arose, and by 'why' mean to find a necessary and sufficient set of causes, then we must look to physical chains of events and eliminate each until the phenomena is no longer present. That is an empirical investigation, not a philosophical one. — Isaac

Sure, but often people conflate for example memory and consciousness. So if someone does not remember it is assumed that this means they were not conscious. I have seen this in discussions led by scientists and by lay people and by philosophers (overlapping groups). Philosophers can have a role in sorting these things out. Philosophers can also look at what the research actually shows and what is being concluded because it fits with current models. Philosophers could also look at paradigmatic bias. As I said somewhere in here scientists did not consider animals conscious or subjects. They were considered automatons, or perhaps better put, it was considered the best default position to consider them like this and professionally dangerous to do otherwise certainly upinto the 60s. I think that was a philosophically poor default choice. And I am not just hindsight backseat driving. I was alive then and challenged the idea then. There has always been a bias to consider things like us to have consciousness. Right now plants are moving into a grey area against default resistence. This is based on philosophical ideas that are not clearly to my mind justified. One common one is that complexity is necessary for consciousness. I have all the sympathy in the world for why this seems like a good default, but I don't think its justified. All sorts of cognitive abilities absolutely are dependent on complexity. I have no doubt about that. The question is whether consciousness is in the same category as those cognitive abilities. And since we know that many extremely sophisticated cognitive abilities can be handled without consciousness I think it would be best not to assume they are the same or have the same cause or are facets of the same 'things' or processes. I am sure there are other roles philosophers can have, or really intelligent non-scientists cna have.. And I would point out that your description makes assumptions. Like that consciousness is best sesedescribed as an effect rather than a facet, say.

If, rather, we want to know which concepts about why consciousness arise are internally non-contradicory and consistent with what empirical evidence we have, then such is an ideal task for amateur philosophy to be engaged in. But by that standard, T Clark's position is as good as any other. It is not internally contradictory, and it is not overwhelmingly contradicted by empirical evidence. — Isaac

But his post was not a position, or not just a position, it was a response or presented as a response. And when taken as a response, a critical arguement is, and fairly basic things were asked about it, I don't think it held up as a counterargument or response to the post it was responding to. Yes, he presented his opinion. It's a discussion forum. I thought it was an odd response to be questioned about it in that context, however much I truly do admire his open and humble explanation of why he draws the conclusion he does.

I understand your position but there's a quite understandable reluctance on forums like this this to engage on constructive theorising because virtually nobody here has any genuine interest in such a process. T Clark has been here way longer than me, but even I am already weary of the "what are your sources" > "oh, those sources are flawed" dance, hence my sympathy with T Clark's position.

I think there's a facade of enquiry, but what's really going on is an attempt to reinforce ideas by pitting them against detractors (often with a stacked deck too) and construct a stronger defense in doing so. In this scenario, the presentation of one's sources to one's opposition is a favour to them, not a requirement of participation. I'm sorry if that sounds cynical.

Sure, but often people conflate for example memory and consciousness. — Coben

As I've said to virtually everyone else in this discussion, but to poor reception, one cannot conflate anything with consciousness unless the definition of consciousness is sufficiently clear as to eliminate or extend beyond the thing being conflated. If it were so, then we wouldn't be having this discussion. If it is possible to conflate memory and consciousness, then it follows that it must be possible to conceive of a concept of consciousness which has just those properties of memory. It follows then that either we have some identifiable factor which yet requires a name, or it might be that's just what consciousness is.

One common one is that complexity is necessary for consciousness. I have all the sympathy in the world for why this seems like a good default, but I don't think its justified. — Coben

Again, what measure would the threshold for what is 'justified' be on?

we know that many extremely sophisticated cognitive abilities can be handled without consciousness — Coben

How can we possibly know this without knowing whether a subject is conscious or not? If we know whether a subject is conscious or not then we can correlate physical states with it.

The whole argument so far has been a lot of "we know consciousness can't be..." followed by "Science doesn't have any means of identifying consciousness". Well if science doesn't, how come random amateur philosophers know so damn much about it?

for themselves, I assume you mean. Sure. But T Clark doesn't know what Khaled needs for justification. Khaled asked him for the source of the theories. That presumably is within the abilities of T Clark. It is not, as T Clark made it seem, like being asked to walk him through the research. It is asking for someone to specify. IOW then Khaled would have a similar amount of justification as T Clark. Right now, he has been presented with an abstract non-specific 'theories'. He has less justification that TC, or let's say, he has less view of what justification led to T Clark drawing a conclusion.

Also part of the context was T Clark saying: you can't know this. I think the answer for most of us would be, no, I don't. But here's why I have this belief. Perhaps he meant the response to implictly acknowledge this, but I don' t think it's clear. — Coben

I've mostly dropped out of this discussion because I think I've probably said all I have to say without repeating myself. I have dropped in from time to time just to see if anything interesting was happening. Now, here, I find my name being bandied about and my words being misrepresented again.

Let's go back to how this started:

• The late lamented Klinko - Science has no theories, hypotheses, or even speculation about the biological nature of consciousness.
• T Clark - That is not true. I have read about this subject. It is my understanding there are theories, hypotheses, and speculation by reputable scientists.
• Coben/Khaled - Hey, you aren't justified in saying that. Your justification is just hearsay. Unless you've got a PhD in cognitive science, you have nothing to say. And your mother is ugly.
• T Clark - Hey, leave my mother out of it.
• Coben/Khaled - Ok.

We discussed my justification. I thought we'd agreed that it is acceptable given the limited nature of what I was trying to show. I gave you the name of the primary source of my understanding. I thought we'd agreed that, without going into the details of the subject, that source was adequate, again, given the limited nature of what I was trying to show and the small consequences of me being wrong.

I don't remember ever questioning @khaled's justification. Did I? What I do remember questioning is the necessity for some intermediary process between biological and mental processes. I tried to make it clear that I don't think such an intermediary is needed. To me, there's no mystery. I think biological processes in the human nervous system are enough to explain mental processes, including consciousness. As I said previously, I think the reason that's hard for some people to swallow is that they see consciousness as something special, fundamentally different from other phenomena. I don't see it that way.

I understand your position but there's a quite understandable reluctance on forums like this this to engage on constructive theorising because virtually nobody here has any genuine interest in such a process. T Clark has been here way longer than me, but even I am already weary of the "what are your sources" > "oh, those sources are flawed" dance, hence my sympathy with T Clark's position. — Isaac

Yes, this is exactly the reason I didn't want to get into specific sources. My point was that the theories, hypotheses, and speculation exist, not that they are necessarily correct, although I did say that Damasio's explanations seem plausible to me.

Now, hows about we leave T Clark out of the mix from now on. At least use the @ function so I know my name is being used in vain.

Notwithstanding that, it's not that we can't know if we're identifying the same concept (we can't of course because our memories are flawed), but it's that we'd have nothing to check it against but our current identification of the concept. Which means we are not creating a consistent demarcation of the world, but rather re-interpreting it continuously. — Isaac

My familiarity with the private language argument is minimal, and from how I interpret it I can't see any connection to the question about whether we are identifying/using the same concepts across time.

If our memories are flawed, then there would seem to be an insuperable difficulty involved in knowing that they are flawed, when they are flawed and the degree to which they are flawed. We would not even be able to carry on a sensible discussion from day to day, from hour to hour or even from minute to minute if all our concepts are constantly morphing. I do agree that, in a sense, we are constantly re-interpreting things, but if we should not have any faith in the consistency of our re-interpretations across time, then we cannot have confidence in any of our thought and any discussion would be moot.

I don't believe it is possible to devise a philosophy using rationality alone. One must start from some axiom which is unsupported. Mine is that there is an external reality. — Isaac

I agree that we all start from rationally unsupportable presuppositions. If yours is that there is an external reality, and following on from what you have said about concepts not being the same from one iteration to the next, then how do you know that presupposition of an external reality is the same each time you think it?

So what does the idea of an external reality mean, if its meaning is always changing? Is there a kind of Wittgensteinian range of meanings which have "family resemblances"? But then, how could we even know that if our memories are flawed?