Wouldn't the rationalists be playing into Satan's hands if they try to get us to believe that belief is bad and that their process for reaching this conclusion is rational? Wouldn't it be better to take a more cliche Zen approach and hit people when they seem to be believing something?

Does not being in a state of confusion first require a false "belief"? — A Gnostic Agnostic

No.

Confusion occurs when someone isn't sure what's the case and especially when there seem to be dissonances in the information at hand.



Aside from that, what you're looking for has nothing to do with logic, really. Logic is about "what follows from what" given certain assumptions, definitions, rules, etc.

In the context of Religion, you could say belief would be 'less of a virtue' when making a priori statements about a Deity.

For example, the Ontological argument for the existence of God is based upon a priori deductive reasoning. In essence, it becomes a play on words.

Inductive reasoning on the other hand, in that context, is considered more persuasive because of its empirical nature (otherwise known as a posteriori), which is knowledge based upon observations and experiences, then resulting probabilities.

I hope that helps...

Wouldn't the rationalists be playing into Satan's hands if they try to get us to believe that belief is bad and that their process for reaching this conclusion is rational? Wouldn't it be better to take a more cliche Zen approach and hit people when they seem to be believing something?

I don't understand anything you are saying there, unless it's just rhetoric. "Belief is not a virtue" does not necessarily render belief "bad". It should just mean that: it is not a virtue. Anyways, if "belief" is not a virtue is the point, where is the "get us to believe" point coming in?

Confusion occurs when someone isn't sure what's the case and especially when there seem to be dissonances in the information at hand.

Could one not confuse good for evil and evil for good based on a "belief" that one is the other, and the other is the one?

Aside from that, what you're looking for has nothing to do with logic, really. Logic is about "what follows from what" given certain assumptions, definitions, rules, etc.

Well this was the general idea of:

If: satan requires "belief" to confuse people into "believing" satan (evil) is god (good)
then: "belief" is not a virtue over knowing what not to "believe".

To tie this into:

In the context of Religion, you could say belief would be 'less of a virtue' when making a priori statements about a Deity.

In this case, god would be associated with the ability to "know" everything *not* to "believe". One can argue here "belief" is a necessity, which can be granted barring it is neither a virtue, nor something bad or evil, just neutral. But that it is not a virtue is the point, because only satan would try to make "belief" a virtue by virtue of requiring it to have people "believe" satan is god.

So treating "belief" as an object (x) and stating satan "requires" (x), therefor (x) is not a virtue. The alternative is knowing (conscience: who/what/where/why/when and how) not to "believe" which renders "belief" absolutely impotent. It should follow from here that any "potent" god would need not rely on "belief" at all, therefor "belief" in a god is unsound.

I'm having difficulties following you. The only thing I can gather from your statement is the concept of logical necessity relating to Cosmology and causation; I guess you could say it is 'neutral' in some sense.

But this business about satan/virtue, etc. etc. I'm losing you.

???

Could one not confuse good for evil and evil for good based on a "belief" that one is the other, and the other is the one? — A Gnostic Agnostic

There's a difference between the phenomenon of confusion--of someone saying, "I'm confused," and saying that someone else is confused. The latter doesn't amount to the person in question feeling confused.

When we say that someone else is confused, what we usually have in mind is (a) the idea that they should be conforming to some extent to conventional concepts, and (b) per those conventional concepts, they're getting things wrong in some way, mixing them up, not making distinctions, etc. And sure, we could have in mind that they're misidentifying something.

But "one being in a state of confusion" is someone saying "I'm confused." Not someone else thinking that the person has something wrong.

I don't understand anything you are saying there, unless it's just rhetoric. "Belief is not a virtue" does not necessarily render belief "bad". It should just mean that: it is not a virtue. Anyways, if "belief" is not a virtue is the point, where is the "get us to believe" point coming in? — A Gnostic Agnostic

I was working from this...

If satan requires "belief" in order to confuse people into "believing" that:
i. "belief" is a virtue, and
ii. evil is actually good; good is actually evil (equivalent: satan is actually god)
then it necessarily follows that "belief" is not a virtue.

which leads, it seems, later in the post to the conclusion that it is better not to believe. It seemed, not to believe in general.

Now, yes, 'belief is not a virtue' does not entail that belief is bad. But working within the context of what I just quoted above and then you're referring to as

the problem of "belief". — A Gnostic Agnostic

h

that ratinonalists might address, it seemed like belief might better avoided in general.

I did find the post a bit hard to understand, but it seemed the problem with belief might be exacerbated if people rationally or otherwise tried to get people to belief things, as here you were asking the rationalists to come and do.

If there is any logic that can be constructed from this or what needs to be clarified first, I am very curious to see how rationalists would try to address the problem of "belief". — A Gnostic Agnostic

In any case this seemed like a call to come and argue something in relation to belief. If they are rationalists, it seemed to me they might mount an argument, this being something leading to people being persuaded, which would, it seems, in this case, persuaded to have a belief about belief.

I'm having difficulties following you. The only thing I can gather from your statement is the concept of logical necessity relating to Cosmology and causation; I guess you could say it is 'neutral' in some sense.

But this business about satan/virtue, etc. etc. I'm losing you.

Should it not follow that if satan *requires* "belief" to confuse "believers" into "believing" that "belief" is a virtue, thereby allowing one to become confused and "bound to believe" that satan is god? Is one not better off avoiding "belief" in the first place? Is "knowing" (rather than "believing") the who/what/where/why/when and how *not* to "believe" necessarily superior to "belief"?

Would an omnipotent god know this? Why would an omnipotent god require and/or rely on "belief" at all if this is what satan requires in order that "believers" "believe" satan is god?

There's a difference between the phenomenon of confusion--of someone saying, "I'm confused," and saying that someone else is confused. The latter doesn't amount to the person in question feeling confused.

That is a good point - but I feel this is a part of the intended deception. For example, if a religious institution relies on 'idol worship' to bind adherents to a "belief"-based 'state', it must first "confuse" people into "believing" that 'idol worship' is something they are themselves *not* doing, when in reality they are worshiping an idol. I understand this begs a definition/understanding of 'idol worship', but this can come later. What is important for now is that the "believer" does not actually know/understand they are themselves confused.

This is exactly the predicament 'idol worshipers' are in: they do not understand they are worshiping an idol because they are confused regarding idol worship itself. This also applies to "belief": a "believer" might "believe" that their "belief" is a solution to a problem, rather than the problem itself.

I am looking for a logic that designates "belief" as an inferior state as compared to, say, "knowing":

"I know..." (who/what/where/why/when and how) *not* to "believe"
is superior to
"I believe..."
which may not be true.

When we say that someone else is confused, what we usually have in mind is (a) the idea that they should be conforming to some extent to conventional concepts, and (b) per those conventional concepts, they're getting things wrong in some way, mixing them up, not making distinctions, etc. And sure, we could have in mind that they're misidentifying something.

But "one being in a state of confusion" is someone saying "I'm confused." Not someone else thinking that the person has something wrong.

It seems a frame of reference problem: one who is confused need not necessarily know/understand or feel they are confused. I think a part of confusion is in the being unaware one is themselves confused. However, one who is not confused can see others who are themselves in a state of confusion, but not knowing of this.

I did find the post a bit hard to understand, but it seemed the problem with belief might be exacerbated if people rationally or otherwise tried to get people to belief things, as here you were asking the rationalists to come and do.

I do not want anyone to "believe" anything - I just invited people to use their knowledge and understanding relating to logic as I assume it is superior to mine, and try to frame the problem I am after in terms of logic. Part of the reason for this is to avoid emotions as the religious "believers" seem to place their emotions before just trying to work out what is true and/or untrue. I do not ask anyone "believe" anything: whether it be from me or anyone else. I am looking for logic that undermines belief entirely.

In any case this seemed like a call to come and argue something in relation to belief. If they are rationalists, it seemed to me they might mount an argument, this being something leading to people being persuaded, which would, it seems, in this case, persuaded to have a belief about belief.

I think we are going too far: I am only interested in a logic that undermines "belief" as a viable state which pays no special attention to emotions as there are just too many barriers.

No. There is no 'logic' which undermines belief in 'God' unless that belief gives 'God' essential properties which can be empirically tested or observed and that test 'fails'. That is because 'logic' must assume 'truth' of chosen axioms and cannot evaluate that truth. (Godel's incompleteness theorem, although mathematical in intent, has been extrapolated to most general systems, such that the 'truth' of at least one axiom cannot be deduced from the system itself)

Hi there. My two cents:

1. God is omnibenevolent
2. Satan is evil
3. If God is omnibenevolent then belief is unnecessary for goodness
4. If Satan is evil then belief is necessary to cause suffering
5. If belief is unnecessary for goodness and necessary to cause suffering then belief is not a virtue
Therefore
6. Belief is not a virtue

God is omnibenevolent = D
Satan is evil = E
G = belief is necessary for goodness
S = belief is necessary to cause suffering
V = belief is a virtue

1. D........premise
2. E.........premise
3. D > ~G....premise
4. E > S.....premise
5. (~G & S) > ~V.....premise
7. ~G.......1,3 MP
8. S.........2,4 MP
9. ~G & S...7,8 Conj
10. ~V......5,9 MP

If there is any logic that can be constructed — A Gnostic Agnostic

Never mind belief and the virtue of it or not, but rather let us get to a logic that undermines a belief in 'God'. Not a proof, mind you, but an undermining via probability, reason, and logic:

Probability for no ‘God’

0. Note: It is not a factor herein that the Biblical and thus necessarily fundamentalist ‘God’ has been demolished by evolutionary science and self-contradiction, for it still remains to size up what’s left.

1. All that we see goes from the simplest to the composite to the complex to the more complex, where we exist, which will continue into the future, where we can expect being higher than ourselves to become. The unlikely polar opposite of this is an ultra complex system of mind of a Designer 'God' being First as Fundamental, but systems have parts, this totally going against the fundamental arts.

2. (1) gets worse, given that there can be no input for any specific direction going into the Fundamental Eterne—the basis of all, this bedrock having to be causeless, having random effects, like those shown in quantum mechanics.

3. So, (2) indicates that there is no ultimate meaning, not that a built-in meaning would be great, for it would be restrictive, but at least, as ‘liberating’, there’s anything and everything possible that could become from the basic eternal state of not anything in particular—our present Earthly life path being one that is being lived now after 13.57 billion years, much of which can be accounted for.

4. On top of the preceding unlikelihoods, and given that obviously that no Designer made everything instantly, it is unlikely that all eventualities could have been foreseen by a Deity in starting a universe suitable for life. It more seems like we were fine-tuned to the Earth.

5. It’s more OK if the ‘God’ Deity is like a scientist who throws a bunch of stuff together that is balanced and energetically reactive enough but not too much so that it races along too fast, etc., but, again, really, what is a fully formed person-like being doing sitting around beforehand, this also being all the more of a quandary that enlarges the question rather than answering it. If life has to come from a Larger Life, then a regress ensues, making this not to be a good template. As for a Deity trying to put workable stuff together, this is much like the idea of a multiverse.

6. Even worse, existence has no alternative, given that nonexistence has no being as a source and that there is indeed something, and so existence is mandatory, there not being any choice to it. It's a given.

7. We see that the One of Totality continually transitions/transmutes, never being able to remain as anything particular, which matches its nature supposed due to no information being able to come into the Eternal in the first place that never was, for the One Fundamental Eterne has to be ungenerated and deathless.

8. Aside from the trivial definition of free will being that without coercion, that the will is free to operate, and the useless definition of the harmful random will equaling ‘freedom’, the deeper notion of ‘free’ as being original and free of the brain will is of a currency never being able to be stated and cashed in on, leaving ‘determined’ to continue to be the opposite of ‘undetermined’.

While eternalism can’t yet be told apart from presentism, the message from both is of a transient ‘now’, whether pre-determined or determined as it goes along. All hope is crushed, both for us and the Great Wheel having any potency. This is the great humility; all hubris is gone.

It is enough, then, that we have the benefit of experiencing and living life well, sometimes, more so given this modern age, although still with sweat, tears, and aversive substrates of emotions that those of the future might consider to be barbaric.

It doesn’t seem like a smart God’s world, and so fundamentalist literalist Biblical ‘reasons’ cannot apply here, for those went away already. The pride of being special and deserving of reward and avoiding punishment is a nice wish, though, for us electro-chemical-bio organisms who appear be be as organic as anything else that grows in nature.

9. God’s operations, curiously restricted to be the same as nature’s has us not being able to tell them apart from nature's, but which is more likely, the natural or the supernatural? Earth is where it ought to be, in the Goldilocks zone, not impossibly out near Neptune. And why must there be a distinct transcendent, immaterial, intangible, super realm when it would still have to give and take energy in the physical material language, talking its talk and walking its walk?

10. So, sit on a fence and go to church half the time or estimate the probability either way; there can be no blame for not knowing what can’t be shown for sure.

Let us have wine, lovers, song, and laughter—
Water, chastity, prayer the day after.
Such we’ll alternate the rest of our days—
Thus, on the average, we’ll make Hereafter!

No. There is no 'logic' which undermines belief in 'God' unless that belief gives 'God' essential properties which can be empirically tested or observed and that test 'fails'. That is because 'logic' must assume 'truth' of chosen axioms and cannot evaluate that truth. (Godel's incompleteness theorem, although mathematical in intent, has been extrapolated to most general systems, such that the 'truth' of at least one axiom cannot be deduced from the system itself)

When it comes to "essential properties" I find that "belief" is an essential property for one to "believe" that 'Satan' is 'God' (equivalent: evil is good). If there is a property (ie. "belief") that evil requires in order to sustain itself, but truth does not, I find it to be "belief". Else: knowing who/what/where/why/when and how not to "believe" which I intuit there must be a logic that exists which spells this out.

A better/simpler argument is:

1. Belief is unnecessary for goodness
2. Belief is necessary for evil
3. If belief is unnecessary for goodness and necessary for evil then belief isn't a virtue
So,
4. Belief isn't a virtue

Logical argument:
G = belief is necessary for goodness
E = belief is necessary for evil
B = belief is a virtue

1. ~G premise
2. E premise
3. (~G & E) > ~B premise
4. ~G & E from 1, 2 conj
5. ~B from 3, 4 MP

1. Belief is unnecessary for goodness
2. Belief is necessary for evil
3. If belief is unnecessary for goodness and necessary for evil then belief isn't a virtue
So,
4. Belief isn't a virtue

Logical argument:
G = belief is necessary for goodness
E = belief is necessary for evil
B = belief is a virtue

1. ~G premise
2. E premise
3. (~G & E) > ~B premise
4. ~G & E from 1, 2 conj
5. ~B from 3, 4 MP

I ask others: does it hold?

"Would an omnipotent god know this? Why would an omnipotent god require and/or rely on "belief" at all if this is what Satan requires in order that "believers" "believe" Satan is god?"


GA, I'm a Christian Existentialist (some people refer to it as being 'Spiritual' if you like). Ethically/morally, when someone uses the term 'evil', that's a euphemism for 'lack of perfection' to me. I don't 'believe' in a sentient Being called Satan.

I think of our temporal nature and finitude, as all part of the tree of life extended metaphor. Meaning, it removes the ethical/moral notion of an external belief system (Satan) and associated paradigm's. I don't try to make sense of that. So in your context of struggling with that 'belief system', when say a far-right Fundy talks about Satan and his attributes and/or his nature it begs the questions of : who/what/where/why/how does he know this... .

Our temporal nature and lack of perfection obscures our judgement ( in all domains personally/professionally/vocation-wise etc. etc.). And morally/ethically, we take on our own responsibility for our own actions and recognize that intrinsic value; we don't say 'the devil made me do it'.

You've heard the term 'existential angst' right?

Sorry, you've lost me. 'Belief' is not 'a property'. Its a noun implying a state of mind characterized by confidence in an idea without sufficient observational evidence. Should that observational evidence be specified, and should that observation fail, then belief is logically undermined. The 'God/Satan' scenario already assumes these to be meaningful concepts, prior to belief statements about them. Their proposed relationship with each other might be part of that 'meaning', but 'belief' in such a relationship beyond 'a story' is a separate issue.

I am looking for logic that undermines belief entirely. — A Gnostic Agnostic

If you are using belief as it is generally used in philosophy - that is anything one believes to be true, regardless of the justification (iow scientific conclusions and folk beliefs and religious beliefs are all under the category of beliefs, just there are differing degrees of rigor) - then that is where my confusion is coming in. If someone used logic to undermine belief, that process would include both relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions - that is, more beliefs.

If you mean belief in the pejorative sense - which is generally not the meaning in philosophy - that's a different story.

GA, I'm a Christian Existentialist (some people refer to it as being 'Spiritual' if you like). Ethically/morally, when someone uses the term 'evil', that's a euphemism for 'lack of perfection' to me. I don't 'believe' in a sentient Being called Satan.

I think of our temporal nature and finitude, as all part of the tree of life extended metaphor. Meaning, it removes the ethical/moral notion of an external belief system (Satan) and associated paradigm's. I don't try to make sense of that. So in your context of struggling with that 'belief system', when say a far-right Fundy talks about Satan and his attributes and/or his nature it begs the questions of : who/what/where/why/how does he know this...

There are a lot of terms here I am either unfamiliar with or don't share an understanding with, so I will just clarify what my understanding of Satan is so there is less confusion.

I understand Satan as comprised of three parts:

shin - expression
tet - bind
nun (final) - ongoing state

I understand the Hebrew language is comprised of 22 letters which are derived from a single 'form' that, when rotated and viewed from 22 different angles produce the letters. Each of these letters imparts a basic meaning related to the hand position. As such I find 'Satan' to be any expression of being bound (to "believe", for example) in an ongoing (ie. unresolved) state. So this is not a sentient being, this is a state of being that is an expression of a bind(s) in an ongoing state.

As such a "belief" system which advances a "belief" that does not reflect the reality is necessarily satanic, because adherents become bound to believe something that is not true. This is how I see "believers": bound to believe.

Our temporal nature and lack of perfection obscures our judgement ( in all domains personally/professionally/vocation-wise etc. etc.). And morally/ethically, we take on our own responsibility for our own actions and recognize that intrinsic value; we don't say 'the devil made me do it'.

You've heard the term 'existential angst' right?

I am not following the "lack of perfection" expression you are using. I observe a lack of conscience obscures judgement more so than anything else, as a lack of conscience is essentially what is required for a "belief" to have power. The alternative is knowing what not to "believe" which requires using the conscience to question/challenge "beliefs". Unfortunately this is what people are attached to: beliefs and how I find "belief" and 'idol worship' to be related, if not the same.

Sorry, you've lost me. 'Belief' is not 'a property'. Its a noun implying a state of mind characterized by confidence in an idea without sufficient observational evidence.

Can "belief" not be a 'state of being' rather than a 'state of mind'? Suppose the way one thinks is the way one feels, and the way one feels is the way one behaves, thus a "belief" that affects the way one thinks/feels/acts has bearing on ones 'state of being'? As in one who is in a 'state of belief' as opposed to a 'state of disbelief'?

I am having trouble with "belief" implying a state of mind rather than a state of being.

Should that observational evidence be specified, and should that observation fail, then belief is logically undermined. The 'God/Satan' scenario already assumes these to be meaningful concepts, prior to belief statements about them. Their proposed relationship with each other might be part of that 'meaning', but 'belief' in such a relationship beyond 'a story' is a separate issue.

Is it possible to construct a scenario such that observational evidence is specified, fails and belief is logically undermined?

If you are using belief as it is generally used in philosophy - that is anything one believes to be true, regardless of the justification (iow scientific conclusions and folk beliefs and religious beliefs are all under the category of beliefs, just there are differing degrees of rigor) - then that is where my confusion is coming in. If someone used logic to undermine belief, that process would include both relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions - that is, more beliefs.

If you mean belief in the pejorative sense - which is generally not the meaning in philosophy - that's a different story.

I am interested in:

If someone used logic to undermine belief, that process would include both relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions - that is, more beliefs.

In what way would the process include relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions?

No. 'Being' implies continuity, whereas 'belief' implies segmentation. We might conceive of 'belief' as a statement about the current 'state of being' but those statements are ephemeral and promoted by shifting context.

Your last sentence is exactly what I have said regarding beliefs with observational correlates.

One begets the possibility of "believing" something that is not true (which causes suffering/death) — A Gnostic Agnostic

Necessarily? How so? After all, presumably your mother loves you....

And there is the whole topic of "belief," accepting something for the sake of argument, that is fundamental in rhetoric. Think it through some more - never mind your "technical abilities" - and see if you arrive at any new and different conclusions.

In what way would the process include relaying beliefs and drawing conclusions? — A Gnostic Agnostic

Well, if you are undermining someone's belief using a process that includes logic (or does not for that matter) you are trying to reach a conclusion and demonstrate that other people should draw the same conclusion. That conclusion is a belief. If I want to undermine your belief in God, say, or that water is two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen, I will present some premises and do some deduction to demonstrate something else is true, or I will try to demonstrate that one of your premises is incorrect. If I succeed you will now believe something else, including perhaps that your premise X is not true. You will also believe my argument makes sense. You would like also believe now or already that this or that type of deduction is correct.

No. 'Being' implies continuity, whereas 'belief' implies segmentation.

I agree 'being' implies and necessarily indicates continuity.
I do not see 'belief' implying or necessarily indicating "segmentation".

Can one not be "bound to believe" in an ongoing/continuous state? What if one "believes" something that is not true, and they persist in this in an ongoing state?

Necessarily? How so? After all, presumably your mother loves you....

I don't understand what part you take exception to.

If one "believes" something that is not true, this is due to ignorance which begets suffering. As such there is a correlation between ignorance and suffering ie. ignorance is suffered.

I find the problem of 'evil' is the blaming/scapegoating of ones own internal state of suffering as being caused by an outside agent, when in reality it is the one who is ignorant who suffers themselves. I find this to be ignorance: blaming someone else for ones own fault (in ignorance), which is what I find the original sin of Adam to be in the Abrahamic mythology which...

And there is the whole topic of "belief," accepting something for the sake of argument, that is fundamental in rhetoric. Think it through some more - never mind your "technical abilities" - and see if you arrive at any new and different conclusions.

...all relates to the problem of "belief" and the superiority of "knowing" who/what/where/why/when and how *not* to "believe" which, rather than ignorance, is the opposite of it: knowledge. Thus one who is closer to the truth suffers less and less, until there is no more suffering as one is not bound by anyone or anything. There is a math equation in here somewhere probably: as ignorance is lifted, binds are lifted as they approach boundlessness. The opposite of boundlessness is bound, which is what one who is "bound to believe" is... bound.

I find therefor that knowledge of good and evil is the same thing as knowing who/what/where/why/when, how and if *not* to "believe" which is what protects one from becoming bound (to "believe").

Well, if you are undermining someone's belief...

...no, not someone's belief. Belief itself as an agency and/or 'state of being'.

See, the "belief" itself matters not - not a particular "belief", but the agency of "belief" entirely.

That "I know..." is superior to "I believe..." if granting "I know..." is actually known and is not mistaken via "I believe I know...".

using a process that includes logic (or does not for that matter) you are trying to reach a conclusion and demonstrate that other people should draw the same conclusion. That conclusion is a belief. If I want to undermine your belief in God, say, or that water is two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen, I will present some premises to demonstrate something else is true, or I will try to demonstrate that one of your premises is incorrect. If I succeed you will now believe something else, including perhaps that your premise X is not true. You will also believe my argument makes sense. You would like also believe now or already that this or that type of deduction is correct.

If taking 'consciously' as knowing the who/what/where/why/when, how and if ...

is there a logic that could defend the following as true:

Belief is necessarily not a virtue over consciously knowing what not to believe.

and/or is this statement already obvious enough to grant as self-evident?

Sorry, you've lost me. 'Belief' is not 'a property'. Its a noun implying a state of mind characterized by confidence in an idea without sufficient observational evidence. — fresco

Generally, in philosophy, it is idea that may have any degree of justification. On the street 'belief' tends to be contrasted with knowledge. In philosophy knowledge is a rigorously arrived at subset of beliefs. You'll find discussions justified true belief, for example.

...no, not someone's belief. Belief itself as an agency and/or 'state of being'.

See, the "belief" itself matters not - not a particular "belief", but the agency of "belief" entirely.

That "I know..." is superior to "I believe..." if granting "I know..." is actually known and is not mistaken via "I believe I know...". — A Gnostic Agnostic

and given that we are fallible creatures what we think we know may turn out not to be the case. Which is why in philosophy, generally, knowledge is seen as a subset of beliefs, a type of belief with rigorous criteria, and then philosophers discuss what these criteria should be.

Belief is necessarily not a virtue over consciously knowing what not to believe.

and/or is this statement already obvious enough to grant as self-evident? — A Gnostic Agnostic

That's a belief. If you come to think that is true, it will be a belief you have. And I am guessing you believe it, to some degree, already.

If one "believes" something that is not true, — A Gnostic Agnostic

What has belief to do with truth? Until you're clear on that you're not going to get anywhere. And you write in categorical terms when your observations are better expressed provisionally and existentially. Some instead of all. Here's an example:

If one "believes" something that is not true, this is due to ignorance which begets suffering. As such there is a correlation between ignorance and suffering ie. ignorance is suffered. — A Gnostic Agnostic

Belief is sometimes a matter of choice as, for example, a basis for understanding or facilitating something. And sometimes it's the presupposition of an argument. And your "which," what does that mean? And how do you know that something is not true? I grant what I think is your argument in some and for some cases, but you've expressed it in universal terms - which makes it false at best, or meaningless.

It seems a frame of reference problem: one who is confused need not necessarily know/understand or feel they are confused. I think a part of confusion is in the being unaware one is themselves confused. — A Gnostic Agnostic

I don't think it's coherent to say that someone can be in a state of confusion without knowing that they are.

Generally, in philosophy, it is idea that may have any degree of justification. On the street 'belief' tends to be contrasted with knowledge. In philosophy knowledge is a rigorously arrived at subset of beliefs. You'll find discussions justified true belief, for example.

But we must keep in mind we are dealing with the virtuosity of "belief".

If even granting knowledge is arrived at as a subset of "beliefs", this still does not make "belief" a virtue.

Can it not also be said "knowledge is arrived at as a subset of falsifying "beliefs" which renders one knowing of what not to "believe"?

For example can not knowing not to "believe" something and the reasons why not be a kind of knowledge?

That's a belief. If you come to think that is true, it will be a belief you have. And I am guessing you believe it, to some degree, already.

I think at best it can be said it depends on from whose perspective one is looking. From your perspective I understand "that's a belief" but from my perspective it is not a "belief", it is a knowledge. I do not find coherence in the general notion that "knowledge" requires "belief" outside of knowing (of) a particular belief(s) to be false and the reasons why.

As a practical example: I know not to "believe" that either the Torah (implied: Bible as it begins with the Torah) or Qur'an are the perfect unaltered words of (a) god, contrary to the claims held by the respective 'states'.

The who/what/where/why/when and how I know this if this is obviously important, but not here. What is important here is this is in response to a "belief"-based claim asserted as true, but is actually in reality false:

we are in possession of the perfect unaltered word of god

which serves as the basis for "belief" in the institutions themselves. It is for this reason that I am interested in undermining "belief" itself (as a cohesive agency) because it is the agency required to confuse "believers" into "believing" something that really is, is really not and something that is really not, really is. If not for "belief" such a confusion can be avoided, and in its place a knowledge of who/what/where/why/when/how *not* to believe.

What has belief to do with truth? Until you're clear on that you're not going to get anywhere. And you write in categorical terms when your observations are better expressed provisionally and existentially. Some instead of all.

It's a good question: the relationship between "belief" and truth. I will borrow from Christian paradigm to keep the Christians entertained.

Take an equilateral triangle pointing upward and place "I am..." on the top, "I know..." and "I believe" as the two bottom as derivative of the more basic state "I am...".

When one is in a state of "belief" in say (x), they can either choose to retain the belief without subjecting it to conscience scrutiny (ie. attempting to prove it false or inferior to an alternative) or subject it to scrutiny based on 'knowns'. If what is 'known' is not sufficient to graduate the "belief" to either:

i. I know... (x) is true
ii. I know... NOT to "believe" (x)

one must go and 'know' whatever is necessary to graduate the "belief". If one chooses not to do this, well this is essentially denying the use of the conscience and I understand this the same as Jesus stating "those who deny me deny the father". If a person does not use their conscience to graduate "beliefs", they are not conscience and likely "believing" something instead, which requires no conscience.

Belief is sometimes a matter of choice as, for example, a basis for understanding or facilitating something. And sometimes it's the presupposition of an argument. And your "which," what does that mean? And how do you know that something is not true? I grant what I think is your argument in some and for some cases, but you've expressed it in universal terms - which makes it false at best, or meaningless.

I express it in universal terms because I think it is wrong to treat "belief" as a potential particular or object. "Belief" is treated as a universal agency in the statement "belief is not a virtue"... one can also say "belief is not a viable agency...". It is one thing to say "belief" is necessary, which I am willing to grant. But that something is "necessary" does not make it a virtue. In the case of the above, the conscience is what I find "beliefs" are to be subjected to in order to graduate them to a knowledge: of what is true/untrue, or who/what/where/why/when/how not to "believe". This is how I find truth and belief are related: one starts from a place of "belief" and graduates it to a place of knowing.

I don't think it's coherent to say that someone can be in a state of confusion without knowing that they are.

Really? Hmm... interesting. I understand deception as something that rather relies on the person not knowing they are confused. In fact I find that exploitation of people through "belief" systems rather relies on their confusion and unaware of being confused, in the same manner idolatrous religions employ use of idols while the adherents are confused about what is idol worship while worshiping idols.

confused adjective
con·​fused | \ kən-ˈfyüzd

Definition of confused

1a : being perplexed or disconcerted
b : disoriented with regard to one's sense of time, place, or identity

I ask others: does it hold? — A Gnostic Agnostic

The argument is valid but the some/all premises won't go down well for some folks.

I tried to be as faithful to your argument as I could.

I'm especially concerned about:

"Belief is unnecessary for goodness." because you would have to believe in some moral code to be good. We could say, going by the Bible, that the fruit that caused the fall of Adam & Eve was, in a narrow sense knowledge of good & evil and, in a broad sense all knowledge. Presumably these require belief. There's a thread on why the exile of Adam and Eve was unjust.

Another thing I want to mention is that even if goodness requires belief it is essential for evil. This, if not negating the virtue of belief, at least dilutes it to the point of being unpalatable.

Also, to deny your position, I'd like to say that if all of reality can be taken to be series of cause-effects then aren't you overshooting? I mean your attack on belief is like trying to kill Hitler's grandfather when in fact Hitler was a free agent, fully capable of making his own decisions and believing what he wants to believe. Looks like freewill is an integral part of your argument as the way you argued your point indicates the absence of freewill; we're at the mercy of our beliefs.

Richard Dawkins' memes seems relevant too. Do people possess beliefs or are we slaves to memes?