reasonable doubt — Bartricks

It's just that systems of any kind require parts, and that those parts came beforehand.

You're not helping - I don't need any help, Descartes has got my back. So you don't worry your little cotton socks off about me, just go in for the attack.

Gibberish. Maybe translate it into Latin and it'll sound better. But in Engilsh it's gibberish.

Now which premise in his oh so dated argument are you disputing? — Bartricks

The same as he always get disputed about, that distinct realm can't interpenetrate, plus the energy transfer not conserving energy, plus the way I plainly put it earlier. I should have written it in French, I guess.

Eh? No, you should have written it in English. Try again.

just go in for the attack — Bartricks

I have assisted your arguments concerning the indivisibility of the elementals and the unity of consciousness.

No, you gave an example of an epileptic which did not do anything to challenge the credibility of premise 2, and you talked about qualia - which no premise of my argument made any mention of.

I assume that in your latest reply you're trying to raise the problem of interaction. But again, I don't yet see which premise you're challenging with it, or what the problem is.

Descartes has got my back. — Bartricks

You should have read Horace before Descartes, but that's not their order in the encyclopedia.

I'm going to eat dinner, because my mind came up with it all by itself with no help from neurology or my central nervous system or the older neurons in my gut. Then I can pull the cart better.

And you should read Descartes. Then you'd understand him better and wouldn't think he thought your neurology has nothing to do with your decision to go and have a meal.

And you should read Descartes. Then you'd understand him better and wouldn't think he thought your neurology has nothing to do with your decision to go and have a meal. — Bartricks

I can smell the pork cooking, that I set out to have for dinner from the decision and its inputs that only my mind came up with by conscious figuring from a mind that is all one with no parts.

Oh, no, I see that yet another Ralph had his entire brain and brain stem removed. I rushed over. I thought he might say, "I've lost my mind!" but he was quiet.

As for your wonderings about helping, it's all there in my initial statement, which I'm leaving as is. Maybe some other responders can turn it into better form or condense it to a simpler 1-2-3.

The other things being equal clause is important, for it is easy to conceive of circumstances under which a rational intuition would not constitute good evidence. — Bartricks

Ok. I get what you're saying. Now what are those conditions in the case of natalism vs antinatalism? There is no "drug" that pushes people to have the reasonable belief (though at this point I think the word reasonable is redundant) that having children is ethical. Some parents become antinatalists later although rarely. So, given that there are no "things" being "unequal" in the case of natalism, the number of natalists would constitute evidence for their beliefs being right no?

The problem, however, is that the principle they do have to affirm still has to give rational intuitions probative force and the fact they have decided only to give their own any probative force is clearly arbitrary and prejudiced. — Bartricks

Is it? I really don't think it is. I've never cared about the number of people that believed in a certain belief, I only cared about what I thought of it. Does that make me prejudiced? So be it, I don't care. I don't think it makes me prejudiced.

for they have given their own rational intuitions privileged status on an arbitrary basis. — Bartricks

And you'd be giving shared rational intuitions privileged status on just an arbitrary a basis

I do not understand your point about divisibility — Bartricks

I am claiming minds are divisible, basically.

Re the rational intuitions that represent procreation to be ethical - well, those, I think, have been induced not by drugs, but by environmental programming. That is, most humans are going to get the intuition that procreation is ethical regardless of whether it actually is or not. Thus that intuition doesn't count for anything, I think.

Re thinking that only your own rational intuitions have any probative force - no, here we simply disagree. I think it is arbitrary to think that your rational intuitions count for something and those of other people do not.
I am not denying that sometimes one may be perfectly justified in believing something on the basis of one's own intuitions, even when they are contradicted by others. And I don't deny that we're often justified in giving our own intuitions some default clout that we don't have to give to others (but in all these cases I would support my case by pointing out that this is what other people's intuitions say too). But to think that, systematically, one's own count for more just in virtue of being one's own is, I think, prejudiced. I can see no reason to think it would be true - you'd have to think that you alone are hooked up to rational reality, that you have some special insight that others lack or something. And those just seem like prejudices. I don't deny they exist - far from it, we have abundant evidence of their existence here on these threads.

I don't think that I would be giving other people's intuitions clout on an arbitrary basis, for it would be the same basis upon which I give my own clout. How's that arbitrary?

Yes, but a claim is not evidence. Our reason represents minds to be indivisible. That's why it makes no sense to attribute half a mind to someone. That's why I can't reduce my debts by lopping bits off myself. And so on. So, my premise has support from our rational representations. By contrast, when you deny it all you offer as 'evidence' is that certain theories would permit it. Well yes, but that's not evidence. Far from it - it means you're rejecting my premise not on the basis of reason, but because it conflicts with your favourite theory. Your theory is now unfalsifiable.

To expand a little on my last point - note that my theory (that my mind is an immaterial soul) is described in the conclusion of my arguments, not any of the premises. So my theory is supported by reason. But you're rejecting one of my premises on the grounds that it conflicts with your theory. That's not rational.
You need first to show that your theory is described by the conclusion of an argument that has stronger - that is, more self-evidently true - premises than the ones that entail my theory. Once you've done that, then I think you'd have some grounds for citing my premise's incompatibility with your theory as some kind of evidence that the premise is false. But not otherwise.

Here's a fourth piece of evidence that my mind is an immaterial soul.

1. If everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance, then I am not morally responsible for anything I think, desire and do.
2. I am morally responsible for some of what I think, desire and do.
3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), not everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.
4. If I am a material object, then everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance
5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), I am not a material object

If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative.

Here's a fourth piece of evidence that my mind is an immaterial soul. — Bartricks

1. If everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance, then I am not morally responsible for anything I think, desire and do.

True, and then, further, you were never responsible at any time for what you became, this being regardless of any religious, moral, court rules deeming you as responsible.

2. I am morally responsible for some of what I think, desire and do.

Not shown; you would have to undo (1) to the complete satisfaction to all.

3. Therefore (from 1 and 2), not everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.

No more 'therefore'. Again, the means need to be provided, not just that it is felt.

4. If I am a material object, then everything I think, desire and do is the causal product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance

True..

5. Therefore (from 3 and 4), I am not a material object

'Therefore' didn't follow.

If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative.

True, as kind of a ghost, soul mind in a realm distinct from the material that still talks the talk and walks the walk of the immaterial at every instant to communicate with it.

Should the mind be immaterial, what are the implications, if any?

You clearly do not understand how arguments work. Premise 1 and premise 2 entail 3. That is, 3 is necessarily true if 1 and 2 are.

You have acknowledged that 1 is true. So you need to deny 2 if you're going to block the conclusion.
Now on what basis do you deny 2?

Don't say '1'. Premise 1 does not entail that 2 is false. You need to add another premise to 1 in order to get the negation of premise 2. You need to add this:

Premise 2* Everything I think, desire and do is the product of prior causes and/or indeterministic chance.

What evidence do you have that premise 2* is true?

And note, you can't say "my evidence is that our minds are material objects and so everything that they are and that goes on in them is determined by prior causes" for that is question begging.

That is, 3 is necessarily true if 1 and 2 are. — Bartricks

Yes, but to apply as a real life exercise it as true you need to show it. I could violate that too and just assert that (2) is false using the same liberty as you asserting it's true.

"my evidence is that our minds are material objects and so everything that they are and that goes on in them is determined by prior causes" for that is question begging. — Bartricks

All I have to do is assert it in the same question begging way that you do, to match your style, but ungrounded assertions will be challenged.

If I am not a material object, then I must be an immaterial one, for that's the only alternative. — Bartricks

Should the mind be immaterial, what are the implications, if any? A spirit of life evolved? Does that make some difference?

No, 2 + 3 = 5 is self-evidently true. Virtually everyone's reason represents it to be true - which is very good evidence that it is.
By contrast, 2 + 3 = 6 is not self-evidently true. virtually no-one gets that rational intuition (and those that do are technically referred to as 'stupid' - meaning, they're not very well hooked-up to reason).

Stop thinking you can make stuff up and thereby make it true. You can't. Be honest: it is self-evident to you that 2 + 3 = 5. It is not self-evident to you that 2 + 3 = 6.

It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 1 of my argument is true. It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 2 is true. It is self-evident to virtually everyone who has the power of reason and reflection that this argument is valid:

1. If P, then Q
2. not Q
3. Therefore not P

My argument had that form. join the dots.

I am not sure what the wider implications are. But there's no 'should' about it - the arguments I am presenting are all deductively valid, have premises that are far more plausible than their negations, and entail the same conclusion: our minds are immaterial souls.

Although having said that, no, a spirit of life did not evolve. I am not entirely sure what you mean by a spirit of life, but I assume you mean our immaterial souls.

And no, if the argument I have just presented is sound (and it is) then we did not evolve, but always existed. Likewise if the argument from divisibility is sound (and it is).

And you always will exist too. They have that implication too. And I suppose some may find that somewhat frightening. We all exist and always will and there's no escape.

2 + 3 = 5 — Bartricks

Then you should put that in since it is surely true.

It is self-evident to virtually everyone that premise 2 is true. — Bartricks

No, it is more that you will be held morally responsible because you're the one who did it.

No, we hold people morally responsible because our reason represents them to be.

if you think you can make someone blameworthy by blaming them, you're nuts.

if you think you can make someone blameworthy by blaming them, you're nuts. — Bartricks

I give neither blame nor credit for the will doing what it means to do.

That doesn't address my point. Did you boil your pork in vodka or something?
The point is that you can't make someone morally responsible by holding them morally responsible. We hold people morally responsible because they appear to us to be morally responsible. That's why we try hard not to punish innocent people.

appear — Bartricks

Yes, much 'appears to us' in our second story as formed from the non-apparent neurological boiler room on the first storey, but luckily science and its instruments have long since informed us.