Explain why it makes sense for someone who knows he will soon be tortured - but isn't being tortured yet - to fear the impending event. — csalisbury
What do you think, monks: Which is greater, the tears you have shed while transmigrating & wandering this long, long time — crying & weeping from being joined with what is displeasing, being separated from what is pleasing — or the water in the four great oceans?"
"As we understand the Dhamma taught to us by the Blessed One, this is the greater: the tears we have shed while transmigrating & wandering this long, long time — crying & weeping from being joined with what is displeasing, being separated from what is pleasing — not the water in the four great oceans.
Obviously, I won't exist again after I die. — csalisbury
Need I be concerned about what will happen to me in this life?
Explain why it makes sense for someone who knows he will soon be tortured - but isn't being tortured yet - to fear the impending event. — csalisbury
Because it's impending? Does indeed seem a dumb question. Back in my day, we used to get caned for infractions at school - a practice long since banned - I have a vivid recollection of standing in the corridor outside the headmaster's office for about 15 minutes. That wait was an important part of the punishment.
That's true. But for the people for whom it's not obvious, it's usually not obvious for religious/mythological reasons. & I'm not saying they're wrong. I'm just trying to meet people who don't buy into those views on their own terms.Is that really so obvious? Depending on your metaphysical presuppositions, this claim may or may not be so
You ask this as though you have a choice in the matter. You will be concerned about what happens to you regardless of whether you ought to. As to whether you ought to, irrespective of whether you have any choice, I think you ought to. To be concerned with what will happen to you in this life, to be concerned with suffering, is show moral awareness.
Well, given that one cannot but fear potential harm, and having dismissed the possibility of the stoicism of the sage, then it is perfectly rational to feel in such a way. It would irrational not to fear harm.
Explain why it makes sense for someone who knows he will soon be tortured - but isn't being tortured yet - to fear the impending event. — csalisbury
Do you still worry for the child you're looking at now or only for the future child who will be tortured. — csalisbury
It's not a matter of respecting or not respecting 'my tradition'. The text I quoted addresses the question: one who was completely free of any self-concern, would not dread impending pain.
I would say you worry about the child you're looking at now and for the future child that will be tortured because you understand them to be one and the same. You worry for the child you see now because she or he will be tortured.
Imagine it's someone you love who wasn't, for whatever reason, 'completely free of any self-concern' — csalisbury
The Buddha teaches that there is 'no self that migrates from life to life'. But nevertheless beings are reborn according to their karma! — Wayfarer
But then I'm back at, of course you'd be concerned, and that is a dumb question. Beings obviously are frightened of death and pain. What's your point? — Wayfarer
Oh, right, well there's a great opportunity for you there, D, you can start a movement explaining to Buddhists what the Buddha got wrong. — Wayfarer
If we imagine ourselves as just say, a collection of biological and physical processes (I don't actually believe this). — Dukkha
Ok, but at this point you've already settled on an answer - an unanalyzable spiritual connection. And that's fine, but there's nowhere left to go from here. I don't necessarily think you're wrong, but we can't reach any further ideas through debate.We know intuitively they are the same person, we just can't explain to ourselves how it is possible that they are. I guess my answer would be that is a spiritual truth that they are the same, and as such it is not something that can be analyzed and given comprehensive (or for some inquirers, even satisfactory) account of in objective terms
Also, another question is, what do you mean when you say the future child is not identical with the present child? Do you mean her body will be different; will have grown, for example? If so, it must nonetheless be her body, and not someone else's that has grown, no? I think it is true that we cannot claim the two temporal instantiations (present and future) of the child are identical ( in the sense of absolutely identical); but rather that it is a case of their being two (obviously different) temporal instantiations of the same identity. — John
But then I'm back at, of course you'd be concerned, and that is a dumb question. Beings obviously are frightened of death and pain. What's your point?
That's just it though! I'm trying to make the aporia obvious and explicit, no matter what your spiritual background. (I agree that there's no way to avoid aporia.) My swoony dream suitor for this thread is an intelligent, but aporia-averse respondent who will tussle all the way. (that's a challenge! if there's anyone listening.)I'd love to be able to say something more, but every attempt I have made over many years to analyze personal identity has fallen into aporia. :’(
If you are reborn in a different body and with no memory of your past ( that is, no memory of what is for you now, present) identity, would you say that it would be a case of a self or identity that has "migrated"? — John
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