From your previous remarks, I don't think you do agree with the physicalist approach, but that when I criticize it, you take the opportunity to criticize my posts. Fair enough? — Wayfarer
What I criticize is your biased assumption that naturalistic explanations "miss the point" or embody "blind spots", and more particularly so since you are apparently unable to even imagine what any alternative theory would look like, let alone propose one. — Janus
.We have no way of examining first person experience from a third person perspective in anything like the kind of way we can examine sense-phenomena. — Janus
How do you know? I passed two years of undergraduate philosophy and an MA in a related subject. I don't have to recite passages of Das Kapital to express views critical of Marxism.You don't read the actual physicalist philosophers, — Janus
Which is *exactly* what I said, which was then dismissed with 'that's not even an argument, it's just word salad'. And yet somehow from this, it's me who is "exhibiting bias"?? — Wayfarer
Sure. But then even that is ok. Especially in the context of the post I was responding to and the one it was.There is speculation and then there is empty speculation. Any speculation which does not take into account the latest scientific results and understanding is empty speculation. — Janus
But what you haven't responded to is the point that science can come up with hypotheses concerning the advent and evolution of consciousnesses. — Janus
Are you quite sure that what was being dismissed as "word salad" was precisely and only the point that science cannot examine the first person perspective from its "third person" vantage point, and was not some further claim or conclusion derived from that, which you were forwarding? — Janus
If we study consciousness as a phenomenon - how it appears in others - then we're still basically in the domain of cognitive science, of seeing how conscious beings act and react. But knowledge of our own awareness or consciousness is of a different order to that, because we ourselves are that which is aware. — Wayfarer
And that claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective, and comprises 'an experience of being', hence, can never be satisfactorily understood or described in objective terms. The hard problem in a nutshell. — Wayfarer
I admire the spirit of science, and I think it is equally valuable in philosophy; the guiding principle is that if you have a theory, you should do everything in your power to criticize it, and falsify it, rather than doing everything in your power to confirm it. — Janus
So what is the best way to ensure this caution. Is it to have a series of peer-reviewed controlled trials testing each aspect with strictly defined correlates to see which show some statistically significant link? Or is it for a group of complete lay people who may know as little as nothing whatsoever about the physical brain write entire books about what they reckon consciousness is, and we sit here and discuss it as if it were fact.
Yes, probably so, but if peer-reviewed, controlled, statistically constrained investigations are going to be taken with a pinch of salt because of their potential paradigmatic bias (something I agree with entirely), then the uninformed ramblings of some philosopher are somewhere between gossip and fairy-tale in the order of how much salt to take them with.
he first is a philosopher. You can imagine how her ideas would be listened to where they do not line up, or seem not to, with scientific consensus, because to them she is a lay person. — Coben
with Susan Greenfield, a scientist, she got lambasted for her work on cellphones. And why? because money didn't like her conclusions. She got treated by some experts in her field, some no doubt brought in by the affected industries, and by experts or at least public talker types in other fields, as if she was a biased non-scientific idiot. — Coben
I did lay research into the physchiatric approach, found what I thought were philosophical biases and problematic ones.
One simple one was that the drug this person was given — Coben
For me that instance when two lay people meet, and even when a scientist or other expert meets a lay person,is vastly more complicated - in part, but not only because scientists are generally not philosophers - but also because what I called a false dilemma on you part above actually can be a wide range of possible scenarios. — Coben
It’s more “the property to be able to personally feel, which cannot be measured in others for now” — khaled
No because the statement “cannot be measured in others” doesn’t express a property of consciousness, there may come a day when we can, we just don’t have the consciousness-o-meter yet. It’s just an observation not a property of consciousness — khaled
I have no idea what that even means. “The response is being sensed”. Can you define “sensed”? Because it seems to me like “sensed” = “has subjective experience” which is a phrase you refuse to acknowledge you understand yet I keep seeing you use it — khaled
Not all definitions are verbal — Isaac
So why were you repeatedly asking for a definition of “subjective experiences” when I know you know what that means (unless you’re not conscious). — khaled
Consciousness can be said to be the capacity to feel something if you really want a verbal definition. — khaled
No, I’m describing something and then saying we cannot measure it. — khaled
You contend it doesn’t “come about” of anything and IS literally the chemical reactions in your brain. I say it is a RESULT of said reactions. I cannot see how consciousness IS a chemical reaction. What is said reaction?
Chemical A (aq) + chemical B (aq) -> consciousness(?) — khaled
If we want to know why consciousness arose, and by 'why' mean to find a necessary and sufficient set of causes, then we must look to physical chains of events and eliminate each until the phenomena is no longer present. That is an empirical investigation, not a philosophical one. — Isaac
We have had a back and forth since then - I have been arguing, along the lines of the Chalmer's 'hard problem', that consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect which can never be satisfactorily accounted for in purely objective terms. I also introduced Nagel's argument which elaborates a similar point. But the response to these was that: these are not arguments, this is 'word salad', this makes no sense. Which kind of supports my point, I would have thought. — Wayfarer
The response to that, was that none of this constituted an argument, that it was meaningless 'word salad', that 'the ramblings of philosophers' have no relevance to the problem, which can only be solved by scientific means, within the physicalist frame of reference. — Wayfarer
And that claim is that 'the nature of consciousness is ineluctably subjective, and comprises 'an experience of being', — Wayfarer
That's not a claim, that's just word-salad. What does any of that mean? — Isaac
It is no surprise that the idea that world is round gained has almost universal agreement, but the idea of Platonic Forms is still almost a 50/50 split among philosophers 2000 years after it was first brought up. — Isaac
Quote me, or link to, where you have been arguing "that consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect which can never be satisfactorily accounted for in purely objective terms". — Isaac
We ourselves, as physical organisms, are part of that universe [i.e. 'that' being 'described by the modern natural sciences'], composed of the same basic elements as everything else, and recent advances in molecular biology have greatly increased our understanding of the physical and chemical basis of life. Since our mental lives evidently depend on our existence as physical organisms, especially on the functioning of our central nervous systems, it seems natural to think that the physical sciences can in principle provide the basis for an explanation of the mental aspects of reality as well — that physics can aspire finally to be a theory of everything.
I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning. The physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time – but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view. There can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it, but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject — without which it would not be a conscious experience at all.
Before you reach the conclusion that "consciousness has an ineluctably subjective aspect", what position did you start from and what rational steps did you take from there to reach this conclusion? — Isaac
Yes, from outside. If other people are conscious then we can examine their consciousness from outside of it. — Isaac
So, I don't see how that is not 'an argument', and, furthermore, an argument against the very principles that you were advocating. — Wayfarer
. Here he summarises the conclusion he is about to reach.I believe this possibility is ruled out by the conditions that have defined the physical sciences from the beginning.
. Here he is providing us with our first empirical fact. AThe physical sciences can describe organisms like ourselves as parts of the objective spatio-temporal order – our structure and behavior in space and time
. Here he is making a claim. There is no "because...", no "therefore..." nothing at all linking this claim to the preceding premises.but they cannot describe the subjective experiences of such organisms or how the world appears to their different particular points of view.
. Another statement of fact. BThere can be a purely physical description of the neurophysiological processes that give rise to an experience, and also of the physical behavior that is typically associated with it,
. Another claim, again with no "because..." no link to the facts A and B that are the only facts he has provided us with thus far.but such a description, however complete, will leave out the subjective essence of the experience – how it is from the point of view of its subject
But before we go further - do these names, like Thomas Nagel, David Chalmers, Daniel Dennett, Edmund Husserl - mean anything to you? Have you studied philosophy, or philosophy of mind? — Wayfarer
The observation that 'the mind' is something that never appears to us as an object, or even an objective reality. — Wayfarer
will it give us any understanding at all of what it's like to be a conscious human being? — Pattern-chaser
There is no "because...", no "therefore..." nothing at all linking this claim to the preceding premises. — Isaac
what background have you got in neuroscience from which to dismiss its findings? — Isaac
Are you saying that faced with a starving child you would treat it as if you could not possibly know if it were hungry? — Isaac
everyone and everything that doesn't agree with you has a "blind spot" — Janus
but the ground-and-consequent nature of the argument ought to be clear. — Wayfarer
As a practical matter, obviously we behave as living beings ought to behave in such cases. — Wayfarer
will it give us any understanding at all of what it's like to be a conscious human being? — Pattern-chaser
You're presuming it's 'like' anything at all. In my lexicon, 'like' means similar to, but you're using differently here to mean, what exactly? — Isaac
This is what it's like to be a philosopher?
You're claiming ignorance of a well-known English idiom — Pattern-chaser
Perhaps you're American? :razz: — Pattern-chaser
Not on my part. I do think the other perspective/field will catch things, sometimes, that other scientists might not. I have no position on what most philosophers think in relation to science, thoughful ones or otherwise.I brought Up Patricia Churchland specifically because she is a philosopher. There seemed to be some suggestion that the 'thoughtful' philosophers could see beyond the short-sighteded and narrow views of the scientists. — Isaac
I don't understand what this has to do with the issue I raised. You understand how peer-review works, right? Scientists do not get to publish just any old crap that they 'reckon' might be true. Their papers are subjected to stringent peer-review, so what Susan Greenfield may have said in other areas does not affect her work in consciousness because her work in consciousness has passed peer-review, ie her conclusion are indeed related to her evidence buy a statistically significant margin. If you don't like Susan Greenfield, you could try Anil Seth, Bruce Hood, Vilynor Ramachandran... — Isaac
Yeah, I just don't think I am treating you like a rampant materialist. The point of my story was that as a lay person I could see things that the relevent scientists - the researchers who developed the drugs were scientists and the relevent experts (psychiatrists) either could not see or would not admit to seeing. IOW that a philosophical approach can come to useful conclusions in other fields.Drug companies have a huge financial interest in promoting their drug, it's not the same thing as research scientists who have no interest other than knowledge acquisition. Notwithsatnding that, I have absolutely no problem whatsoever with the fact that scientists are biased. I'd go even further and say that the vast majority are seeking evidence to support a personal world-view. I bolded that because there seems to be some degree of ignoring my comments in this regard so that I fit better into the 'rampant materialist' caricature that's been painted for me — Isaac
But that's not what's happened here. Read the posts. Have the posts from the non-physicalists been speculative? Have they presented their position as a possible alternative story? Have they referred at all, even erroneously, to the actual empirical evidence, in an attempt to ensure their thoeries are not overwhelmingly contradicted by it? No, they have consisted almost entirely of a long-winded version of "David Chalmers says its a hard problem, so it is" — Isaac
Yes, and "what it's like" there is doing the job of "similar but not necessarily identical" — Isaac
empirical science is not even close to specifying how laws of thought come about — javra
The empirical sciences cannot fully address everything that mind entails (such as its laws of thought). Philosophy as its own branch of study is required if we are to hold any hope of so doing. — javra
Why do you think that the laws of thought "come about" in that way? — Isaac
Trick question. I don't. I believe they're a deterministic aspect of sentience endowed existence — javra
What words would you use to answer the question "what is pain like?" — Isaac
I would just describe it as best as I can — Terrapin Station
Words can't capture experiences. — Terrapin Station
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