I said which ONE. One. One at a time.

Anyway, if you're denying both, then you're denying premise 1. So, you deny that extended objects are divisible.
Okay, er, explain that to me then. An extended object occupies some space, yes? It has to. Denying that is like denying that bachelors have to lack wives.
Any region of space is infinitely divisible, yes? If you don't believe me, start dividing some space and tell me when you've finished.
So, any extended object is going to be divisible.
Thus premise 1 is true and anyone who denies it is just plain confused.

Premise 1 has an 'other things being equal' clause. It isn't met in the case of the morality of procreative acts. — Bartricks

I don’t get why it wouldn’t be but then again, I didn’t think that clause had any significance whatsoever and I still don’t get what significance it might have. Could you explain that? What “things” are “equal”. Oftentimes when I hear “other things being equal” it is just there to add words to an essay.

Premise 1 can't reasonably be denied. For if you've got an argument for its falsity, then you just confirm it. — Bartricks

How so? If most people thought the sun revolves around the earth would that be evidence for the hypothesis? No it wouldn’t be, that doesn’t make the hypothesis true or false, I’m just saying that people’s rational beliefs do not constitute evidence for anything. Empirical observation does.

One thing is 'evidence' for the truth of a proposition only insofar as it appears to be providing us with some epistemic reason to believe that other thing, which is something only our reason can tell us about. — Bartricks

Agreed so far

Hence why the principle is true. If you deny it, you'll find you don't have any evidence for anything. — Bartricks

Disagree. The fact that evidence is as you described (something that gives us reason to believe a hypothesis is true with some epistemic reason) does not mean that MOST PEOPLE’S rational intuitions constitute evidence. I can deny the proposition that having a majority with the same rational conclusion about something constitutes evidence and instead say something like: Only my own rational conclusions constitute evidence, the number of people who share them has nothing to do with it. That’s what I think, I don’t think the number of people who rationally believe in any proposition is evidence for that proposition. I only care about what I see, not the number of people who see the same thing

Your last point commits a category error. I am talking about the mind - the object, whatever it may be, that is bearing our conscious states. You're conflating conscious states with the object they're the states of. — Bartricks

I haven’t mentioned “conscious states” though. Panpsychism proposes that the object called “mind” actually exists in everything everywhere. That is not inconsistent with physical objects being indivisible but it poses the “combination problem”, (I’m not sure if this is the actual name) which is asking how exactly these “minds” of all the different constituents of a larger thing (say a human or animal) “come together” to form a unified consciousness.

So back to your argument, according to panpsychism, conscious you IS divisible in a sense, it just wouldn’t be you anymore. Think of consciousness in panpsychism as a jigsaw piece. Sometimes the pieces come together to form a Bartricks but if the pieces break apart Bartricks will cease to exist, although the individual pieces, in themselves conscious will continue to.

Also have to sleep now bye

I don't know what you mean by a 'metaphysical thing'. Do you mean that it is immaterial? In that case you agree with me - I've been arguing that the mind is an immaterial object, not a material object.

Your next claim - that the mind relies upon the brain - is false, but it is not something I argued for or against, so it is irrelevant in this context.

Conscious states are states of an object called a....wait for it....MIND. — Bartricks

To a dualist, of course. Don't expect a physicalist to agree with this premise. They can be quite happy pointing "conscious" directly at people, just as they point "wet" directly at tea.

For that purpose, I would argue that taking part of the brain away and disposing of it, is in fact not dividing the brain for the purpose of the expression.

When you are using the word "divided" in Premise two, to say that one mind becomes two minds, you also need to apply the same meaning to the word "divided" in premise one, to say that one brain becomes two brains.

Else, you might use the word "divided" as you do in premise one, to say that you are cutting pieces off the brain (and the question implies that to only the primary piece of the brain the mind belongs), then you also need to apply the same meaning to Premise two, to say that you can't cut away pieces of the mind.

If you opt for the second, then we have an additional difficulty - such as, we only see evidence of a mind by it's manifestation through a brain, so when you cut away some of a mind, then it doesn't belong to a brain, so how can it be demonstrated to exist?

I don't know what you mean by a 'metaphysical thing'. Do you mean that it is immaterial? — Bartricks

Yes, immaterial will do. I will use that in future.

Your next claim - that the mind relies upon the brain - is false — Bartricks

That's an interesting idea. What makes you so sure of that?

No, to everyone.
So you think wetness can just exist? Wetness is a property of liquids.
Imagine I go into a shop and I ask for a wet blanket. They say they don't have any blankets. I say "oh, well I'll just take the wet then". I'd be asked to leave, yes? Because I'm clearly mad.
You can't just have 'wet'. You can have a wet this or a wet that. But you can't just have wet.

Likewise, you can't just have conscious states. They are states - the clue is in the name - of a thing. What thing? Why a MIND of course.

So all along you actually agree that the mind is immaterial?!!

Did you not notice that I was arguing for precisely that thesis? So why are you telling me I'm wrong, when you think I'm right - it makes no sense!!

My arguments imply that the mind is an immaterial thing. Not a material thing. An immaterial thing.

No, to everyone. — Bartricks

What do you mean?

So you think wetness can just exist? Wetness is a property of liquids. — Bartricks

Exactly.

But you can't just have wet.

Likewise, you can't just have conscious states. — Bartricks

Exactly.

They are states - the clue is in the name - of a thing. What thing? — Bartricks

Why, a person, of course.

You're not making any sense at all.

You've just said that the brain can be divided and that the brain can't be divided in the same sentence.

How many times - the BRAIN can be divided. It is the MIND that can't be divided.

So a MIND is an object and a conscious state is a state of it.

And what kind of object is the mind? Why it is an immaterial object, not a material one as my arguments demonstrate.

So a MIND is an object — Bartricks

"So" in the current idiom, or as an inference? From what?

You were comfortable with denying that consciousness is a thing, or things. Great. Gloss 'mind' as 'mentalness'.

“Are our minds souls?”

Not if “soul” is the transcendental object necessary for the source and expression of feelings, but “mind” is the transcendental object necessary for the source and expression of cognitions.

Otherwise....sure, why not?

Why it is an immaterial object, not a material one as my arguments demonstrate. — Bartricks

And panpsychism is saying that every material object has such an immaterial object attached to it. It then becomes a problem how these immaterial objects combine or split up but that doesn’t falsify the whole position.

How can a person possibly think that a mind is not immaterial? (maybe we have different understandings of the definition of "immaterial").

https://www.dictionary.com/browse/immaterial?s=t
3. not material; incorporeal; spiritual.

So all along you actually agree that the mind is immaterial?!!

Did you not notice that I was arguing for precisely that thesis? So why are you telling me I'm wrong, — Bartricks

.. no, all this time I thought you were discussing the difference between mind and soul.

You've just said that the brain can be divided and that the brain can't be divided in the same sentence. — Bartricks

Can you show me that? I think you probably have misread me, and I would like to clarify my wording.

1. If an object is material, then it is divisible
2. My mind is not divisible
3. Therefore my mind is not material — Bartricks

2. Mind is divisible. Indeed, it is divided in millions of connection between neurons. Destroy one connection and you are destroying one part of mind.

See argument — Bartricks

No argument can support such a conclusion. There's no such thing as an immaterial soul, except in religious fiction.

The other things being equal clause is important, for it is easy to conceive of circumstances under which a rational intuition would not constitute good evidence. For instance, if there's a drug that induces the rational intuition that P is true regardless of whether P is actually true or not, and we find that we have all taken that drug, then the fact we all get the rational intuition that P is true would not count as evidence that P is true.

Nevertheless, we could only discover that we had good reason to think we had taken such a drug (and thus discover that we had good reason to discount the relevant intuitions) on the basis of other rational intuitions. And so it is only if the principle is true that we even have the means to discover when the other things being equal clause is not met.

Yes, I agree that someone could say that about the version of the principle expressed in the argument - that is, they could deny it without affirming it. The problem, however, is that the principle they do have to affirm still has to give rational intuitions probative force and the fact they have decided only to give their own any probative force is clearly arbitrary and prejudiced. So, yes, someone could deny 1, but they could not deny 1 reasonably. That is, someone who denied 1 on the grounds that they think this principle - if and only if something appears to be the case to me is there any good evidence that it is the case - is true, is simply not a reasonable person, for they have given their own rational intuitions privileged status on an arbitrary basis. I have no problem acknowledging that wholly unreasonable people can reject a premise - they can and will reject any premise. But a reasonable person who acknowledges that their appearances have probative force is going to accept that, other things being equal, so do the appearances of others. Thus, I don't think there is any reasonable way to deny 1.

I do not understand your point about divisibility. Our reason represents our minds to be indivisible. That there are some theories about what the mind is that would, if they were true, allow the mind to be divisible, is neither here nor there. Here's such a theory - the theory that our minds are pieces of cheese. That theory - and it is good to have fancy terms for ridiculous theories, so let's call it Mental-fromagism - would allow that the mind is divisible, for cheese is clearly divisible. But so what? How's that evidence that the mind is divisible? What appearances can you appeal to that even challenge, never mind overturn, those appearances that speak in favour of premise 2?

So, again, Are you saying that it has more weight if there's agreement? Yes or no.

Yes.

"other things being equal".

If that's what you're saying, then what does "you can't argue for anything without presupposing its truth" have to do with it? How would that support that something has more weight if there's agreement?

Because that's not all I'm saying.

Okay. So what's the support for something having more weight if there's agreement?

Do you deny the principle?

Yes. That's what I said from the start. I don't accept the premise.

On what basis? Presumably you don't think that Terrapin Station is God and determines what's true. If you do think that, then you reject my premise because you're mad, which doesn't worry me in the slightest because I'm interested in what's true, not in what I can get a crazy person to believe.
So, on what basis do you reject it?

So, on what basis do you reject it? — Bartricks

It's the argumentum ad populum fallacy, and that's considered a fallacy for good reason.

Are you ever going to explain what your support of the premise is? (with respect to agreement having more weight)